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Книга предназначена для студентов филологических факультетов университетов и факультетов иностранных языков педагогических вузов в качестве руководства для практических занятий по курсу теоретической грамматики английского языка. Она содержит тезисное представление основных положений грамматической теории, разбитое по семинарским темам, задания для самостоятельной работы по основным разделам морфологии, синтаксиса и грамматики текста, выдержки из работ лингвистов по кардинальным проблемам грамматики английского языка, тесты и глоссарии.

Выходит в комплекте с учебниками М.Я. Блоха «Теоретическая грамматика английского языка» (на английском языке) и «Теоретические основы грамматики».

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Оригинал-макет данного издания является собственностью издательства «Высшая школа», и его репродуцирование (воспроизведение) любым способом без согласия издательства запрещено.

От авторов

Предлагаемая книга предназначена для студентов филологических факультетов университетов и факультетов иностранных языков педвузов в качестве руководства для практических занятий по курсу теоретической грамматики английского языка. Она ориентирована на системное описание грамматического строя языка, представленное в трудах М.Я. Блоха (*Блох М.Я.* Теоретическая грамматика английского языка. На англ. яз. - 3-е изд. - М.: Высшая школа, 2000; *Блох М.Я.* Теоретические основы грамматики. - 3-е изд. - М.: Высшая школа, 2002), и составляет с ними единый учебный комплекс.

Курс теоретической грамматики английского языка входит в число базовых курсов обучения студентов, для которых английский язык является профилирующей дисциплиной специализации.

Отвечая требованиям программы, курс ставит своей целью, вместе с комплексным описанием грамматического строя английского языка, дать обобщающее введение в проблематику современных грамматических исследований и, соответственно, в методику научно-грамматического анализа языкового материала.

Особенностью курса является интегративное представление морфологии и синтаксиса как единой системы речеобразования. В этой связи в курс вводится развернутое представление теории уровней языка, оппозиционной теории грамматических категорий с раскрытием контекстного поведения грамматических форм, проблематика парадигматического синтаксиса с его выходом в построение целого текста. Особое внимание уделяется рассмотрению грамматической семантики во всех разделах описания, что соответствует современному когнитивному подходу к языку в целом.

Курс предполагает усиленную самостоятельную работу студентов.

Непосредственными учебными задачами курса являются следующие:

1. Теоретически осветить основы грамматического строя английского языка в соответствии с современным состоянием науки о языке в его двух взаимосвязанных и взаимодополнительных функциях - когнитивной и коммуникативной.

2. Ввести студентов в наиболее важные проблемы современных научных исследований грамматического строя английского языка.

3. Развить у студентов умение применять теоретические знания по грамматике языка к практическому преподаванию английского языка на разных ступенях обучения.

4. Развить у студентов научное мышление, соответствующее методологии предмета теоретической грамматики, научить их библиографическому поиску в изучаемой области, привить им умение самостоятельно перерабатывать фундаментальную и текущую научную информацию по предмету, самостоятельно делать обобщения и выводы из данных, приводимых в специальной литературе, а также из собственных наблюдений над фактическим языковым материалом в его разных речевых формах, осмысленно сопоставлять грамматические явления английского и родного языков.

Перечисленные задачи курса показывают его многоаспектность. Для эффективного выполнения полного комплекса указанных задач необходимо в процессе прохождения курса, с одной стороны, создать у студентов представление об объекте изучения как о системе взаимосвязанных элементов и их свойств (фактологическая часть курса), а с другой стороны, ввести учащихся в исследовательскую сферу предмета, которая осложняется различными, подчас взаимопротивоположными трактовками изучаемых явлений в рамках различных школ и направлений (проблемно-дискуссионная часть курса). Обе части теоретического курса грамматики тесно связаны, поскольку и лингвистика в целом с ее многочисленными отраслями, и теоретическая грамматика как одна из отраслей лингвистики развиваются в ходе полемики вокруг своих чрезвычайно сложных объектов и их взаимозависимостей.

Предлагаемое руководство строится таким образом, чтобы обеспечить учащемуся органическое освоение обеих отмеченных частей курса. Фактологическая часть курса непосредственно представлена в планах семинарских занятий. Проблемно-дискуссионная часть курса представлена, с одной стороны, выдержками из оригинальных работ ученых разных направлений, а с дру-

гой стороны, блоками упражнений, направленных на овладение студентами специальными методиками грамматической исследовательской техники (морфемно-дистрибутивный анализ, оппозиционно-категориальный анализ, заместительное тестирование в диагностических моделях, трансформационный анализ, семантико-контекстологический анализ и др.).

Важно учитывать, что введение студентов в проблемно-дискуссионную часть курса должно быть нацелено на демонстрацию общего восхождения науки в познании предмета - восхождения, которое осуществляется именно в результате раскрытия проблем, возникающих в результате различного истолкования реальных, диалектически сложных и противоречивых языковых явлений.

Для контроля самостоятельной работы студентов в руководство включены тесты, которые в зависимости от уровня подготовки студентов могут выполняться либо на аудиторных занятиях, либо дома.

К основному тексту руководства приложены два глоссария терминов - соответственно, общелингвистических и прагмалингвистических. Приводимые толкования терминов рассчитаны на то, чтобы дать студентам критерии ориентации при работе над специальной литературой, отражающей многочисленные разночтения и дискуссии живой исследовательской работы.

Выпуская в свет предлагаемое руководство, авторы надеются, что оно поможет студентам полнее и глубже овладеть своей профессией.

Авторы

Seminar 1

SYSTEMIC CONCEPTION OF LANGUAGE

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1. The systemic conception of language. The approaches towards language treatment. The notion of system. The communicative principle in the consideration of language.
2. The definition of a sign. The specific nature of language signs. Types of signs.
3. Paradigmatic and syntagmatic relations of language units. The role of F. de Saussure and LA. Beaudoin de Courtenay in the development of linguistic theory. The notion of synchrony and diachrony.
4. Language levels and language units. The correlation of word, phrase, sentence, dicteme (utterance). The peculiar status of phoneme. Word and sentence as basic units of language.
5. The word as a nominative unit. The notion of referent. The opposition of notional and functional words.

1. System as a Linguistic Notion

Human language is a verbal means of communication; its function consists in forming, storing and exchanging ideas as reflections of reality. Being inseparably connected with the people who create and use it, language is social and psychological by nature. ¹ Language incorporates three constituent parts. They are the phonological system, the lexical system, and the grammatical system. The phonological system determines the material (phonetic) form of its

significant units; the lexical system comprises the whole set of nominative means of language (words and stable word-groups); the grammatical system presents the whole set of regularities determining the combination of nominative units in the formation of utterances.

The aim of theoretical grammar of language is to present a theoretical description of its grammatical system. To achieve this aim it is necessary to scientifically analyze and define its categories and study the mechanisms of grammatical formation of utterances in the process of speech production.

Modern linguistics is essentially based on the systemic conception of language. System in general is defined as a structured set of elements related to one another by a common function. The interpretation of language as a system develops a number of notions, namely: the notions of language levels and language units, paradigmatic and syntagmatic relations, the notions of form and meaning (function), of synchrony and diachrony, of analysis and synthesis, and some others.

2. Language and Speech

The discrimination of language and speech is the fundamental principle of linguistics. This principle has sustained throughout the whole history of the study of language. With a special demonstrative force it was confirmed by L.A. Beaudoin de Courtenay (end of the XIX c.) and F. de Saussure (beginning of the XX c.) who analyzed the language-speech dichotomy in connection with the problem of identifying the subject of linguistics. The two great scholars emphatically pointed out the difference between synchrony and diachrony stressing the fact that at any stage of its historical evolution language is a synchronic system of meaningful elements, i.e. a system of special signs.

Language in the narrow sense of the word is a system of means of expression, while speech is a manifestation of the system of language in the process of communication. The system of language includes the body of material units - sounds, morphemes, words, word-groups, and a set of regularities or "rules" of the use of these units. Speech comprises both the act of producing utterances and the utterances themselves, i.e. the text made up of lingual units of various status.

From the functional point of view all the units of language should be classed into those that are non-meaningful semantically, such as phonemes, and those that express a certain semantic meaning, such as words. The non-meaningful units may be referred to as "cortemes", they provide a physical cover (acoustic, graphical) for meaningful units; the meaningful units, in distinction to cortemes, may be referred to as "signemes". Signeme is a lingual sign. The introduction of a special name for it is called upon to show that there is a profound difference between lingual signs and non-lingual, common signs.

Language and speech are inseparable, they form an organic unity. The stability of this unity is ensured by grammar since it dynamically connects language with speech by categorially determining the process of utterance production.

The signeme (lingual sign) in the system of language has only a potential meaning. In speech the potential meaning of the lingual sign is "actualized", in other words, it is made situationally significant as part of the grammatically organized text.

The functional dynamics of lingual units in speech is efficiently demonstrated by the branch of linguistics called "pragmalinguistics". Among other things, pragmalinguistics investigated the relevant contribution to the total communicative content of utterances made by different unit types. In this connection, stretches of speech have been described the role of which consists not in the expression of certain meanings, but in maintaining the contact between the communicants, or sustaining the "phatic communion". These elements have received the name of "phatic" (see: excerpt from "Papers in Linguistics" by Firth J.R., p. 18 of the present book).

3. Paradigmatic and Syntagmatic Relations

Lingual units stand to one another in two fundamental types of relations: syntagmatic and paradigmatic.

Syntagmatic relations are immediate linear relations between units in a segmental sequence (string).

One of the basic notions in the syntagmatic analysis is the notion of syntactic syntagma. A "syntactic syntagma" is the combination of two words or word-groups one of which is modified by the other.

To syntagmatic relations are opposed paradigmatic relations. They exist between elements of the system outside the strings in which they co-occur. These intrasystemic relations find their expression in the fact that each lingual unit is included in a set or series of connections based on different formal and functional properties.

Paradigmatic and syntagmatic relations are not isolated from one another. Paradigmatic relations co-exist with syntagmatic relations in such a way that some sort of syntagmatic connection is necessary for the realization of any paradigmatic series. This is revealed to the full in a classical grammatical paradigm. It presents a productive series of forms. A paradigmatic form - a constituent of a paradigm - consists of a stem and a specific element (inflexion, suffix, auxiliary word). The function of a grammatical paradigm is to express a categorial meaning.

4. Language Units and Language Levels

Units of language are divided into segmental and suprasegmental. Segmental units consist of phonemes, they form phonemic strings of various status. Suprasegmental units do not exist by themselves, but are realized with segmental units and express different modificational meanings reflected on the strings of segmental units.

The segmental units of language form a hierarchy of levels. Units of each higher level are formed of units of the immediately lower level. But this hierarchical relation is not reduced to the mechanical composition of larger units from smaller ones, as units of each level are characterized by their own, specific, functional properties which provide the basis for the very recognition of the corresponding language levels.

The lowest level of lingual units is phonemic: it is formed by phonemes. The phoneme has no meaning, its function is purely differential.

The second level, located above the phonemic level, is morphemic. The morpheme is the elementary meaningful part of the word built up by phonemes. The morpheme expresses abstract, "significative", meaning.

The third level is lexemic. Its differential unit is the word. The word realizes the function of nomination.

The fourth level is denotemic, its constituent unit is denoteme (notional part of the sentence).

The fifth level is proposemic. It is built up by sentences. As a sign, the sentence simultaneously fulfils two functions - nominative and predicative.

The sixth level is the level of topicalization, its constituent element is the "dicteme" ("utterance"). The function of the dicteme is to build up a topical stretch of some text. Being an elementary topical unit of text, the dicteme fulfils four main signemic functions: the functions of nomination, predication, topicalization, and stylization.

Questions:

1. What are the determining features of a system? How do they apply to language?
2. What is the functional relevance of the language unit?
3. What conceptual correlation is the language-speech dichotomy based on?
4. What is the correlation of syntagmatic and paradigmatic relations?
5. What is the difference between segmental and suprasegmental units?
6. What language levels are identified in the language system?
7. What conditions the non-overlapping of language levels?
8. What functions do the language units, representatives of the six language levels, perform?

I. Say which of the strings are synchronic and which are diachronic:

- 1) gospel, the holy, as, say;
- 2) gospel, godspel, holy, halis
- 3) the, baet, says, 8636;
- 4) swaeswa baet halise godspel 8636.

II. Single out cases of phatic communion and explain the functions of the phatic elements:

1. "Nice day again, isn't it? Hm-hm. By the way, Jones, ... wouldn't you do me a favour? The fact is, I'm sort of hard-up. So... could you? I mean, I need a few shillings... Could you lend me - say - ten bob?"
2. "Good morning, Missis Partridge! How's your leg, better?" "If you want to ask me money again, I am not inclined to give you any more!" "No-no, I just wanted to ask how's your leg, that's all." "Much better, thank you."

Selected Reader

1.

Sweet H. **The Practical Study of Languages. Grammar**

Grammar, like all the other divisions of the study of language, has to deal with the antithesis between form and meaning.

The fact that in language there is generally a divergence between form and meaning - as when the idea of plurality is expressed by a variety of forms, and sometimes by none at all (*trees, men, sheep*), or when the same form is used to express distinct grammatical functions (*he sees the trees*) - makes it not only possible, but in many cases desirable, to treat grammatical form and grammatical meaning apart.

That part of grammar which concerns itself simply with forms, and ignores the meanings of the grammatical forms as far as possible, is called *accidence* or "forms" (German *formenlehre*); that which concentrates its attention on the meanings of grammatical forms is called *syntax*. Thus under *accidence* an English grammar describes, among other details, those of the formation of the plural of nouns - how some add *-s*, some *-es*, while others mark the plural by vowel-change, and so on. In the *syntax*, on the other hand, the grammar ignores such formal distinctions as are not accompanied by corresponding distinctions of meaning, or rather takes them for granted, and considers only the different meanings and grammatical functions of noun-plurals in general. The business of *syntax* is, therefore, to explain the meaning and function of grammatical forms, especially the various ways in which words are joined together to make sentences. As the form of a sentence depends partly on the order of its words, word-order is an important part of *syntax*, especially when it serves to make such distinctions as in the English, *The man saw the fox first*, and *The fox saw the man first*. In fact, word-order is the most abstract part of *syntax*, just as word-order is the most abstract grammatical form.

In accordance with its etymology, *syntax* is by some grammarians regarded entirely from this latter point of view, so that it is by them identified with the analysis of sentences, the meaning of grammatical forms being included under *accidence*. Thus the peculiar meaning of the plural inflection in such words as *sands, leads, waters of the Nile*, would by such grammarians be discussed under *accidence*, on the ground that *accidence* deals with isolated words, *syntax* only with combinations of words into sentences.

Although the application of grammatical terms cannot be allowed to depend on their etymology, yet, as we cannot avoid saying something about the meaning of grammatical forms under *accidence* - if only to discriminate between such inflections as *trees, John's, comes* - it is often convenient to clear off this part of the grammar under *accidence*, especially if the variations of meaning are only slight, or else so great that they cannot be brought under general rules.

The whole question is, after all, one of convenience. The separation of meaning from form is a pure matter of convenience, and is not founded on any logical necessity, but only on a defect of language as it is, for in an ideally perfect language form and meaning would be one - there would be no irregularities, no isolated phenomena, no dictionary, and what is now dictionary and grammar would be all *syntax*. Even in languages as they exist, form and meaning are inseparable, so that the separation of *accidence* and *syntax* must always be a more or less arbitrary one, which may vary in different languages, quite apart from any questions of convenience.

We have seen that grammar deals with those phenomena of language which can be brought under general rules, while the dictionary deals with isolated phenomena - especially with the meanings of separate words.

But not of all words. It is clear that while the meaning of such a word as *man* or *house* belongs to the dictionary, that of such a word as *in the disobedience of man* belongs to the grammar, for it has exactly the same function as the *-s* of the genitive case: it cannot, indeed, be said to have any meaning of its own at all.

From the point of view of the practical study of languages, such a question as whether or not the prepositions are to be treated of in the grammar as well as the dictionary, and the further question whether

all of them, or only some of them, are to be included in the grammar, must be answered by showing whether or not the acquisition of the language will be facilitated thereby: and this will depend on the structure of each language.

We have seen that there is no real necessity for the separation of accident and syntax. Although practical convenience often seems to call for a separation, there may be circumstances under which it is desirable to treat forms and their grammatical functions and meanings together.

In this book I have also tried to do justice to another important principle of practical grammar, namely, that grammatical analysis has two stages, one of *recognition* or identification, and another of *reproduction* or construction. As I say in the preface, "The first requisite is to understand written texts, which involves only the power of recognizing grammatical forms, not of constructing them, as in the further stage of writing or speaking the language."

I then go on to say, "All these principles are those which are carried out - consciously or unconsciously - by most linguists. An experienced linguist in attacking a new language begins with the shortest grammar he can find. He first takes a general bird's-eye view of the language, finds out what are its special difficulties, what has to be brought under general rules, what to learn detail by detail, what to put off till a later stage. The rash beginner who starts with a big grammar forgets two-thirds of it soon after he begins independent reading. Such a grammar as the one in the present work simply attempts to give him the really useful residue which, when once learnt, is not and cannot be forgotten."

The evils of the separation of syntax from accident are well shown in the way in which the dead languages are taught in schools. Boys are made to learn paradigms by heart, and are then set to read the classical authors with the help of a dictionary before they have acquired any real knowledge of the meanings of the inflections they are expected to recognize in their texts - much as if they were taught the names of tools without being taught their uses.

It is now generally admitted that a grammatical rule without an example is of no practical use: it is an abstraction which is incapable of entering into any direct associations with anything in the language

itself. The example, on the one hand, is concrete: it can be imprinted firmly on the memory by the mere force of the mechanical associations involved in carefully reading it and carefully pronouncing it aloud; while, on the other hand, it is logically associated with the rule, which it explains, illustrates, and justifies. The example serves also as a standard or pattern by which the learner can recognize other examples of the rule as they occur in his reading. The example is thus a link between these other examples and the rule itself.

Many of the older grammarians, while expending much thought and care on elaborating their statement of the rules, considered the choice of examples as of subordinate importance. They forgot that the first object of grammatical study is not the acquisition of rules, but of a practical command of the language itself; so that instead of the examples being intended solely to illustrate the rules, the true relation is almost the reverse: the rules are mere stepping-stones to the understanding of the examples; so when the latter are once thoroughly understood, the rules become superfluous and may be forgotten.

(pp. 123-128)

Questions:

1. What problem does grammar have to deal with, according to H. Sweet?
2. What is the province of syntax?
3. What proves that in grammar meaning and form sometimes diverge? Does it mean that meaning is virtually independent of form?

2.

Firth J.R. Papers in Linguistics 1934-1951

Contextualization

The central concept of the whole of semantics considered in this way is the context of situation. In that context are the human participant or participants, what they say, and what is going on. The pho-

netician can find his phonetic context and the grammarian and the lexicographer theirs. And if you want to bring in general cultural background, you have the contexts of experience of the participants. Every man carries his culture and much of his social reality about with him wherever he goes. But even when phonetician, grammarian, and lexicographer have finished, there remains the bigger integration, making use of all their work, in semantic study. And it is for this situational and experiential study that I would reserve the term "semantics".

For the adequate description and classification of contexts of situation we need to widen our linguistic outlook. Certain elementary categories are obvious, such as speaking, hearing, writing, reading; familiar, colloquial, and more formal speech; the languages of the Schools, the Law, the Church, and all the specialized forms of speech.

Then one might add such types of situation as those in which there is an "individual" or "monologue" use of language, and those in which there is a sort of "choric" use, as when vocal interchange merely promotes or maintains affective rapport. Malinowski has applied to this kind of linguistic behaviour the very happy phrase "phatic communion" - "a type of speech in which ties of union are created by a mere exchange of words".

Malinowski has also insisted on the specially interesting types of situation in which vocal interchange is just part of a job of work in hand, such as fishing, hunting, loading a truck, or the co-operative handling of tools and materials. He says the meaning of such words is "their pragmatic efficiency". Most of our contemporary "eye-language" in notices and directions is of this kind.

A great deal of conversation or discussion may also be in preparation for concerted or socially determined action. All the language of public administration and government may be said to be the language of planning and regulation, the language of public guidance. The subsequent discussion of success or failure may be regarded both as "phatic communion" and as a situation in which something planned is either accomplished or ends in failure.

In more detail we may notice such common situations as

(a) Address: "Simpson!", "Look here, Jones", "My dear boy", "Now, my man", "Excuse me, madam".

(b) Greetings, farewells, or mutual recognition of status and relationship on contact, adjustment of relations after contact, breaking off relations, renewal of relations, change of relations.

(c) Situations in which words, often conventionally fixed by law or custom, serve to bind people to a line of action or to free them from certain customary duties in order to impose others. In Churches, Law Courts, Offices, such situations are commonplace. Your signature or your word is a very important piece of linguistic behaviour. In passing, we may notice that, when other things fail, judges often have recourse to very rudimentary semantics in their interpretations. There is a great field for practical semantics in the contextualization of crucial words in judicial remarks and judgements, particularly in the lower courts.

Such words are made binding by law, but many other words and phrases are used with a similar binding effect in everyday life, because their use releases overwhelming forces of public opinion, of social custom. "Be a sport!", "I know you won't let us down". One of the magic words of the age is *plan*. The mere use of this word and its derivatives releases certain forces of opinion and experience and gives the word weight. Its association with certain influential contexts gives it a power over us in this age of uncertainty.

Many more types of situation will occur to the interested student, but there is an obvious need for a more accurate study of our speech situations in order that categories may be found which will enable us to extend such social studies all over the world.

(pp. 27-31)

Questions:

1. What is meant by the "context of situation"? In what does its significance for analysis lie?
2. What is "phatic communion"? Dwell upon the types of situations in which phatic communion occurs.
3. What makes phatic communion effective?

3.

Palmer F.R.

Semantics. A New **Outline**

Context of Situation

The term *context of situation* is associated with two scholars, first an anthropologist who has already been mentioned, B. Malinowski, and later a linguist, J.R. Firth. Both were concerned with stating meaning in terms of the context in which language is used, but in rather different ways.

Malinowski's interest in language derived from his work in the Trobriand Islands in the South Pacific. He was particularly concerned with his failure to produce any satisfactory translations for the texts he had recorded. For instance, he recorded a boast by a canoeist which he translated, "We-run front-wood ourselves ... we-turn we-see companion-ours he-runs rear-wood." This, Malinowski argued, made sense only if the utterance was seen in the context in which it was used where it would become clear that, for instance, "wood" referred to the paddle of the canoe. Living languages must not be treated like dead ones, torn from their context of situation, but seen as used by people for hunting, cultivating, looking for fish, etc. Language as used in books is not at all the norm; it represents a farfetched derivative function of language, for language was not originally a "mirror of reflected thought". Language is, he maintained, a "mode of action", not a "countersign of thought".

Malinowski's arguments were primarily based on his observation of the way in which the language of the people he was studying fitted into their everyday activities, and was thus an inseparable part of them. But he noted also that there is, even in our own more sophisticated society, a special significance of expressions such as *How do you do?* *Ah, here you are*, which are used to establish a common sentiment. [...] This aspect of language he called "phatic communion", where the words do not convey meaning but have a purely social function.

He noted, too, that the child, right from the stage of babbling, uses words as "active forces" with which to manipulate the world around him. For the primitive man, similarly, words are "important utensils". Indeed for him, Malinowski argued, there is much in common between words and magic, for both give him power.

Malinowski's remarks about language as a mode of action are useful in reminding us that language is not simply a matter of stating information. But there are two reasons why we cannot wholly accept his arguments. First, he believed that the "mode of action" aspect of language was most clearly seen in the "basic" needs of man as illustrated in the languages of the child or of primitive man. He assumed that the language he was considering was more primitive than our own and thus more closely associated with the practical needs of the primitive society. To a very large degree, therefore, he assumed that the difficulties of translation were due to the differences in the nature of the languages and that the need to invoke context of situation was more important when dealing with primitive languages. But he was mistaken. For although there may be "primitive" people, who lack the knowledge and skill of civilised people, there is no sense in which a language can be regarded as primitive. Of course many languages may not have the vocabulary of modern industrial society, but this is a reflection of the interests of the society, not of the primitive nature of the language. In purely linguistic terms it appears to be a fact that no one language can be judged more primitive than another - though Malinowski is by no means the only scholar to make this false assumption.

The difficulties of translation that Malinowski noted result only from the DIFFERENCES between the languages, not the fact that one is more primitive. Secondly, Malinowski's views do not provide the basis of any workable semantic theory. He does not even discuss the ways in which context can be handled in a systematic way, to provide a statement of meaning. Moreover, it is quite clear that even with his Trobriand Islanders much of their linguistic activity is not easily related to context. For instance, he discusses narrative, the telling of stories; but here, surely, the context is the same at all times - the story teller and his audience, whatever the story. If context is to be taken as an indication of meaning, all stories will have the same meaning. Malinowski's solution was to invoke "secondary context",

the context within the narrative; but that has no immediately observable status and can no more be objectively defined than concepts or thoughts that he was so eager to banish from discussion.

J.R. Firth, the first Professor of General Linguistics in Great Britain, acknowledged his debt to Malinowski, but felt that Malinowski's context of situation was not satisfactory for the more accurate and precise linguistic approach to the problem. For Malinowski's context of situation was "a bit of the social process which can be considered apart" or "an ordered series of events *in rebus*" (i.e. an ACTUAL observable set of events). Firth preferred to see context of situation as part of the linguist's apparatus in the same way as are the grammatical categories that he uses. It was best used as "a suitable schematic construct" to apply to language events and he, therefore, suggested the following categories:

- A. The relevant features of the participants: persons, personalities
 - (i) The verbal action of the participants.
 - (ii) The non-verbal action of the participants.
- B. The relevant objects.
- C. The effects of the verbal action.

In this way contexts of situation can be grouped and classified - and this is, of course, essential if it is to be part of the linguistic analysis of a language.

As an example of his use of context of situation Firth considered a "typical" Cockney event with the sentence:

"Ahng gunna gi' wun fer Ber'."
"I'm going to get one for Bert."

"What," he asks, "is the minimum number of participants? Three? Four? Where might it happen? In a pub? Where is Bert? Outside? Or playing darts? What are the relevant objects? What is the effect of the sentence?" 'Obvious!' you say."

It is important to stress that Firth saw context of situation as one part of the linguist's apparatus or rather as one of the techniques of description, grammar being another such technique on a different level, but of the same abstract nature. For linguistics was for him a sort of hierarchy of such techniques all of which made statements of meaning. Here he used the analogy of the spectrum in which light is dispersed

into its various wavelengths; linguistics similarly would "disperse" meaning in a "spectrum of specialized statements". Thus, for Firth all kinds of linguistic description, the phonology, the grammar, etc., as well as the context of situation, were statements of meaning. Describing meaning in terms of context of situation is, then, just one of the ways in which a linguist handles a language, and not in principle very different from the other ways in which he carries out his task.

Firth's views have often been criticised or even rejected outright, but the criticisms have usually failed to understand precisely what Firth was trying to say. It will be worth while, therefore, to consider some of them since this may make Firth's standpoint clearer. 'First, it has often been said that he was guilty of equivocation in his use of the word "meaning". For while context of situation may well deal with meaning in the usual sense, i.e. the "semantic" sense, quite clearly the other levels, grammar, etc., are not concerned with meaning in the same sense. In claiming, therefore, that all the levels are statements of meaning and that context of situation was thus just one of a set of similar levels, Firth was, consciously or unconsciously, using "meaning" in two different senses, one legitimate, the other his own idiosyncratic usage.

This criticism is not entirely fair for three reasons. First, it is valid only if we accept that there is an area of linguistic investigation which deals with the relation of language and the world outside that is quite distinct from the investigation of the internal characteristics of language. But, as we have already seen, many linguists have confined semantics to sense relations; for them at least, the study of meaning does not differ greatly in kind from grammar, since both would seem to be intralinguistic. I do not accept this point of view - I merely point out that Firth is by no means alone in seeing the study of meaning in the narrow semantic sense as not different in principle from the study of grammar. Secondly, we have already seen in the discussion of sense and reference (2.3), that it is almost certainly impossible, in principle, to decide what is "in the world" and what is "in language". If this is so, Firth is surely to be praised rather than criticised for refusing to draw a clear distinction within his levels of description between the one that deals with language and the world and those that are wholly within language. Thirdly, Firth did not produce any total, "monolithic", lin-

guistic model which could, in theory at least, totally describe a language. He did not, in fact, believe that such a model was possible even in principle (though nearly all linguists have assumed that such a model is not merely possible, but essential). The linguist for Firth merely makes partial statements of meaning, saying what he can about language where he can, cutting into it at different places like cutting a cake. There is no need on such a view to distinguish between statements that are about meaning and those that are not.

A second criticism of Firth's view is that it has very limited value since it will not get us very far. Context of situation may be all right for the Cockney example or for the drill sergeant's *Stand at ease*, but not for the vast majority of the sentences that we encounter. But this does not prove that Firth was wrong. If we cannot get very far with context of situation this is perhaps no more than a reflection of the difficulty of saying anything about semantics, and it is surely better to say a little than to say nothing at all. It must be remembered too that Firth believed we could never capture the whole of meaning. The proper conclusion, perhaps, should be that we need far more sophisticated techniques for context of situation than have yet been developed.

It is easy enough to be scornful, as some scholars have been, of contextual theories and to dismiss them as totally unworkable. But it is difficult to see how we can dismiss them without denying the obvious fact that the meaning of words and sentences relate to the world of our experience. One virtue of Firth's approach was that he set out to make only PARTIAL statements of meaning. It may be that this is all we can ever hope to achieve.

(pp. 46-54)

Questions:

1. **What proves that it is important to distinguish between language as a "mode of action" and language as "a countersign of thought"?**
2. **What is the source of many translation problems, according to F.R. Palmer?**
3. **Comment upon the definitions of "context of situation", given by B. Malinowski and J.R. Firth.**
4. **What is "meaning" in its intralinguistic and extralinguistic senses?**

4.

Lyons J. Semantics

What Is Communication?

To say that language serves as an instrument of communication is to utter a truism. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine any satisfactory Definition of the term "language" that did not incorporate some reference to the notion of communication. Furthermore, it is obvious, or has appeared so to many semanticists, that there is an intrinsic connexion between meaning and communication, such that it is impossible to account for the former except in terms of the latter. But what is communication? The words "communicate" and "communication" are used in a fairly wide range of contexts in their everyday, pre-theoretical sense. We talk as readily of the communication of feelings, moods and attitudes as we do of the communication of factual information. There can be no doubt that these different senses of the word (if indeed they are truly distinct) are interconnected; and various definitions have been proposed which have sought to bring them under some very general, but theoretical, concept defined in terms of social interaction or the response of an organism to a stimulus. We will here take the alternative approach of giving to the term "communication" and the cognate terms "communicate" and "communicative" a somewhat narrower interpretation than they may bear in everyday usage. The narrowing consists in the restriction of the term to the intentional transmission of information by means of some Established signalling-system; and, initially at least, we will restrict the term still further - to the intentional transmission of factual, or Propositional, information.

- The principal signalling-systems employed by human beings for the transmission of information, though not the only ones, are languages. [...] It will be assumed that the sense in which the terms "sign-sender", "receiver" and "transmission" are being employed in section is clear enough from the context. [...]

A signal is *communicative*, we will say, if it is intended by the sender to make the receiver aware of something of which he was not previously aware. Whether a signal is communicative or not rests, then, upon the possibility of choice, or selection, on the part of the sender. If the sender cannot but behave in a certain way (i.e. if he cannot choose between alternative kinds of behaviour), then he obviously cannot communicate anything by behaving in that way. This, we say, is obvious; and upon it depends one of the most fundamental principles of semantics - the principle that choice, or the possibility of selection between alternatives, is a necessary, though not a sufficient, condition of meaningfulness. This principle is frequently expressed in terms of the slogan: meaning, or meaningfulness, implies choice.

"Communicative" means "meaningful for the sender". But there is another sense of "meaningful"; and for this we will reserve the term "informative" and the cognate expressions "information" and "inform". A signal is *informative* if (regardless of the intentions of the sender) it makes the receiver aware of something of which he was not previously aware. "Informative" therefore means "meaningful to the receiver". If the signal tells him something he knew already, it tells him nothing (to equivocate deliberately with the verb "tell"): it is uninformative. The generally accepted slogan, that meaningfulness implies choice, can thus be interpreted from either the sender's or the receiver's point of view. It is worth observing, at this point, that sender's meaning involves the notion of intention and receiver's meaning - the notion of value, or significance. [...]

Under a fairly standard idealization of the process of communication, what the sender communicates (the information put into the signal, as it were, by the sender's selection among possible alternatives) and the information derived from the signal by the receiver (which may be thought of as the receiver's selection from the same set of alternatives) are assumed to be identical. But there are, in practice, frequent instances of misunderstanding; and we must allow for this theoretically.

The communicative component in the use of language, important though it is, should not be overemphasized to the neglect of the non-communicative, but nevertheless informative, component which is of such importance in social interaction. All utterances will contain a certain amount of information which, though put there by the speaker, has

not been intentionally selected for transmission by him; and the listener will commonly react, in one way or another, to information of this kind.

There are two further points having to do with the notion of communication which should be mentioned, though they will not be discussed in detail here. The first has to do with the distinction between the actual and the intended receiver of a signal. It is not uncommon for there to be more than one receiver linked to the sender by a channel of communication and for the sender to be communicating with only one (or some subset) of these receivers. The sender may then include as part of the signal some feature which identifies the intended receiver, or addressee, and invites him to pay attention to, or respond to, the signal. The most obvious case of this in communication by means of language is when the sender uses a name or some other term of address in what we will later refer to as the *vocative* function. But the distinction between receiver and addressee is more widely relevant in communication, since, as we shall see later, the sender will often adjust what he has to say according to his conception of the intended receiver's state of knowledge, social status, and so on.

The second point is of more general theoretical importance: that successful communication depends, not only upon the receiver's reception of the signal and his appreciation of the fact that it is intended for him rather than for another, but also upon his recognition of the sender's communicative intention and upon his making an appropriate behavioural or cognitive response to it. This has long been a common place of non-philosophical treatments of meaning and communication (e.g., Gardiner 1932); and it has been forcefully argued more recently, from a philosophical point of view, by such writers as Grice (1957) and Strawson (1964).

As far as statements of fact (or what purport to be statements of fact) are concerned, it is generally the case that the sender will intend that the receiver should believe what he is told: that he should hold it to be true and should store it in memory as a fact. Furthermore, the sender's desire to convince the receiver that such-and-such is true commonly derives from, or is associated with, some other purpose. For example, there are all sorts of reasons why we might wish to draw someone's attention to the fact that it is raining: we may think that he will be pleased to know that he need not water the garden; we may be con-

cerned that he should not forget to take his raincoat or umbrella; we may want him to close the window or bring in the washing. The particular purpose that we have in telling someone that it is raining will vary, but there will usually be some purpose over and above our desire to inform him of a fact of which he was previously ignorant. Indeed, it may be the case (and it commonly is) that what we actually say is of itself uninformative, in that the receiver knows (and we may know that he knows) whatever fact it is that we are drawing to his attention. This does not invalidate in any way the notions of communication and information with which we are operating here. There is nothing paradoxical in the suggestion that a non-informative utterance should be produced with the intention, that the receiver should infer from it (and from the fact that, despite its banality, it is uttered) something that is not said and in the context need not be said. It may be assumed, however, that the interpretation of non-informative utterances trades upon our ability to interpret the same utterances in contexts in which they would be informative; so too does our ability to infer the very specific and context-bound purposes that the sender might have had for producing such-and-such an utterance-token on some particular occasion. The sentence "It's raining" has a certain constancy of meaning which is independent of the specific purposes that someone might have in uttering it. The question is whether this constant meaning of "It's raining" and of any arbitrary sentence that might be uttered in order to make a statement of fact can be said to depend intrinsically upon some more general notion of communicative intention.

We will not go into this question here. Meanwhile, it may be pointed out that, whereas it is clearly not essential to the notion of making a communicative and informative statement that the person making the statement should be speaking what he believes to be the truth or should intend the addressee to believe what he is being told, these are arguably the conditions under which the communication of factual information is normally assumed to operate.

(pp. 32-35)

Questions:

1. How does J. Lyons define the notion of "communication"?
2. When does a signal become "communicative" vs "informative"?

3. How do the terms "communicative" and "meaningful" correlate?
4. In what does the difference in communication between the receiver and the addressee lie?
5. What makes communication successful, according to J. Lyons?

5.

Robins R.H. General Linguistics. An Introductory Survey

Language and Communication

Many definitions of the word "language" have been attempted and they are to be found in dictionaries and in some textbooks. One definition, first set down in 1942, has enjoyed a wide currency: "A language is a system of arbitrary vocal symbols by means of which a social group cooperates." This definition covers much that is important, but in a sense all definitions are, by themselves, inadequate, since, if they are to be more than trivial and uninformative, they must presuppose, as does the one just quoted, some general theory of language and of linguistic analysis.

More useful at this point in an elementary book on linguistics will be some notice of certain salient facts that must be taken into account in any seriously intended theory of language.

Language is, so far as we know now, species-specific to man. Every normal human being has acquired one language, his mother tongue, by late childhood, the basic lexicon, grammar, and pronunciation within the first ten years of life, apparently without effort and without the requirement of systematic instruction, in contrast to the actual teaching necessarily involved in the attainment of literacy and the mastery of foreign languages at school. Much that passes among conscientious parents as "teaching a child to speak" really amounts to the deliberate widening of his vocabulary along with his knowledge of the world.

The skills involved in speaking, being an acquisition taken for granted and largely unnoticed in the process, excite no comment and

evoke no admiration; their absence in pathologically defective persons arouses sympathy. We praise people for particular and relatively rare abilities that depend on speech, for having a fine singing voice, for being a stirring preacher, an inspiring orator, or a good storyteller, and for being able to recite with clarity a patter-song of the type written by W.S. Gubert, an unnatural exercise that taxes the powers of most otherwise fluent speakers of a language. But all these accomplishments represent additional abilities over and above the mastery of one's own first language.

Conversely, no other members of the animal kingdom have been shown to possess anything like a human language. Of course animals communicate, and socially organized animals cooperate by means of vocal and other forms of communication. Much study has rightly been devoted to animal communication. Interestingly, the animal communication system in some respects nearest to human language (though a very long way off!) is the so-called language of bees, whereby bees that have been foraging are able, by certain formalized movements often called "dancing", to indicate to other bees still in the hive the direction, distance, and richness of a source of nectar, so that these others can make straight to it. This system shares with human language the ability to impart detailed information about matters not directly accessible to the senses of those receiving it; but we notice at once that the medium employed, the "substance", as it is sometimes called, has nothing in common with the spoken medium in which all human language is primarily expressed.

Naturally studies in animal communication have centred on our nearest kin among the mammals, the primates, and specific investigations have been made, for example, into the calls of gibbons in their natural habitat. But the area best known and most exciting to the general public in this type of research has been the attempts to teach chimpanzees to communicate with humans by human methods. Of these chimpanzees, Washoe and Sarah, the subjects of prolonged training and study in America, are the most famous. [...] Here it must suffice to point out that attempts to teach chimpanzees actually to speak have largely failed; the signs used are in the main visual, involving gestures and facial movements. With this medium, intercourse involving information, questions, and requests, together with

responses directly linked to them, and the rudiments of syntactic structures, has made astonishing progress, far beyond the scope of the language of bees, for example. But, and this is an important reservation, bee language developed entirely within natural communities of bees; chimpanzees have learned their language only after prolonged association with human beings who have devoted themselves to teaching them and studying them. Such studies tell us much about the latent and inherent potentialities of chimpanzees, but they do not affect the unique species-specificity of language in mankind.

Human language, unlike every other communication system known in the animal kingdom, is unrestricted in scope and infinite in extent. Against the severe restrictions placed on the topics about which bees and even trained chimpanzees can communicate, human beings can, in any language, talk about all the furniture of earth and heaven known to them and about all human experience. Languages are adaptable and modifiable according to the changing needs and conditions of speakers; this is immediately seen in the adaptation of the vocabulary of English and of other languages to the scientific and industrial developments, and the concomitant changes in people's lives, that took place in Europe and North America in the eighteenth, nineteenth, and twentieth centuries.

The immense power and range of language have been perceived in all societies, and the realization of them was, no doubt, partly responsible for the magical associations felt among some peoples to belong to certain words relating to things and events vital to their lives or fearful in their effects. Traces of such a magical outlook on language are to be seen today in some familiar attitudes.

For all this flexibility and power, human languages have developed through the millennia in which mankind has existed on earth as a separate species through the medium of speech. The earliest known writing systems do not date back more than about 4,000-5,000 years, a minute distance in the time-scale of human existence. [...] all human language and everything in human life that depends on language rests ultimately on the distinguishable noises that humans are able to make out of the passage of air through the throat, nose, and mouth.

Human infants inherit a biologically determined ability to acquire and use a language, and this inheritance may account for the univer-

sal features found in all known languages and assumed in the rest; but we do not inherit any particular language. A child learns the language of those with whom he is brought up in infancy and early childhood, whether they be, as is usually the case, his actual parents or others. There is no biological preconditioning to acquire English rather than Malay or Italian rather than Swahili.

Human progress is greatly hastened by the use of language in cultural transmission (one of its functions); the knowledge and experience acquired by one person can be passed on to another in language, so that in part he starts where the other leaves off. In this connection the importance of the invention of printing can hardly be exaggerated. At the present time the achievements of anyone in any part of the world can be made available (by translation if necessary) to anyone else able to read and capable of understanding what is involved. From these uses of language, spoken and written, the most developed animal communication system, though given the courtesy title of language, is worlds away.

One topic connected with the study of language that has always exercised a strong fascination over the general public is the question of the origin of language. There has been a good deal of speculation on this, usually taking the form of trying to infer out of what sort of communicative noise-making fully fledged languages in all their complexities gradually developed. Imitative exclamations in response to animal noises, onomatopoeia and more general sound mimicry of phenomena, exclamations of strong emotion, and calls for help have all been adduced. Linguists, however, tend to leave this sort of theorizing alone, not because of any lack of intrinsic interest, but because it lies far beyond the reaches of legitimate scientific inference, since we can have no direct knowledge of any language before the invention of writing. In relation to the origin of language, every known language is very recent.

Two frequently used analogies for attempted inference on the origin of language are the acquisition of speech by children and the structures and characteristics of so-called "primitive" languages. Both are invalid for this purpose. Children acquire their native language in an environment in which language is already established and in constant and obvious use all around them for the satisfaction of needs,

some manifestly shared by themselves. Their situation is entirely different from that of mankind as a whole in the circumstances assumed to obtain while language itself was taking shape. The second argument, based on the alleged nature of "primitive" languages, rests on a common, though deplorable, misconception of these languages. Linguistically, there are no primitive languages. There are languages of peoples whose cultures as described by anthropologists may be called primitive, i.e. involving a low level of competence in the exploitation of natural resources and the like. Primitive, however, is not a proper qualification of language. Investigations of the languages of the world do not bear out the assumption that structurally the languages of people at different levels of cultural development are inherently different. Their vocabularies, of course, at any time reflect fairly closely the state of the material and more abstract culture of the speakers; but languages are capable of infinite adjustment to the circumstances of cultural development, and their phonetic and grammatical organization may remain constant during such changes. It is a palpable fact of informed observation in the linguistic study of the languages of culturally primitive peoples that phonetically and grammatically their languages are no less (and no more) systematic and orderly than the languages of Western Europe and of the major world civilizations. Nor are the processes of change, that affect all parts of languages, any less active or any slower in operation in these languages than in others; indeed, the converse may be the case, as it has been held that the establishment of writing systems and standards of correctness tend, if anything, to retard linguistic changes in certain situations. Every language has aeons of changes, irretrievably lost to knowledge, lying behind it. To argue from the language of primitive peoples to the nature of a primitive stage in the evolution of language is valueless.

Languages fall into the class of symbol systems, symbols being a special class of signs. The science of sign and symbol systems, sometimes called semiotics, lies outside the range of an outline introduction to general linguistics, but a brief clarification of the terms is desirable. Signs in general are events or things that in some way direct attention to, or are indicative of, other events or things. They may be related naturally or causally, as when shivering is taken as a sign of

fever, or as when earthquakes are, or were, said to be signs of the subterranean writhing of the imprisoned god Loki; or they may be related conventionally and so used, and they are then called symbols, as, for example, the "conventional signs" for churches, railways, etc. on maps, road signs, and the colours of traffic lights.

Among symbol systems language occupies a special place, for at least two reasons. Firstly, it is almost wholly based on pure or arbitrary convention; whereas signs on maps and the like tend to represent in a stylized way the things to which they refer, the words of a language relate to items of experience or to bits of the world in this way only in the proportionately very small part of vocabulary called onomatopoeic. The connection between the sounds of words like *cuckoo*, *hoopoe*, and such imitative words as *dingdong*, *bowwow*, *rat-tattat*, etc. and the creatures making such noises or the noises themselves is obvious; and in a wider set of forms in languages a more general association of sound and type of thing or event is discoverable, as in many English words ending in *-ump*, such as *thump*, *clump*, *stump*, *dump*, which tend to have associations of heaviness, thickness, and dullness. It has been found experimentally that made-up words, like *maluma* and *oomboolu*, and *takete* and *kikeriki*, are almost always treated alike by persons who hear them for the first time and are asked to assign them to one or the other of a pair of diagrams, one round in shape and the other spiky; the first pair are felt appropriate to the former shape, and the second pair to the latter. The onomatopoeic and "sound-symbolic" part of language is of great significance, but its extent in any vocabulary is quite small, and despite attempts by some to see the origin of language in such imitative cries, it must be realized that the vastly greater part of the vocabulary of all languages is purely arbitrary in its associations. Were this not so, vocabularies would be much more similar the world over than they are, just as the conventional picture signs of several historically unrelated pictographic systems show obvious resemblances.

Secondly, what is conveyed by all other symbol systems can be explained in language, and these other systems can be interpreted in language, but the reverse is not the case. The instructions given by road and railway signals can be expressed in words, the propositions of logic can be translated into ordinary language, though with loss of

brevity and precision, those of classical Aristotelian logic fairly directly, those of modern symbolic logic more indirectly. But in languages we deal with whole areas of human life and engage in modes of communication *with* which logical systems as such have no concern.

(PP- 5-15)

Questions:

1. What makes language "species-specific" to man?
2. What theories of the origin of language does R.H. Robins discuss? Dwell upon them.
3. What is a sign? What is specific to a language sign?

6.

Haas W. Linguistic Relevance

Linguistic Analysis

To the linguist, fundamentally the most puzzling characteristic of language is its enormous productivity - that obvious ability we have, every one of us, of always adding something new to an infinite variety of utterances; of saying what has never been said before, and understanding what we have never heard before. To explain how this is possible, is the root-problem of linguistic analysis. It is of course immediately clear that there are, and must be, certain partial similarities between the new utterances and the old - certain regularities in those operations of saying and understanding: what is novel must be assumed to arise from a new but regular combination of old parts. The first task, then, of linguistic description - somewhat analogous to the chemist's attempt to "explain" the puzzling variety of material things - may be said to be a reductive one: the task, namely, of reducing the practically infinite variety of utterances to a relatively few recurrent relations of a relatively few recurrent elements. So much seems to be obvious and un-controversial. But much that is less obvi-

ous seems to follow from having located the problem and determined the task in this way.

Something about the objects to be described and analysed must be taken for granted; and the question is, how much. One may ask, for instance, whether it would be profitable to apply linguistic methods to arbitrary stretches of speech, i.e. to nothing more than certain events of acoustic disturbance. We seem to require more, as a basis for linguistic operations: nothing less, in fact, than that succession of different *significant utterances* which is our problem. They are the objects of our analysis. Precisely as the chemist is not concerned to verify the perceived variety of material things (including the instruments of his laboratory), so the linguist simply observes the various meaningful utterances and knows of their distinct existence, without feeling obliged to explain how he knows it. Neither the chemist's nor the linguist's presupposition is beyond question. But the question is asked by other disciplines - by psychologists, anthropologists, philosophers. The linguist (and, *mutatis mutandis*, the chemist) asks about the *internal structure* of his "facts", always taking for granted that he can observe and roughly distinguish them.

J.R. Firth refers here to a "basic postulate", which he calls "the implication of utterance". "Language text," he says, "must be attributed to participants in some context of situation," before it can be analysed. The various global forms and meanings of the pieces of text, which are subjected to linguistic analysis, are regarded as "given" by the linguist, though they are capable of being "established" and "explained" by anthropological inquiries - that is, by a study of speakers and listeners in "contexts of situation". This tells us something about the relation between the linguistic and the social studies of human speech. "Context of situation," says Firth, "makes sure of the sociological component" of linguistic descriptions. It is "a convenient abstraction at the social level of analysis, and forms the basis of the hierarchy of techniques", which are employed by linguistic analysis proper. L. Bloomfield was equally explicit on what he called "the fundamental assumption of linguistics". "We must assume," he said, "that in every speech-community some utterances are alike (or partly alike) in form and meaning." This is the basis of linguistic analysis. Bloomfield, however, made it unnecessarily difficult for himself, and his

followers, to feel at ease with this fundamental assumption. In Bloomfieldian linguistics, likeness of meaning becomes a source of trouble. It is formulated in such a way as to allow mysterious "elements" of meaning ("sememes") to attach themselves to the clear-cut formal elements of any given utterance. As a result, an unmanageable crowd of elusive extra-lingual entities intrudes, in haphazard fashion, into the very fabric of linguistic analysis; whereas for Firth, situational context, lying itself safely *outside* the utterance, provides all we need to presuppose in order to describe the significant functions and elements within.

It is on account of that "semantic" function of any described utterance - a function in "contexts of situation" - that Firth regarded the whole of linguistic description, from syntax to phonetics, as a Statement of various "modes of meaning". The unfortunate idiosyncrasy of this special terminology - which confined the term "semantic" to an anthropological study, while ascribing "meaning" to everything that is linguistically relevant, whether it be a sentence or a word or a mere sound - seems to have been seriously misleading. It suggested a highly eccentric and esoteric theory, precisely at the point at which Firth in fact affirmed what is generally acknowledged to be the fundamental presupposition of linguistic studies. Indeed, he succeeded, where others had failed - namely, in admitting extralingual presuppositions, without allowing them to disrupt the proper autonomy of linguistic studies. Extralingual "context of situation", which replaces all those sporadically intrusive "semantic entities", was simply thought of as infusing every linguistic element with *relevance*, or, as Firth put it, with some "mode of meaning".

Yet, whatever the difference between Firth and Bloomfield, they were agreed on one important point - namely, that the objects of linguistic analysis are not just physical objects, not arbitrarily selected "stretches of speech". Such, they were sure, would not offer them enough information for their reductive task. "As long as we pay no attention to meanings," says Bloomfield, "we cannot decide whether two uttered forms are "the same" or "different"." To be able to decide so much as this, we need to assume that some of those physical "stretches" make sense, and that they make different kinds of sense (though full information as to what specific sense any utterance makes

will not need to be presupposed as given). Meaningful utterances, then, many and various, are the objects of linguistic inquiry. The linguist's concern is with their internal constitution, the question being how to reduce them to recurrent elements in recurrent relations.

(pp. 116-119)

Questions:

1. What is the task of linguistic description, as seen by W. Haas?
2. In what does W. Haas see the difference between Bloomfield's and Firth's approaches to meaning?

7.

ECOU

The Role of the Reader (Explorations in the Semiotics of Texts)

7.1. The Analysis of Meaning

7.1.1. An intensional semantics is concerned with the analysis of the content of a given expression. This kind of study has assumed in the last two decades two forms, complementary and/or alternative to each other: the *interpretative* analysis with the format of a compositional spectrum of markers and the *generative* analysis in form of predicates and arguments. While the former approach seems to be exclusively concerned with the meaning of elementary lexical entries, the latter seems to fit the needs of a *textual analysis* which considers both the semantic and the pragmatic aspect of discourses.

I think, however, that such a clear-cut opposition should not be established. As it is proposed in Chapter 8 of this book, *a sememe is in itself an inchoative text, whereas a text is an expanded sememe*. The author who has more clearly advocated such an assumption (implicitly as well as explicitly) is Charles Sanders Peirce. Some elements of Peirce's thought can be reexamined in the light of such theoretical per-

spectives: Peirce's theory of interpretant cannot but lead to a form of meaning analysis which fits both the requirements of an interpretative and a generative semantics and only from Peirce's point of view can many problems of contemporary text theories be satisfactorily solved. According to the principles of compositional analysis, a semiotic expression (be it a verbal item or any type of physical utterance) conveys, according to linguistic conventions, an organized and analyzable content, formed by the aggregation (or hierarchy) of semantic features. These features constitute a system, either closed or open, and belong to different contents of different expressions in different arrangements. Compositional analysis should describe and define a virtually infinite number of contents by means of a possibly finite ensemble of features, but this exigency of economy gives rise to many aporias.

If the features constitute a finite set of metasemiotic constructions, then their mode of describing a virtually infinite amount of contents sounds rather disappointing. By such features as "human", "animate", "masculine", or "adult" (see Chomsky), one can distinguish a bishop from a hippopotamus, but not a hippopotamus from a rhinoceros. If, on the contrary, one elaborates more analytical metasemiotic features such as "not-married" or "seal" (as it happens in the interpretative perspective of Katz and Fodor), one is obliged to foresee an incredible number of other features such as "lion", "bishop", or "with two eyes", therefore losing universality and running the risk that the set of metasemiotic features contains as many items as the language to be analyzed.

Moreover, it is hard to establish which kind of hierarchy these features should be accorded to. A simple relation of embedding from genus to species can help only to a certain extent. It is, for example, obviously important to know that a schooner is a sailing ship, that a sailing ship is a vessel, a vessel - a boat, and a boat - a vehicle (marine), but this kind of classification does not distinguish a schooner from a brigantine, since it disregards other features such as the form of the sails and the number of the masts. Provided this requirement is satisfied, it remains to be known what purposes a brigantine or a schooner serves.

As a further criticism we can add that a compositional analysis in terms of universal features does not say satisfactorily in which linguistic environments the item can be inserted without producing am-

biguity. There are rules of subcategorization, establishing the immediate syntactic compatibility of a given item, and there are selectional rules establishing some immediate semantic compatibility, but these instructions do not go beyond the normal format of a dictionary. Some scholars have proposed a semantic representation with the format of an *encyclopedia*, and this solution seems to be the only one capable of conveying the whole information entailed by a given term; but the encyclopedic representation excludes the possibility of establishing a finite set of metasemiotic features and makes the analysis potentially infinite.

7.1.2. Other approaches have tried to overcome these difficulties by representing the items of a lexicon as predicates with n arguments. Bierwisch, for instance, represents *father* as "X parent of 7+ Male X 4- (Animate Y + Adult X + Animate Y)" and *kill* as "X, cause (X_d change to (-Alive X_d- Animate y)." This kind of representation not only takes into account the immediate semantic markers (in form of a dictionary), but also characterizes the item through the relations it can have, within the framework of a proposition, with other items. In this perspective single semantic items are viewed as already inserted in a possible co-text.

Generative semantics has improved the use of predicate calculus, but shifting from the representation of single terms to the logical structure of the propositions (McCawley, Lakoff, and others). Only Fillmore has tried, with his case grammar, to unify both interpretive-compositional and generative perspective. Fillmore remarks that the verbs *ascend* and *lift* are both motion verbs and are both used to describe a motion upward, but *lift* requires conceptually two objects (the one moving upward, the other causing the motion), whereas *ascend* is a one-argument predicate. This remark leads one to recognize that arguments, in natural languages, can be identified with *roles* (similar to the *actants* in Greimas' structural semantics); for any predicate there is an Agent, a Counteragent, an Object, a Result, an Instrument, a Source, a Goal, an Experiencer, and so on. This kind of analysis solves very well the problem of the classification of features, following a sort of logic of action. Moreover, it satisfies the encyclopedic requirement and transforms a purely classificatory representa-

tion into an operational schema: the composition of the meaning of a predicate tells us how to act in order to give rise to the denoted action Or in order to isolate it within a context. *To walk*, for instance, should mean that there is a human agent, using ground as a counteragent, moving his body in order to displace it (as a result) from a spacial source to a spacial goal, by using legs as instrument, and so on. However, some objections can be raised: (i) Whereas the roles can be recognized as a set of innate universals expressed by a fixed inventory of linguistic expressions, the linguistic features which fill in these roles are again potentially infinite (how many kinds of instrument can be foreseen?), (ii) The proposal of such a "case grammar" seems to work apropos of predicates, but requires some additions as far as the representation of arguments is concerned. Using a knife as instrument, i can kill someone, but what about the semantic representation of *knife*? it seems that, more than a predicate argument structure, it could be Useful in this case to employ such categories as *who produces* it, *with what material*, according to *what formal rule* and for *what purpose*. This kind of representation recalls the four Aristotelian causes (Efficient, Formal, Material, and Final); but the representation of an "object" could also be transformed into the representation of the action required to produce this object (therefore: not *knife* but *to make a knife*), (iii) A complete semantic theory should also take into account syncategorematic terms such as preposition and adverb (*for*, *to*, *below*, *while*, and 80 on). According to the research of many scholars (Leech, Apresjan, and others), it seems that this is possible, but we are far from recognizing that those researches are to be considered both satisfactory and definitive. I think that an exploration into Peirce's theory of interpretant can strongly help to improve all these approaches.

-). 7.1.3. There is, in any case, a sort of gap between contemporary compositional analysis and Peirce's semiotic account of interpretants. Contemporary analyses are concerned mainly with a semantics of verbal languages, whereas Peirce was dealing with a general semiotics concerning all types of sign. I have elsewhere demonstrated that Peirce offers the theoretical opportunity of extending the problem of compositional analysis to every semiotic phenomenon, including images and gestures.

Nevertheless, in order to maintain a certain parallelism between the two poles of our inquiry, I shall limit the subject of section 7.2 to Peircean proposals and examples concerning *verbal* language, even though this methodological decision obliges me to underestimate the important relationship between symbols, icons, and indices. Someone could object that this limitation is imposed by the very nature of my subject matter: Peirce has said that only symbols (not icons and indices) are interpretable. "Pragmaticism fails to furnish any translation of meaning of a proper name or other designation of an individual object" (5.429); qualities have "no perfect identities, but only likenesses, or partial identities" (1.418). "Only symbols seem to be instances of genuine Thirdness (since they can be interpreted), whereas icons are qualitatively degenerate and indices are reactionally degenerate, both depending on something else without any mediation (the icon from a quality, the index from an object)" (2.92 and 5.73). Moreover, "it is not all signs that have logical interpretants, but only intellectual concepts and the like" (5.482).

I think, however, that the context of Peirce's thought happily contradicts these statements. It is difficult to assume [...] that qualities are always general without asserting that they can and should be in some way defined and interpreted. And as far as icons are concerned, it should be remembered that the possibility of making deductions by observing those icons which are called diagrams depends on the fact that diagrams can be interpreted and do arouse interpretants in the mind of their interpreters.

7.1.4. A sign-function correlates a given expression to a given content. This content has been defined by a given culture irrespective of whether a given state of the world corresponds to it. "Unicorn" is a sign as well as is "dog". The act of mentioning, or of referring to, themes made possible by some indexical devices, and "dog" can be referred to an individually existent object, whereas "unicorn" cannot. The same happens with the image of a dog and the image of a unicorn. Those which Peirce called iconic signs are also expressions related to a content; if they possess the properties of (or are similar to) something, this something is not the object or the state of the world that could be referred to, but rather a struc-

tured and analytically organized content. The image of a unicorn is not similar to a "real" unicorn; neither is recognized because of our experience of "real" unicorns, but has the same features displayed by the definition of a unicorn elaborated by a given culture within a specific content system. The same can be demonstrated apropos of indexical device.

The self-sufficiency of the universe of content, provided by a given culture, explains why signs can be used in order to lie. We have a sign-function when something can be used in order to lie (and therefore to elaborate ideologies, works of art, and so on). What Peirce calls signs (which to somebody stand for something else in some respect or capacity) are such just because I can use a representamen in order to send back to a fictitious state of the world. Even an index can be falsified in order to signify an event which is not detectable and, in fact, has never caused its supposed representamen. Signs can be used in order to lie, for they send back to objects or states of the world only *vicariously*. In fact, they send immediately back to a certain content. I am thus asserting that the relationship between *signifiant* and *signifié* (or between *sign-vehicle* and *signification*, or between *sign* and *meaning*) is autonomous in itself and does not require the presence of the referred object as an element of its definition. Therefore it is possible to elaborate a theory of signification on the grounds of a purely intensional semantics. I am not saying that an extensional semantics is devoid of any function; on the contrary, it controls the Correspondence between a sign-function and a given state of the world, when signs are used in order to mention something. But I am stressing the fact that an extensional semantics can be elaborated (and that processes of reference or mention can be established) only because an intensional semantics is possible as a self-sufficient cultural construct (that is, a code or a system of codes).

Can we say that the texts of Peirce entitle us to accept this perspective? Obviously, in the Peircean framework, when signs are applied to concrete experiences or *haecceitates*¹, they are related to the indicated objects.

¹ haecceity [hek'si-.iti] (*Lat.*) that which makes an object what it uniquely is (*lit.*: thisness) (*Триву. аем.*)

But it is not by chance that in 1.540 Peirce established a difference between sign and representamen; when he says that he uses the words "sign" and "representamen" differently, he means that the sign is the concrete, *token* element (the utterance) used in the concrete process of communication and reference, whereas the representamen is the *type* to which a coding convention assigns a certain content by means of certain interpretants. "By sign I mean anything that conveys any definite notion of an object in any way, as such conveyers of thought are familiarly known to us. Now I start with this familiar idea and make the best analysis I can of what is essential to a sign, and I define a *representamen* as being whatever that analysis applies to. [...] In particular all signs convey notions to *human minds*; but I know no reason why every representamen should do so." I read this passage as the proposal of a difference between a theory of signification and a theory of communication. Representamens are type-expressions conventionally correlated to a type-content by a given culture, irrespective of the fact that they can be used in order to communicate effectively something to somebody.

Peirce continually oscillates between these points of view, but never makes their difference explicit. Therefore when dealing with interpretants the object remains as an abstract hypothesis which gives a sort of pragmatic legitimacy to the fact that we are using signs; and when, on the contrary, dealing with objects, the interpretant acts in the background as an unnoticed but highly effective mediation which permits us to understand signs and to apply them to such and such concrete experience.

7.2. Interpretant, Ground, Meaning, Object

7.2.1. Let me examine some basic definitions of interpretant. In 1.339 the definition looks rather mentalistic: "A sign stands/or something *to* the idea which it produces, or modifies... That for which it stands is called its *object*, that which it conveys, its *meaning*; and the idea to which it gives rise, its *interpretant*." But in 2.228 (probably some years later, according to Hartshorne and Weiss, who, without identifying the date of the first fragment, list it among the texts of 1895 and give the second one as written in 1897) Peirce specifies: "A

sign, or representamen, is something which stands to somebody for something in some respect or capacity. It addresses somebody, that is, it creates in the mind of that person an equivalent sign, or perhaps a more developed sign. That sign which it creates I call the *interpretant* of the first sign. The sign stands for something, its *object*. It stands **for** that object, not in all respects, but in reference to a sort of idea, which I have sometimes called the *ground* of the representation." As everybody realizes, in the second fragment the interpretant is no longer in idea but another sign. If there is an idea, it is the idea of that second sign, which should have its own representamen independently of that idea. Moreover, the idea here intervenes in order to reduce the *haecceitates* of the given object: this object is only such insofar as it is thought under a certain profile. It is thought of as an abstraction and a model of a possible biased experience.

It is absurd to maintain that Peirce intended by object a given concrete thing. This would be possible, at most, when considering the expression "that dog" (and in this case only the object is a *haecceity*). But according to Peirce even "to go", "up", and "whenever" are representamens. Obviously, for a realist such as Peirce, even these expressions are referred to concrete experiences; and also from the joint point of view of a theory of signification oppositions such as "up" vs. "down" or "to go" vs. "to come" are established as elements of the content insofar as they reflect and legitimize our concrete experience of space and time relations. But according to Peirce "to go" is an expression that has no identity other than the agreement between its several manifestations; therefore its object is only the natural existence of a law, and an idea is a thing even though it has not the mode of existence of a haecceity. As for an expression such as "Hamlet was insane", Peirce says that its object is only an imaginary world (therefore the object is determined by the sign), whereas a command such as "Ground arms!" has as its proper object either the subsequent action of the soldiers or "the Universe of things desired by the Commanding Captain at that moment". The fact that in this passage Peirce mixes up the response of the soldiers and the intention of the captain by defining both as objects shows that there is something ambiguous in his definition of object. In fact, the first case represents an *interpretation* of the sign [...]. But in either case it is clear that the object is

not necessarily a thing or a state of the world but a rule, a law, a prescription [...].

As a matter of fact, Peirce speaks of two kinds of objects. There is a *dynamic* object, which "by some means contrives to determine the sign to its representation," and there is an *immediate* object, which is "the object as the sign itself represents it, and whose Being is thus dependent upon the Representation of it in the Sign."

(pp. 175-180)

Questions:

1. What kinds of linguistic analysis characterize intensional semantics?
2. What makes it possible to bring together the notions of a sememe and a text and view one in terms of the other?
3. What is indispensable for the semiotic expression?
4. On what grounds does U. Eco conclude that compositional analysis is not always effective?
5. What advantages does predicate calculus have? What are its limitations?
6. What kinds of signs are singled out by Ch.S. Peirce? How does he differentiate symbols, icons and indices?
7. What is specific to "intensional" semiotics/"extensional" semiotics?
8. How does Ch.S. Peirce define "interpretant"/"representamen"/"object"/"ground"?

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Seminar 2

MORPHEMIC STRUCTURE OF THE WORD

1. The morphemic structure of the word. The notions of morph, morpheme, allomorph.
2. The traditional classification of morphemes.
3. The allo-emic classification of morphemes.
4. The notion of distribution, types of distribution.
5. The principle of identifying free/bound, overt/covert, additive/replacive, continuous/discontinuous morphemes.
6. The notion of zero morpheme.

1. Word as a Nominative Unit

The word is a basic nominative unit. Without words there cannot be any communication even in thought, to say nothing about speech communication.

From the point of view of its nominative function, the word is an elementary indivisible constituent part of the lexicon.

It is not easy to identify the word because the words are heterogeneous from the point of view of both content and form.

To find the criteria of word identification linguists resort to the notions of functional correlation and continuum. Functional correlation connects the elements which have similar and different properties. In fact, within a complex system of interrelated elements there exist two types of phenomena - "polar" and "intermediary". Polar

phenomena stand to one another in an explicit opposition. Intermediary phenomena are located in the system in between, the polar phenomena, making up a gradation of transitions. A total of these transitions makes up a continuum. Thus, between proper nouns and common nouns - polar phenomena - there exist different transitions of semi-proper nouns which make up a continuum.

Giving a definition to the word on these lines, it is necessary to describe the notional one-stem word and the grammatical morpheme as the opposing polar phenomena. The continuum existing between them is constituted by functional words. Functional words are very limited in number and perform various grammatical functions. In distinction to these, notional words are infinite in number and are nominative units proper.

Thus, the word is the nominative unit of language built up by morphemes and indivisible into smaller segments as regards its nominative function.

2. Morphemic Structure of the Word

The morphological system of language reveals its properties through the morphemic structure of words. So, it is but natural that one of the essential tasks of morphology is to study the morphemic structure of the word.

. In traditional grammar the study of the morphemic structure of the word is based upon two criteria -positional and semantic (functional). The positional criterion presupposes the analysis of the location of the marginal morphemes in relation to the central ones. The semantic criterion involves the study of the correlative contribution of the morpheme to the general meaning of the word. In accord with the traditional classification, morphemes at the upper level are divided into root morphemes and affixal morphemes (lexical and grammatical).

The morphemic composition of modern English words has a wide range of varieties but the preferable morphemic model of the common English word is the following: prefix + root + lexical suffix + grammatical suffix.

Further insights into the correlation between the formal and functional aspects of morphemes may be gained in the light of the "allo-

ernie" theory put forward by Descriptive Linguistics. In accord with this theory, lingual units are described by means of two types of terms -r "allo-terms" and "erne-terms". Erne-terms denote the generalized, invariant units of language characterized by a certain functional status, e.g., phonemes, morphemes, lexemes, phrasemes, etc., but in practice analysis this terminology is applied only to the analysis of phonemes and morphemes. Allo-terms denote the concrete manifestations or variants of the erne-units. Allo-units are distinguished by their regular co-location with other elements of language. Typical examples of allo-units are allophones and allomorphs.

The allo-emic identification of lingual elements forms the basis for the so-called "distributional" analysis. The aim of the distributional analysis is to study the units of language in relation to the adjoining elements in the text.

•» In the distributional analysis three main types of distribution are discriminated: **contrastive distribution**, **non-contrastive distribution**, and **complementary distribution**. Contrastive and non-contrastive distributions concern identical environments of different morphs. The morphs are said to be in contrastive distribution if their meanings (functions) are different; such morphs constitute different morphemes, e.g., "returned // returning // returns". The morphs are in non-contrastive distribution if their meanings (functions) are identical; such morphs constitute "free alternants" ("free variants") of the same morpheme, e.g., the suffixes "-ed" and "-t" in the verb forms "learned // learnt", or the suffixes "-s" and "-i" in the noun forms "genies" // genii". As for complementary distribution, it concerns different environments of formally different morphs which fulfil one and the same function; such morphs are termed "allo-morphs", e.g., there exist a few allomorphs of the plural suffix of the noun: "-en" (*children*), "-s" (*toys*), "-a" (*data*), "-es" (*crises*), "-i" (*genii*), the zero allomorph (*trout // trout*), etc.

The application of distributional analysis to the morphemic level results in the classification of morphemes on distributional lines. In accord with this classification a few "distributional morpheme types" are identified: free and bound morphemes, overt and covert morphemes, additive and replacive morphemes, continuous and discontinuous morphemes, segmental and supra-segmental morphemes.

Questions:

1. What is the correlation between notional and functional words?
2. What is the basic difference between the morpheme and the word as language units?
3. What is a morph?
4. What does the difference between a morpheme and an allomorph consist in?
5. What principles underlie the traditional study of the morphemic composition of the word?
6. What principles is the distributional analysis of morphemes based on?
7. What are the determining features of the three types of distribution?

I. Do the morphemic analysis of the words on the lines of the traditional and distributional classifications.

MODEL: Do the morphemic analysis of the word "inseparable".

On the lines of the traditional classification the word "inseparable" is treated as a three-morpheme word consisting of the root "-separ-", the prefix "in-" and the lexical suffix "-able".

On the lines of the distributional analysis the root "-separ-" is a bound, overt, continuous, additive morpheme; the prefix "in-" is bound, overt, continuous, additive; the suffix "-able" is bound, overt, continuous, additive.

- a) unmistakably, children's (books), disfigured, underspecified, surroundings, presume, kingdom, brotherhood, plentiful, imperishable, unprecedented, oxen, embodiment, outlandish;
- b) hammer, students' (papers), sing - sang - singing - singer, really, proficient - deficient - efficient, gooseberry, unreprieved, incomparable;
- c) quiet, perceptions, vvhewaterina, bell, unbelievably, glassy, uncommunicative, inexplicable, infamy, strenuousness;
- d) inconceivable, prefigurations, southernism, semidarkness, adventuresses, insurmountable, susceptibility, ineptitude, unfathomable, insufficiency, to prejudge, cranberry.

II. Define the type of the morphemic distribution according to which the given words are grouped.

MODEL: *insensible - incapable*

The morphs "-ible" and "-able" are in complementary distribution, as they have the same meaning but are different in their form which is explained by their different environments.

- a) impeccable, indelicate, illiterate, irrelevant; .b) undisputable, indisputable;
- c) published, rimmed;
- d) seams, seamless, seamy.

III. Group the words according to a particular type of morphemic distribution.

MODEL: *worked - bells - tells -fells - telling - spells - spelled - spelt -felled - bell.*

spells - spelled: the allomorphs "-s" and "-ed" are in contrastive distribution (= fells - felled);

bell - bells: the allomorph "-s" and the zero allomorph are in contrastive distribution;

spelt - spelled: the allomorphs "-t" and "-ed" are in non-contrastive distribution;

worked - spelled: the allomorphs "-ed" [t] and "-ed" [d] are in complementary distribution, etc.

- a) burning - burns - burned - burnt;
- b) dig - digs - digging - digged - dug - digger;
- "c) light - lit - lighted - lighting - lighter;
- d) worked - working - worker - workable - workoholic.

• IV. Group the words according to a particular type of morphemic distribution:

1. mice, leapt, appendices, kittens, cats, witches, leaping, children, leaped, leaps, formulae, stimuli, matrices, sanatoria;
2. geese, dogs, chickens, deer, mats, bade, bid, phenomena, formulae, formulas, genii, geniuses, scissors;
3. genera, brethren, brothers, trout, gestures, blessed, blest, tins, pots, matches, antennae, antennas;
4. anthems, classes, lice, handkerchiefs, handkerchieves, bereft, bereaved, grouse, cleaved, cleft, clove.

Selected Reader

1.

Francis W.N. **The Structure of American English**

Building Blocks of Speech: Morphemics

Morphs and Allomorphs

The linguist who has completed a phonemic analysis of a language [...] is in about the position a chemist would be in when he had succeeded in isolating the elements. We have somewhat of an advantage over the chemist, for while he must keep a hundred and two elements, we have only 45 phonemes to worry about. But this doesn't help us a great deal. The number of possible combinations of our 45 phonemes is for all practical purposes as great as the number of possible compounds of a hundred and two elements. There are so many, in fact, that only a small percentage of them are used in actual speech. Our next duty in studying the structure of English, therefore, is to see what combinations are used, and what they are like. The study of these matters is the province of morphemics. [...]

[...] we know that the phonemes by themselves have no meaning. Therefore, we conclude that the meaning must somehow be associated with the way the phonemes are combined. [...] Because these units have recognizable shape, we call them "morphs", a name derived from the Greek word for "shape" or "form". A morph, then, is a combination of phones that has a meaning. Note that each morph, like each phone, or each person or each day, happens only once and then it is gone. Another very similar combination of very similar phones may come along right after it; if so, we will call this second combination another morph similar to the first one. If we are sure enough of the similarity, which must include similarity of both the phones and the

meaning, we can say that the two morphs belong to the same morph-type or allomorph. An allomorph can thus be defined as a family of morphs which are alike in 2 ways: (1) in the allophones of which they are composed, and (2) in the meaning which they have. Or if we wish to be a bit more precise, we can define an allomorph as a class of phonemically and semantically identical morphs. [...] I We may sum up the material of this section, then, as follows:

. A morph is a meaningful group of phones which cannot be subdivided into smaller meaningful units.

i An allomorph is a class of morphs which are phonemically and semantically identical; that is, they have the same phonemes in the same order and the same meaning.

Morphemes

, With the recognition of the uniquely occurring morphs and their association in sets of identical allomorphs, we have made a good start toward moving up the ladder of linguistic structure to the next level. One thing seems certain even this early: we shall find a much greater number and variety of units on this level than we did on the phonemic level. The number of different combinations that can be made from 33 segmental phonemes is very large indeed. In fact, we can be sure that no matter how many allomorphs we may discover, they will be only a small percentage of the total mathematical possibility. It is here, in fact, that the great diversity and adaptability of language begins to show itself. And it is here that we must give up the hope of being as exhaustive in our treatment as we were in our discussions of phonetics and phonemics, that we cannot hope to list all the allomorphs in English. Instead we can deal only with representative types and illustrations of morphemic structure. [...]

Definition: A morpheme is a group of allomorphs that are semantically similar and in complementary distribution.

As we have suggested in the title of this chapter, morphemes are the building blocks out of which the meaningful utterances of speech are put together. A morpheme is a group of allomorphs, each of which is a combination of phonemes; but, as we pointed out in the first chapter, in structure of the kind the language shares with many other natural and man-made phenomena, the whole is more than the sum

of all its parts. When phonemes are organized into an allomorph, meaning is added to make a new thing, just as when hydrogen and oxygen are organized into water, a substance emerges that has new and different qualities which could not have been guessed from a knowledge of the qualities of its components. From here on up the ladder of increasingly complex linguistic structure, we shall observe increasingly complex and precise indications of meaning, for after all it is to communicate meanings that language had been created, therefore, morphemes, the smallest structural units possessing meaning, occupy a key position in linguistic structure. They are the fundamental building blocks out of which everything we say is built.

Inflection and Derivation

So far we have distinguished 2 principal types of morphemes: *bases*, like [rat], and *affixes*, which are either *prefixes*, like [re-], or *suffixes*, like [-es]. Before we can proceed to the identification of *words*, which is the ultimate goal of morphemics, we must look a bit more closely at the various types of affixes and the ways in which they occur. [...]

[We can differentiate between] two types of suffixes, a distinction that will be of considerable importance in our discussion of words, as well as when we come to discuss grammar. [...] These suffixes which must always come at the end of the morpheme groups to which they belong we will call inflectional suffixes. Those which may be followed by other suffixes we will call derivational suffixes. We can make a similar distinction between the types of paradigms in which these suffixes take part. Thus a paradigm like [agri: -agri:d], the second form of which consists of the stem plus the inflectional suffix [-ed], can be called an inflectional paradigm, and the form [эДГЫ] can be called an inflected form of *agree*. On the other hand, the pair [agri: -agri:mant] illustrates a derivational paradigm, and the form [agri:mant] is a derivative form or simply a derivative of *agree*.

The suffixes of present-day English can thus be divided into 2 groups, inflectional and derivational suffixes. No such distinction exists in the case of prefixes, however; they are all derivational. By means of prefix like [dis-], for instance, a whole new set of derivatives of *agree* can be made, corresponding to the derivatives already formed by adding suffixes. In turn, these new derivatives may add inflectional suffix-

es, so that we may get such forms as "disagreed", "disagreements", and "disagreeablenesses". Since in adding suffixes all derivational ones must be added to the base before the final inflectional one, we assume the same of prefixes. That is, inflection takes place on a level of structure higher than that of derivation. What this comes to is that, in terms of our examples, we treat a form like "disagreements" as consisting of {disagrimant} + [-es], rather than [dis-] + [agrimants]. Or, looking at it from the other direction, we may say that in analyzing linguistic forms into their constituent morphemes, we separate inflectional suffixes first, before we separate derivational prefixes or suffixes.

Bound Bases. If we study such combinations as "conclude", "conceive", and "consist", we can observe that the stem of a derivative is not always a free form; it may be bound. Thus, by comparing "conclude" with "occlude", "preclude", "include", and "exclude", we come to the conclusion that there is a morpheme [-klude], which serves as a stem for these various derivational forms. Yet we never find it as a free form; that is, we can find no environment into which [-klude] fits in [...].

1. Bound morphemes are of 3 types: suffixes, prefixes, and bound bases.
2. Suffixes are either inflectional or derivational.
 - a) Inflectional suffixes are always final in the morpheme groups to which they belong. They are of wide occurrence, making large form-classes. Their distribution tends to be regular.
 - b) Derivational suffixes may be final in the morpheme groups to which they belong, or they may be followed by other derivational suffixes or by inflectional suffixes. They are of relatively limited occurrence, and their distribution tends to be arbitrary.
3. Prefixes are always derivational.
4. Bound bases are morphemes which serve as stems for derivational forms but which never appear as free forms.

Questions:

1. What is W.N. Francis's definition of a morph?
2. In what way do E. Nida's and W.N. Francis's definitions of an allomorph differ?

3. In what does W.N. Francis see the difference between the two types of paradigms: inflectional and derivational?
4. What proves that inflection is relevant for a level of structure higher than that of derivation?
5. What types of bound morphemes does W.N. Francis identify?

2.

Nida E.

Morphology

The Descriptive Analysis of Words.
Introduction to Morphology

Morphology is the study of morphemes and their arrangements in forming words. Morphemes are the minimal meaningful units which may constitute words or parts of words, e.g. *re-*, *de-*, *un-*, *-ish*, *-ly*, *-ceive*, *-mand*, *-tie*, *boy-* and *like-* in the combinations *receive*, *demand*, *untie*, *boyish*, *likely*. The morpheme arrangements which are treated under the morphology of a language include all combinations that form words or parts of words. Combinations of words into phrases and sentences are treated under the syntax.

The Identification of Morphemes. Morphemes as Minimal Units

One of the first tasks which confront the linguist in examining a new language with a view to discovering and describing its structure is the identification of the minimal meaningful units of which the language is composed. These minimal units are called "morphemes", and in many instances they are readily recognized. For example, in the English words *boyish*, *maddening*, *condense*, *receive* and *up*, we have little difficulty in identifying the various component units: *boy-*, *-ish*, *mad-*, *-en*, *-ing*, *con-*, *-dense*, *re-*, *-ceive*, and *up*. With practically no complications we have thus "broken down" these longer expres-

sions (i.e. words) into their constituent parts. The process by which this is accomplished appears at first to be almost instinctive, but if we consider closely what we have done, we recognize that we compared words, or at least drew upon our knowledge of such comparisons. In order to identify the morphemes we must have certain partially similar forms in which we can recognize recurring particles. What we need for comparison would be provided by the following series: *boy*, *girlish*, *mad*, *fatten*, *fattening*, *constrain*, *density*, *return*, *deceive*, *start*, *up*. These forms contain each of the morphemes in a different situation. By this means we compare and isolate, and it is only by such Comparison with other forms that we can discover morphemes. [...]

a) Determination of Allomorphs by Complementary Distribution

The plural forms of English nouns illustrate a number of points in allomorph identification. The predominant pattern of formation consists in the suffixation of [-az - z - -s], but there are other ways of forming the plural. For example, the *ox* has in the plural the Suffix "-en". There is absolutely nothing in the phonological form of the stem *ox* to indicate that it does not take the regular plural suffixal set. A word such as *box*, which is phonologically similar, does take the suffix [-3z]. The only way in which we may know which words occur with which suffixes is to make a list, and the specific class for *oxen* contains just this one word. Since, however, the allomorphic set [-8Z - z - -s] and the form [-an] are in complementary distribution and **have** a common semantic distinctiveness (i.e. they are indicators of pluralization), we may combine all these forms as allomorphs. Some plural nouns do not differ in any overt way from the singular nouns, e.g. *sheep*, *trout*, *elk*, *salmon*, and *grouse*. For the sake of descriptive convenience we may say that these words occur with a zero suffix.

b) Basis of Complementation

The three types of plural formatives (1) [-az - z - -s], (2) [-an], and (3) [-0] (0 = zero) are all in complementary distribution. If they are combined as a single morpheme, then each of these forms constitutes an allomorph. Nevertheless, the relationships between these allomorphs are quite different because the basis of complementation is very different. The allomorphs [-az - z - -s] are in complementation

on the basis of phonological environment. This type of complementation we symbolize by ~. The complementation which exists between the three types of plural formatives is based upon the morphological environment. That is to say, we can describe the environment only by specifically identifying particular morphemes. This type of complementation we can symbolize by GO. Accordingly, the series noted above may be written as [-az - z - -s] oo [-an] <x> [-0]. [...]

d) Basic and Nonbasic Allomorphs

In treating phonologically defined allomorphs it is sometimes helpful to select a single form as phonologically basic, i.e. one from which the other allomorphs may be phonologically "derived". For example, of the three allomorphs [-az - z - -s] we may set up [-az] as phonologically basic. This is done in view of two types of data: (1) comparison with other similar series in English, e.g. [iz - z - -s], atonic forms of "is": *Rose's dead, Bill's dead, Dick's dead* [-az - z - -s], atonic forms of "has": *Rose's done it, Bill's done it, Dick's done it*, and (2) congruence with general patterns of phonological change, by which we note that it is "phonologically simpler" to explain or describe the loss of a phoneme than the addition of one. For the most part, however, we do not concern ourselves greatly about the rank of allomorphs as determined by their possible phonological relationships.

There is much greater value in determining the basic or nonbasic character of morphologically defined allomorphs. The basic allomorph is defined in terms of three characteristics: statistical predominance, productivity of new formations, and regularity of formation. An allomorph which occurs in more combinations than any other may generally be selected as being the basic form. A form which is statistically predominant is also likely to be productive of new combinations. For example, in English the so-called ^-plural is productive of new plural formations, e.g. *radios* and *videos*. Whether a form is regular (i.e. consists of phonologically defined allomorphs) may also be a factor in determining its allomorphic rank.

The determining of the basic forms of a morpheme makes it possible to refer to the entire morpheme by a single allomorphic form. For example, in discussing the English plural formatives we may refer to the allomorphic series as a whole by using the symbols

{ } to enclose the basic allomorph, e.g. {-az}. In many instances, there is no foundation for, or particular value in, attempting to set up a basic allomorph, but one may arbitrarily select a particular characteristic form of an allomorphic series and use it to refer to the entire series.

e) Types of Zero

When the structure of a series of related forms is such that there is a significant absence of a formal feature at some point or points in the series, we may describe such a significant absence as "zero". For example, with the words *sheep, trout, elk, salmon, and grouse*, there is a significant (meaningful) absence of a plural suffix. We determine that there is an absence because the total structure is such as to make us "expect" to find a suffix. This absence is meaningful, since the form with the absence (i.e. with zero) has a meaning which is different from the singular form, which has no such absence. A significant absence in an allomorphic series may be called an allomorphic zero.

Sometimes the general structure suggests a zero element. For example, in Totonac the subject pronouns are as follows:

k-	first person singular	-wi	first person plural
	-ti second person singular	-tit	second person plural
	- third person singular	-qu	third person plural

The third person singular is never indicated overtly, i.e. it has no obvious form. The absence of some other form is what actually indicated the third singular. Structurally, this is a type of significant absence; it is not, however, an allomorph zero, but, rather, a morpheme zero. That is to say, this significant absence does not occur in a series of allomorphs, but in a series of morphemes. Both types of zeros are structurally and descriptively pertinent, but should be carefully distinguished.²

It is possible to say that in English the nouns have a zero morpheme for singular and {-əŋ} for plural. This would mean that *sheep* in the singular would have a morphemic zero and in the plural an allomorphic zero. One should, however, avoid the indiscriminate use of morphemic zeros. Otherwise the description of a language becomes unduly sprinkled with zeros merely for the sake of structural congruence and balance.

Types of Morphemes as Determined by Their Distribution

The distribution of morphemes differentiates a great many classes of morphemes and combinations of morphemes: a) bound vs. free, b) roots vs. nonroots, c) roots vs. stems, d) nuclei vs. nonnuclei, e) nuclear vs. peripheral, [...] j) closing vs. nonclosing.

a) Bound vs. Free Forms

Bound morphemes never occur in isolation, that is are not regularly uttered alone in normal discourse³. Such bound forms include prefixes, suffixes, infixes, replacives [...], and some roots. Free morphemes are those which may be uttered in isolation, e.g. *boy*, *girl*, *man*. They always consist of a root. Stems, which consist of a root or a root plus some other morpheme, are by definition always bound, e.g. *-ceive* (cf. receive) and *recep-* (cf. reception), *manli-* (cf. manliness) and *formaliz-* (cf. formalizer). A distinction may be made between potentially free, actually free, and bound morphemes. For example, the word *boy* is actually free in such an utterance as *Boy!* (an exclamation of enthusiasm or a vocative, depending upon the intonation), but it is only potentially free in such a word as *boyish*. "Actual freedom", however, always involves some combining intonational morphemes. What we usually mean to indicate by distinguishing free morphemes from bound morphemes is the potential freedom of forms, not their actual free occurrences. Some morphemes are always bound, e.g. *-ceive*, whereas others may have a bound allomorph, e.g. [abil-] (the bound allomorph of [eibal] in *ability* [abiliti]).

b) Roots vs. Nonroots

Roots constitute the nuclei (or cores) of all words. There may be more than one root in a single word, e.g. *blackbird*, *catfish*, and *he-goat*, and some roots may have unique occurrences. For example, the unique element *cran-* in *cranberry* does not constitute the nucleus of any other words, but it occurs in the position occupied by roots; cf. *redberry*, *blueberry*, *blackberry*, and *strawberry*. All other distributional types of morphemes constitute nonroots.

In special contexts it is always possible to employ a bound form in isolation. For example, in response to the question, "What is this suffix?" one may reply "-ly".

It is not always easy to distinguish between roots and nonroots. This is because some roots become nonroots and vice versa. For example, the nonroot *-ism* in such words as *fatalism*, *pragmatism*, *fascism* has become a full root, e.g. *I'm disgusted with all these isms*. We may say that *ism* fills the position of both a root and a nonroot. As a suffix it is a nonroot, and as a noun it is a root. Conversely, the root *like* became the bound form *-ly*. Historically, a form such as *man-like* became *manly*, but a new formation *man-like* was reintroduced. There is no difficulty in this instance, because there is so little phonetic-semantic resemblance between *like* and *-ly*, and hence we consider them two morphemes. But in the words *disgraceful* and *bucketful* we recognize elements which have phonetic-semantic resemblance to the root/M//. There are actually three allomorphs: 1) [ful]/H//, 2) [bɪ] -ful having secondary morphological stress and combined with the preceding word with an open juncture as in [peil-fal] *pailful*, [bAkət-fal] *bucketful* and 3) [jal] with zero stress and combined with close juncture, as in [disgreisfal] *disgraceful*. Allomorph 1 occurs in syntactic constructions, and allomorph 2 combines in the same way as do compounding roots, but allomorph 3 combines in the same formal and structural manner as do suffixes, and hence it is a suffix. Combinations with allomorph 2 result in nouns, e.g. *bucketful*, *handful*, *cupful*, *spadeful* (typical root-plus-root constructions), but constructions with allomorph 3 result in adjectives, e.g. *plentiful*, *bountiful*, *careful*, *tasteful*, *spiteful* (typical root-plus-nonroot constructions). [...]

c) Roots vs. Stems

•" All bound roots are stems, but not all stems (they are all bound) are roots. A stem is composed of 1) the nucleus, consisting of one or more roots, or 2) the nucleus plus any other nonroot morphemes, except the last "structurally added" morpheme that results in a word. The form *man-* in *manly* is at the same time a root and a stem. The form *breakwater* is the stem of *breakwaters*, but it is not a single root. There are two root morphemes, *break* and *water*. The stem [abil-] in *ability* is a bound alternant of a root morpheme [eibal co əbɪ]. A form such as *men's* may never constitute a stem since the genitive morpheme *-s* always closes any morphological construction in English.

d) Nuclei vs. Nonnuclei

The nucleus of a morphological construction consists of 1) a root or 2) a combination of roots (including possible nonroots attributive to respective roots). The nonnucleus is made up of nonroots. In the construction *boyishness* the element *boy* is the nucleus and *-ishness* constitutes the nonnucleus. In *breakwaters* the nucleus *breakwater* consists of two roots. [...]

e) Nuclear vs. Peripheral Structures

A nuclear structure consists of or contains the nucleus, or constitutes the head of a subordinate endocentric construction. A peripheral morpheme usually consists of a nonroot and is always "outside" of the nuclear constituent. In the word *formal* the nuclear element *isform-* and the peripheral element *-al*. In the word *formalize* the nuclear structure *isformal-* and the peripheral element is *-ize*. "Nuclear" and "peripheral" are simply names for the immediate constituents. [...]

j) Closing vs. Nonclosing Morphemes

Certain morphemes "close" the construction to further formation. For example, in English the use of a genitive suffix closes the noun to further suffixation. No suffix follows the genitive.

Questions:

1. How does E. Nida define a morpheme?
2. What does the procedure of discovering morphemes consist in?
3. What are the criteria of allomorph identification?
4. Why is it linguistically relevant to speak of the zero allomorph of the plural suffix?
5. What relationships can underlie allomorphic sets?
6. What is the ground for considering the allomorph [-92] as phonologically basic?
7. What are the criteria of qualifying a morphologically defined allomorph basic?
8. What are the linguistic implications of the significant zero? What is an allomorphic zero?
9. What is the difference between a morphemic zero and an allomorphic zero?
10. What are the main types of distributionally defined morphemes, according to E. Nida?

3.

**Harris Z. Structural
Linguistics**

Morphology

The sequences (not necessarily contiguous) of phonemes or of components which represent the flow of speech are now divided into new segments each of which is uniquely identifiable in terms of phonemes (or components). This is done in such a way that each of these parts is independent of the others in its occurrence over a stretch of any length (covering the whole utterance). The criteria for determining independence are selected in such a way as to yield a number of parts (morphemic segments or alternants), or rather the occurrences of such parts in stated environments, are then grouped into classes (called morphemes) in such a way that all the members of a particular morpheme either substitute freely for each other or are complements in corresponding sections of the variant. Members of each morpheme can then constitute a class called a morphophoneme.

We may therefore say that each morpheme is composed directly of a sequence of morphophonemes, each of which in turn is a class consisting of one or more complementary phonemes or components. Each morpheme has only one morphophonemic constituency but the distinctions between sounds are in general only in one-many correspondence with the distinctions between morphophonemes: two distinct morphophonemic sequences may represent identical segment (or phoneme) sequences; such different morphophonemic sequences are phonemically equivalent.

It may be noted here that the morphemes are not distinguished directly on the basis of their meaning or meaning differences, but by the result of distributional operations upon the data of linguistics (this data including the meaning - like distinctions between utterances which are not repetitions of each other). In this sense, the morphemes may be regarded either as expressions of the limitations of distribution of phoneme, or (what ultimately amounts to the same thing) as elements se-

lected in such a way that when utterances are described in terms of them, many utterances are seen to have similar structure.

The morphemes are grouped into morpheme classes, or classes of morphemes-in-environments, such that the distribution of one member of a class is similar to the distribution of any other member of that class. These morpheme classes, and any sequences of morpheme classes which are substitutable for them within the utterance, are now grouped into larger classes (called position or resultant classes) in such a way that all the morpheme sequences (including sequences of one morpheme) in a position class substitute freely for each other in those positions in the utterances within which that class occurs. All subsidiary restrictions upon occurrence, by virtue of which particular member of one class or sub-class occurs only with particular members out of another, are stated in a series of equations. The final resultant classes for the corpus, i.e. the most inclusive position classes, serve as the elements for a compact statement of the structure of utterances.

It is possible, however, to study other relations among the morpheme classes than those of substitution within the utterance. The investigation of the relations between a class and sequences which contain it lead to a hierarchy of inclusion levels and to the analysis of immediate constituents. The relations between one class and any other class which accompanies it in an utterance may be expressed by long components of morphemes or of morpheme classes. And the investigation of substitution within stretches shorter than a whole utterance leads to morphological constructions and hierarchies of increasingly enclosing constructions.

The Criterion of Relevance: Distribution

Descriptive linguistics, as the term has come to be used, is a particular field of inquiry which deals not with the whole of speech activities, but with the regularities in certain features of speech. These regularities are in the distributional relations among the features of speech in question, i.e. the occurrence of these features relatively to each other within utterances. It is of course possible to study various relations among parts or features of speech, e.g. similarities (or other relations) in sound or meaning, or genetic relations in the history of

the language. The main research of descriptive linguistics, and the only relation which will be accepted as relevant in the present survey, is the distribution or arrangement within the flow of speech of some parts or features relatively to others.

The present survey is thus explicitly limited to questions of distribution, i.e. of the freedom of occurrence of portions of an utterance relatively to each other. All terms and statements will be relative to this criterion. For example, if the phonemic representation of speech is described as being one-one, this does not mean that if a particular sound *x* is associated with a phoneme *Y*, then when we are given the phoneme *Y* we associate with it the original particular sound *x*. The one-one correspondence means only that if a particular sound *x* in a given position is associated with a phoneme *Y* (or represented by the symbol *Y*), then when we are given the phoneme *Y* we will associate with it, in the stated position, some sound *x'*, *x''*, which is substitutable for the original *x* (i.e. has the same distribution as *x*). In the stated position, the symbol *Y* is used for any sound which is substitutable for *x*, *x'*, etc.

In both the phonologic and the morphologic analyses the linguist first faces the problem of setting up relevant elements. To be relevant, these elements must be set up on a distributional basis: *x* and *y* are included in the same element *A* if the distribution of *x* relative to the other element *B*, *C*, etc., is in some sense the same as the distribution of *y*.

The distribution of an element is the total of all environments in which it occurs, i.e. the sum of all the (different) positions (or occurrences) of an element relative to the occurrences of other elements.

Two utterances or features will be said to be linguistically, descriptively, or distributionally equivalent if they are identical as to their linguistic elements and the distributional relations among these elements.

Questions:

1. **What is morphophoneme?**
2. **What are the criteria of differentiating morphemes?**
3. **What does the notion of distribution imply?**
4. **What features (or utterances) can be described as distributionally equivalent?**

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Seminar 3**CATEGORIAL STRUCTURE
OF THE WORD**

1. **The basic notions concerned with the analysis of the categorial structure of the word: grammatical category, opposition, paradigm. Grammatical meaning and means of its expression.**
2. **The Prague linguistic school and its role in the development of the systemic conception of language. The theory of oppositions, types of oppositions: privative, gradual, equipollent; binary, ternary, etc. Oppositions in grammar.**
3. **The notion of oppositional reduction. Types of oppositional reduction: neutralization and transposition.**
4. **Synthetical and analytical forms. The principle of identifying an analytical form. The notion of suppletivity.**

1. Notion of Opposition. Oppositions in Morphology

The most general meanings rendered by language and expressed by systemic correlations of word-forms are interpreted in linguistics as categorial grammatical meanings. The forms rendering these meanings are identified within definite paradigmatic series.

The grammatical category is a system of expressing a generalized grammatical meaning by means of paradigmatic correlation of grammatical forms. The ordered set of grammatical forms expressing a categorial function constitutes a paradigm. The paradigmatic correlations of grammatical forms in a category are exposed by grammat-

ical oppositions which are generalized correlations of lingual forms by means of which certain functions are expressed.

There exist three main types of qualitatively different oppositions: "privative", "gradual", "equipollent". By the number of members contrasted, oppositions are divided into binary and more than binary. The privative binary opposition is formed by a contrastive pair of members in which one member is characterized by the presence of a certain feature called the "mark", while the other member is characterized by the absence of this differential feature. The gradual opposition is formed by the degree of the presentation of one and the same feature of the opposition members. The equipollent opposition is formed by a contrastive group of members which are distinguished not by the presence or absence of a certain feature, but by a contrastive pair or group in which the members are distinguished by different positive (differential) features.

The most important type of opposition in morphology is the binary privative opposition. The privative morphological opposition is based on a morphological differential feature which is present in its strong (marked) member and is absent in its weak (unmarked) member. This featuring serves as the immediate means of expressing a grammatical meaning, e.g. we distinguish the verbal present and past tenses with the help of the privative opposition whose differential feature is the dental suffix "-(e)d": "*work // worked*": "non-past (-) // past (+)".

Gradual oppositions in morphology are not generally recognized; they can be identified as a minor type at the semantic level only, e.g. the category of comparison is expressed through the gradual morphological opposition: "*clean // cleaner // cleanest*".

Equipollent oppositions in English morphology constitute a minor type and are mostly confined to formal relations. In context of a broader morphological interpretation one can say that the basis of morphological equipollent oppositions is suppletivity, i.e. the expression of the grammatical meaning by means of different roots united in one and the same paradigm, e.g. the correlation of the case forms of personal pronouns (*she // her, he // him*), the tense forms of the irregular verbs (*go // went*), etc.

As morphological gradual and equipollent oppositions can be reduced to privative oppositions, a word-form can be characterized

by a bundle of differential features (strong features) exposing its categorial properties.

2. Oppositional Reduction

Oppositional reduction, or oppositional substitution, is the usage of one member of an opposition in the position of the counter-member. From the functional point of view there exist two types of Oppositional reduction: neutralization of the categorial opposition {fed its transposition.

' In case of neutralization one member of the opposition becomes fully identified with its counterpart. As the position of neutralization is usually filled in by the weak member of the opposition due to its more general semantics, this kind of oppositional reduction is stylistically colourless, e.g.: "Man is sinful." It is an example of neutralization of the opposition in the category of number because in the sentence the fioun "man" used in the singular (the weak member of the opposition) fulfils the function of the plural counterpart (the strong member of the Imposition), for it denotes the class of referents as a whole.

Transposition takes place when one member of the opposition placed in the contextual conditions uncommon for it begins to simultaneously fulfil two functions - its own and the function of its counterpart. As a result, transposition is always accompanied by different stylistic effects, e.g.: "Jake had that same desperate look his father had, and he was always getting sore at himself and wanting other people to be happy. Jake was always asking him to smile" (W. Saroyan).

In the cited example the transponized character of the continuous form of the verb is revealed in its fulfilling two functions - one of them is primary, the other is secondary; the primary function of the Said verb form is to denote a habitual action, while its secondary function consists in denoting an action presented in the process of development. Due to the transpositional use of the aspect verbal form, the analyzed context becomes stylistically marked.¹ The study of the oppositional reduction has shown that it is effected by means of a very complex and subtle lingual mechanism which involves the inherent properties of lexemes, lexical and grammatical distribution of the replaced word-form and numerous situational factors, such as the aim of communication, the speaker's wish either to

identify or to characterize the denoted object, to reveal some facts or to conceal them, to sound either flat or expressive, the speaker's intention to evaluate the discussed objects, the interlocutors' sharing or non-sharing of the needed information, etc. All these factors turn oppositional reduction into a very powerful means of text stylization.

Questions:

1. In what way are the two notions - "grammatical category" and "opposition" - interconnected?
2. What grammatical elements constitute a paradigm?
3. What are the differential features of privative, gradual, and equipollent oppositions?
4. What enables linguists to consider the privative binary opposition as the most important type of oppositions?
5. What makes neutralization stylistically colourless?
6. What ensures a stylistic load of transposition?

I. Define the types of the oppositions and interpret the categorial properties of their members in privative terms.

MODEL: *play -played*

The words "play - played" make up a binary privative opposition. The strong member is "played"; its differential feature is the denotation of a past action. The marker of this categorial meaning is the grammatical suffix "-ed".

- a. k-Q, m - w, s-n, a:-ə-i:
- b. he - she, he - they, he - it, we - they;
- c. intelligent - more intelligent - the most intelligent;
- d. I understand - I am understood;
- e. tooth - teeth, pincers - a pair of pincers;
- f. am - is;
- g. he listens - he is listening;
- h. mother - room.

II. Build up the oppositions of the categorial forms and define the types of the oppositions:

efficient, have defined, they, information, he, more efficient, vessel, we, define, the most efficient, are defined, I, vessels, will define, bits of information, defined, less efficient, a most efficient.

III. Point out in the given situations the reduced grammatical forms, state the type of the oppositional reduction.

MODEL: *You must remember that your son will be a what-you-call-*

- *him.* In this sentence we observe a transponized use of the phrase (the opposition is "word - phrase") accompanied by a stylistic effect: "a what-you-call-him" conveys a connotation of contempt and belongs to a colloquial register.

a)

- 1) Morning! Brilliant sun pouring into the patio, on the hibiscus flowers and the fluttering yellow and green rags of the banana-trees (Lawrence).
- 2) Did you ever see such a thing in your lives? (Coppard)
- 3) Women are Scheherazades by birth, predilection, instinct; and arrangement of the vocal cords (O.Henry).
- 4) "On the left of me was something that talked like a banker, and on my right was a young fellow who said he was a newspaper artist." (O.Henry)
- 5) The glow remained in him, the fire burned, his heart was fierce like a sun (Lawrence).
- 6) She had been brought out of her simple yeses and noes and had grown used to fulsome explanations (Forster).
- 7) One of these was a remarkably well-made man of five-and-thirty, with a face as English as that of the old gentleman I have just sketched was something else; a noticeably handsome face, fresh-coloured, fair and frank, with firm, straight features, a lively grey eye, and the rich adornment of a chestnut beard (James).
- 8) It was a beautiful sunny day for the wedding, a muddy earth but a bright sky (Lawrence).

b)

- 1) She is too good, too kind, too clever, too learned, too accomplished, too everything (James).
- 2) That evening at knocking-off time she sends for me to come up to her apartment. I expected to have to typewrite about 2,000 words of notes-of-hand, liens, and contracts, with a ten-cent tip in sight; but I went (O.Henry).
- 3) She reminisced about Henrietta's squeezes, her impromptu dances where she loved to do the polka and it was Wilson who could pick up the "do-you-remembers" and add onto them with memories of her own (Forster).
- 4) It was a wild, cold, unreasonable night of March, with a pale moon, lying on her back as though the wind had tilted her (Stevenson).

- 5) And now, lo, the whole world could be divested of its garment, the garment could lie there shed away intact, and one could stand in a new world, a new earth, naked in a new naked universe (Lawrence).
- 6) "So you have come! And you have walked, walked all the way? Oh, imagine walking in so much sun and dust!" (Lawrence)
- 7) In the distance, Peconic Bay shimmered beneath a cloudless pale-blue sky that was backlit in gold (Stone).
- 8) She was different - there was a breach between them. They were hostile worlds (Lawrence).

c)

- 1) Twenty dollars a week doesn't go far (O. Henry).
- 2) Many a happy hour she had spent planning for something nice for him (O. Henry).
- 3) Outside it was getting dark. The street-light came on outside the window. The two men at the counter read the menu. From the other end of the counter Nick Adams watched them (Hemingway).
- 4) The aim of the aeroplanes was becoming more precise minute by minute, and only two of the anti-aircraft guns were still retaliating (Fitzgerald).
- 5) The waters leaped up at him for an instant, but after the first shock it was all warm and friendly ... (Fitzgerald).
- 6) ... for weeks they had drunk cocktails before meals like Americans, wines and brandies like Frenchmen, beer like Germans, whisky-and-soda like the English ... (Fitzgerald).
- 7) "I'm giving a cocktail party tonight for a few old friends and of course you've got to come." (Saroyan)
- 8) But she would remember it. "Where's the what's-its-name?" she would ask. "Don't tell me you forgot the what's-its-name?" (Thurber)

d)

- 1) He just stood there for a minute, looking at Myra with a peculiar little smile on his face; and then says to her, slowly, and kind of holding on to his words with his teeth: "Oh, I don't know. Maybe I could if I tried!" (O. Henry)
- 2) ... it was not Italian she was speaking, it was a bastard language of a little Spanish and a little something that Clementina had never heard before (Cheever).
- 3) The most pathetic sight in New York - except the manners of the rush-hour crowds - is the dreary march of the hopeless army of Mediocrity. Here Art is no benignant goddess, but a Circe who turns her wooers into mewling Toms and Tabbies who linger about the doorstep of her

- ... abode, unmindful of the flying brickbats and boot-jacks of the critics
r| (O. Henry).
- 4) When the planes had made certain that the beleaguered possessed no further resources, they would land and the dark and glittering reign of the Washingtons would be over (Fitzgerald).
 - 5) "So they draws up open-air resolutions and has them O.K.'d by the
!• Secretary of Agriculture, Mr. Comstock and the Village Improvement
„§ Mosquito Exterminating Society of South Orange, N.J."
(O. Henry)
 - :-6) "But I hadn't much faith in looks, so I was certainly surprised when she
l|j pulls out a document with the great seal of the United States on it, and
•J.,' "William Henry Humble" in a fine, big hand on the back." (O. Henry)
 - f,7) Riding to work in the morning, Francis saw the girl walk down the aisle
y of the coach. He was surprised; he hadn't realized that the school she
went to was in the city, but she was carrying books, she seemed to be
going to school (Cheever).
 - 8) He would find him to-morrow and ask for the position. He would be
' somebody in the world (O. Henry).

Selected Reader

1.

Bybee J. Essay on Irrealis as a Grammatical Category

! Grammatical Meaning in American Structuralism

: While it sometimes seems that linguistic theory and linguistic description can exist and develop independently of one another, every Description is based, at least implicitly, on a theory of language. This is just as true of descriptions of grammatical meaning as it is of descriptions of grammatical form. The influence of theory on the description of grammatical meaning may not seem so very obvious, however, because explicit attention to the nature and organization of grammatical meaning has hardly been the central focus of theoretical activity in this century. Although grammatical meaning has not attracted as much

attention as syntactic theories, there have been major swings in the way it has been viewed, with consequent effects on the substance of grammatical description. What follows is a brief summary of the major changes in such theories in American linguistics.

The work of Boas, Sapir and Whorf on the grammatical systems of Native American languages in 1920's and 1930's show grammatical meaning being treated with great sensitivity and respect. The exciting discovery emerging from the newly-available data on a variety of native languages of North America was that the concepts that require obligatory grammatical expression differ across languages, with some languages not using many of the traditional categories of European languages, such as obligatory number or gender, and instead requiring clauses to carry information about evidentiality or temporal distinctions much more elaborated than those familiar from European languages (Boas 1949: 206-207). A tension between the emphasis on the similarities among languages and their differences is evident in the work of this period, with Whorf making his mark by arguing that the Hopi tense/aspect/modality system is vastly different from anything imaginable in European languages (1938), while Sapir (1921) deftly juggles differences and similarities among languages in working out a typology of both morphological form and grammatical meaning. Still the differences among languages seemed profound, and it seemed natural that such differences would reflect equally profound differences in the ways that peoples of different cultures conceptualize reality.

This early start was not, however, followed by a great flowering of interest in grammatical meaning and its cultural and cognitive consequences. Instead American linguists turned away from the study of meaning to concentrate on the study of form, led by Leonard Bloomfield, who already in his 1933 book *Language* argued that as scientific investigators, linguists have no direct access to meaning. The descriptive tradition that followed Bloomfield attended very little to the meaning of grammatical morphemes in the languages being described. A greater emphasis on the differences among languages arose. Beyond the categories of person and number, there seemed to be no hope that languages would carve up reality in similar ways, and a plethora of grammatical terminology arose for categories of tense, aspect and mood, making such categories appear even more different cross-linguistically. The autonomy of gram-

mar from meaning is asserted not only by Chomsky (1957), but also by H. Veinreich (1963), and finds expression in the descriptive tradition of tagmemics, in which morphemes are identified, not by meaning, but by their place in an elaborate numbering system which indexes their distribution (an example is Turner [1958]).

The Influence of Jakobson

While American Structuralism had taken a turn away from the consideration of grammatical meaning and any possible form-meaning covariation, Roman Jakobson, in an effort that spanned five decades, articulated a rigorous theory of grammatical meaning based on Structuralist principles. Although not many descriptions exist that adhere strictly to Jakobson's theory, some of his principles have become so basic to linguistic thought that they have been assumed uncritically in descriptions of both generative and more traditional leanings. The most important of these principles is that of the semantic Opposition, which gives rise to designators of grammatical meaning, such as "past/nonpast", "future/nonfuture" and "realis/irrealis".

The notion of opposition has several consequences for the analysis of grammatical meaning. First, Jakobson proposed that all grammatical oppositions were essentially binary and categories having more than two members could be analyzed with sets of binary features. This proposal was based on a firm belief that the binary opposition represents a logical operation very basic to human cognition and is furthermore essential to language in that it simplifies multilateral oppositions (Jakobson 1972 [1990]).

Second, it follows from the notion of opposition that a grammatical morpheme (henceforth abbreviated to *gram*) takes its meaning from the system of oppositions to which it belongs. Thus a present tense in a language that also has a past and a future will be different from a present tense in a language that has a past but no future. In this view, grams do not have inherent meaning, but rather are defined by their relation to other members of the opposition.

Third, the categories of a Jakobsonian grammar are Aristotelean: the boundaries between members of the category are discrete and the features defining the members are necessary and sufficient conditions.

Thus the semantic space covered by a gram is homogeneous - each occurrence of the gram represents its features of meaning equally as well as any other occurrence.

Fourth, each gram has one abstract, invariant meaning, a meaning that is present in all contexts of use. Additional nuances or variations in meaning are attributable to items in the context and are not part of the meaning that is derived from the sets of binary features defining the meaning of a gram.

These principles have found their way into the set of assumptions that linguists use when approaching the analysis of the grammatical system of a language, and they show up to varying degrees in descriptive work. For instance, it is common to see labels such as "past/non-past" and "future/non-future" used in grammatical descriptions, or even more explicitly binary features [+/- past], [+/-future], [+/-continuous], etc. (e.g. Li 1973) in place of fuller descriptions of the range of use of grams.

The assumption that a gram has one abstract meaning that is manifest in all its occurrences is, of course, an assumption that is essential to linguistic analysis: one could not discern the meanings of morphemes, either lexical or grammatical, without assuming that they are constant across conditions. Only in this way can one discover the cases in which meanings are not constant. It is the treatment of meanings that do differ in context, e.g. the use of the English Past Tense in //^/-clauses yielding a hypothetical, but not past, sense, that is controversial. A Jakobsonian analysis would insist that English Past Tense cannot mean "past" but rather must mean "remote from present reality" since it is used in situations such as hypothetical ones, which are not past (Steele 1975, Langacker 1978).

On the other hand, two other tenets of Jakobson's theory are not generally applied descriptively. First, Jakobson considered grammatical meaning to apply only to obligatory categories (Jakobson 1972 [1990]) thus excluding from his theory of grammar non-obligatory items such as auxiliary constructions, particles and derivational affixes. This exclusion leaves only a small core of grammatical categories to be analyzed, and indeed, in some languages, none at all. Most descriptions, to be complete, must also attend to the non-obligatory but still grammaticized items and constructions. In fact, many descriptions omit a discussion of obligatoriness altogether, perhaps

because it is very difficult in many cases to decide whether or not a category is obligatory.

Another aspect of Jakobson's theory, which he regarded as of utmost importance, but which has not been strictly adhered to in analyses, is the asymmetry between the members of a binary set. When two categories are in opposition, one may signal the existence of a feature of meaning, but the other does not signal the absence of that feature; it simply does not say whether the feature is present or not. Thus for Jakobson, the negative value for a feature is always the unmarked value. While the notion of markedness has pervaded all branches of linguistics, it has also generalized far beyond the strict definition assigned it by Jakobson. For most linguists today, the unmarked member of a category, or the unmarked construction type or interpretation is the one judged to be most common and most usual, either in the language or cross-linguistically.

Questions:

1. What are the central claims of American structuralism?
2. What does the autonomy of grammar from meaning asserted by American structuralism find its expression in?
3. What are the main points of the Jakobsonian view of grammatical categories?
4. How does R. Jakobson treat the notion of opposition?
5. What are R. Jakobson's principles of treating a gram?
6. How do linguists treat the unmarked member nowadays?

2.

Wierzbicka A. A Semantic Basis for Grammatical Typology

To compare languages (or anything else) we need a *tertium comparationis* (that is, a common measure). Typologists have often recognized this basic point, on a theoretical level. For example, Faltz, in his cross-linguistic study of reflexives, writes:

Before settling in to an examination of a phenomenon in many different languages, it is necessary to have some language-independent idea of what that phenomenon is, so that we know what to begin to look for. The term *reflexive* must therefore be provided with some universal content. (Faltz 1985: 1)

By using as its tools meaning-based categories such as "noun", "numeral", "plural", "past", "imperative", "conditional", or "reflexive", linguistic typology has also recognized that in the case of language the necessary *tertium comparationis* is provided by meaning. However, categories of this kind were usually not defined, or if they were defined, their definitions were not adhered to, and in fact, whatever the definitions, the actual analysis was carried out on the basis of intuition and common sense. [...]

American structuralists such as Zellig Harris or Charles Fries, who refrained from using any traditional grammatical labels and from referring to any traditional grammatical categories (cf., e.g. Harris 1946 and 1951; or Fries 1952), were therefore more consistent and more rigorous in their approach to linguistic analysis than either traditional grammarians or present-day typologists. They did not, however, develop linguistic typology.

Languages differ in form and structure, but they all encode meaning. The meanings encoded in different languages are also different, but they often share a common core, and they are all based on the same set of innate and universal semantic "atoms", or semantic primitives, which appear to be lexicalized in all languages of the world. (Cf. Wierzbicka 1991a, 1991b, 1992; Goddard, Wierzbicka, 1994.) Generally speaking, different languages encode in their lexicons and in their grammars different configurations of these semantic primitives. Some configurations, however, appear to be very widespread, and to play an important role in the grammar of countless and most diverse languages of the world. I believe that recurring configurations of this kind represent meanings which are particularly important in human conceptualization of the world. It is an important task of linguistics as a discipline to identify such meanings; by fulfilling this task, linguistics can contribute in a significant way to the study of humankind, transcending the boundaries of academic disciplines.

Among the meanings which linguistic investigations show to be grammaticalized most widely in the languages of the world, we can recognize certain scenarios such as the "transitive" scenario or the "reflexive" scenario; and we can see that large parts of grammars are organized around such scenarios, and can be described with reference to them. Other widely grammaticalized meanings are of a different nature. All types of meanings, however, can be rigorously described and insightfully compared in terms of the same set of universal semantic primitives and of the metalanguage based on them. I believe that without such a metalanguage, grammatical typology has no firm basis and no precise tools with which it could fully achieve its objectives.

If we recognize that grammar encodes meaning we have to draw from this the necessary consequences. We have to sharpen our methodological tools, define our terminology, and ask ourselves exactly what we are doing. When we do this, we will be rewarded, I think, not only by greater rigour but also by better insight.

(pp. 202-204)

Questions:

1. What unites all the existing languages and what makes them different, according to A. Wierzbicka?
2. What method of analyzing grammatical meanings does A. Wierzbicka propose?

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Seminar 4

GRAMMATICAL CLASSES OF WORDS

1. Principles of grammatical classification of words. The traditional classification of words.
2. The syntactico-distributional classification of words.
3. The theory of three ranks (O. Jespersen).
4. The notion of lexical paradigm of nomination.
5. Functional words and their properties in the light of
 - the traditional classification,
 - the syntactico-distributional classification,
 - the mixed approach.
6. Pronouns and their properties in the light of
 - the traditional classification,
 - the syntactico-distributional classification,
 - the mixed approach.

1. Principles of Grammatical Classification of Words

In modern linguistic descriptions different types of word classes are distinguished: grammatical, etymological, semantic, stylistic, etc., one can presume, though, that no classification can be adequate to its aim if it ignores the grammatical principles. It is not accidental that the theoretical study of language in the history of science began with the attempts to identify and describe grammatical classes of words called "parts of speech".

In Modern Linguistics parts of speech are differentiated either by a number of criteria, or by a single criterion.

The polydifferential ("traditional") classification of words is based on the three criteria: semantic, formal, and functional. The semantic criterion presupposes the evaluation of the generalized (categorical) meaning of the words of the given part of speech. The formal criterion provides for the exposition of all formal features (specific inflectional and derivational) of all the lexemic subsets of a particular part of speech. The functional criterion concerns the typical syntactic functions of a part of speech. Contractedly the set of these criteria is referred to as "meaning, form, function".

2. Traditional Classification of Words

In accord with the traditional criteria of meaning, form, and function, words on the upper level of classification are divided into notional and functional.

In English to the notional parts of speech are usually referred the noun, the adjective, the numeral, the pronoun, the verb, the adverb.

On the lines of the traditional classification the adverb, e.g., is described in the following way: the adverb has the categorial meaning of the secondary property (i.e. the property of process or another property); the forms of the degrees of comparison for qualitative adverbs, the specific derivative suffixes; the syntactic functions of various adverbial modifiers.

The notional parts of speech are the words of complete nominative value; in the utterance they fulfil self-dependent functions of naming and denoting things, phenomena, their substantial properties. Opposed to the notional parts of speech are the functional words which are words of incomplete nominative value, but of absolutely essential relational (grammatical) value. In the utterance they serve as all sorts of mediators.

To the basic functional parts of speech in English are usually referred the article, the preposition, the conjunction, the particle, the modal word, the interjection. As has been stated elsewhere, functional words are limited in number. On the lines of the traditional classification they are presented by the list, each of them requiring its own, individual description.

3. Syntactic Classification of Words

The syntactic (monodifferential) classification of words is based on syntactic featuring of words only. The syntactic classification of words, in principle, supplements the three-criteria classification specifying the syntactic features of parts of speech. For the Russian language the basic principles of the syntactic classification of words were outlined in the works of A.M. Peshkovski. In English the syntactico-distributional classification of words was worked out by L. Bloomfield and his followers Z. Harris and especially Ch.C. Fries.

The syntactico-distributional classification of words is based on the study of their combinability by means of substitution tests. As a result of this testing, a standard model of four main syntactic positions of notional words was built up. These positions are those of the noun, verb, adjective, and adverb. Pronouns are included into the corresponding positional classes as their substitutes. Words incapable to occupy the said main syntactic positions are treated as functional words.

4. The Three-Layer Classification of Words (M. Blokh)

The evaluation of the differential features of both cited classifications allows us to work out a classification of the lexicon presenting some essential generalizations about its structure (Blokh 2000: 44-48). The semantico-grammatical analysis of the lexicon shows that it is explicitly divided into two parts: the notional words and the functional words. The open character of the notional part and the closed character of the functional part have the status of a formal grammatical feature. Between these two parts there is an intermediary field of semi-functional words.

The unity of the notional lexemes, as well as their division into four infinitely large classes, is demonstrated in the inter-class system of derivation. This inter-class system of derivation is presented as a four-stage series permeating the lexicon; it has been given the name of "Lexical Paradigm of Nomination". For example: "fancy - to fancy - fanciful - fancifully".

As the initial position in a particular nomination paradigm can be occupied by a lexeme of any word class, one can define the concrete "derivational perspective" of the given series in accord with a

part of speech status of the constituent in the initial position. Thus, in the following paradigm of nomination the derivational perspective is verbal (V ->): "to decide - decision - decisive - decisively".

The universal character of the nomination paradigm is sustained by suppletivity, both lexemic and phrasemic, e.g.: "an end - to end - final - finally" (lexemic), "gratitude - grateful - gratefully - to express gratitude" (phrasemic).

The lexical paradigm of nomination has a parallel substitutional representation: "one, it, they... - to do, to make, to act ... - such, same, similar... - thus, so, there..."

In consequence of the identification of the said pronominal paradigm representation, the functional part of the lexicon is to be divided into two sets: first, the pronominal; second, the functional proper, or "specifier".

Thus, the general classification of the lexicon, not denying or in any sense depreciating the merits of their classification, but rather deriving its essential propositions from their positive data, is to be presented in a brief outline in the following way:

- the whole of the lexicon is divided into three layers;
- the first, the upper layer, having an open character, is formed by four classes of notional words; since these words have full nominative value, they may be referred to as "names": respectively, substance-names (nouns), process-names (verbs), primary property names (adjectives), secondary property names (adverbs);
- the names are consolidated into an integral system by the lexical paradigm of nomination - the paradigmatic series whose function is to form and distribute any given word root among the four lexical class-types (parts of speech);
- the second, intermediate layer, having a closed character is formed by pronominal words or "substitutes of names"; here belong pronouns and replacer lexemes of all kinds (noun-, verb-, adjective-, adverbial-replacers), words of broad meaning (cf.: thing, matter, etc.), and also numbers;
- the third, the lower layer, having a closed character, is formed by functional words proper, or "specifiers of names": determiners, prepositions, conjunctions, particles, etc.

: The function of the second and third layers, within the framework of their specifying role, is to organize together with the categorial means of grammar, the production of speech utterances out of the direct naming means of language (the first layer).

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Questions:

1. What is the grammatical essence of the term "part of speech"?
2. What are the strong and weak points of the traditional (polydifferential) classification of words?
3. What are the advantages and disadvantages of the syntactico-distributional (monodifferential) classification of words?
4. What are the main principles of the three-layer classification of words?
5. What parts does the whole of the lexicon consist of?
6. What is the differential feature of the notional part of the lexicon?
7. What is the notional part of the lexicon represented by? What demonstrates the unity of the notional part of the lexicon?
8. What is the role of suppletivity in the lexical paradigm of nomination?
9. What functions do the words of the second and third layers of the lexicon perform in the production of speech?

I. Build up the lexical paradigm of nomination.

MODEL: *high: high - height - heighten - highly (high)*

- 1) fool, to criticize, slow, fast;
- 1) new, work, to fraud, out;
- 3) to cut, sleep, brief, hard;
- 4) down, beauty, to deceive, bright.

II. Define part-of-speech characteristics of the underlined words. Analyze them according to O. Jespersen's theory of three ranks. Give your reasons.

1. I don't know why it should be, I am sure; but the sight of another man asleep in bed when I am up, maddens me (Jerome).
2. He did not Madame anybody, even good customers like Mrs. Moore.
3. To out-Herod Herod.
4. If jfs and ans were pots and pans there'd be no need of tinkers.
5. Poor dears, they were always worrying about examinations... (Christie)
6. "After all, I married you for better or for worse and Aunt Ada is decidedly the worse." (Christie)
7. Good thing, too. He'd have gone to the bad if he'd lived (Christie).

8. "I believe," said Tommy thoughtfully, "she used to get rather lots of fun out of saying to old friends of hers when they came to see her "I've left you a little something in my will, dear" or "This brooch that you're so fond of I've left you in my will." (Christie)
9. When I'm dead and buried and you've suitably mourned me and taken up your residence in a home for the aged. I expect you'll be thinking you are Mrs. Blenkinsop half of the time (Christie).
10. The little work-table dispossessed the whatnot - which was relegated to a dark corner of the hall (Christie).
11. "But -" Tuppence broke in upon his "but" (Christie).
12. "Look here, Tuppence, this whole thing is all some things and some-ones. It's just an idea you've thought up." (Christie)
13. Tommy came back to say a breathless goodbye (Christie).
14. Although it was dim, there was a faded but beautiful carpet on the floor, a deep sage-green in colour (Christie).
15. I thought it was something wrong when his wife suddenly up and left him (Christie).

Revision

I. Give the definitions of the following notions:

category, complementary distribution, element, contrastive distribution, grammatical meaning, morph, opposition, oppositional reduction, paradigm, signeme, system.

II. Analyze the morphemic composition of the following words:

- a) embodiment, conceive, multifarious;
- b) impassable, marksmanship, genii;
- c) unconsciously, strawberry, indistinguishable;
- d) insubordination, impracticable, media.

III. Define the type of the morphemic distribution according to which the following words are grouped:

- a) lice - houses;
- b) ineffable - immortal;
- c) transfusible - transfusable;
- d) non-flammable - inflammable.

IV. Account for the stylistic flavour of the oppositionally reduced forms of the words used in the sentences.

MODEL: *Why are you being so naughty?*

In this sentence the stylistic effect is brought about by the transpositional use of the strong member of the opposition (the continuous form of the verb "to be") instead of its weak member.

1. Peter's talk left me no opening had I besieged it ever so hard (O.Henry).
2. The faces of her people appeared to her again, and how dark were their skin, their hair, and their eyes, she thought, as if though living with the fair people she had taken on the dispositions and the prejudices of the fair (Cheever).
3. He weighed about as much as a hundred pounds of veal in his summer suitings, and he had a Where-is-Mary? expression on his features so plain that you could almost see the wool growing on him (O.Henry).
4. She remembered how in Nascosta even the most beautiful fell quickly under the darkness of time, like flowers without care; how even the most beautiful became bent and toothless, their dark clothes smelling, as the mamma's did, of smoke and manure (Cheever).
5. The road Francis took brought him out of his own neighborhood, across the tracks, and toward the river, to a street where the near-poor lived, in houses whose peaked gables and trimmings of wooden lace conveyed the purest feeling of pride and romance... (Cheever)
6. He raised his shoulders, spread his hands in a shrug of slow indifference, as much as to inform her she was an amateur and an impertinent nobody (Lawrence).
7. "Full of curiosity, no doubt, little woman, to know why I have brought you here?" "Well, Guardian," said I, "without thinking myself a Fatima, or you a Blue Beard, I am a little curious about it." (Dickens)
8. "Oh," said Tuppence, "don't be an idiot." "I'm not being an idiot," Tommy had said. "I am just being a wise and careful husband." (Christie)

Selected Reader

1.

**Chelson H. Linguistics and
English Grammar**

Structural Grammar

As descriptive linguistics arose in America, a few English professors were aware of the movement and followed its development. One of these was Charles Carpenter Fries of the University of Michigan. From the twenties onward he urged upon his colleagues the necessity of rethinking the content of the grammar course in the schools. There was, however, very little available that would serve to replace the existing scheme.

In 1952 Fries published "The Structure of English", designed to meet this need. As its subtitle, "An Introduction to the Construction of English Sentences", suggests, it is almost entirely devoted to syntax. It attempts to build a new treatment of the subject on the basis of a large body of recorded spoken English. This, however, is resented in conventional spelling and analyzed much as written material might be.

Fries rejects the traditional parts of speech. Instead he defines four major form classes and 15 groups of function words. No one of these corresponds particularly well with any traditional category. For example, Class 1 contains nouns plus some (not all) pronouns; Class 2 contains most verbs, but the auxiliaries and some superficially similar forms are excluded. He was not afraid to set up very small groups of function words: "not", for example, forms a group by itself.

Formal characterizations are attempted for these categories. Class 1 includes all words that can be used in a sentence like:

The -----is/are good.

This is supplemented by seven other criteria, including the occurrence of a plural form, the use with -'s, use following determiners

(articles, and so on) and prepositions. The four form classes are described as having large and unlimited membership. The groups of function words are defined by listing. While the lists are not complete, it is implied that exhaustive lists could easily be worked out and would not be greatly larger.

Because his categories do not correspond with the traditional parts of speech, Fries does not use the familiar terminology. Instead he gives arbitrary labels "Class 3", "Class A", and so on. For some people this has been the most obvious feature of the Fries scheme, and they have tended to dismiss it as mere juggling of labels. Others have acted as if mere dropping of "noun" for "Class 1" has constituted progress.

A number of basic sentence patterns are described by formulae using his arbitrary symbols. For example, D 12-d 4 symbolizes sentences of the pattern of "The pupils ran out." These formulae are of value in focusing attention on the pattern rather than on the specific words. Certain words are described as "modifying" others. (Fries always uses quotes around this and related words, apparently to avoid implications of a meaning-based definition of "modify".) ¹ This seems to be a direct inheritance from either school grammar or European scholarly traditional grammar or both. But he does not put the same emphasis on single-word main sentence elements as do the older systems.

After a number of sentence patterns have been discussed, there is a brief treatment of immediate constituents. It is claimed that the immediate constituent structure can be found from the structure signals and the class membership of the major words, no recourse to meaning being necessary. This chapter gives a crucial point in Fries' understanding of grammar. Without immediate constituents, most of the description of function words becomes rather irrelevant. The function words are not the structure of the sentence; they are only signals of that structure. The successive layers of immediate constituents do define the structure of the sentence directly.

The emphasis in "The Structure of English" is clearly on sentence structure. For this reason the whole system is best known as "structural grammar". Looked at from the point of view of school grammar, it was a new and radical innovation. Hence it became known among English teachers and school administrators as the "new gram-

mar". Because of Fries' insistence on the principles of linguistics - he meant, of course, as a device for establishing a grammatical analysis - the scheme also came to be identified as "linguistics", and is commonly so called by English teachers today.

Linguists generally look on Fries' work as a small step in the right direction but a rather timid one. In particular, they consider as extremely conservative his failure to use phonemic notation for his examples or to give more than passing attention to intonation.

A sober appraisal of Fries' structural grammar must, I think, consider it more nearly as scholarly traditional grammar. It is, of course, much influenced by descriptive linguistics, particularly by the Bloomfieldian point of view of 30-s and 40-s. Like the work of these linguists, it is based directly on a sample of actual usage collected for the purpose. But neither of these characteristics would set it off from traditional grammar.

Fries differs from the older grammarians of the scholarly tradition in showing much more concern for the basic structure of the grammar. His innovations are almost entirely here, rather than in details. Indeed, the easiest criticism to level against his work is grossness. A great deal of refinement in detail will be needed before it can be considered adequate. Much of that refinement, however, can be accomplished by working along the same lines as Fries. Structural grammar must be judged not as a complete system, but as a skeleton. Perhaps no more could legitimately be expected in one publication. Unfortunately, there has not been much work expended on feeling out and perfecting the scheme. Structural grammar stands today very nearly where Fries put it in 1952.

Parts of Speech. Basis of Classification

There are several bases on which definitions can be made. The traditional definition of the adverb is in terms of syntactic use: "An adverb is a word that modifies a verb, adjective, or another adverb." That of the noun is in terms of meaning: "A noun is a name of a person, place, or thing." Some recently proposed definitions have been in terms of inflection: "A noun is a word which forms a plural by adding -s or the equivalents." Many of the classes could be defined in any of these three ways.

Some grammars have seemed to use different techniques for defining different parts of speech. Inconsistency might result in overlapping categories or in uncovered gaps. Indeed, some grammars quite clearly suffer from either or both of these difficulties.

Yet no one type of definition seems fully satisfactory by itself. As a result, many grammarians have tried to combine several techniques into elaborate definitions, carefully created to avoid at least the most serious gaps and overlappings. This is not, however, an easy matter. The several criteria are often in conflict. The difficulties in working them together harmoniously can best be seen from some simple examples.

"Table" presumably names a thing, it is inflected for plural by adding -s, and it occurs in typically noun positions in sentences. By any definition, "table" is a noun. "Handshake" meets the inflectional and syntactic definitions but seems to state an action more than name a thing. (Unless, of course, a thing is defined simply as anything named by a noun - an interesting circularity!) "Perseverance" may name a thing - the application of the definition is quite unsure; but it does not occur in typical noun positions in sentences; but it does not seem to have a plural. "Cattle" has the opposite trouble; it does not seem to have a singular and it shows no evidence that it is inflected for plural - it somehow just is plural, witness: "*The cattle are lowing*". "Handshake", "perseverance", and "cattle" are examples of words that are nouns by some definitions, but not by all. There are many more. Because of these, the choice of basis of definition may be crucial.

Certainly the least promising type of definition is that based on meaning. In the first place, it is hard to draw the lines clearly and decisively. We do not at present have sufficiently precise techniques for delimiting and classifying the meanings of words. No definition based on meaning will be clear enough in its application to satisfy any but the least critical user. As a matter of fact, the traditional meaning-based definitions of school grammar do not seem to be actually applied, even by the authors of the books, because they would not serve the needs. Parts of speech are identified in some other way, perhaps not consciously recognized by the identifier, and then the definition is used merely to legitimize the decision.

To be useful in grammar, the parts of speech must be based on structural (that is, grammatical) features of the words classified. There are, however, 2 quite different possibilities: 1) The criteria might be found within the word - in types of inflection, derivational suffixes, or other features. For example, a noun might be defined as a word that takes a plural in -s or the equivalent, or is formed by the suffixes -ance, -ness, or -ity. By such a definition, "handshake" is a noun because there is a plural "handshakes", and "perseverance" is a noun because it is formed by the suffix -ance. No such definitions will help with "cattle", which we somehow would like to see included. 2) The criteria might be found outside the word - in the use in sentences. Thus a noun might be defined as any word that can occur in a frame such as: The -----is/are good. "Handshake" and "cattle" fit this with no question. But does "perseverance"? - "The 'perseverance' is good." This sentence seems a little odd. This might be for any number of reasons: because we cannot think of an occasion to use such a sentence and so are badly handicapped in judging whether it would be acceptable; or because we have selected a bad frame to use as a test. It will require a very sophisticated use of carefully selected frames to avoid many difficulties of this sort.

Probably some more elaborate definition will make it clear that "perseverance" is indeed a noun, just like "table", "handshake", and "cattle". Certainly a good definition, be it morphologic or syntactic, will be a very difficult thing to design, and perhaps also quite complex to operate.

Notice that the difficulties with the definitions come at different places. "Cattle" poses a problem for one; "perseverance" does not. "Perseverance" was a crux for the other; but this had no difficulty with "cattle". Perhaps a joint definition could exploit the potentialities of both. Any word which meets either criterion or both would be a noun. This has its difficulties also. In general, however, this has been the procedure of good scholarly traditional grammar, insofar as it has examined the question at all. (Traditional grammarians have tended to concentrate their attention elsewhere and accept the parts of speech rather uncritically.) Even an involved joint definition will probably leave a small list of difficult cases that must be assigned more or less arbitrary.

A different technique has been employed by Trager and Smith⁴ and linguists in their tradition. They set up 2 systems of classes. One is based on inflectional criteria. In it are distinguished nouns, personal pronouns, adjectives, and verbs. These are defined as words showing the following types of inflection:

man	man's	men	men's
I	me	my	mine
nice	nicer	nicest	
go	goes	went	gone going

The remaining words, which show no inflection at all, are classed together as particles.

Trager and Smith's second system is classified by syntactic criteria. In it are found nominals, pronominals, adjectivals, verbals, adverbials, prepositionals, and so on. The two sets of terms are carefully distinguished by the using the suffix -al in all syntactic terms. In general, nouns are also nominals, verbs are also verbals, and so forth. The two systems do not match exactly, however; if they did there would be no need to treat them as separate systems.

Such a distinction between two systems of classification has certain merits. When adhered to carefully, it makes clear exactly what is being talked about. It helps to avoid the jumping to syntactic conclusions on inflectional evidence, and vice versa. It gives a simple system for statements about syntax.

Unfortunately, some of the suggested labels present terminological difficulties. For example, "verbal" has long been established in another meaning. "Prepositional" seems to many unnecessary, since "preposition" is available and not needed in the morphology-based system. "Adjective" is a very much smaller class than that usually known by this name. Partly for such reasons, most grammarians have rejected Trager and Smith's scheme, often with the protest that it is too elaborate and awkward. Others see no need for the complexity of two partly parallel classifications. Such criticism is not wholly justified - after all the facts of English are complex, and no simple system of parts of speech can be expected to be adequate.

There is another criticism, possibly much more cogent. This divorcing of the two may be, in part, an abdication of responsibility. Syntax and inflection are different, of course, but they are part of the same grammar. They should be worked into the most completely integrated statement possible. Trager and Smith's system, perhaps, makes too much of the difference between various levels of syntax.

Questions:

1. What is the purpose of structural grammar?
2. What principle did Ch. Fries apply to identify his form classes?
3. Why isn't there any correspondence (according to Fries himself) between the traditional parts of speech and Fries's form classes/function words' groups?
4. What makes the problem of parts of speech extremely difficult?

2.

**Strang B. Modern English
Structure**

The second main kind of class-meaning is form-class meaning. When a dictionary lists the functions of words it does at least two things: it describes their lexical role (usually either by listing approximate synonyms or by listing uses in the sentence), and it classifies the words according to what is traditionally called a parts of speech system. This second kind of characterization is essential, for "the meaning of a word is its use in the language" and when words are used their function is always dual. They bear in themselves a lexical meaning, but what they do in the sentence results from something further, the fact that they are members of classes (and, of course, of "groups"). In some words lexical meaning is perhaps dominant, in others class-meaning certainly is but in none is class-meaning absent. [...]

A full description of a language would include an inventory of all forms with their lexical and class functions, but since this would be

an unmanageably vast undertaking, the lexical description is normally carried out in a separate work, the dictionary, while the establishment of classes and their functions, being a work of greater generality, belongs to the grammar. Accordingly, when our analysis of utterance structure is complete, our chief remaining task will be treatment of form-classes, and this term must now be explained. It clearly bears a close relationship to the traditional term, already mentioned, part of speech. The difficulties about that are that it does not suggest any clear meaning, and its technical use is somewhat tainted because it was used in an outgrown type of analysis. If anything, it suggests that members of the parts of speech function as components of speech or utterances, and we have agreed that it is the "group" that does this; the "group" may often be represented by a member of a part of speech in actual utterances, but that coincidence is not necessary. In reaction against the traditional term, word-class had come into widespread use. It is an improvement, but it suggests that members of the classes are always and necessarily words, and in fact they are only usually so. As the members are alike (within each class) in form, in one sense or another (morphological structure, syntactical patterning, etc.) form-class is probably the best name for the classes, with the caveat that it does not chiefly refer to likeness of shape within the class-member for instance, "beautifully", "sweetly", "happily", all belong to one form-class, but "goodly", though apparently similar in shape, does not. [...]

How then are form-classes to be established? [...] There are 2 chief bases, the syntactical, i.e., in what patterns, and what kind of concomitants, a form functions; and the morphological, i.e., what its morpheme structure and potential contrasts are. The peculiarly controversial nature of English form-class analysis is due to the fact that for a statement both full and relatively neat both must be used. Morphology is inadequate alone, because relatively few kinds of English words are subject to morphological variation and because even these few exhibit regular patterns of syntactic occurrence it is willful to ignore. Syntax alone will not do, partly because it brings us up against the familiar problem that we have to find criteria for determining what is the same syntactical position, and partly because it too ignores a substantial amount of evidence. Accordingly, we shall con-

sider both kinds of evidence and be prepared for cases of conflict between them, i.e., for borderline forms not indisputably assignable to any class. [...]

"Words may be divided in most languages into variable words and invariable words" (Robins 1959: 121). Recent linguists have often departed from this position, holding that each member of what we call a paradigm is a distinct word (e.g., Bloomfield 1935: 11.5), but we have seen good reason to keep to the traditional view in describing English. There are 2 large sets of form-classes in English, and those whose members are variables and those whose members are invariables. Very closely linked with this, though not producing quite the same division, is the principle that English form-classes are of two kinds, those whose members constitute an open class, and those whose members constitute a closed system (the former tending to be variables, the latter invariables). An open class is one whose membership cannot be catalogued, and usually one subject to continual growth; a closed system is a set of items finite in number, and related in such a way that alterations in one will cause alterations in others, if not all. Closed-system items, if they are words, are usually the kind of word a dictionary must explain by giving uses in the sentence, not synonyms; for open-class items there are synonyms. Words that are closed-system items are at the grammatical pole, those that belong to open classes are at the lexical pole. So the contrast open - closed has brought us to another, namely that lexically full words usually belong to open, and often to variable, form-classes; lexically empty words, to closed systems usually of invariable items. [...]

Questions:

1. In what does B. Strang see the advantages of using both morphological and syntactic criteria for a parts of speech classification?
2. What peculiar features of form classes (full words) and function-word groups (empty words) does B. Strang point out?

;

3.

Quirk R., Greenbaum S., Leech Q., Svartvik J. A

University Grammar of English

Parts of Speech

The structures realizing sentence elements are composed of units which can be referred to as parts of speech. These can be exemplified for English as follows:

- | | |
|---------------|---------------------------------------------------|
| (a) noun | - <i>John, room, answer, play</i> |
| adjective | - <i>happy, steady, new, large, round</i> |
| adverb | - <i>steadily, completely, really, very, then</i> |
| verb | - <i>search, grow, play, be, have, do</i> |
| (b) article | - <i>the, a(n)</i> |
| demonstrative | - <i>that, this</i> |
| pronoun | - <i>he, they, anybody, one, which</i> |
| preposition | - <i>of, at, in, without, in spite of</i> |
| conjunction | - <i>and, that, when, although</i> |
| interjection | - <i>oh, ahugh, phew</i> |

Closed-System Items

The parts of speech are listed in two groups, (a) and (b), and this introduces a distinction of very great significance. Set (b) comprises what are called "closed-system" items. That is, the sets of items are closed in the sense that they cannot normally be extended by the creation of additional members: a moment's reflection is enough for us to realize how rarely in a language we invent or adopt a new or additional pronoun. It requires no great effort to list all the members in a closed system, and to be reasonably sure that one has in fact made an exhaustive inventory (especially, of course, where the membership is so extremely small as in the case of the article).

The items are said to constitute a system in being (1) reciprocally exclusive: the decision to use one item in a given structure excludes the possibility of using any other (thus one can have "the book" or "a

book" but not "*a the book"); and (2) reciprocally defining: it is less easy to state the meaning of any individual item than to define it in relation to the rest of the system. This may be clearer with a non-linguistic analogy. If we are told that a student came third in an examination, the "meaning" that we attach to "third" will depend on knowing how many candidates took the examination: "third" in a set of four has a very different meaning from "third" in a set of thirty.

Open-Class Items

By contrast, set (a) comprises "open classes". Items belong to a class in that they have the same grammatical properties and structural possibilities as other members of the class (that is, as other nouns or verbs or adjectives or adverbs respectively), but the class is "open" in the sense that it is indefinitely extendable. New items are constantly being created and no one could make an inventory of all the nouns in English (for example) and be confident that it was complete. This inevitably affects the way in which we attempt to define any item in an open class: while it would obviously be valuable to relate the meaning of "room" to other nouns with which it has semantic affinity (chamber, hall, house,...) one could not define it as "not house, not box, not plate, not indignation,..." as one might define a closed-system item like "this" as "not that".

The distinction between "open" and "closed" parts of speech must be treated cautiously however. On the one hand, we must not exaggerate the ease with which we create new words: we certainly do not make up new nouns as a necessary part of speaking in the way that making up new sentences is necessary. On the other hand, we must not exaggerate the extent to which parts of speech in set (b) are "closed": new prepositions (usually of the form "prep + noun + prep" like *by way of*) are by no means impossible.

Although they have deceptively specific labels, the parts of speech tend in fact to be rather heterogeneous. The adverb and the verb are perhaps especially mixed classes, each having small and fairly well-defined groups of closed-system items alongside the indefinitely large open-class items. So far as the verb is concerned, the closed-system subgroup is known by the well-established term "auxiliary". With

the adverb, one may draw the distinction broadly between those in -ly that correspond to adjectives (complete + -ly) and those that do not (now, *there, forward, very*, for example).

Pronouns

Pronouns constitute a heterogeneous class of items with numerous subclasses. Despite their variety, there are several features that pronouns (or major subclasses of pronouns) have in common, which distinguish them from nouns:

- (1) They do not admit determiners;
- (2) They often have an objective case;
- (3) They often have person distinction;
- (4) They often have overt gender contrast;
- (5) Singular and plural forms are often not morphologically related.

Like nouns, most pronouns in English have only two cases: common (somebody) and genitive (somebody's). But six pronouns have an objective case, thus presenting a three-case system, where common case is replaced by subjective and objective. There is identity between genitive and objective "her", and partial overlap between subjective "who" and objective "who(m)". The genitives of personal pronouns are, in accordance with grammatical tradition and a primary meaning, called "possessive pronouns".

Subjective	I	we	he	she	they	who
Objective	me	us	him	her	them	who(m)
Genitive	my	our	his	her	their	whose

There is no inflected or -'s genitive with the demonstratives or with the indefinites except those in -one, -body.

Personal, possessive, and reflexive pronouns have distinctions of person:

- 1st person refers to the speaker (I), or to the speaker and one or more others (we);
- 2nd person refers to the person(s) addressed (you); 3rd person refers to one or more other persons or things (he/she/ it, they).

In 3rd person singular, the personal, reflexive, and possessive pronouns distinguish in gender between masculine (he/him/himself/ his), and non-personal (it/itself/its). Relative and interrogative pronouns and determiners distinguish between personal and non-personal gender.

The 2nd person uses a common form for singular and plural in the personal and possessive series but has a separate plural in the reflexive (yourself, yourselves). "We", the 1st person plural pronoun, does not denote "more than I" (cf.: the boy - the boys) but "I plus one or more others". There is thus an interrelation between number and person. We may exclude the person(s) addressed.

Questions:

1. What parts of speech do the authors identify? How do they classify them?
2. What common features of pronouns do they point out?
3. What casual forms of the pronouns do they single out?
4. What subclasses of pronouns is the category of person relevant for?
5. What classification types of pronouns are gender sensitive?
6. What subclasses of pronouns have number distinctions?

4.

Hill A. Introduction to Linguistic Structures

Form Classes

In English words and fixed phrases are divided into two groups: those which can take suffixes and prefixes, that is to say, those which are inflectable; and those which can take only prebases and postbases and which are therefore uninflectable. Suffixes and prefixes are added to bases in intersecting and largely symmetrical sets called paradigms. A typical paradigm is that for nouns, where a given form is classified according to the 2 variations, or categories, of case and

I number. Since the paradigmatic sets are sharply different for large r' groups of words, words fall into classes defined by their paradigms. I [These large groups are called form classes, though the traditional I name for them is parts of speech.

English possesses three classes of inflected words: nouns, pro-t-nouns, and verbs. [...]

Paradigmatic characteristics will not, however, identify all members of these classes since some of them are defective, lacking all or [some of the expected set of suffixes. In complex words which are thus ^defective, the normal next step is to look at any postbases the form i may contain, since other constructions containing the same postbase may be fully inflectable. If this should be the case, the postbase defines the class of the defective constructions. Thus the analyst may |: find himself with such a form as "greenness", which cannot be imme-1 diately classified as a noun, since it is not usually inflected for number fOr case. But the same postbase occurs in "kindness", where it is regu- i'larly inflected for number, giving "kindnesses". As a result, the ana- j lyst has no hesitation in calling "greenness" a noun. One of the ad-I vantages of a complete and indexed morphemic lexicon of English ^would be that it would bring together all constructions containing the same postbase, so that this kind of analysis would be greatly simplified. [...]

If there were a morphemic lexicon, the formation of English words could be much more fully described than is possible at present, and individual postbases and prebases could be extensively used in assigning words to their proper form classes. [...]

We can start a series like "the slow cars", "the slower cars", "the slowest cars". Phonologically each series is a single phrase, that is, is not interrupted by any juncture other than /+/. We know that the last word in each is a noun, as proved by the suffixes it may appear with. We can then use the series to set up a tentative definition of one group of adjectives: any word which can be modified by the addition of [-əʃ] and [-ist] is an adjective.

The definition is not complete, however, since the resultant word has to have the syntactic and morphological characteristics of "slow, slower, slowest" and, negatively, must lack the characteristics of any other form class. Thus, for instance, "type, typer, typist" might be

thought of as a series which contains adjectives. The series does not have the distribution of "slow, slower, slowest". We can say "a slower car than mine" or "the slowest car in the group". We cannot fit "typer" or "typist" into this series, or even into a series involving other nouns, such as "boy" or "talk". Negatively, a form such as "typist" has the inflectional characteristics of a noun, as in "the typist's coat". For these reasons, then, the series "typer, typist" does not contain the same morphemes as "slower, slowest"; and "type, typer, typist" are not adjectives. To be complete, our preliminary definition should read: any word having the distributional characteristics of "slow" and capable of being modified by the addition of "-er" and "-est" is an adjective, and the resultant constructions containing the postbases "-er" and "-est" are also adjectives...

More important than this difficulty in terminology is the fact that our definition - any word having the distributional characteristics of "slow" and capable of being modified by the addition of "-er" and "-est" is an adjective, and the resultant constructions containing the postbases "-er" and "-est" are also adjectives - runs counter to most, if not all, traditional definitions. It is usual, for instance, to define "slower" as an adverb in such sentences as "The car runs slower", which our definition denies. The traditional definition is based on meaning, whereas ours has as usual attempted to rely on form and distribution. Even in this situation, then, we shall call "slower" an adjective and shall describe the peculiarities of distribution of adjectives after verbs when we describe the elements of sentences...

Questions:

1. What are A. Hill's criteria of identifying form classes?
2. What do distributional characteristics of the word show?

5.

Jespersen O. The Philosophy of Grammar

Chapter VII. THE THREE RANKS.

- ⁱ Subordination. Substantives. Adjectives. Pronouns. Verbs.
Adverbs. Word Groups. Clauses. Final Remarks

i* Subordination

¹" The question of the class into which a word should be put - whether "that of substantives or adjectives, or some other - is one that concerns the word in itself. Some answer to that question will therefore be found in dictionaries.⁵ We have now to consider combinations of words, and here we shall find that though a substantive always remains a substantive and an adjective an adjective, there is a certain scheme of subordination in connected speech which is analogous to the distribution of words into "parts of speech", without being entirely dependent on it.

In any composite denomination of a thing or person [...], we always find that there is one word of supreme importance to which the others are joined as subordinates. This chief word is defined (qualified, modified) by another word, which in its turn may be defined (qualified, modified) by a third word, etc. We are thus led to establish different "ranks" of words according to their mutual relations as 'defined or defining. In the combination *extremely hot weather* the last word *weather*, which is evidently the chief idea, may be called ternary; *hot*, which defines *weather*, secondary, and *extremely*, which defines *hot*, tertiary. Though a tertiary word may be further defined

Note, however, that any word, or group of words, or part of a word, may be turned into a substantive when treated as a *quotation word*, e.g. your *late* was misheard as *light* I his speech abounded in / *think so's* I there should be two I's in his name.

by a (quaternary) word, and this again by a (quinary) word, and so forth, it is needless to distinguish more than three ranks, as there are no formal or other traits that distinguish words of these lower orders from tertiary words. Thus, in the phrase *a certainly not very cleverly worded remark*, no one of the words *certainly*, *not*, and *very*, though defining the following word, is in any way grammatically different from what it would be as a tertiary word, as it is in *certainly a clever remark*, *not a clever remark*, *a very clever remark*.

If now we compare the combination *a furiously barking dog* (*a dog barking furiously*), in which *dog* is primary, *barking* secondary, and *furiously* tertiary, with *the dog barks furiously*, it is evident that the same subordination obtains in the latter as in the former combination. Yet there is a fundamental difference between them, which calls for separate terms for the two kinds of combination: we shall call the former kind *junction*, and the latter *nexus*. [...] we shall see that there are other types of nexus besides the one seen in *the dog barks*. It should be noted that *the dog* is a primary not only when it is the subject, as in *the dog barks*, but also when it is the object of a verb, as in *I see the dog*, or of a preposition, as in *he runs after the dog*.

As regards terminology, the words *primary*, *secondary*, and *tertiary* are applicable to nexus as well as to junction, but it will be useful to have the special names *adjunct* for a secondary word in a junction, and *adnex* for a secondary word in a nexus. For tertiary we may use the term *subjunct*, and quaternary words, in the rare cases in which a special name is needed, may be termed *sub-subjuncts*.⁶

Just as we may have two (or more) coordinate primaries, e.g. in *the dog and the cat ran away*, we may, of course, have two or more coordinate adjuncts to the same primary: thus, in *a nice young lady* the words *a*, *nice*, and *young* equally define *lady*; compare also *much* (II) *good* (II) *white* (II) *wine* (I) with *very* (III) *good* (II) *wine* (I). Coordinate adjuncts are often joined by means of connectives, as in *a rainy and stormy afternoon I a brilliant, though lengthy novel*. Where there is no

I now prefer the word *primary* to the term *principal*. One might invent the terms *superjunct* and *supernex* for a primary in a junction and in a nexus respectively, and *subnex* for a tertiary in a nexus, but these cumbersome words are really superfluous.

connective the last adjunct often stands in a specially close connexion with the primary as forming one idea, one compound primary (*young-mJady*), especially in some fixed combinations (*in high good humour*, *by M'feat good fortune*; *extreme old age*). Sometimes the first of two adjuncts tends to be subordinate to the second and thus nearly becomes a ^v adjunct, as in *burning hot soup*, *a shocking bad nurse*. In this way *very*, which was an adjective (as it still is in *the very day*) in Chaucer's *a verr ay par fit gentil knight*, has become first an intermediate between an adjunct and a subjunct, and then a subjunct which must be classed, among adverbs. A somewhat related instance is *nice* (*and*) in *nice and \$warm*, to which there is a curious parallel in It. *bell'e: Giacosa, Foglie 136 il concerto. ... Oh ci ho bell'e rinunziato / Tu Thai bell'e trovato*. Other instances of adjuncts, where subjuncts might be expected, are ^w Fr. *Elle est toute surprise / les fenetres grandes ouvertes*. I; л Coordinated subjuncts are seen, e.g. in *a logically and grammatically, cally unjustifiable construction I a seldom or never seen form*. ; i In the examples hitherto chosen we have had substantives as primaries, adjectives as adjuncts, and adverbs as subjuncts; and there is certainly some degree of correspondence between the three parts of speech and the three ranks here established. We might even define substantives as words standing habitually as primaries, adjectives as ,. : words standing habitually as adjuncts, and adverbs as words standing habitually as subjuncts. But the correspondence is far from complete, as will be evident from the following survey: the two things, word-classes and ranks, really move in two different spheres.

Substantives

Substantives as Primaries. No further examples are needed.

Substantives as Adjuncts. The old-established way of using a substantive as an adjunct is by putting it in the genitive case, e.g. *Shelley's poems / the butcher's shop / St. Paul's Cathedral*. But it should be noted that a genitive case may also be a primary (through what is often called ellipsis), as in "I prefer Keats's poems to *Shelley's* / I bought it at the *butcher's* / *St. Paul's* is a fine building". In English what was the first element of a compound is now often to be considered an independent word, standing as an adjunct, thus in *stone wall / a silk dress* and a *cotton* one. Other examples of substantives as

adjuncts are *women* writers / a *queen* bee / *boy* messengers, and (why not?) *Captain* Smith / *Doctor* Johnson - cf. the non-inflexion in G. *Kaiser* Wilhelms Erinnerungen (though with much fluctuation with compound titles).

In some cases when we want to join two substantival ideas it is found impossible or impracticable to make one of them into an adjunct of the other by simple juxtaposition; here languages often have recourse to the "definitive genitive" or a corresponding prepositional combination, as in Lat. *urbs Romae* (cf. the juxtaposition in Dan. *byen Rom*, and on the other hand combinations like *Captain Smith*), Fr. *la cite de Rome*, E. *the city of Rome*, etc., and further the interesting expressions E. *a devil of a fellow* / *that scoundrel of a servant* / *his ghost of a voice* / G. *ein alter schelm von lohnbedienter* (with the exceptional use of the nominative after *von*) / Fr. *ce fripon de valet* / *un amour d'enfant* / *celui qui avail un si drole de nom* / It. *quel ciarlatano d'un dottore* / *quel pover uomo di tuopadre*, etc. This is connected with the Scandinavian use of a possessive pronoun *ditfoe* "you fool" and to the Spanish *Pobrecitos de nosotros!* / *Desdichada de mi!* [...]

Substantives as Subjuncts (subnexes). The use is rare, except in word groups, where it is extremely frequent. Examples: emotions, *part* religious ... *but part* human (Stevenson) / the sea went *mountains* high. In "Come *home* / I bought it *cheap*" *home* and *cheap* were originally substantives, but are now generally called adverbs; cf. also go *South*.
Adjectives

Adjectives as Primaries: you had better bow to the *impossible* (sg.) ye have the *poor* (pi.) always with you - but in *savages*, *regulars*, *Christians*, *the moderns*, etc., we have real substantives, as shown by the plural ending; so also in "the child is a *dear*", as shown by the article. G. *beamier* is generally reckoned a substantive, but is rather an adjective primary, as seen from the flexion: *der beamte*, *ein beamier*. Adjectives as Adjuncts: no examples are here necessary. Adjectives as Subjuncts. In "a *fast* moving engine / a *long* delayed punishment / a *clean* shaven face" and similar instances it is historically more correct to call the italicized words adverbs (in which the old adverbial ending *-e* has become mute in the same way as other weak *-e's*) rather than adjective subjuncts. [...]

Pronouns

Pronouns as Primaries: / am well / *this* is *mine* / *I* who said *that*? / *I* What happened? / *nobody* knows, etc. (But in a *mere nobody* we have a real substantive, cf. the pi. *nobodies*.)

" Pronouns as Adjuncts: *this* hat / *my* hat / *what* hat? / *no* hat, etc.

" In some cases there is no formal distinction between pronouns in these two employments, but in others there is, cf. *mine* : *my* / *none* : *no*; thus also in G. *mein* hut: *der meine*. Note also "Hier ist ein um-stand (*ein* ding) richtig genannt, aber nur *einer* (*eines*)". In Fr. we have formal differences in several cases: mon chapeau : *le mien/ce* chapeau : *celui-ci* / *quel* chapeau : *lequel*? / *I* *chaque* : *chacun* / *I* *quelque* : *quelqu'un*.

Pronouns as Subjuncts. Besides "pronominal adverbs", which need no exemplification, we have such instances as "I am *that* sleepy (vg.) / *the* more, *the* merrier / *none* too able / I won't stay *any* longer / *nothing* loth / *somewhat* paler than usual."⁷

Verbs

Finite forms of verbs can only stand as secondary words (adnexes), never either as primaries or as tertiaries. But participles, like adjectives, can stand as primaries (the *living* are more valuable than the *dead*) and as adjuncts (the *living* dog). Infinitives, according to circumstances, may belong to each of the three ranks; in some positions they require in English *to* (cf. G. *zu*, Dan. *at*). I ought strictly to have entered such combinations as *to go*, etc., under the heading "rank of word groups".

Infinitives as Primaries: *to see* is *to believe* (cf. *seeing* is *believing*) / *I* she wants *to rest* (cf. she wants *some rest*, with the corresponding substantive). Fr. *esperer*, c'esty'owzr / il est defendu *defumer* ici / sans *courir* / *I* au lieu de *courir*. G. *denken* ist schwer / er verspricht *zu kommen* / *I* ohne *zu laufen* / *I* anstatt *zu laufen*, etc.

There are some combinations of pronominal and numeral adverbs with adjuncts that are not easily "parsed," e.g. *this once* / we should have gone to Venice, or *somewhere not half so nice* (Masefield) / Are we going *anywhere* particular? They are psychologically explained from the fact that "once" = one time, "somewhere" and "anywhere" = (to) some, any place; the adjunct thus belongs to the implied substantive.

Infinitives as Adjuncts: in times *to come* \ there isn't a girl *to touch* her / the correct thing *to do/ina* way not *to be forgotten* /the never *to be forgot ten* look. Fr. la chose *afaire* /du tabac *dfamer*. (In G. a special passive participle has developed from the corresponding use of the infinitive: das *zu lesende* buch.) [...] This use of the infinitive in some way makes up for the want of a complete set of participles (future, passive, etc.).

Infinitives as Subjuncts: *to see* him, one would think /I shudder *to think* of it / he came here *to see* you.

Adverbs

Adverbs as Primaries. This use is rare; as an instance may be mentioned "he did not stay for *long* I he's only just back from *abroad*". With pronominal adverbs it is more frequent: from *here* I till *now*. Another instance is "he left *there* at two o'clock": *there* is taken as the object of *left*. *Here* and *there* may also be real substantives in philosophical parlance: "Motion requires *a here* and *a there* I in the Space-field he innumerable other *theres*. "

Adverbs as Adjuncts. This, too, is somewhat rare: the *offside* / in *after* years / the few *nearby* trees (US) / all the *well* passengers (US) / a *so-so* matron (Byron). In most instances the adjunct use of an adverb is unnecessary, as there is a corresponding adjective available. (Pronominal adverbs: the *then* government / the *hither* shore.)

Adverbs as Subjuncts. No examples needed, as this is the ordinary employment of this word-class.

When a substantive is formed from an adjective or verb, a defining word is, as it were, lifted up to a higher plane, becoming secondary instead of tertiary, and wherever possible, this is shown by the

Absolutely novel	use of an adjective instead of an
Utterly dark	adverb form.
Perfectly strange	absolute novelty utter darkness perfect
Describes accurately	stranger accurate description my firm
I firmly believe	belief, a firm believer severe judges
judges severely	careful reader I+ 11
reads carefully II +	
III	

к It is worth noting that adjectives indicating size (*great, small*) are Bused as shifted equivalents of adverbs of degree (*much, little*): *a great ylmirer of Tennyson*, Fr. *un grand admirateur de Tennyson* [...] Curme Mentions G. *die geistig armen, etwas Idngst bekanntes*, where *geistig ind Idngst* remain uninflected like adverbs "though modifying a substantive": the explanation is that *armen* and *bekanntes* are not sub-Sjstantives, but merely adjective primaries, as indicated by their flex-ion. Some English words may be used in two ways: "these are/ы// *Equivalents (for)*" or "*fully equivalent (to)*", "*the direct opposites (of)*" , jior "*directly opposite (to)*"; Macaulay writes: "The government of Ifthe Tudors was *the direct opposite to* the government of Augustus", .tlwhere *to* seems to fit better with the adjective *opposite* than with the f; substantive, while *direct* presupposes the latter. In Dan. people hesi-'\$ tate between *den indbildt syge* and *den indbildte syge* as a translation I', of/e *malade imagineaire*.

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v

(pp. 96-101)

Questions:

1. What principle does O. Jespersen consider to be major while differentiating between the three ranks of words?
2. What is meant by "junction" and "nexus"?
3. How do the traditional parts of speech and O. Jespersen's theory of three ranks correlate? Is there any one-to-one correspondence between the traditional parts of speech and O. Jespersen's three ranks? What are the advantages of the theory of three ranks?

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Seminar 5

NOUN AND ITS CATEGORIES

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1. The general characteristics of the noun as a part of speech. Classification of nouns.
2. The category of gender: the traditional and modern approaches to the category of gender. Gender in Russian and English.
3. The category of number. Traditional and modern interpretations of number distinctions of the noun. Singularia Tantum and Pluralia Tantum nouns.
4. The category of case: different approaches to its interpretation. Case distinctions in personal pronouns.
5. The category of article determination. The status of article in the language hierarchy. The opposition of articles and pronominal determiners.
6. The oppositional reduction of the nounal categories: neutralization and transposition in the categories of gender, of number, of case, and of article determination.
7. The specific status of proper names. Transposition of proper names into class nouns.

1. Noun as a Part of Speech

. The noun as a part of speech has the categorial meaning of "substance".

The semantic properties of the noun determine its categorial syntactic properties: the primary substantive functions of the noun are those of the subject and the object. Its other functions are predicative, attributive and adverbial.

The syntactic properties of the noun are also revealed in its special types of combinability. In particular, the noun is characterized

by the prepositional combinability with another noun, a verb, an adjective, an adverb; by the casual combinability which co-exists with its prepositional combinability with another noun; by the contact combinability with another noun.

As a part of speech the noun has also a set of formal features. Thus, it is characterized by specific word-building patterns having typical suffixes, compound stem models, conversion patterns. The noun discriminates four grammatical categories: the categories of gender, number, case, and article determination.

2. Category of Gender

The problem of gender in English is being vigorously disputed. Linguistic scholars as a rule deny the existence of gender in English as a grammatical category and stress its purely semantic character. The actual gender distinctions of nouns are not denied by anyone; what is disputable is the character of the gender classification: whether it is purely semantic or semantico-grammatical.

In fact, the category of gender in English is expressed with the help of the obligatory correlation of nouns with the personal pronouns of the third person. The third person pronouns being specific and obligatory classifiers of nouns, English gender distinctions display their grammatical nature.

The category of gender is based on two hierarchically arranged oppositions: the upper opposition is general, it functions in the whole set of nouns; the lower opposition is partial, it functions in the subset of person nouns only. As a result of the double oppositional correlation, in Modern English a specific system of three genders arises: the neuter, the masculine, and the feminine genders.

In English there are many person nouns capable of expressing both feminine and masculine genders by way of the pronominal correlation. These nouns comprise a group of the so-called "common gender" nouns, e.g.: "person", "friend", etc.

In the plural all the gender distinctions are neutralized but they are rendered obliquely through the correlation with the singular.

Alongside of the grammatical (or lexico-grammatical) gender distinctions, English nouns can show the sex of their referents also lexically with the help of special lexical markers, e.g.: *bull-calf* / *cow-calf*,

i.,sparrow / *hen-sparrow*, *he-bear* / *she-bear*, etc. or through suffix-derivation: *sultan* / *sultana*, *lion* / *lioness*, etc. The category of gender can undergo the process of oppositional tion. It can be easily neutralized (with the group of "common nouns") and transponized (the process of "personification"). The English gender differs much from the Russian gender: the English gender has a semantic character (oppositionally, i.e. grammatically repressed), while the gender in Russian is partially semantic (Russian ate nouns have semantic gender distinctions), and partially formal.

3. Category of Number

The category of number is expressed by the opposition of the plural form of the noun to its singular form. The semantic difference of the Acjpositional members of the category of number in many linguistic works is treated traditionally: the meaning of the singular is interpreted as "one" * and the meaning of the plural - as "many" ("more than one"). As the traditional interpretation of the singular and the plural members does not work in many cases, recently the categorial meaning of the **plural** has been reconsidered and now it is interpreted as the denotation of "the potentially dismembering reflection of the structure of the referent" (correspondingly, the categorial meaning of the singular is treated as "the non-dismembering reflection of the structure of the referent").

The categorial opposition of number is subjected to the process of oppositional reduction. Neutralization takes place when countable **aouns** begin to function as Singularia Tantum nouns, denoting in such **cases** either abstract ideas or some mass material, e.g. *On my birthday we always have goose*: or when countable nouns are used in the function of the Absolute Plural: *The board are not unanimous on The ques-tion*. A stylistically marked transposition is achieved by the use of the descriptive uncountable plural (*The fruits of the toil are not always visible*) and the "repetition plural" (*Car after car rushed past me*).

4. Category of Case

The case meanings in English relate to one another in a peculiar, unknown in other languages, way: the common case is quite indifferent from the semantic point of view, while the genitive case functions as **Ji** subsidiary element in the morphological system of English be-

cause its semantics is also rendered by the Common Case noun in prepositional collocations and in contact.

In the discussion of the case problem four main views advanced by different scholars should be considered: the "theory of positional cases", the "theory of prepositional cases", the "limited case theory", and the "postpositional theory".

According to the "theory of positional cases", the English noun distinguishes the inflectional genitive case and four non-inflectional, purely positional, cases - Nominative, Vocative, Dative, Accusative. The cardinal weak point of this theory lies in the fact that it mixes up the functional (syntactic) characteristics of the sentence parts and the morphological features of the noun.

The "theory of prepositional cases" regards nounal combinations with the prepositions in certain object and attributive collocations as morphological case forms: the Dative Case (to + N, for + N), the Genitive Case (of + N).

The "limited case theory" recognizes the existence in English of a limited case system whose members are the Genitive Case (a strong form) and the Common Case (a weak form).

The "postpositional theory" claims that the English noun in the course of its historical development has completely lost the morphological category of case; that is why the traditional Genitive Case is treated by its advocates as a combination of a noun with a particle.

Taking into account the advantages of the two theories - the "limited case theory" and the "postpositional theory" opens new perspectives in the treatment of the category of case. It stands to reason to regard the element *-s / -es* as a special case particle. Thus, according to the "particle case theory" the two-case system of the noun is to be recognized in English: the Common Case is a direct case, the Genitive Case is an oblique case. As the case opposition does not work with all nouns, from the functional point of view the Genitive Case is to be regarded as subsidiary to the syntactic system of prepositional phrases.

5. Category of Article Determination

The problem of English articles has been the subject of hot discussions for many years. Today the most disputable questions concerning the system of articles in English are the following: the identi-

tion of the article status in the hierarchy of language units, the Dumber of articles, their categorial and pragmatic functions.

There exist two basic approaches to the problem of the article status: some scholars consider the article a self-sufficient word which forms with the modified noun a syntactic syntagma; others identify the article with the morpheme-like element which builds up with the nominal stem a specific morph.

In recent works on the problem of article determination of English nouns, more often than not an opinion is expressed that in the "hierarchy of language units the article occupies a peculiar place - the place intermediary between the word and the morpheme.

In the light of the oppositional theory the category of article determination of the noun is regarded as one which is based on two binary oppositions: one of them is upper, the other is lower. The opposition of the higher level operates in the whole system of articles and contrasts the definite article with the noun against the two other forms of article determination of the noun - the indefinite article and the meaningful absence of the article. The opposition of the lower level operates within the sphere of realizing the categorial meaning of non-identification (the sphere of the weak member of the upper opposition) and contrasts the two types of generalization - the relative generalization and the absolute generalization. As a result, the system of articles in English is described as one consisting of three articles - the definite article, the indefinite article, and the zero article, which, correspondingly, express the categorial functions (meanings) Of identification, relative generalization, and absolute generalization. The article paradigm is generalized for the whole system of the common nouns in English and is transpositionally outstretched into the subsystems of proper nouns and Unica (unique nouns) as well as into the system of pronouns.

Questions:

1. What are the "part of speech" properties of a noun? • 2. What does the peculiarity of expressing gender distinctions in English consist in?
3. What differentiates the category of gender in English from that in Russian? 8 - 3548

4. Why don't lexical gender markers annul the grammatical character of English gender?
5. Why is the interpretation of the categorial meaning of the noun plural form as "more than one" considered not well grounded?
6. What is the modern interpretation of the categorial semantics of the plural form of the noun?
- ' 7. What makes the category of case in English disputable? > 8. What are the strong and weak points of the "prepositional", "positional", and "postpositional" case theories? 9. What ensures a peculiar status of "-s"?
10. What are the main approaches to the treatment of the article?
- ' 11. What shows the intermediate (between the word and the morpheme) status of the article?
12. What does the oppositional representation of the articles reveal? •
13. What are the categorial meanings of the three articles?

I. Account for the article determination of the given casual phrases:

- a) a soldier's bag, a ten miles' forest, the Prime Minister's speech;
- b) Travolta's first role, expensive teenagers' T-shirts, the man who was run over yesterday's daughter;
- c) week's work, a new men's deodorant, a hundred miles' run;
- d) within a stone's throw, a child's dream, Christ's Church.

11. Define the casual semantics of the modifying component in the underlined phrases and account for their determination:

a)

1. Two Negroes, dressed in glittering livery such as one sees in pictures of royal processions in London, were standing at attention beside the car and as the two young men dismounted from the buggy they were greeted in some language which the guest could not understand, but which seemed to be an extreme form of the Southern Negro's dialect (Fitzgerald).
2. Home was a fine high-ceiling apartment hewn from the palace of a Renaissance cardinal in the Rue Monsieur - the sort of thing Henry could not have afforded in America (Fitzgerald).
3. Wherefore it is better to be a guest of the law, which, though conducted by rules, does not meddle unduly with a gentleman's private affairs (O.Henry).
4. The two vivid years of his love for Caroline moved back around him like years in Einstein's physics (Fitzgerald).

"Isn't Ida's head a dead ringer for the lady's head on the silver dollar?" (O.Henry)
 He had been away from New York for more than eight months and most of the dance music was unfamiliar to him, but at the first bars of the "Painted Doll", to which he and Caroline had moved through so much happiness and despair the previous summer, he crossed to Caroline's table and asked her to dance (Fitzgerald).

b)

And then followed the big city's biggest shame, its most ancient and rotten surviving canker... handed down from a long-ago century of the basest barbarity- the Hue and Cry (O.Henry). He mentioned what he had said to the aspiring young actress who had stopped him in front of Sardi's and asked quite bluntly if she should persist in her ambition to go on the stage or give up and go home (Saroyan). The policeman's mind refused to accept Soapy even as a clue. Men who smash windows do not remain to parley with the law's minions (O.Henry).
 I've heard you're very fat these days, but I know it's nothing serious, and anyhow I don't care what happens to people's bodies, just so the rest of them is O.K. (Saroyan).

"I dropped them flowers in a cracker-barrel, and let the news trickle in my ears and down toward my upper left-hand shirt pocket until it got to my feet." (O.Henry)

5.

She turned and smiled at him unhappily in the dim dashboard light (Cheever).

c)

Andy agreed with me, but after we talked the scheme over with the hotel clerk we gave that plan up. He told us that there was only one way to get an appointment in Washington, and that was through a lady lobbyist (O.Henry).
 Nobody lived in the old Parker mansion, and the driveway was used as a lovers' lane (Cheever).
 His eyes were the same blue shade as the china dog's in the right-hand corner of your Aunt Ellen's mantelpiece (O.Henry).
 Pandemonium broke loose in the courtroom. A woman's scream rose above the bedlam and suddenly a lovely, dark-haired girl was in Walter Mitty's arms (Thurber).
 "A man?" said Sue, with a jew's-harp twang in her voice (O.Henry).

6. Then he would spring onto the terrace, lift the steak lightly off the fire, and run away with the Goslins' dinner, Jupiter's days were numbered. The Wrightsons' German gardener or the Farquarsons' cook would

d)

1. He was past sixty and had a Michael Angelo's Moses beard curling down from the head of a satyr along the body of an imp (O.Henry).
2. One day this man finds his wife putting on her overshoes and three months' supply of bird seed into the canary's cage (O.Henry).

1. After leaving Pinky, Francis went to a jeweller's and bought the girl a bracelet (Cheever).

1. And Mr. Binkley looked imposing and dashing with his red face and grey moustache, and his tight dress coat, that made the back of his neck roll up just like a successful novelist's (Cheever).

1. He broke up garden parties and tennis matches, and got mixed up in the processional at Christ's Church on Sunday, barking at the men in red dresses (Cheever).

1. I painted the portrait of a very beautiful and popular society dame (O.Henry).

III. Open the brackets and account for the choice of the case form of the noun:

a)

1. Vivian Schnlitzer-Murphy had rubies as big as (hen + eggs), and sap phires that were like globes with lights inside them (Fitzgerald).
1. But as Soapy set foot inside the (restaurant + door) the (head + waiter + eye) fell upon his frayed trousers and decadent shoes (O.Henry).
1. A miserable cat wanders into the garden, sunk in spiritual and physical discomfort. Tied to its head is a small (straw + hat) - a (doll + hat) - and it is securely buttoned into a (doll + dress), from the skirts of which protrudes its long, hairy tail (Cheever).
1. Soapy straightened the (lady + missionary + ready-made + tie), dragged his shrinking cuffs into the open, set his hat at a killing cant and sidled towards the young woman (O.Henry).
1. "I'm afraid I won't be able to," he said, after a (moment + hesitation) (Fitzgerald).

b)

1. Of women there were five in Yellowhammer. The (assayer + wife), the (proprietress + the Lucky Strike Hotel), and a laundress whose wash-tub panned out an (ounce + dust) a day (O.Henry).

2.- "The face," said Reineman, "is the (face + one + God + own angels)." (O.Henry)

3. people who had come in were rich and at home in their richness with one another - a dark lovely girl with a hysterical little laugh he had met before; two confident men whose jokes referred invariably to last (night + scandal) and (tonight + potentialities)... (Fitzgerald).

4. His face was a sickly white, covered almost to the eyes with a stubble the (shade + a red Irish setter + coat) (O.Henry).

5. During the first intermission he suddenly remembered that he had not had a seat removed from the theatre and placed in his dressing room, so he called the (stage + manager) and told him to see that such a seat was instantly found somewhere and placed in his dressing room (Saroyan).

c)

1. His eyes were full of hopeless, tricky defiance like that seen in a (cur) that is cornered by his tormentors (O.Henry).

2. The scene for his *miserere mei Deus* was, like (the waiting room + so many doctors + offices), a crude (token + gesture) toward the sweets of domestic bliss: a place arranged with antiques, (coffee + tables), potted plants, and (etchings + snow-covered bridges and geese in flight), although there were no children, no (marriage + bed), no stove, even, in this (travesty + a house), where no one had ever spent the night and where the curtained windows looked straight onto a dark (air + shaft) (Cheever).

1. Their eyes brushed past (each other), and the look he knew so well was staring out at him from hers (Fitzgerald).

2. "Hello, Mitty," he said. "We're having the (devil + own time) with McMillan, the millionaire banker and close personal friend of Roosevelt." (Thurber)

1. "You know? Clayton, that (boy + hers), doesn't seem to get a job..." (Cheever)

d)

1. He noticed that the (face + the + taxi + driver) in the photograph inside the cab resembled, in many ways, the (painter + face) (Saroyan).

2. Here he was, proudly resigned to the loneliness which is (man + lot), ready and able to write, and to say yes, with no strings attached (Saroyan).

3. He was tired from the (day + work) and tired with longing, and sitting on the (edge + the bed) had the effect of deepening his weariness (Cheever).

4. The (voice + childhood) had never gladdened its flimsy structures; the (patter + restless little feet) had never consecrated the one rugged high way between the two (rows + tents + rough buildings) (O.Henry).
5. But now Yellowhammer was but a (mountain + camp), and nowhere in it were the roguish, expectant eyes, opening wide at (dawn + the enchanting day); the eager, small hands to reach for (Santa + bewildering hoard); the elated, childish voicings of the (season + joy), such as the (coming good things + the warmhearted Cherokee) deserved (O.Henry).

IV. Translate the sentences into English and define the semantic type of the casual phrase:

1. Никто не расслышал последние слова умирающего пациента.
2. Он купил новый офицерский китель.
3. Сестра подписалась на богато иллюстрированный дорогой женский журнал.
4. Утомительный десятимильный переход, казалось, вымотал всех, кроме капрала.
5. Неожиданное двадцатипроцентное увеличение зарплаты удивило сотрудников фирмы, поскольку они уже привыкли к скупости своего шефа.

V. Comment on the oppositional reduction of the categorial nounal forms:

a) the category of number

1. Yet, every dim little star revolving around her, from her maid to the manager of the Italian Opera, knows her weaknesses, prejudices, follies, haughtinesses, and caprices... (Dickens)
2. There's many a poor respectable mother who doesn't get half the fuss and attention which is lavished on some of these girls! (James)
3. But Hamilton drinks too much and all this crowd of young people drink too much (Fitzgerald).
4. He won't be retiring for another eighteen months (Christie).
5. In her grace, at once exquisite and hardy, she was that perfect type of American girl that makes one wonder if the male is not being sacrificed to it, much as, in the last century, the lower strata in England were sacrificed to produce the governing class (Fitzgerald).
6. Michael saw Mrs. Dandy, not quite over her illness, rise to go and be come caught in polite group after group (Fitzgerald).
7. While it grew dark they drank and just before it was dark and there was no longer enough light to shoot, a hyena crossed the open on his way

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around the hill. "That bastard crosses there every night," the man said.

"Every night for two weeks." "He's the one makes the noise at night. I don't mind it. They are a filthy animal though." (Hemingway)

He opened a second window and got into bed to shut his eyes on that night, but as soon as they were shut - as soon as he had dropped off to sleep - the girl entered his mind, moving with perfect freedom through its shut doors and filling chamber after chamber with her light, her perfume, and the music of her voice (Cheever).

"Man has a right to expect living passion and beauty in a woman." (Anderson)

What does a man risk his life day after day for? (O.Henry)

b) the category of case

1. The car speed was so slow that it seemed to be crawling (Cheever).
2. Music's voice went to his heart (O.Henry).
3. The hearth was swept, the roses on the piano were reflected in the polished of the broad top, and there was an album of Schubert waltzes on the rack (Cheever).
4. He remembered reading - in a John D. MacDonald novel, he thought - that every modern motel room in America seems filled with mirrors (King).
5. And I expect the whole place is bugged, and everybody knows everybody else's most secret conversations (Christie).

c) the category of gender

1. The old man was soon asleep and dreamed of the ocean and his golden beaches (Hemingway).
2. The moon was rising, blood-red. The boy was looking at her thinking that he had never seen so red a moon (Galsworthy).
3. She shuddered. The child, his own child, was only an "it" to him (Lawrence).
4. When Alice was speaking to the Mouse, she noticed that he was trembling all over with fright (Carroll).
5. I herded sheep for five days on the Rancho Chiquito; and then the wool entered my soul. That getting next to Nature certainly got next to me. I was lonelier than Crusoe's goat (O.Henry).
6. In November a cold, unseen stranger, whom the doctors called Pneumonia, stalked about the colony, touching one here and there with his icy fingers (O.Henry).

d) the category of article determination

1. She never told him they (letters) were from a husband (James).
2. And if you do well on "Emergency" there are the first-class thrill

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- shows, like "Hazard" and "Underwater Perils", with their nation wide coverage and enormous prizes. And then comes the really big time (Sheckley).
3. He closed his eyes again and remembered, with mild astonishment, a time when he had been in the trouble (Sheckley).
 4. The breakers leaped at him, staggering him, while the boys yelled with ecstasy; the returning water curled threateningly around his feet as it hurried back to sea (Fitzgerald).
 5. It was a white world on which dark trees and tree masses stood under a sky keen with frost (Lawrence).
 6. Meanwhile he heard the ringing crow of a cockerel in the distance, he saw the pale shell of the moon effaced on a blue sky (Lawrence).
 7. Gowing came a little later and brought, without asking permission, a fat and, I think, very vulgar-looking man named Padge, who appeared to be all moustache (Grossmith).
 8. The next day she loved and rejoiced on the day he crossed the floor, he was sun, moon and stars in one (Lawrence).
 9. Old Jolyon was too much of a Forsyte to praise anything freely (Galsworthy).
 10. "Has he any relatives in England?" "Two aunts. A Mrs. Everard, who lives at Hampstead, and a Miss Daniels, who lives near Ascot." (Christie)
 11. Intending to call Dr. Wilbur's home number, Sybil inserted a dime in the slot to ask for long distance but heard only a metallic nothingness. The telephone was dead (Schreiber).
 12. Kate did not like having to learn lessons from this little waif of a Teresa (Lawrence).
 13. Tonight when he returned to his apartment at the stable he would begin to paint this breathtaking picture of sky and sand and sea (Stone).
 14. Where she stopped the sign read: "Mme. Sofronie. Hair Goods of All Kinds." One flight up Delia ran, and collected herself, panting. Ma dame, large, too white, chilly, hardly looked the "Sofronie" (O. Henry).

VI. Analyze the categorial features of the underlined wordforms:

The boy was devouring cakes, while the anxious-looking aunt tried to convince the Grahams that her sister's only son could do no mischief.

MODEL: We had just finished the cocktails when the door was flung open and the Morstens's girl came in, followed by a boy.

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the cocktails - the noun form is marked by the expression of the categorial meanings of plurality and identification and is unmarked in the categories of gender and case;

the door - the noun form is marked by the expression of the categorial meaning of identification of the referent, and is unmarked in the expression of the categories of case, number, and gender;

The Morstens's - the noun form is marked by the expression of the categorial meanings of plurality, of identification of the referent, of appurtenance, and of animateness (the strong member of the upper opposition of the category of gender);

the girl - the noun form is marked by the expression of the categorial meanings of identification of the referent, and of the feminine gender. At the same time it is the unmarked member of the oppositions in the categories of case and number;

a boy - the noun form is marked by the expression of the categorial meaning of the masculine gender, and is the unmarked member of the oppositions in the categories of case, number, and article determination.

Selected Reader

1.

Strang B. **Modern English**
Structure

Form-Classes Functioning in the Noun Phrase

We shall class as nouns words which comply with the following set of criteria:

- (a) They constitute an open class - indeed, the most open of all, since any word (or other linguistic form) becomes (conforms to the criteria for) a noun if it is mentioned rather than used (as in "There are too many ifs and buts about it", "a *certain je*

ne sais quoi"). It is a corollary that they have full lexical meaning, and, even, if they are monosyllables, inherent stress.

- (b) Functionally, they can be the (or the head of the) subject, or, without morphological change [...] the complement, of a sentence. Examples are "shopkeeper", "boy", and "change" in "The shopkeeper gave the boy his change".
- (c) Positionally, they can follow directly in minimal constructions (i.e., be head-word to) a closed system of words we shall call determiners. They can also follow directly in the same clause, and without change of form, the closed system of items we shall call prepositions. Examples of these positions are those of "house", "top" and "hill" in "The house stood on the top of the hill". They can stand in adjunct relationship directly before other nouns (as in "gold mine", "retiring age"), and directly after nouns in the genitive case (as in "a mare's nest").
- (d) Morphologically, they are variables in respect of a two-term system of number and a two-term system of case. [...]
- (e) Finally, nouns are sub-divided in terms of syntactical patterning into several genders, i.e., subclasses capable of patterning with certain pronouns and not with others. Gender as a linguistic term generally relates to limited capacities for patterning with other linguistic forms, though the particular kind of limitation found in English is far from being the only one.

It is from all these features taken together that a family likeness arises, which is the source of the class-meaning of nouns. In the past, nouns have often been defined from the kind of class-meaning they have - it was said, f. ex., that a noun is the name of anything that exists or can be conceived. There is a good deal of truth in this - enough to have kept the idea alive for many centuries - but it is not wholly true. In any case it seems nowadays like putting the cart before the horse: it is the common formal feature that fulfils a common function and so gives rise to a common meaning in nouns as a whole. It happens in this case that the resultant class-meaning is relatively specific and easy to verbalize. But it is not the evidence that a particular word is or is not a noun.

Number

- The distinction between singular and plural in English nouns is primarily morphological, though there are supporting features of limited collocation with other items, determiners, numerals and verbs. Thus, "a", "one", "every", "much", "this", "that" pattern only with singulars; numerals above "one", "many", "these", "those", only with plurals; so, in the case of central nouns, do groups without determiner ("Sheep grazed in the fields") (some speak here of zero-determiner, since the determiner is not just absent, but by its absence contributes an identifiable meaning to the whole utterance). This restriction of patterning may, as in the example just given, be the only indication of plurality. Those verb-forms which we may briefly label "-.s forms" pattern only with singulars ("The sheep is/was in the field"; "The sheep are/were in the field") - and this may be the only sign of Singularity (in marginal nouns and names, but not with central nouns). But in the great majority of cases number-variation is indicated by morphological change, and if there is only one indication, it is most often this one. That is why we speak of the distinction as primarily morphological; but equally we must recognize that noun singular and plural are established not by a single criterion but by family resemblances. The lack of an invariable criterion means that sometimes number is not clear (as in "The sheep ate up every scrap of grass"), but even internally ambiguous sentences are usually clarified by context (linguistic or situational).

Two types of morphological patterning must be distinguished in the pairing of singular and plural forms of nouns.

a) The first constitutes in any one idiolect, a virtually closed class, and consists commonly of the pairing of:

- 1) ox [nks] with oxen [nksan]
- 2) man [maen] with men [men]
- 3) foot [fut] with feet [fi:t], etc. [...]

b) The second type of morphological change is much more common, but can be dealt with much more briefly, because a generalization can be made about it. All nouns not catered for by the provisions of (a) have this second kind of pluralisation, and we have already frequently referred to it as the open-class kind. It is found, generally

speaking, not only in the (literally) countless nouns already in the language but also in the vast majority of newcomers being adopted. In this class the change for the plural consists of adding a final morpheme (suffix) realized in 3 distinct phonemic forms according to the character of the final phoneme of the base: boy [boi]: boys [boiz]; cup [L\p]: cups [kAps]; judge [dsAdj]: judges [dsAdsiz].

The functions of the singular-plural distinction in nouns have so far only been roughly indicated. They are primarily referential in character, and two concurrent systems must be distinguished. In formal speech and writing the distinction is most often between singular as referring to none or one, and plural as referring to more than one. But in informal and unself-conscious usage, the distinction is usually between one (singular) and other-than-one (plural). For instance, according to one's "style", both the following sentences are possible in reference to the same situation: "No children were there" and "No child was there".

It is important to be clear about what it is that is being referred to - not an object or concept single or not-single in itself, but one or other-than-one of the referent of the noun in question. Thus, there is inherently no special problem about the singular of a word like "crowd" because a crowd is necessarily made up of a lot of persons, any more than there is about the word "person" because a person is necessarily made up of a lot of cells.

Case

Case is "any one of the varied forms of a noun, adjective or pronoun, which expresses the varied relations in which it may function" (Oxford English Dictionary). That is, it is a form to express relationship, not the relationship itself; and the kind of relationship is one that only certain sorts of word (those characteristically functioning in the noun-phrase) enter into - case and noun, etc., are to some extent mutually defining words. OED's definition is meant to apply to a wide range of languages; it does not of course imply that all these form-classes actually have case-systems in English (for adjectives clearly not). For the two terms of the English noun case-system, the labels "common case" and "genitive case" are probably the most appropriate of those available.

4" The two terms of the case-system of English nouns are not on an 'equal footing. Formally, the one we have called common case is uninflected, while the genitive is inflected; functionally, the uses of the •genitive are specific, those of the common case general, in the sense that a noun is in the common case unless there s reason for it not to be. In other words, both formally and functionally, the common case js unmarked and the genitive marked.

} •#. In the common case singular, the base of the noun is used. In the 'genitive a morphemic suffix is added, once again -'s sibilant suffix ; fiaving alternants [iz], [z], [s] in the same distribution as the open-class plural morpheme. There is, of course, a distinction in the written form, where the genitive has an apostrophe before the -s; and there is a difference in speech in those words that have closed-class plurals, since there are no exceptions to the spoken form of the genitive suffix - save in a few expressions where the next word begins With s-, and then only regularly in expressions that have become traditional as wholes, such as *Pears' Soap* [peaz soup]. This degree of uniformity in distribution is unique amongst grammatical bound morphemes in English.

In the plural the common-case forms are those described above. For those words that have open-class plurals, there is no formal case-contrast, though in writing a distinction is made by placing an apostrophe " after the -s in the genitive. Nouns with closed-class plurals do have a contrast in speech, adding to the common-class plural the sibilant morpheme with alternants [iz], [z], [s] in the now familiar distribution.

The value of grammatical contrasts is that they convey meanings and distinctions that the language is not well adapted to convey lexically; so any attempt to sum up "the meaning" of the genitive is doomed. It is hard to get nearer to it than to say that it conveys a relationship, which may be of possession, origin, consisting of, extent of, association with or concerning (directed towards). Genitives commonly occur in collocations with another noun-like word, which provides the second term of the relationship, and may be classified according as the relationship is subjective (directed from the referent of the genitive noun to that of the other) or objective (directed towards the referent of the genitive noun). An example (adapting a book-title) is "my aunt's murder" (subjective if it refers to the murder she

committed; objective if it refers to murder committed upon her). There is no formal difference, and this may lead to ambiguity, but generally the context and lexical probability make clear which is meant. Of the kinds of relationship expressed, that of possession is probably dominant, with the result that there is a tendency to avoid the genitive of nouns whose referents cannot possess (are not, or are not thought of as being, human or at least animal). So we readily speak of a student's book, but not of a book's student (=one who studies that book); and similarly not only for nouns with actually personal referents, but for others like "ship" and "car", which have as referents things some speakers like to think of in human terms; but hardly the "typewriter's ribbon". Possession is not the only relationship expressed by the genitive, however, and in expressions of a certain pattern the genitive of extent is very common (indeed, compulsory for the required relationship), e.g., *a day's work*, *a stone's throw*. For this reason, it is inadvisable to give the case a name like "possessive", or indeed any transparent name, for it just does not correspond to any simple lexical notion in English, except in a special sense we shall now look into. Naturally the genitive relationship in its full range needs to be expressed in connection with nouns not eligible, as we have explained, for genitive case-forms. In such words, a quite different pattern is used, namely the particle "of" followed by the noun in common case, the whole following the form for the other term of the relationship (as in "The Book of the Month"). "Of" therefore does have much the same "meaning" as the case-form (though its distribution is different) and we might have used the name "of-case" if we could have been sure that that would not suggest that of-constructions themselves are case-forms. Though "of" is a word, it belongs not to lexis, but to grammar, since it is one of the closed-system items we shall call "prepositions".

There are two difficulties about describing the use of the genitive. That of saying what kind of relationship it expresses we have already met. The second is that of the relative distribution of case-construction and of-constructions. The general principles outlined so far must now be restricted in application. First there are idioms, constructions functioning as wholes, internally invariable, such as "money's worth", "harm's way", "heart's content", "mind's eye", "wits' end". Second-

a genitive used quasi-adjectivally in certain words which otherwise do not conform to noun patterning, as in "yesterday's rain", "j|today's engagements", "to-morrow's match". Such constructions : not like the idioms, for their total lexical content is not fixed, but jhey do represent fixed patterns of usage. Thirdly, various forces com-Ципе to keep alive a sense of patterns formerly productive in the lan-ige; one such force is the analogy of idioms, another is the memo-^of familiar quotations (*mind's eye* is one of these, and one less fully Ssimilated is *the round world's imagined corners*), and a third is news-ГГ usage, especially in headlines, for which the compactness of de case-form is very convenient, so that it is often used where it would linarily be inappropriate, and so become increasingly familiar. Ijjuphony is also a disturbing factor; except in set expressions (idi-s, quotations and references) most speakers avoid the case-con-

%truction after final [s], saying, for instance, "The Eve of St. Agnes" ; lather than "St. Agnes' Eve". But the most important restriction of ;4ll is that our generalization applies, as far as speech is concerned, "almost wholly to the singular forms. As we have seen, the case-con-'trast in the plural is vestigial, and generally in the plural of-constructions are preferred. In writing the case-construction is more freely Used, and some speakers follow the model of written English.

There are some instances, commonly in rather fixed patterns, in which the genitive is not associated with another noun-like word, but used absolutely, notably with locative force (*at the greengrocer's*); it may also occur, not alternatively with the of-construction, but in conjunction with it (*that boy of Smith's*).

Gender

Two things are important about gender in English: first, that it is a covert class, controlling the patterning of pronouns in relation to nouns, and second, that it is quite close to being natural, i.e., a reflex of the sex-distinctions of male, female or neither, but it is not entirely so. The pronoun-system with which it correlates is threefold, the term being labeled "masculine", "feminine" and "neuter", but as there is not simply one-to-one correspondence between these terms and the conditioning classes of nouns, we find actually a seven-term system, thus:

- 1) patterning with pronouns he/who, nouns like "man", "back", "horse";
- 2) patterning with she/who, nouns like "woman", "maid", "hare";
- 3) patterning with he/she/who, nouns like "person", "doctor", "parent", "friend";
- 4) patterning with it/which, nouns like "cake", "box", "insect";
- 5) patterning with it/he/which, nouns like "bull", "ram", "cock", "horse";
- 6) patterning with it/she/which, nouns like "cow", "ewe", "hen", "car", "boat";
- 7) patterning with it/he/who/which, nouns like "child", "baby", "dog", "cat".

There is some variation of usage; for instance, some will put "hare" under (6) rather than (2); and where options exist they are not in free variations, but are controlled by factors which may or may not be linguistic - we may speak of a baby as "it" because we do not know whether it is a boy or a girl, but if we speak of a car as "she" it is to associate ourselves with a particular attitude to the car.


Questions:

1. What criteria does B. Strang suggest for noun identification?
2. How does B. Strang define the categorial meaning of number in the nouns?
3. What formal and functional features of the casual nounal forms does B. Strang single out?
4. What evidence does B. Strang provide to reveal the semantic ambiguity of the Genitive Case?
5. What is typical of case-constructions distribution and that of of-constructions?
6. What principles underlie B. Strang's gender classification?

Quirk R., Greenbaum S., Leech Q., Svartvik J.
A University Grammar of English

Noun Classes. Gender. Case

The English makes very few gender distinctions. Where they are made, the connection between the biological "sex" and the grammatical category of "gender" is very close, insofar as natural sex distinction determines English gender distinctions. It is further typical of English that special suffixes are not generally used to mark gender distinctions. Nor are gender distinctions made in the article. Some pronouns are gender-sensitive (the personal "he", "she", "it", and the relative "who", "which"), but others are not ("they", "some", "these", etc.). The patterns of pronoun substitution for singular nouns give us a set of 10 gender classes as illustrated below:



Double Genitive

An of-genitive can be combined with an -s genitive in a construction called the "double genitive". The noun with the -s genitive inflection must be both definite and personal:

An opera of Verdi's an opera of my friend's

Questions:

1. How do the authors treat the category of gender?
2. What criterion do they use to single out gender classes?
3. What casual forms of the noun do they single out?
4. What semantic types of the Genitive do they identify?
5. What are the differential features of the group genitive, the genitive with ellipsis, and the double genitive?

3.

Gardiner A. The Theory of Proper Names

A proper name is a word or group of words recognized as indicating or tending to indicate the object or objects to which it refers by virtue of its distinctive sound alone, without regard to any meaning possessed by that sound from the start, or acquired by it through association with the said object or objects. [...]

One of the two largest classes of proper names is that which provides designations for places - for continents, countries, provinces, towns, villages, and even private residences, not to speak of expanses of water, mountains, promontories, and so forth. In this class all the four conditions mentioned above come into play, but with differences deserving of comment. (1) There are but few localities in the world so different from the rest that they eschew proper names and are habitually represented by brief descriptions; indeed I can instance only the North and South Poles. As regards the similarity of the entities named

ere is not that degree which exists between the stars as seen by a terrestrial observer, but it would be a grievous misrepresentation of things if someone objected that the Mediterranean and London have nothing in common except that both are localities. When sea is compared with sea and town with town the difficulty of selecting features characteristic enough to serve as basis for differentiating descriptions will be appreciated to the full. The fact that places change from century to century is another reason for giving them immutable names of their own to emphasize their continuity, though this cause of proper names exercises less influence in place-names than it does in names of persons. (2) The interest without which no place would be given a name does not spring from exactly the same kind of source as the interest that prompted the naming of the stars. There the needs of mariners and of those concerned with the measurement of time have co-operated with the scientific preoccupations of a small body of specialists. As regards places, there is scarcely anyone without a home or haunt of his own which is a vital interest to him, whereas his concern with distant places varies greatly and in the majority of cases is simply non-existent. For this reason most places are for him "mere names". Again it accords well with Mill's view of the meaninglessness of proper names that place-names can prove serviceable with only a minimum of knowledge. When a railway-journey is being planned one does not stop to inquire details about the junctions at which one has to change, nor is more information required in giving an address than to specify the larger and smaller regions within which the particular place is located. The interest that different persons display in a given place is apt to be extremely heterogeneous and the virtue of a proper name is that, since it embraces the whole of its object, it caters to all requirements without bias in any direction. (3) It is superfluous to waste words over the utility of place-names in locating other places than those designated by themselves; the postman and the pedestrian are here the best witnesses. It would be tedious to cover the same ground again in reference to personal names, the largest class of all. Still it is worth pointing out that there is no human being so wretched as to have no name of his own, and yet the great majority of people whom we meet in the streets of a city are of supreme indifference to us. What is more, they look alike, or at all events the distinguishing marks are not conspicu-

ous enough for the individuality of each to be upheld by words more meaningful than proper names. It is of importance for the theory of personal names that these accompany their owners, as a rule, from the cradle to the grave, and consequently identify these owners at every conceivable stage and in every situation. Indeed, we may pertinently note that a personality sometimes undergoes temporary eclipse by change of name, as in the case of girls who marry or prominent men when elevated to the peerage.

Thus much having been said, it may seem profitable to discuss a few special problems and traits in connexion with persons and their names. Perhaps someone might think fit to ask why the name of some almost universally known person, like Napoleon or Shakespeare, does not lose its quality of being a proper name as a consequence of acquiring meaning and becoming a household word. I can picture some reader objecting: "If your hypothesis concerning *sun* and *moon* is correct, why does not the name *Napoleon* present itself to us as a common noun, seeing that here, if anywhere, the mind travels right through the sound to the meaning?" But does it? For the generality of mankind, and it is they who confer their meaning upon words, when the sun's roundness, and brightness, and warmth, and a few other traits have been enumerated, the meaning of the word *sun* is practically exhausted. With a personal name like *Napoleon* it is far otherwise. Whole books are required to set forth the meaning of *Napoleon*, and what the bearer of the name has signified to his contemporaries and to later generations. The meaning of his name by no means confines itself to those traits that have brought him celebrity. His childhood, his experiences as a lover, his life at St. Helena have all to be brought into the account. Another reason which would suffice to uphold the position of *Napoleon* amid the ranks of proper names is what I have proposed to call the Law of Serial Uniformity, this is at bottom only a manifestation of the generalizing tendency of the human mind, which assimilates phenomena with a valiant disregard of the differences that may exist between them. All persons have names of their own, and *Napoleon* is the name of the great Corsican. And that name cannot fail to be regarded by the linguistic consciousness as a proper name, no matter how much more significant it may be to the public at large than that of any ordinary person.

„. Let us next ask how far designations like *Cook* and *Father*, when Jjemployed as vocatives or as means of reference, can be considered to be proper names. They resemble these by not having the article prefixed to them. Here we cannot avail ourselves of the antithesis between Language and Speech which stood us in good stead when dealing with examples like *a Goethe*. We cannot say that *Cook* is a mere i? phenomenon of Speech, for within the limited circle where the word ;! serves as substitute for a personal name it has more than a mere ad I Ace, momentary application; it may indeed be stabilized for years in a family as the recognized designation of the same person. The gram-, marian must here forge a nomenclature that does justice to the special case, and I should propose to classify *Cook*, when thus employed, as "a common noun *adopted* (not merely *used*) as a proper name". The conception of a proper name as liable to gradations becomes , imperative in such instances. Usually *Father* is still less of a real proper name than *Cook*, since, except when the other parent imitates the parlance of her offspring, *Father* is employed only by those to whom its bearer stands in the paternal relation. I pass over the interesting topic of nicknames, but it is necessary that something should be said about examples like *Richard le Spicer* and *Robert le Long*, quoted from a medieval roil by Weekley to illustrate the way in which common English surnames originated. Here it would be fitting, in my opinion, to say that *Spicer* and *Long* are already proper names, inasmuch as their bearers or else the community in which they lived had evidently decreed it that these designations should be the official means of establishing their identity. Naturally the spicer (*I'epicier*) had every incentive to advertise his trade, and it would be wrongheaded to suppose that he wished the meaning of that epithet to be ignored. But *Richardle Spicer* may possibly have been long of limb, and it is by no means certain that *Robert le Long* was not a spicer. The fact that Richard took *le Spicer* and not any other applicable attribute to be his *epitheton constans* plainly confers on *le Spicer* the right to be considered a proper name, though one rather more questionable than *Dartmouth*, a name of long standing in which the meaning doubtless seldom comes to consciousness.

A number of other categories of proper names can be dealt with very rapidly, since only in one particular do they teach us anything

new. All ships and boats receive proper names of their own on account of the commercial and other interest which they possess for their owners, though not necessarily for the community at large. Houses are not quite so universally accorded this means of distinction, since temporary tenants can feel little objection to their place of residence being identified by a number. The effective motive here comes into view. The man who builds a new house for himself or unexpectedly becomes the proud possessor of one is specially apt to mark his satisfaction by choosing a name for it, and the name chosen is likely to recall some scene of the name-giver's previous activity or to reflect some subject of peculiar interest to him. The like holds good for the naming of animals, pets, and indeed any object of human pride or affection.

I pass on to more dubious cases. An eminent French philologist has claimed that the names of birds which he personally is unable to identify on sight are in reality proper names. As previously remarked, personal ignorance of the meaning of a word - and this is a failing for which everyone ought to feel the greatest sympathy - can carry no weight in determining its categorization. To what category a word belongs is decided by the linguistic feeling of those best acquainted with the object and the manner of its reference, although the assistance of grammarian and dictionary-maker must be invoked to find the technical term appropriate to the definition of the feeling. Now everyone who knows that linnets and corn-crakes and shrikes and whinchats are birds, and that these are the ordinary English designations of them, must sub-consciously place those designations in the same category as *sparrow* and *thrush*, and no one with grammatical knowledge will doubt that *sparrow* and *thrush* are common names. External evidence for this is found in the use of the articles and the formation of plurals without any sense of incongruence. If *whinchat* is felt to be more of a proper name than *sparrow*, it is because a proper name is merely a word in which one feature common to all words whatsoever - the power of conveying distinctions by means of distinctive sounds - is discerned in its purest form, and our attention is drawn to the distinctive sound or writing (which is merely sound translated into another medium) more urgently in the case of a rare word than in that of a common one.

None the less I think a good case may be made out for regarding the scientific Latin names of birds and plants as more of proper names; than their common English equivalents. The name *Brassica rapa* easily evokes the thought of a botanist classifying a number of specimens which to the lay mind are much alike, and to one of which he gives the name *Brassica rapa*, just as a parent names his baby. We have no such thought about the word *turnip*, and *Brassica rapa* is simply the scientific name for the ordinary turnip. We may find confirmatory support for regarding *Brassica rapa* as a proper name, or at least as much more of a proper name than *turnip*, in the fact that we do not say *This is a Brassica rapa* or *These are Brassica rapas*, though we might say *These are fine specimens of Brassica rapa*. In so saying we appeal to the name of any single example of the type, whereas in speaking of a certain vegetable as a *turnip* we appeal to the similarity of that vegetable to others of its kind. The difference of linguistic attitude is a mere nuance, but it is a real one. In the one instance the sound of the name, what we usually describe as the name itself, is more in the foreground than in the other instance.

Whether or no we classify the Latin names of plants and animals as proper names - admittedly they are borderline cases - it is undeniable that in fact those names refer to things existent in great number. If the contention of the last paragraph be deemed worthy of consideration, it is inevitable that the debate should be extended to new ground. The question whether the names of the months and of the days of the week should be regarded as proper names is one of much interest, since different languages take different lines about it. Whether a language uses capital letters or not is no proof, though it is a symptom that may be employed as evidence, if care be taken not to attach overmuch importance to it. The French write *jeudi* and *Janvier* where we write *Thursday* and *January*, and I believe I am right in saying that most French grammarians would not admit month-names and day-names as proper names. That at all events these names are also general names is clear from the facility and lack of strain felt in *tous les jeudis* (note the article and the plural ending) and in *Mrs. Brown is at home on Thursdays*. Nevertheless, there are details of usage, e.g. *jeudi le 15 mars*, which seem to place these names on a different footing from other common nouns. If the problem be stated in another

way, it seems likely that the same answer would be obtained from both Frenchmen and Englishmen. If we were to ask: "Which of the two words *hiver* (*winter*) and *decembre* (*December*) is more of a proper name than the other?" it would probably be admitted that the latter should have the preference. The reason is both obvious and interesting. The stretches of time indicated by the names of the seasons are felt to be more contrasted in their nature than those indicated by the month-names. Contiguous months may be much of a muchness, but there is an unmistakable difference between the seasons. Consequently in the names of the seasons the meaning plays a greater part in marking the distinction than is played by the meaning attaching to the month-names, and in the latter correspondingly the distinctive name, i.e. the distinctive word-sound, exercises a more important role in indicating the period meant. The month-name is for that reason more of a proper name than the name of the season.

It is a peculiarity of the months and the days of the week that a fixed order belongs to their meaning. It is undeniable that Wednesday implies the day after Tuesday and that before Thursday. Still that modicum of constant meaning does not compensate for the fact that the other characters of the day designated by the name *Wednesday* are variable and intangible and differ from person to person, so that the name itself is the only thing which we can cling to in order to uphold the distinction between one day and another.

It is superfluous to discuss feast days like Easter, Whitsunday, Lupercalia. To the Englishman at all events the names of these are proper names, though on account of their recurring every year they must join the ranks of the "common proper names".

(pp. 43-54)

Questions:

1. What definition does A. Gardiner give to proper names?
2. Does A. Gardiner support the view of the meaninglessness of proper names? What does he include into their semantics?
3. Why does A. Gardiner refuse to regard vocatives of the type "Father", "Cook", names of birds and plants as proper names?
4. How does A. Gardiner view the month-names and the day-names?

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VERB: GENERAL. NON-FINITE VERBS

1. A general outline of the verb as a part of speech.
2. Classification of verbs (notional verbs / semi-notional verbs / functional verbs).
3. Grammatical subcategorization of notional verbs (actional / statal / processual; limitive / unlimited).
4. The lexical aspect in English and in Russian.
5. The valency of verbs (complementive / uncomplementive verbs; transitive / intransitive verbs).
6. A general outline of verbals: the categorial semantics, categories, syntactic functions.
7. The infinitive and its properties. The categories of the infinitive. Modal meanings of infinitival complexes.
8. The gerund and its properties. The categories of gerund. The notion of half-gerund.
9. The present participle, the past participle, and their properties.

1. Classification of Verbs

Grammatically the verb is the most complex part of speech. This is due to the central role it performs in the expression of the predicative functions of the sentence, i.e. the functions of establishing the connection between the situation (situational event) named in the

«iteration and reality. The complexity of the verb is inherent not only in the intricate structure of its grammatical categories, but also in its various subclass divisions, as well as in its falling into two sets of forms profoundly different from each other: the finite set and the non-finite set (verbals, or verbids).

The categorial semantics of the verb is process presented dynamically. This general processual meaning is embedded in the semantics of all the verbs. It is proved by the verb valency and the syntactic function of the predicate.

The processual categorial meaning of the notional verb determines its characteristic combination with a noun expressing both the doer of the action (its subject) and, in cases of the objective verb, the recipient of the action (its object); it also determines its combination with an adverb as the modifier of the action.

In the sentence the finite verb invariably performs the functions of the verb-predicate, expressing the processual categorial features of predication, i.e. time, aspect, voice, and mood.

From the point of view of their outward structure, verbs are characterized by specific forms of word-building, as well as by the formal features expressing the corresponding grammatical categories.

The grammatical categories which find formal expression in the outward structure of the verb are, first, the category of finitude dividing the verb into finite and non-finite forms (this category has a lexico-grammatical force); second, the categories of person, number, tense, aspect, voice, and mood.

The class of verbs falls into a number of subclasses distinguished by different semantic and lexico-grammatical features. On the upper level of this division two unequal sets are identified: the set of verbs of full nominative value (notional verbs) which are opposed to the set of verbs of partial nominative value (semi-notional and functional verbs). The set of notional verbs is derivationally open. The second set is derivationally closed, it includes limited subsets of verbs characterized by individual relational properties. On the lower level of division each set can be subdivided into numerous subsets according to their relevant features.

Notional verbs are classified on the basis of three main principles: the relation of the subject of the verb to the process denoted by

the verb, the aspective verbal semantics, the verbal combinability with other language units.

According to the first criterion, all notional verbs are divided into two sets: actional and statal. This division is grammatically relevant since it explains the difference between the actional and statal verbs in their attitude towards the denotation of the action in progress. Actional verbs express the action performed by the subject, i.e. they present the subject as an active doer. Statal verbs, unlike their subclass counterparts, denote the state of their subject, i.e. they either give the subject the characteristic of the inactive recipient of some outward activity, or else express the mode of its existence.

Aspective verbal semantics (the second criterion) exposes the inner character of the process denoted by the verb. It represents the process as durative (continual), iterative (repeated), terminate (concluded), interminate (not concluded), instantaneous (momentary), ingressive (starting), overcompleted (developed to the extent of superfluity), undercompleted (not developed to its full extent), and the like. According to the aspective verbal semantics, two major subclasses of notional verbs are singled out: limitive and unlimitive. The verbs of the first order present a process as potentially limited. The verbs of the second order present a process as not limited by any border point. The demarcation line between the two aspective verbal subclasses is not rigidly fixed, the actual differentiation between them being in fact rather loose. Still, the opposition between limitive and unlimitive verbal sets does exist in English. This division of verbs has an unquestionable grammatical relevance, which is expressed, among other things, in peculiar correlation of these subclasses with the categorial aspective forms of the verbs (indefinite, continuous, perfect). It also reveals the difference in the expression of aspective distinctions in English and in Russian. The English lexical aspect differs radically from the Russian aspect. In terms of semantic properties, the English lexical aspect expresses a potentially limited or unlimited process, whereas the Russian aspect expresses the actual conclusion (the perfective, or terminative aspect) or non-conclusion (the imperfective, or non-terminative aspect) of the process in question. In terms of systemic properties, the two English lexical aspect varieties, unlike their Russian absolutely rigid counterparts, are but loosely distin-

ished and easily reducible. In accord with these characteristics, both *e* English limitive verbs and unlimitive verbs may correspond alter-itely either to the Russian perfective verbs or imperfective verbs, Depending on the contextual uses.

The syntactic valency of the verb falls into two cardinal types: Iobligatory and optional. The obligatory valency is such as must necessarily be realized for the sake of the grammatical completion of the ntactic construction. The subjective and the direct objective valencies of the verb are obligatory. The optional valency is such as is not necessarily realized in grammatically complete constructions: this type lof valency may or may not be realized depending on the concrete Imformation conveyed by the utterance. Most of the adverbial modifiers are optional parts of the sentence, so in terms of valency the j adverbial valency of the verb is mostly optional.

Thus, according to the third criterion - the valency of the verb -I all notional verbs are classified into two sets: complementive (taking obligatory adjuncts) and supplementive (taking optional adjuncts). I Complementive and supplementive verbs fall into minor groups: com-| plementive verbs are subdivided into predicative, objective, and ad-| verbial verbs; supplementive verbs are subdivided into personal and | impersonal verbs.

In connection with complementive and supplementive characteristics of verbs there arises the question of clarifying the difference between the two notions - "objectivity" and "transitivity". Verbal objectivity is the ability of the verb to take any object, irrespective of its type. Verbal transitivity is the ability of the verb to take a direct object. The division of the verb into objective and non-objective is more relevant for English than for Russian morphology because in English not only transitive but also intransitive objective verbs can be used in passive forms.

Semi-notional and functional verbs are united in the set of the verbs characterized by partial nominative value. To this set of verbs refer several subdivisions of verbs: auxiliary verbs, modal verbs, link verbs, and semi-notional verbid introducer verbs. All semi-functional and purely functional verbs function as markers of predication showing the connection between the nominative content of the sentence and reality.

2. Non-Finite Forms of the Verb

Non-finite forms of the verb (verbids) are the forms of the verb which have features intermediary between the verb and the non-processual parts of speech. Their mixed features are revealed in their semantics, morphemic structural marking, combinability, and syntactic functions. Verbids do not denote pure processes but present them as peculiar kinds of substances and properties; they do not express the most specific finite verb categories - the categories of tense and mood; they have a mixed, verbal and non-verbal, valency; they perform mixed, verbal and non-verbal, syntactic functions.

The strict division of functions clearly shows that the opposition between the finite and non-finite forms of the verb creates a special grammatical category. The differential feature of the opposition is constituted by the expression of verbal time and mood: while the time-mood grammatical signification characterizes the finite verb in a way that it underlies its finite predicative function, the verbid has no immediate means of expressing time-mood categorial semantics and therefore presents the weak member of the opposition. The category expressed by this opposition is called the category of "fmitude". The syntactic content of the category of fmitude is the expression of verbal predication.

The peculiar feature of the verbid verbality consists in their expressing "secondary" ("potential") predication. They are not self-dependent in a predicative sense. The verbids normally exist only as part of sentences built up by genuine, primary predicative constructions that have a finite verb as their core. And it is through the reference to the finite verb-predicate that these complexes set up the situation denoted by them in the corresponding time and mood perspectives.

The English verbids include four forms distinctly differing from one another within the general verbid system: the infinitive, the gerund, the present participle, and the past participle. In compliance with this difference, the verbid semi-predicative complexes are distinguished by the corresponding differential properties both in form and in syntactic-contextual function.

The infinitive combines the properties of the verb with those of the noun, as a result it serves as the verbal name of a process. By virtue of its general process-naming function, the infinitive should be considered as the head-form of the whole paradigm of the verb.

SThe infinitive has a dual, verb-type and noun-type, valency. The infinitive has three grammatical categories: the aspective category of development (the opposition of Continuous and Non-Continuous Informs), the aspective category of retrospective coordination (the opposition of Perfect and Non-Perfect forms), the category of voice (the opposition of Passive and Non-Passive forms). Consequently, the categorial paradigm of the infinitive of the objective verb includes » eight forms: the Indefinite Active, the Continuous Active, the Perfect *I* Active, the Perfect Continuous Active; the Indefinite Passive, the Continuous Passive, the Perfect Passive, the Perfect Continuous Passive. The infinitive paradigm of the non-objective verb, correspondingly, includes four forms.

The gerund, like the infinitive, combines the properties of the verb with those of the noun and gives the process the verbal name. In comparison with the infinitive the gerund reveals stronger substantive properties. Namely, as different from the infinitive, and similar to the noun, the gerund can be modified by a noun in the possessive case or its pronominal equivalents (expressing the subject of the verbal process), and it can be used with prepositions.

The combinability of the gerund is dual: it has a mixed, verb-type and noun-type, valency. Like the infinitive, the gerund performs the syntactic functions of the subject, the object, the predicative, the attribute, and the adverbial modifier. The gerund has two grammatical categories: the aspective category of retrospective coordination and the category of voice. Consequently, the categorial paradigm of the gerund of the objective verb includes four forms: the Simple Active, the Perfect Active, the Simple Passive, the Perfect Passive. The gerundial paradigm of the non-objective verb, correspondingly, includes "two forms.

The present participle serves as a qualifying-processual name. It combines the properties of the verb with those of the adjective and adverb.

The present participle has two categories: the category of retrospective coordination and the category of voice. The triple nature of the present participle finds its expression in its mixed (verb-type, adjective-type, adverb-type) valency and its syntactic functions (those of the predicative, the attribute, and the adverbial modifier).

The present participle, similar to the infinitive, can build up semi-predicative complexes of objective and subjective types.

The **past participle** combines the properties of the verb with those of the adjective. The categorial meaning of the past participle is qualifying: it gives some sort of qualification to the denoted process. The past participle has no paradigmatic forms; by way of paradigmatic correlation with the present participle, it conveys implicitly the categorial meanings of the perfect and the passive. Its valency is not specific; its typical syntactic functions are those of the attribute and the predicative.

Like the present participle, the past participle is capable of making up semi-predicative constructions of complex object, complex subject, as well as absolute complexes.

The consideration of the English verbids in their mutual comparison, supported and supplemented by comparing them with their nonverbal counterparts, reveals a peculiar character of their correlation. The correlation of the infinitive, the gerund, and the verbal noun, being of an indisputably systemic nature and covering a vast proportion of the lexicon, makes up a special lexico-grammatical category of processual representation. The three stages of this category represent the referential processual entity of the lexemic series, respectively, as dynamic (the infinitive and its phrase), semi-dynamic (the gerund and its phrase), and static (the verbal noun and its phrase). The category of processual representation underlies the predicative differences between various situation-naming constructions in the sphere of syntactic nominalization.

Another category specifically identified within the framework of substantival verbids and relevant for syntactic analysis is the category of modal representation. This category, pointed out by L.S. Bar-khudarov, marks the infinitive in contrast to the gerund, and it is revealed in the infinitive having a modal force, in particular, in its attributive uses, but also elsewhere.

In treating the *ing-forms* as constituting one integral verbid entity, opposed, on the one hand, to the infinitive, on the other hand, to the past participle, appeal is naturally made to the alternating use of the possessive and the common-objective nounal element in the role of the subject of the *ing-form*, the latter construction is known in linguistics

as "half-gerund". The half-gerund is an intermediary form with double features whose linguistic semi-status is reflected in the term itself. In fact, the verbid under examination is rather to be interpreted as a transferred participle, or a gerundial participle, since semantic accent in half-gerundial construction is made on the situational content of the ! fact or event described, with the processual substance as its core (e.g.: I / *didn't mind the children playing in the study*).

Questions:

1. What is the general categorial meaning of the verb?
2. What does the processual categorial meaning of the verb determine?
3. What grammatical categories find formal expression in the outward structure of the verb?
4. What criteria underlie the subclassification of notional verbs?
5. What does aspective verbal semantics find its expression in?
6. What is peculiar to the English lexical aspect?
7. What combinability characteristics does the verb have?
8. What are the mixed lexico-grammatical features of the verbids revealed in?
9. What is peculiar to the predication expressed by the verbids?
10. Which of the verbids is considered the head-form of the whole paradigm of the verb?
11. What grammatical categories does the infinitive distinguish?
12. What grammatical categories does the gerund have?
13. What grammatical categories differentiate the present participle from the past participle?
14. What considerations are relevant for interpreting the half-gerund as gerundial participle?

I. Define the modal meanings actualized by the infinitive and infinitival complexes (possibility, necessity, desire, expression of an actual fact):

a)

1. There is a Mr. Anthony Rizzoli here to see you (Sheldon).
2. I have a regiment of guards to do my bidding (Haggard).
3. I'll send a man to come with you (Lawrence).
4. I never saw anybody to touch him in looks (Haggard).
5. There is nothing in that picture to indicate that she was soon to be one of the most famous persons in France (Christie).
6. It was a sound to remember (Lawrence).

b)

1. There were several benches in advantageous places to catch the sun... (Christie)
2. "Why don't you get married?" she said. "Get some nice capable woman to look after you." (Christie)
3. It occurred to Tommy at this moment with some force that that would certainly be the line to take with Aunt Ada, and indeed always had been (Christie).
4. With the choice of getting well or having brimstone and treacle to drink, you chose getting well every time (Christie).
5. "I suppose there must be some people who are slightly batty here, as well as normal elderly relatives with nothing but age to trouble them." (Christie)
6. "Pity she hadn't got a fortune to leave you," said Tuppence (Christie).

c)

1. I've got everything laid out tidily for you to look through (Christie).
2. There's really very little to tell (Christie).
3. Three sons were too much to burden yourself with (Christie).
4. "There's nothing to find out in this place - so forget about Mrs. Blenkinsop." (Christie)
5. She must have been a tartar to look after, though (Christie).
6. But it's not the police she wants, it's a doctor to be called - she's that crazy about doctors (Christie).

II. Rephrase the sentences so as to use a gerund as an object:

1. I insist on it that you should give up this job immediately.
2. They were surprised when they didn't find any one at home.
3. He went on speaking and was not listening to any objections.
4. When the boy was found he didn't show any signs of being alive.
5. Do you admit that you have made a mistake by divorcing her?
6. They suspect that he has been bribed.

III. Choose infinitive or gerund and give your reasons:

1. As some water had got in, the engine of the boat couldn't but... work ing (to stop).
2. I'm afraid our camera wants ... (to repair).
3. This is not the way ... children (to treat).
4. I soon regretted ... the doctor's recommendations (not to follow).
5. I regret ... that I can't come to your wedding (to say).

6. Did they teach you ... at school (to dance)?
7. Who has taught you ... so well (to dance)?
8. She demanded ... the whole truth (to tell).
9. On her way home she stopped ... with her neighbour (to talk). "JO. Remember ... the gas-stove before leaving the fiat (to turn off).

IV. Point out Participle I, gerund or verbal noun:

a)

1. Curtis Hartman came near dying from the effects of that night of waiting in the church... (Anderson)
2. They invented the art of giving Christmas presents. Being wise, their gifts were no doubt wise ones, possibly bearing the privilege of exchange in case of duplication (O.Henry).
3. The stewardess announced that they were going to make an emergency landing. All but the child saw in their minds the spreading wings of the Angel of Death. The pilot could be heard singing faintly... (Cheever)
4. Soapy, having decided to go to the Island, at once set about accomplishing his desire. There were many easy ways of doing this (O.Henry).

b)

1. The loud groaning of the hydraulic valves swallowed up the pilot's song, and there was a shrieking high in the air, like automobile brakes, and the plane hit fiat on its belly in a cornfield and shook them so violently that an old man up forward howled, "Me kidneys! Me kidneys!" The stewardess flung open the door, and someone opened an emergency door at the back, letting in the sweet noise of their continuing mortality - the idle splash and smell of a heavy rain (Cheever).
2. "At that time me and Andy was doing a square, legitimate business of selling walking canes. If you unscrewed the head of one and turned it up to your mouth a half pint of good rye whiskey would go trickling down your throat to reward you for your act of intelligence." (O.Henry)
3. Now the shadow of the town fell over the valley earlier, and she remembered herself the beginnings of winter - the sudden hoarfrost lying on the grapes and wild flowers, and the contadini coming in at dark on their asini, loaned down with roots and other scraps of wood, for wood was hard to find in that country and one would ride ten kilometri for a bundle of green olive cuttings, and she could remember the cold in her bones and see the asini against the yellow light of evening and hear the lonely noise of stones falling down the steep path, falling away from their hoofs (Cheever).

4. Johnsy lay, scarcely making a ripple under the bedclothes, with her face towards the window. She stopped whistling, thinking she was asleep (O.Henry).

c)

1. "Can't you let a man die as comfortably as he can without calling him names? What's the use of slanging me?" "You're not going to die." "Don't be silly. I'm dying now. Ask those bastards." (Hemingway)
2. "There was a girl standing there - an imported girl with fixings on - philandering with a croquet maul and amusing herself by watching my style of encouraging the fruit canning industry." (O.Henry)
3. At the first cocktail, taken at the bar, there were many slight spillings from many trembling hands, but later, with the champagne, there was a rising tide of laughter and occasional bursts of song (Fitzgerald).
4. Cutting the last of the roses in her garden, Julia heard old Mr. Nixon shouting at the squirrels in his bird-feeding station (Cheever).

d)

1. Old Behrman, with his red eyes plainly streaming, shouted his contempt and derision for such idiotic imaginings (O.Henry).
2. He certainly could not remember ever having felt arrogant or ever having been pleased that he had slighted or offended anyone. He had never felt that plain work, for very little money, was beneath him, but he had always been eager to get back to his writing. Every now and then when the going was tough he had even grown fearful that he might never break through, and that he might find himself working steadily at a common job, solely because he had to provide for his family (Saroyan).
3. He floundered in the water. It went into his nose and started a raw stinging; it blinded him; it lingered afterward in his ears, rattling back and forth like pebbles for hours. The sun discovered him, too, peeling long strips of parchment from his shoulders, blistering his back so that he lay in a feverish agony for several nights (Fitzgerald).
4. And third, if he proved difficult in any way, as she knew he might, or if he went right on leering at every girl he happened to see, who was to stop her from getting a divorce and being none the worse for having been for a while Mrs. Andre Salamat? (Saroyan)

V. Translate the phrases into English finding a suitable place for Participle I or Participle II.

1. переводимое сейчас письмо,
2. вдохновленные сыгранной для них музыкой,

заброшенный сад, неподвиженный результат, последствия, неподвижные заранее, количество родившихся детей, музыка, доносящаяся из соседнего дома, раненный в голову офицер.

. Account for the use of Complex Subject and Complex Object Constructions:

He's talked about himself, making no sense at all, seeming to say only that it was a lonely thing to be a writer, it was a painful thing to be no longer the writer you were. . . (Saroyan)

Mrs. Wiley gathered her two rosy-cheeked youngsters close to her skirts and did not smile until she had seen Wiley laugh and shake his head (O.Henry).

- 1 3. When Julia called him to come down, the abyss between his fantasy and the practical world opened so wide that he felt it affect the muscles of his heart (Cheever).
4. The waiter poured something in another glass that seemed to be boiling, but when she tasted it it was not hot (O.Henry). This time there was no rush. It was a puff, as of wind that makes a candle flicker and the flame go tall (Hemingway). "Sit down on that stool, please. I didn't hear horse coming." (O.Henry) Stunned with the horror of this revelation, John sat there open-mouthed, feeling the nerves of his body twitter like so many sparrows perched upon his spinal column (Fitzgerald).
Willie Robins and me happened to be in our - cloakroom, I believe we called it - when Myra Allison skipped through the hall on her way downstairs from the girls' room (O.Henry).

. Translate the sentences into English and comment on the structure of the Complex Object or on the absence of this construction:

- 1 . Затем мы услышали, как одна птица закричала, а другая ей ответила.
2. Извините, но я слышал, как вы разговариваете по телефону, потому и осмелился войти.
3. Я слышал, что ты уже студент колледжа, не так ли?
4. Я удивился, когда услышал, как он спокойно говорит это.
5. Вы когда-нибудь видели, чтобы она покраснела?
6. Я часто замечал, что как англичане, так и немцы шутят, не получая от этого никакого удовольствия.

7. Не так уж трудно было понять, что я вам не нравлюсь.
8. Если ты сейчас к нему зайдешь, ты застанешь его за работой в саду.
9. Ему показалось сложным написать отцу о своих чувствах к ней.
10. Я считаю важным предупредить вас о возможной опасности.

Selected Reader

1. Biber D., Johansson S.,

Leech Q., Conrad S., Finegan E.

Longman Grammar of Spoken and Written English

Major Verb Functions and Classes

There are three major classes of verbs: **lexical verbs** (also called **full verbs**, e.g. *run, eat*), **primary verbs** (*be, have, and do*), and **modal verbs** (e.g. *can, will, might*). These classes are distinguished by their roles as main verbs and auxiliary verbs. Lexical verbs comprise an open class of words that function only as main verbs; the three primary verbs can function as either main verbs or auxiliary verbs, and modal verbs can function only as auxiliary verbs. [...] In addition, verbs can be classified on the basis of their semantic domains and valency patterns (copular, intransitive, and transitive). Finally, we make a fundamental distinction between simple lexical verbs and the various kinds of multi-word verbs (phrasal verbs, prepositional verbs, and phrasal-prepositional verbs).

[...] The verb types are not distributed evenly across registers:

- Lexical verbs are extremely common in fiction and conversation. They are less common in news, and considerably less common in academic prose.
- The copula *be* occurs most commonly in academic prose and least commonly in conversation.

[...] Although many verbs have more than one meaning, we have found it useful to classify verbs into seven major semantic domains: **ac-**

tivity verbs, communication verbs, mental verbs, causative verbs, verbs of simple occurrence, verbs of existence or relationship, and aspectual verbs.

For the most part, the following classification of verbs is based on their core meanings (i.e. the meaning that speakers tend to think of first). However, it is important to note that many verbs have multiple meanings from different semantic domains, and in some cases a verb is most common with a non-core meaning. In those cases, the verb is listed in the category corresponding to its most typical use. For example, most speakers tend initially to think of the verbs *start, stop, and keep* as referring to physical activities, as in the following examples: *We stopped at the market on the way back. I'll keep the coins. We stopped at the market on the way back. I'll keep the coins.*

It must have been fifteen minutes before he got it started. However, these verbs more commonly have an aspectual meaning, concerned with the progress of some other action: *And it was two o'clock when they stopped talking. I keep doing garlic burps. Her car started to overheat.*

As a result, these three verbs are listed under the aspectual category.

There are two kinds of problem case we should mention. First, for some verbs there is no single correct classification, since their core meanings can be considered as belonging to more than one category. For example, the verbs *hesitate, pretend, find, and resist* can be regarded as both activity verbs and mental verbs. The verbs *read, deny, confirm, and blame* can denote both communication acts and mental acts or states.

Also some verbs can be used with different meanings belonging to more than one semantic domain. This is especially true of activity verbs, which often have secondary meanings in some other domain. For example, the verbs *contact* and *raise* can refer to physical activities or communicative acts, while the verbs *admit* and *consult* can refer to physical, communicative, or mental activities. The verbs *follow, gather, face, and overcome* can be physical or mental; *change, rise, and open* can refer to either a physical activity or a simple occurrence; *look* can refer to either a physical or mental activity or a state of existence (e.g. *you look happy*); and the verbs *make* and *get* can refer to physical activities, but they are also commonly causative in meaning.

Most verbs, however, have core meanings belonging to only one semantic domain. [...]

Activity verbs primarily denote actions and events that could be associated with choice, and so take a subject with the semantic role of agent. Examples are *bring, buy, carry, come, give, go, leave, move, open, run, take, work*. [...]

Activity verbs can be transitive, taking a direct object, or intransitive, occurring without any object. [...]

Communication verbs can be considered a special subcategory of activity verbs that involve communication activities (speaking and writing). Common communication verbs include *ask, announce, call, discuss, explain, say, shout, speak, state, suggest, talk, tell, write* [...].

Mental verbs denote a wide range of activities and states experienced by humans; they do not involve physical action and do not necessarily entail volition. Their subject often has the semantic role of recipient. They include both cognitive meanings (e.g. *think* or *know*) and emotional meanings expressing various attitudes or desires (e.g. *love, want*), together with perception (e.g. *see, taste*) and receipt of communication (e.g. *read, hear*) [...].

Many mental verbs describe cognitive activities that are relatively dynamic in meaning, such as *calculate, consider, decide, discover, examine, learn, read, solve, and study*. [...] Other mental verbs are more stative in meaning. These include verbs describing cognitive states, such as *believe, doubt, know, remember, understand*, as well as many verbs describing emotional or attitudinal states, such as *enjoy, fear, feel, hate, like, love, prefer, suspect, want*. [...]

Verbs of facilitation or causation, such as *allow, cause, enable, force, help, let, require, and permit* indicate that some person or inanimate entity brings about a new state of affairs. These verbs often occur together with a nominalized direct object or complement clause following the verb phrase, which reports the action that was facilitated. For simplicity, we will simply refer to these verbs as causative verbs [...].

Verbs of simple occurrence primarily report events (typically physical events) that occur apart from any volitional activity. Often their subject has the semantic affected role. For simplicity, we will refer to these verbs as occurrence verbs. They include *become, change, hap-*

pen, develop, grow, increase, and occur. [...]

Verbs of existence or relationship report a state that exists between I entities. Some of the most common verbs of existence or relationship are copular verbs, such as *be*, *seem*, and *appear*. Such copular verbs are typically followed by a subject predicative and perform a linking function, so that the subject predicative directly characterizes the subject:

The problem is most acute in rural areas.

All these uses seem natural and serviceable.

Other verbs of existence or relationship are not copular verbs, but report a particular state of existence (e.g. *exist*, *live*, *stay*) or a particular relationship between entities (e.g. *contain*, *include*, *involve*, *represent*). We will refer to verbs of existence or relationship simply as existence verbs. [...]

Finally, aspectual verbs, such as *begin*, *continue*, *finish*, *keep*, *start* and *stop* characterize the stage of progress of some other event or activity, typically reported in a complement clause following the verb phrase [...].

(pp. 358-364)

Questions:

1. On what principles do the authors classify English verbs?
2. What main classes of English verbs do they single out?
3. Does the semantic criterion always prove helpful while classifying English verbs?

2.

Biber D., Johansson S., Leech Q., Conrad S., Finegan E.

Longman Grammar of Spoken and Written English

Non-Finite Clauses

Non-finite clauses are regularly dependent. They are more compact and less explicit than finite clauses: they are not marked for tense and modality, and they frequently lack an explicit subject and subor-

dinator. Compare the following examples to paraphrases using finite clauses:

1 a / *don't know what to write about.*

1 b / *don't know what I should write about.*

2a **Crossing**, *he lifted the rolled umbrella high and pointed to show cars, buses, speeding trucks, and cabs.*

2b As **he was crossing**, *he lifted the rolled umbrella high and pointed to show cars, buses, speeding trucks, and cabs.* 3a **Style being a relational concept**, *the aim of literary stylistics is to be relational in a more interesting sense than that already mentioned.*

3b **Since style is a relational concept**, *the aim of literary stylistics is to be relational in a more interesting sense than that which has already been mentioned.*

To interpret a non-finite clause, it is necessary to use clues from the main clause and often also from the wider context.

There are three main types of non-finite clause, each containing a different type of verb-phrase: **infinitive clauses**, **wi[^]-clauses**, and **erf-clauses**. The three types differ considerably with respect to the grammatical roles they can play. Infinitive clauses and *ing-clauses* are the most versatile grammatically. Non-finite clauses are often loosely integrated into the main clause and may even lack a verb altogether. [...] Infinitive clauses can have a range of syntactic roles:

A. Subject

*Artificial pearls before real swine were cast by these jet-set preachers. **To have thought this** made him more cheerful. [...]*

B. Extraposed subject

*It's difficult **to maintain a friendship.**
It is a mistake **to take sides.***

C. Subject predicative

*My goal now is **to look to the future.** [...]*

D. Direct object

*Do you want **me to sent them today?** [...]*

E. Object predicative

*Some of these issues dropped out of Marx's later works because he considered them **to have been satisfactorily dealt with.** [...]*

F. Adverbial

*[...] **To succeed again** they will have to improve their fitness and concentration.*

G. Part of noun phrase

*[...] They say that failure **to take precautions against injuring others** is negligent. [...]*

H. Part of adjective phrase

*They're too big **to fight**, that's the trouble, isn't it?*

[...] /<<g-clauses can have a range of syntactic roles:

A. Subject

Having a fever is pleasant, vacant. [...]

B. Extraposed subject

*[...] There is only around five tons of newsprint left and it's very difficult **getting** supplies into Sarajevo.*

C. Subject predicative

*[...] The real problem is **getting something done about the cheap imports.***

D. Direct object

*I started **thinking about Christmas.** [...]*

E. Prepositional object

*No-one could rely on **his going to bed early last night.***

F. Adverbial

*I didn't come out of it **looking particularly well**, I know. [...]*

G. Part of noun phrase

*I think he smashed two cars **coming down the road.** [...]*

H. Part of adjective phrase

*// might be worth **giving him a bell to let him know what's happening.** [...]*

I. Complement of preposition

*Jordan said he would get tough with the homeless by **running identification checks on them.** [...]*

^clauses are less versatile than the other types of non-finite clauses. They have the following roles:

A. Direct object

*Two-year-old Constantin will have **his cleft palate repaired**.*

B. Adverbial

***When told by police how badly injured his victims were** he said: "Good, I hope they die."*

C. Part of noun phrase

*There wasn't a scrap of evidence to link him with the body found **on the Thames foreshore at low tide**,*

(pp. 198-200)

Questions:

1. What features differentiate non-finite clauses from finite clauses?
2. What syntactic roles do infinitive clauses have?
3. What syntactic functions do m^{\wedge} -clauses and \ll -clauses perform?

3.

Gordon E.M., Krylova I.P.

The English Verbals

All English grammars distinguish between finite and non-finite forms of the verb. The non-finite forms, which are also called verbals or the non-predicative forms of the verb, comprise, according to most grammars, the infinitive (*to take*), the gerund (*taking*), participle I (*taking*), and participle II (*taken*). For reasons which will be given below, the gerund and participle I will be treated as a single form [...] and referred to as the "zrcg-form". As the term "participle I" thus becomes unnecessary, there is no point in using the term "participle II" either [...]. So this non-finite will be further referred to as the "participle".

The verbals are regarded in most grammars as forms of the verb

because they have certain features in common with the finite forms.

I But at the same time they have their own peculiarities which distinguish them from the finite forms [...].

_ Some of the properties of the infinitive and the *ing-form* fully • correspond to those of the finite forms, whereas other properties coincide only partly.

I. Properties of the infinitive and the *mg-form* fully correspond-s ing to those of the finite forms.

1. The two verbals have the same lexical meanings as the corresponding verb. It is noteworthy that they preserve not only the concrete lexical meaning expressed by the stem of the verb but also the idea of action inherent in the verb.
2. The infinitive and the *ing-form* have the same morphological pattern as the finite forms. This holds good for root-verbs as well as derivatives formed with the help of suffixes or prefix
es. [...] The infinitive and the *mg-form* also repeat the pattern of all kinds of compound verbs, cf. *he whitewashes - to white wash - whitewashing [...]*.

II. Properties of the infinitive and the *ing-form* corresponding to | those of the finite forms partly.

1. The infinitive and the *ing-form* correspond to the finite forms only partly with regard to their grammatical categories.
 - a. The infinitive and the *ing-form*, in common with the finite forms, have the category of voice which is expressed by the opposition of active and passive forms. [...]
 - b. The infinitive and the *ing-form* lack the category of person and number inherent in the finite forms.
 - c. The category of mood is expressed only by the finite forms.

It should be pointed out, however, that although the infinitive

does not possess special forms opposed to each other and representing its action either as a real fact or as a non-fact, it may, nevertheless, express certain modal shades of meaning, such as necessity, possibility, purpose, and condition.

necessity: *I feel that I also have a contribution to make.*

possibility: *He was quick-witted, unpompous, the easiest man to do business with.*

purpose: *I'm going downstairs to pack my things.*

condition: [...] *To hear people tell it, I haven't got a mind. "*

The perfect infinitive may in certain functions, depending on the context, show that its action was not realized in the past.

- d. Like the finite forms, the infinitive and the *ing-form* are capable of expressing tense distinctions. We find two forms opposed to each other - the simple form and the perfect form.

Yet the two verbals differ considerably from the finite forms in expressing time relations. In the first place, the finite forms generally express time relations absolutely, i.e. they have special forms to refer an action to the present, the past or the future. [...] The verbals express time relatively, i.e. in relation to the action of the predicate verb in the sentence. The action of the verbals may be either simultaneous with or precede or follow the action of the predicate verb. [...]

- e. The differentiation between the non-continuous and the continuous aspect is found only in the infinitive and is expressed by the opposition of the simple and the continuous forms. [...] It should be pointed out that the simple form of the infinitive is still vaguer in expressing aspect characteristics than with regard to time relations. The opposition between the non-continuous and the continuous forms is not well defined compared to the finite forms of the verb where it appears to be quite distinct. The continuous infinitive may serve to emphasize the idea of duration, process, making the statement more vivid, more expressive, often being a stylistic device. [...]

The perfect continuous form occurs as a rare exception. If used at all, it serves to express an action which began before the moment denoted by the action of the predicate verb and continued up to or into that moment. [...]

The *ing-form* has no special forms to express aspect distinctions, but on the whole it tends to show, like all continuous forms, that the action is not accomplished. Yet, this rule does not hold good for all its uses. [...]

As is seen from the above description of the forms of the verbals, the infinitive and the *ing-forms* lack those categories which are indispensable to predication, namely the categories of mood, tense, person, and number. This cannot but affect their functioning in the sentence.

2. The infinitive and the *ing-form*, like the finite forms of the verb, are always associated with a subject. But the way their subject is expressed differs greatly from that of the finite forms. Since the finite forms have the function of the predicate in the „Sentence, it stands to reason that their subject is always the grammatical subject of the sentence. But the subject of the verbals may be expressed in various ways.

- i Thus, in a number of functions the subject of the verbal happens to be the person or thing denoted by the subject of the sentence and, consequently, of the finite verb. [...] But the subject of a verbal is also frequently expressed by some secondary part of the sentence. E.g. *He gave her permission to leave.* [...] Moreover, the subject of the infinitive and the *ing-form* may be found in a neighbouring clause and even a different sentence. E.g. *To trace him may take some time, but I can assure you, Mrs Rolston, that the police take every eventuality into account.* [...] In all the above cases the relation between the action of the verbal and its subject is established on the semantic plane as the subject is «not expressed by any special grammatical means. [...]

3. There is considerable similarity between the distribution of the two verbals and the finite forms.

p In the first place, the infinitive and the *ing-form* are similar to the finite forms in that they are seldom used singly. They are generally J extended phrases. This is accounted for by the fact that, on the one hand, verbs, as a rule, logically require some sort of a complement; on the other hand, most verbs have to be used with complements for structural reasons - they are not complete without them and, moreover, sometimes do not make any sense. The infinitive and the *ing-form* repeat the same pattern and have the same kind of complements.

4. There is not much similarity between the functions of the verbals and those of the finite forms. [...] The finite forms always have the function of the predicate. But the infinitive and the *ing-form* which lack the categories of predication fulfill a great variety of other functions in the sentence. [...]

The functions of the verbals may be divided into two groups - the independent use of verbals and the dependent use of verbals.

By the independent use of verbals we understand their functioning as subject (a), predicative (b) and parenthesis (c).

- e.g. (a) [...] *But to write was an instinct that seemed as natural to me as to breathe. Being shrewd is quite different from the process of thinking.*
- (b) *My instinct was to halt but my father kept striding. The last thing I should ever have dreamt of was finding myself here for good.*
- (c) *To tell the truth, my memory is a bit dim too.*

Secrets, generally speaking, are not very well kept nowadays, with reporters and television cameras all around us. The verbals, as has been said, lack the categories indispensable to predication. Despite that, however, they may acquire predicative force in the sentence. But this function is not typical of them and is rarely found, being restricted to a very limited number of sentence patterns.

In their dependent use the verbals serve to modify verbs, nouns and adjectives which function as their headwords. Since verbals do not always come under the traditional classification of the secondary parts of the sentence and thus present great difficulty for analysis, the non-committal term "adjunct" will be applied [...]. Accordingly, the infinitive and the *ing-form* will be called verb adjuncts (a), noun adjuncts (b) and adjective adjuncts (c).

- e.g. (a) *You don't mean to say you believe a word of this nonsense. Anna came smiling into the study.*
- (b) *He had a keen desire to learn. I saw the clouds lit up by the setting sun.*
- (c) *Ready to say good-bye after a few minutes, he stood up and looked round the drawing-room. She could have been quite a pretty girl, but she had long ago decided that it was not worth trying.*

[...] The participle, as has been said, differs considerably from the finite forms as well as from the infinitive and the *ing-form*. On the one hand, its verbal nature is less prominent as compared to the two other verbals and this is the cause of some limitations in its use. On the other hand, it has certain peculiarities of its own which make its application still more restricted.

The participle is, in the main, formed only from transitive verbs and has passive meaning.

- e.g. *People near him, hypnotized into agreeing, were sagely nodding their heads.*

, Yet we find also participles with active meaning, formed from intransitive verbs. Although the number of such verbs is limited, these participles present considerable interest. Some of these participles are formed from verbs which have only intransitive meaning.

- e.g. *The house was made of unpainted plank gone gray now and had a strange unfinished look. [...]*

Once arrived at the quay alongside which lay the big transatlantic liner, Poirot became brisk and alert. [...] They were hunting for an escaped convict. [...] [...] The participle, like the infinitive and the *ing-form*, has some properties that fully correspond to those of the finite forms, and other properties that coincide with them only partly.

I. Properties of the participle fully corresponding to those of the finite forms.

1. The participle has the same lexical meaning as the corresponding verb.
2. The participle has the same morphological pattern as the corresponding verb. It holds good for root-verbs, derivatives, all kinds of compounds, and also set phrases that serve as verb equivalent. [...]

II. Properties of the participle partly corresponding to those of the finite forms.

The participle has more points of difference with the finite forms than the infinitive or the *ing-form*.

1. The participle has only one form and consequently does not possess any of the grammatical categories inherent in the finite forms. But the participle, nevertheless, has its own grammatical meanings which are closely connected with the lexical character of the verb.

[...] The participle of transitive verbs has passive meaning and the participle of intransitive verbs has active meaning.

Both participles can be formed from terminative as well as from durative verbs. The participle of a terminative verb serves to denote a state resulting from a previously accomplished action. The resultant state is usually simultaneous with the action of the predicate verb.

IP*

[...] The participle of a durative verb denotes an action [...] also simultaneous with the action of the predicate verb.

2. Like the finite forms and the two other verbals, the participle is always associated with a subject. But while the subject of the infinitive and the *ing-form* may be expressed in a number of various ways, the means of expressing the subject of the participle are more limited. The subject of the participle may be the person or thing denoted by the subject of the sentence. [...] The subject may also be the same person or thing as denoted by the object of the sentence. [...] Finally, the participle, like the other verbals, may have a subject of its own when used in an absolute construction. [...]
3. Although, in principle, the distribution of the participle is similar to that of the finite forms and the two other verbals, we find at the same time significant points of difference between them.

Like the infinitive and the *ing-form*, the participle can have complements which are generally placed in postposition. It may be preceded only by certain adverbs. [...] But the participle does not take as many complements as the infinitive or the *wig-form*. The complements it can have are usually restricted to the indication of the place or the time or the doer of the action.

The participle functions singly much more often than the infinitive or the *wig-form*. [...]

4. The participle differs considerably not only from the finite forms but also from the infinitive and the *wig-forms* in its functioning in the sentence. Therein lies a very important difference between the participle and the two other verbals.

In the first place, the participle cannot be used either as a link-verb or as a modal verb or as an auxiliary verb.

Secondly, its syntactic functions in the sentence are more restricted than those of the other verbals. It can serve only as a verb adjunct, close (a) and loose (b), and as a noun adjunct, also close (a) and loose (b). verb adjuncts: (a) *The sunning buzzards sat hunched on what remained of the roof.*

(b) */ was anxious to see how I should feel when exposed to the danger.*

noun adjuncts: (a) */ thought quite a lot about Jones' promised fortune.*

(b) *It was one of the manservants, bearing an envelope, addressed to me in Collingwood's bold hand.* The participle may have another verbal as its head-word, e.g. *The play failed to have a long run because the public of that day was uneasy at seeing a clergyman made fun of.*

It should be pointed out, however, that even in these functions which the participle has in common with the infinitive and the *ing-form*, it is incapable of expressing the great variety of syntactic and semantic relations which are typical of the two other verbals.

(PP. 9-31)

Questions:

1. What features in common with finite forms of the verb do the infinitive, the *i/ig-form*, and the participle have? Which of them coincide only partly with those of the finite forms?
2. In what way do the verbals express time and modality relations?
3. What is peculiar to the subject-predicate relations distinguished by the verbals?
4. What syntactic functions do the verbals perform?
5. What differences between the infinitive, the *ing-form*, and the participle do the authors point out?

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Seminar 7

VERB AND ITS CATEGORIES

1. **The category of person and number: traditional and modern interpretations.**
2. **The category of tense: the basic notions connected with the category of tense (lexical/grammatical denotation of time; "the present moment"). Modern conceptions of English tenses.**
3. **The category of aspect:**
 - a. **the problems of the aspective characterization of the verb;**
 - b. **lexical aspective/grammatical aspective meanings;**
 - c. **treatment of aspect in Modern Linguistics;**
4. **The category of retrospect:**
 - a. **the "tense view";**
 - b. **the "aspect view";**
 - c. **the "tense-aspect blend view";**
 - d. **the "time correlation view";**
 - e. **the "retrospective coordination view".**
5. **The category of voice.**
6. **Language means of expressing modality. The category of mood.**
7. **The oppositional reduction of the verbal categories. Neutralization and transposition of verbal forms.**

1. Categories of Person and Number

The finite forms of the verb make up a very complex and intricate system; its intricacy is caused by the fact that they are directly connected with the structure of the sentence, the finite verb functioning as its predication centre.

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The morphological study of the English finite verb includes the study of its categories, those of person, number, tense, aspect, voice, and mood.

Person and number are treated by scholars as closely related categories. In their treatment two approaches are contrasted: traditional and modern.

In accord with the traditional approach to these two categories, scholars point out to the existence in English of three persons and two numbers.

In modern linguistic works on the problem it is also stressed that the categories of person and number are closely interwoven in English and should be considered together. At the same time it is particularly emphasized that these categories are specific because they don't convey the inherently "verbal" semantics. It means that the categories of person and number have a "reflective" character: the personal and numerical semantics in the finite verb is the reflection in the verb lexeme of the personal and numerical semantics of the subject referent.

The semantic and formal analysis of the person-number forms of the verb shows that in the strictly categorial sense one should speak of personal pronouns set consisting of six different forms of blended person-number nature - three in the singular and three in the plural. The intermixed character of the numerical and personal forms of the finite forms of the verb finds its expression both at the formal and functional levels of analysis in different subsystems of verbs. The peculiarity of expressing person-number distinctions in the English verb lies in the deficiency of the finite regular verb for there exists the only positive person-number mark of the finite regular verb - the morpheme of the third person singular. This deficient system cannot and does not exist in the language by itself: in fact, the verbal person-number system only backs up the person-number system of the subject. Due to it the combination and strict correlation of the English finite verb with the subject is obligatory not only syntactically but also categorially.

2. Category of Tense

The category of tense is considered to be an immanent grammatical category which means that the finite verb form always expresses time distinctions.

The category of tense finds different interpretations with different scholars. Thus, in traditional linguistics grammatical time is often represented as a three-form category consisting of the "linear" past, present, and future forms. The future-in-the-past does not find its place in the scheme based on the linear principle, hence, this system is considered to be deficient, not covering all lingual data.

At the same time linguists build up new systems of tenses in order to find a suitable place in them for future-in-the-past. Nevertheless, many of such schemes are open to criticism for their inconsistency which finds its expression in the fact that some of them deny the independent status of future tenses while others exclude from the analysis future-in-the-past forms.

The said inconsistency can be overcome if we accept the idea that in English there exist two tense categories.

The first category - the category of primary time - expresses a direct retrospective evaluation of the time of the process denoted, due to which the process receives an absolute time characteristic. This category is based upon the opposition of "the past tense" and "the present tense", the past tense being its strong member.

The second tense category is the category of "prospective time", it is based upon the opposition of "after-action" and "non-after-action", the marked member being the future tense. The category of prospect is relative by nature which means that it characterizes the action from the point of view of its correlation with some other action. As the future verbal form may be relative either to the present time, or to the past time included in non-future, the English verb acquires two different future forms: the future of the present and the future of the past. It means that the future of the past is doubly strong expressing the strong members of the category of primary time and the category of prospect.

The category of primary time is subjected to neutralization and transposition, transposition being more typical. The vivid cases of transposition are the "historical present" and the "Preterite of Modesty". As for the category of prospect, it is often neutralized; neutralization can be of two types: syntactically optional and syntactically obligatory.

3. Category of Aspect

Grammatical aspective meanings form a variable grammatical category which is traditionally associated with the opposition of continuous and non-continuous forms of the verb. Yet, one can find a great divergence of opinions on the problem of the English aspect. The main difference lies in the interpretation of the categorial semantics of the oppositional members - continuous and indefinite forms: the categorial meaning of the continuous -form is usually defined as the meaning of duration, while the interpretation of the categorial semantics of the Indefinite form causes controversy (the indefinite form may be interpreted as having no aspective meaning (I.P. Ivanova), as a form having a vague content (G.N. Vorontsova), as a form stressing the fact of the performance of the action (A.I. Smirnitsky). In Modern Linguistics A.I. Smirnitsky's interpretation of the categorial semantics of the indefinite form is widely accepted.

In theoretical grammar the interpretation of perfect / non-perfect verb-forms also refers to disputable questions. Some linguists interpret the opposition of perfect / non-perfect forms as aspective (O. Jespersen, I.P. Ivanova, G.N. Vorontsova), others - as the opposition of tense forms (H. Sweet, G.O. Curme, A. Korsakov). A.I. Smirnitsky was the first to prove that perfect and non-perfect make up a special, self-sufficient, category which he called the "category of time correlation"; this viewpoint is shared now by a vast majority of linguists.

Developing A.I. Smirnitsky's views on the categorial semantics of perfect / non-perfect forms, we can come to the conclusion that in English there exist two aspective categories: the category of development (based on the opposition of continuous and non-continuous forms) and the category of retrospective coordination (based on the opposition of perfect and non-perfect forms).

The perfect form has a mixed categorial meaning: it expresses both retrospective time coordination of the process and the connection of the prior action with a time-limit reflected in a subsequent event. The recognition of the two aspect categories also enables one to give a sound interpretation to the perfect continuous forms: they must be treated as forms having marks in both the aspect categories.

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The opposition of continuous and non-continuous forms can be neutralized and transposed. Besides, in the category of development verbs which are usually not used in continuous forms can be subjected to the process of reverse transposition, e.g.: *Were you wanting my help?*

As for the opposition of perfect and non-perfect forms, it can undergo only the process of neutralization, transposition being alien to it.

4. Category of Voice

The category of voice occupies a peculiar place in the system of verbal categories because it reflects the direction of the process as regards the participants in the situation denoted by a syntactic construction. The passive form, being marked, expresses the reception of the action by the subject of the syntactic construction; its weak counter-member - the active form - has the meaning of "non-passivity".

In comparison with Russian, the category of voice in English has a much broader representation as not only transitive but also intransitive objective verbs can be used in the passive voice.

Another peculiarity of voice distinctions of English verbs consists in the fact that active forms often convey passive meanings.

5. Category of Mood

A great divergence of opinions on the question of the category of mood is caused by the fact that identical mood forms can express different meanings and different forms can express similar meanings.

The category of mood shows the relation of the nominative content of the sentence towards reality. By this category the action can be presented as real, non-real, desirable, recommended, etc.

It is obvious that the opposition of the one integral form of the indicative and the one integral form of the subjunctive underlies the unity of the whole system of English moods. The formal mark of this opposition is the tense-retrospect shift in the subjunctive, the latter being the strong member of the opposition. The shift consists in the perfect aspect being opposed to the imperfect aspect, both turned into the relative substitutes for the absolute past and present tenses of the indicative.

The study of the English mood reveals a certain correlation of its formal and semantic features. The subjunctive, the integral mood of unreality, presents the two sets of forms according to the structural

division of verbal tenses into the present and the past. These form-sets constitute the two corresponding functional subsystems of the subjunctive, namely, the spective, the mood of attitudes, and the conditional, the mood of appraising causal-conditional relations of process-].- Each of these, in its turn, falls into two systemic subsets, so that at the immediately working level of presentation we have the four subjunctive form-types identified on the basis of the strict correlation between their structure and their function: the pure spective, the modal active, the stipulative conditional, the consecutive conditional:

<p>Pure Spective (Subjunctive 1)</p> <p>consideration desideration inducement</p>	<p>Stipulative Conditional (Subjunctive 2)</p> <p>unreal condition</p>
<p>Modal Spective (Subjunctive 4)</p> <p>consideration desideration inducement</p>	<p>Consecutive Conditional (Subjunctive 3)</p> <p>unreal consequence</p>

| The elaborated scheme clearly shows that the so-called "imperfective mood" has historically coincided with Subjunctive 1.

The described system is not finished in terms of the historical development of language; on the contrary, it is in the state of making big change. Its actual manifestations are complicated by neutralizations of formal and semantic contrasts, by fluctuating uses of the

Kiliaries, of the finite "be" in the singular.

Today scholars discuss different classifications of moods in English revealing new correlations of meaning and form in the process of expressing mood distinctions but so far a universally accepted system of moods has not been worked out. Hence our task in the objective study of language, as well as in language teaching, is to accurately register these phenomena, to explain their mechanism and systemic implications, to show the relevant tendencies of usage in terms of varying syntactic environments, topical contexts, stylistic preferences.

Questions:

1. What is specific to the categories of person and number in English?
2. What enables scholars to identify six number-person forms of the verb in English?
3. What does the person-number deficiency of the finite regular verb entail?
4. What does the immanent character of the category of tense imply?
5. What is the main weak point of the traditional "linear" interpretation of tenses?
6. What are the theoretical advantages of identifying in English two separate tense categories?
- * 7. What is the main point of difference between the two categories of tense: the category of primary time and the category of prospect? 8. What categorial meanings do continuous forms and non-continuous forms express?
- ^ 9. What category do the perfect forms express?
10. What accounts for the peculiar place of the category of voice among the verbal categories?
11. What makes the expression of voice distinctions in English specific?
- * 12. What complicates the analysis of English mood forms?
- v 13. What does the category of mood express?
14. What features of mood forms should be taken into account to give a full picture of English moods?
15. What is the status of the so-called "imperative mood" in English?

I. Dwell upon the categorial features of the verbs in the following sentences:

a)

1. "Well, I am an honest man, though not a very rich one. I only gave 15 shillings for the bust, and I think you ought to know that before I take 18 pounds from you." (Doyle)
2. I thought you might be interested to meet Mr. Anstruther. He knows something of Belgium. He has lately been hearing news of your convent (Christie).
3. "Oh She, as thou art great be merciful, for I am now as ever thy servant to obey." (Haggard)
4. "What is it?" she said confusedly. "What have I been saying?" "It is nothing," said Rose. "You are tired. You want to rest. We will leave you." (Christie)
5. In one of my previously published narratives I mentioned that Sherlock Holmes had acquired his violin from a pawnbroker in the Tottenham

Court Road, for the sum of 55 shillings. To those who know the value of a Stradivarius, it will be obvious that I was being less than candid about the matter (Hardwick). 6. Perhaps she wasn't an actress at all. Perhaps the police were looking for

her (Christie).

b)

1. "I think, Mr. Holmes, it is time that we were leaving for Euston." "I will order a four-wheeler. In a quarter of an hour we shall be at your service." (Doyle)
2. "What he will divulge I cannot tell, but I have no doubt that your Grace could make him understand that it is to his interest to be silent. From the police point of view he will have kidnapped the boy for the purpose of ransom." (Doyle)
3. "Hast thou aught to ask me before thou goest, oh Holly?" she said, after a few moments' reflection (Haggard). ' 4. "Mr. Holmes!" cried Mrs. Hudson indignantly. "How many times have I said that I won't tolerate your indoor shooting?" (Hardwick) I; 5. By the way, I shall be grateful if you will replace this needle. It is getting rather blunt (Hardwick). ' 6. She wondered if any Warrenders lived here still. They'd left off being buried here apparently (Christie).

c)

1. My future is settled. I am seeing my lawyer tomorrow as it is necessary that I should make some provision for Mervyn if I should pre-decease him which is, of course, the natural course of events (Christie).
2. "Yes, it was old Mrs. Carraway. She's always swallowing things." (Christie)
- ' 3. "Wouldn't you like something? Some tea or some coffee perhaps?..." "No, no, not even that. We shan't be stopping very much longer." (Christie)
4. "Oh! It's lovely. It's too good for me, though. You'll be wanting it your self-" (Christie)
5. "Somebody was being poisoned last time we were here, I remember," said Tuppence (Christie).
6. A lot of signposts are broken, you know, and the council don't repair them as they should (Christie).

d) 1. "A year and a half -" She paused. "But I'm leaving next month." (Christie)

2. "Well, you see, Mrs. Beresford, one needs a change -" "But you'll be doing the same kind of work?" (Christie)
3. She picked up the fur stole. "I'm thanking you again very much - and I'm glad, too, to have something to remember Miss Fanshawe by." (Christie)
4. I wish you were coming with me (Christie).
5. Will you be wanting some sandwiches? (Christie)
6. It was a funny way to partition it (the house), I should have thought. I'd have thought it would have been easier to do it the other way (Christie).

II. Comment upon the reduced verbal forms:

a)

- 1 "Holmes, we have never had a case such as this. A woman comes to us - is brought to us - with a problem of some sort... We don't know who she is, nor what her problem may be. Isn't that the kind of challenge you're always praying will come your way?" (Hardwick)
2. "I seem to feel that what you've been saying from the beginning is that a human being doesn't live, but is lived." (Saroyan)
3. It went down very well in the States. They were liking that kind of thing just then (Christie).
4. "Yes, a lift," said Dr Meynell, trying to think of something else even more dashing - and failing. "Then we shall avoid all undue exertion. Daily exercise on the level on a fine day, but avoid walking up hills." (Christie)

b)

1. "You would like some hot water, wouldn't you?" said Miss Jellyby, looking round for a jug with a handle to it, but looking in vain. "If it is not being troublesome," said we. "Oh, it's not the trouble," returned Miss Jellyby; "the question is, if there is any." (Dickens)
2. "Might one ask," inquired Holmes, "where you propose going?" (Hardwick)
3. "I'm going with you," she said. "Nonsense, my dear; I go straight into the city. I can't have you racketing about!" (James)
4. "It's not like Jolyon to be late!" he said to Irene, with uncontrollable vexation. "I suppose it'll be June keeping him." (Galsworthy)

c)

1. And you can't talk about such things to men you meet in hotels - they're looking just for such openings (O.Henry).

1. The thousand and one stories are being told every day by hundreds of \ thousands of viziers' daughters to their respective sultans (O.Henry).
- , 3. The next morning at 11 o'clock when I was sitting there alone, an Uncle Tom shuffles into the hotel and asks for the doctor to come and see Judge Banks, who, it seems was the mayor and a mighty sick man (O.Henry).
4. In an adjoining room a woman was cooking supper. Odors from strong bacon and boiling coffee contended against the cut-plug fumes from the vespertine pipe. Outside was one of those crowded streets of the east side, in which, as twilight falls, Satan sets up his recruiting office. A mighty host of children danced and ran and played in the street. Some in rags, some in clean white and beribboned, some wild and restless as young hawks, some gentle-faced and shrinking, some shrieking rude and sinful words, some listening, awed, but soon, grown familiar, to embrace - here were the children playing in the corridors of the House of Sin. Above the playground forever hovered a great bird (O.Henry).

d)

- ' 1. She then said, "I'm not going to bother to introduce anybody to you just because Luther's going along to catch a train for Boston in a little while..." (Saroyan)
- »2. "If you will get her to ask one question about the new winter styles in cloak sleeves I will promise you a one-in-five chance for her, instead of ^; one in ten." (O.Henry) |; 3. "Mayor's color and pulse was fine. I gave him another treatment, and f ^ he said the last of the pain left him." (O.Henry)
- I 4. Mr. Hubber was coming at seven to take their photograph for the Christmas card (Cheever).

Selected Reader

1.

Strang B. Modern English Structure

Form-classes. The Verb Phrase

We turn now to those classes of words which characteristically function in the predicating part of the sentence. We may begin by using for them as a whole the traditional name, "verb". [...] The class-meaning has, as with nouns, traditionally been made a starting-point for defining the class, but we shall depend on other criteria, regarding the class-meaning as a consequence of the total functional peculiarities of the class. All the same, it is of practical use when discussing verbs to have a term for the cumbersome expression "the kind of meaning verbs have". There is in ordinary English no single word for this notion, but as many verbs are action-words, it is common to refer to their meaning as verbs (not their lexical meaning) as "the action denoted by them". This is a convenient formula, and I shall use it; but in using it one must always remember that "action" here is technical term for the class-meaning of verbs - it does not have its ordinary value or imply that every verb names, denotes or expresses an action. As a reminder of this, I use the term between single inverted commas, thus 'action'.

In fact, the appropriate grammatical categories constitute the best point of departure for making more precise the definition of these classes, continuing the process of identification that began by specifying their characteristic sentence-function. The forms of the verb varied in accordance with these criteria together make up the conjugation (i.e., the kind of paradigm verbs have) of the verb. There would be relatively few marginal cases if one defined the verb as a member of the class of words subject to conjugation, in the sense explored before.

The seven grammatical categories in relation to which verb-forms must be placed are as follows:

- (a) Person, which we have met in a similar technical sense in relation to the pronoun. Indeed, it is a category rather of concord between subject-form and verb than one appropriate to a single sentence-component. Its range in Modern English is very limited.
- (b) Number. The sense, once again, is technical, and it is different from the sense of number in relation to nouns, etc. In verbs, it is a dependent grammatical function, a feature of concord, since it depends on the number of the verb's subject, and not on anything inherent in the verb. Like person, its range in Modern English is very limited, but the two together form, with position, the principal ways of showing what is the subject of the sentence.

The remaining categories are more purely verbal.

- (c) Mood is defined by the OED as "any one of the several groups of forms in the conjugation of a verb which serve to indicate... whether it expresses a predication, a command, a wish or the like."
- (d) Voice can be defined as any one of the forms by which the relation of the subject to the 'action' is indicated.
- (e) Tense is any one of the forms in the conjugation of a verb which serve to indicate the different times at which the 'action' is viewed as happening or existing. The tenses do not refer directly to "real", i.e., extralinguistic, time, but to a speaker's subjective use of distinctions of time drawn (in general, compulsorily drawn) in accordance with these distinctions of his language; the language may even use these distinctions for grammatical purposes that have nothing to do with time.
- (f) Aspect is any one of the several groups of forms in the conjugation of the verb which serve to indicate the manner in which the 'action' denoted by the verb is considered as being carried out.
- (g) Lastly comes a category marginal to the verb as we are defining it, that of finitude - marginal in the sense that one of the two terms involved, that of non-finitude, characterizes forms belonging to the verb conjugationally, but not usually sharing the typical sentence-functions of the verb. Finitude is the

property of being, or not being, subject to limitation in respect of the two concord categories - of person and number.

The general observations are necessary before we begin to examine the conjugation of English verbs in the light of these categories. The first is that in actual verb-forms the component grammatical meanings are often not so separable as this analysis might suggest. In particular, tense, mood, and aspect are often inextricably entwined, and one's terms may need to take account of this by combining to form tense-aspect, tense-mood, etc. Since the categories represent, for the most part, independent variables, it is, however, an advantage to have the terms available for separate use.

The second observation is that the use of form and conjugation in the section above begs a lot of questions. Neither must at the stage be thought of as confined within the limits of a single word. [...]

The issue is closely bound up with another: while the English verbal system forms a unity in the sense that its components fulfill a common sentence-function, from other points of view it divides into two distinct classes, one open, one closed, with some overlap of membership between them. It is the open class that most simply exemplifies the principle of conjugation described above; with it we can begin, and to its members I should like to restrict the name "verb". However, as the wider use is so firmly established in current speech, I shall where necessary use the more explicit term "lexical verb" as a reminder of our special sense for the word. As is usual with open-class words, these words have full lexical meaning - that is why our term is appropriate. Each member of the class can have three finite and three non-finite forms, though some of the forms may be undifferentiated. The dictionary form of verbs, without any inflection or other modification, may be called the base, and other forms described in terms of their departures from it. It is necessary to distinguish between simple conjugation, in which formal variation is confined to the limits of the word, and complex conjugation, in which it is not. We shall begin with simple conjugation.

The base is used to constitute the first tense-aspect-mood. Though often called present, this can best be characterized negatively - it is the form used when there is no positive reason for the use of the past, or the subjunctive, or any complex conjugational form. It is - for-

ally and functionally - the unmarked term in the conjugation; it will well be called the neutral or non-past of the verb. It is used without formal modification of the base with all persons and numbers of the verb except the third person singular, for which a morpheme is added identical to the basic grammatical morpheme used (with nouns, i.e., [s], [z], [ɪz], according to the quality of the preceding phoneme - the last sound of the base. This ending is spelt morphemally, with -s. Thus we form *I, you, we, they hit, live, grudge, he, she, it hits, lives, grudges*.

To avoid the cumbersome tense-aspect-mood we can refer to this set of forms as form-set 1. Its functions in so far as they can be put positively have been well stated by Henry Sweet (1891-1898, §§ 2223-2231), as being to imply "that a statement is of general application, and holds good for all time (The sun rises in the east), or that an action or phenomenon is habitual, as in "He gets up at six every morning", "I always get it at the same shop", or recurrent, as in "He goes to Germany twice a year", "Wherever she sees him she begins to laugh". In addition, form-set 1 is used for simple futurity in clauses introduced by "if (conditional clauses), as in: "If she comes before I leave, we can talk it over."

Contrasted with this form-set in respect of one of its components, *I** namely tense, is form-set 2, which we may call "past" (without implying that this useful short label gives an exact picture of its functions). The forms here are more varied and complex to describe, lacking the overall regularity of form-set 1, but in one respect they are simpler, since they show no variation for person or number (except *I* 'in the verb "be"). There are two principal ways in which the contrast with form-set 1 may be achieved. An open-class of verbs adds a morpheme realized as [ɪd] after alveolar stops, [ɪd] after other voiced sounds, and [ɪt] after other voiceless sounds. Once again, the identity of function between these three forms is recognized traditionally by the use of a common spelling for the morpheme -(e)d, sometimes preceded by doubling of the final consonant of the base. Examples are:

end-ed [ɛndɪd], rest-ed [rɛstɪd], call-ed [kɔ:lɪd], manage-d [ˈmænɪdɪd], wish-ed [wɪʃt], hop-ped [hɒpt].

This type of past-formation is often called regular, as is the open-class plural formation of nouns.

The other verbs have widely differing kinds of past-formation. As they form a closed class, they can be listed. [...]

[...] The contrast of non-past and past in English verbs is not unequivocally established by regular difference of form. Most verbs do have a form-set 2 in contrast with form-set 1 (even the invariables have the difference that in the past they do not inflect for the third person singular), but the contrast can take so many shapes that we must look to function as the basis of our sense that it is one contrast. More technically, we look for a difference of distribution in the kind of context, linguistic or situational, where each form-set occurs. The functions of form-set 2 are more positively distinctive than those of form-set 1, and in non-subordinate clauses are chiefly the denoting of 'actions' thought of as in the past, as in: "Who took my book from the table?" "I asked you not to come here". In subordinate clauses, however, it is used in the sense of the non-past if the verb of the main clause is in the past, as in: "I knew you liked oysters".

In conditional clauses it has a value of hypotheticalness, tentativeness, as in: "If I went, you come with me?"

Contrasted with form-sets 1 and 2 in respect, not of tense, but of mood, is the subjunctive. It is usual to give a label to the negative term of this opposition, and call it "indicative". The formal mark of the subjunctive in the non-past is the absence of inflection for the third person singular (or, one might say, the verb-base is used unchanged in all person for the non-past subjunctive; or again, that the subjunctive has a special form only in the third person singular - save in the verb "be", where the base is not used in the indicative). In other words, the subjunctive is formally no more than a vestigial survival in Modern English, and, as might be expected in the absence of formal distinctions to carry them, its functions are slight. The only obligatory use of the non-past subjunctive is in certain forward-looking formulaic expressions, mostly of wishes and prayers, so the connection with the present is even more tenuous than in the case of the corresponding indicative form-set. By describing these uses as formulaic, I mean that they exist as wholes, and do not serve as substitution-frames in the ordinary way of linguistic forms. Examples are: "God bless you!", "God save the Queen!", "Long live the King!", "Woe betide...", "So be it".

nmai /. * ^^ ~-----

Forward-referring expressions, not wishes or prayers are: "Far be it from me...", "Come what may", "If need be...". In other sentence-patterns the non-past subjunctive is optional. In clauses where the speaker does not commit himself to the actuality of what is asserted, it can alternate with the indicative, as in: "If it be true..." and in a dependent clause: "...whether it be true or no."

This alternation is not altogether free, the use of the subjunctive belonging to more formal English in such sentences. Where this function occurs in a sentence-pattern requiring inversion of subject and verb, the same alternation is not possible; instead, the subjunctive alternates with a complex form: "Suffice it to say..." or "Let it suffice to say..."

Here, the stylistic difference is less marked, but the subjunctive is slightly more formal.

If the non-past subjunctive is little used, and only attains full conjugation in the verb "be", the past subjunctive is so much more restricted that it can only exist in that verb. Its forms consist of the past plural used in all persons of the verb, and it is only the verb "be" that makes a distinction of singular and plural in its past forms, and so is capable of having a past subjunctive. That category belongs, therefore, not to the form-class verb, but to the single verb "be" in present-day English. However, the uses of "be" as a closed-system item in forming units of complex conjugation are so extensive that the restriction is less than it seems. At the moment we are concerned with "be" as a lexical verb in simple conjugation. The unique past subjunctive form is "were" (even this is only distinctive in the first and third person singular), and it has two principal functions - to express, in subordinate clause, either rejected hypothesis or unfulfilled wish, as in: "If I were you...", "As if he were a fool...", "I wish I were dead!"

Nowhere is the form obligatory, even in these functions; "was" can always be substituted, especially in conversation. Those who retain the use of "were" have the slight advantage that their expression implies early in the utterance whether or not they reject the hypothesis they put forward, contrast:

"If he was there I didn't see him" with:

"If he were here, we should have seen him by now."

But one should guard the view that it is invariably an advantage to be compelled by one's language-system to make the maximum number of distinctions.

In rather dated formal English, a third option is the use of inversion for hypothesis, as in: "Were he to arrive tomorrow he would still be too late." With this construction the subjunctive is obligatory.

We turn now to the second, and much the largest, section of the conjugation of verbs, that involving forms larger than one word, namely complex conjunction. The words involved in such constructions are always of two distinct kinds: there is a member of the open class of verb-forms, always non-finite, and one or more members of the closed system now to be described. The non-finite parts of English verbs are threefold, the infinitive and imperative consisting simply of the base, the present participle, consisting of the base + suffix "-ing" [ig] (sometimes with sound-modification at the junction between base and suffix) and the past participle.

It is convenient to have a term less cumbersome than closed-system item for referring to this second kind of verb-like element. A traditional name for them is auxiliary (verb), but this is not really very illuminating. Their function may be summed up as that of carrying the grammatical meaning of the verb-phrase, while the other component carries the lexical meaning; what they do is show what the lexical item is up to in a given sentence. A name given them by the late Professor J.R. Firth suggests this function much more clearly. It is the term "operator", borrowed from mathematics, that is, a symbol indicating that an operation (multiplication, subtraction, etc.) is to be formed upon a component, an indicator of the processes due. [...] Similarly, the item "it... give" without linguistic operators conveys no clear meaning, but when they are added, the expression is clear: "It would give them all pleasure if you accepted".

Questions:

1. What categories of the verb does B. Strang single out? How does she define them?
2. What principle does B. Strang use to differentiate between form-set 1 and form-set 2 in the verb?
3. How does B. Strang define the functions of form-set 1 verbs?

4. What are the functions of form-set 2 verbs?
5. What semantic and formal differential features of the subjunctive does B. Strang single out?
6. Why does she define the non-past subjunctive as a formal vestigial survival in Modern English?

2.

Bybee J. Verb and Its Categories

Applications to Modality

When investigating the meaning or function of grammatical morphemes, especially cross-linguistically, it is important to distinguish the relevant conceptual domain from the grammatical expression of concepts within that domain. For instance, time is a conceptual domain that is presumably universally relevant, and languages refer to temporal concepts both lexically (*today, last year, soon*) and grammatically. Tense and aspect are the labels for the grammatical expression of temporal concepts. Compared to lexical expression, the grammatical expression of temporal concepts is extremely limited. Only certain focal concepts in the temporal domain receive grammatical expression. These cross-linguistically common focal points for grammatical expression are called "gram-types" in Bybee and Dahl (1989); "gram-types" are manifest in language-specific grams. I; Applying this three-way distinction of the conceptual domain, gram-types and grams to modality, modality is a broad functional or conceptual domain, and certain focal points in this domain commonly take I grammatical expression in language-specific grams. However, the actual application of this model is not so clear in the case of modality as it is in the case of tense and aspect. A major difficulty is encountered in giving a coherent characterization to the conceptual domain of modality. In fact, it appears that modality encompasses several partially parallel conceptual domains whose main connections may be more diachronic than synchronic. One way of characterizing these domains is as follows:

(1) The domain of conditions on agents: *agent-oriented modality* specifies conditions on agents with respect to the completion of the predicate. Traditionally these conditions have been the social conditions of obligation and permission, but linguistically parallel markers often also specify the internal conditions of volition and ability. In this domain, linguistic expression is commonly lexical or through auxiliaries or particles and very rarely through inflection.

(2) The functional domain of speech acts that impose obligation or grant permission: *speaker-oriented modality*, of which imperative is the most commonly-occurring example, signals that an utterance is a directive or mand. Grams with this function are commonly in flecional (expressed in the bound, obligatory morphology), and appropriately designated as *mood*.

(3) The epistemic domain: *epistemic modality* expresses the degree of commitment the speaker has to the truth of the proposition expressed in the utterance. The degree of commitment ranges from uncertainty through possibility to probability. Epistemic modality is often expressed inflectionally, but may also be periphrastic or lexical.

(4) The domain of subordinate propositions: *subordinating moods* are usually related synchronically or diachronically to the first three domains. They either signal an embedded directive or a clause that is not asserted, particularly one whose truth the speaker may not be committed to.

Thus modality, rather than encompassing one conceptual domain, as tense and aspect or person and number do, may span these four domains. A single gram may be ambiguous between readings on two or more of these levels, e.g. British English *should*, which is used for obligation, epistemic probability (*the trip should take about fourteen days*), imperative (*you should repeat this ten times*) and as a subjunctive (*it is funny she should say that*). Such ambiguity results from the gram proceeding through the four levels in a diachronic sense: agent-oriented modalities tend to generalize themselves, but they also tend to give rise to meanings belonging to the other three types.

Despite the complexity of the domain, universal gram-types are identifiable in modality just as they are in tense and aspect. Certain focal meanings occur frequently across languages. For instance, Bybee et al. (1994) find grams expressing obligation, permission, abili-

ty, root possibility, epistemic probability and possibility, imperative, pid prohibitive to be quite common and quite similar in a 76 language sample. Moreover, the polysemy of grams in this cross-linguistic sample follows patterns which strongly suggest universal diachronic pathways by which obligation evolves into probability in the epistemic domain and imperative in the speaker-oriented domain; Ability gives rise to root possibility and permission and further to Epistemic possibility. Thus, there is no shortage of diachronic or universal regularities in the modality domains.

In addition, however, there is no shortage of puzzles to be untangled, especially in language-specific synchronic analyses. One ubiquitous problem arises from the fact that a highly generalized modality gram may have, especially by the late stages of grammaticization, spread to multiple constructions thereby exhibiting a distribution and polysemy that does not yield easily to a unitary analysis. Further, since the innovation of grammaticization tends to take place in main clauses, and subordinate clauses tend to be conservative morpho-syntactically, very old, highly generalized grams tend to remain conventionalized in subordinate clauses, where it is difficult to identify their semantic contribution. In order to unravel this problem, it is necessary to examine the role of constructions in the process of grammaticization. | Early in the recent revival of grammaticization studies, it was often said that in grammaticization, a lexical morpheme becomes a grammatical one. Lately, however, the grammaticization literature contains many corrections of this overly simple statement. A lexical morpheme does not grammaticize, rather, a lexical morpheme (or combination of grammatical ones) in a construction grammaticizes. | In fact, it is the whole construction with specific morphemes plugged into it, that produces a gram. Thus we would not want to say that *have* has grammaticized in English to both a perfect and an obligation gram. Rather we would say that the construction [*have* + Past (Participle)] has become an anterior, and the construction [*have* + *to* + verb] has become an obligation expression. Similarly, it is not accurate to say that in English *go* has become a future marker; rather we must say that [*be going to* + verb] has become a future marker. | There are two reasons that it is important to consider the construction that is grammaticizing. One is a diachronic reason: the whole con-

struction contributes to the resulting grammatical meaning. Thus in studying the relation between the source meaning and the resulting meaning, the whole construction has to be taken into account. The second is a synchronic reason: because any particular morpheme contributes only a part of the meaning of a grammaticized construction, one need not necessarily expect to find that elements from the same etymon in different constructions have identical or even relatable meanings. Thus one would not attempt to identify a single meaning for the two occurrences of *have* in the perfect and obligation constructions. Yet it is precisely attempts of this nature that stymie analysts, particularly of lesser-known languages, leading to the notion that grams in different languages have very different functions, and thus to the development of vague terminology to cover vast territories of semantic space. In the next section, which discusses the use of the term "irrealis", I will argue that, among other difficulties with this term, it is sometimes used to cover etymologically related elements in very different constructions that are perhaps not synchronically related.

Is There a Universal Grammatical Category "Irrealis"?

In Bybee et al. (1994: Chapter 6) we noted that in our large-scale cross-linguistic survey of categories of the verb, we did not find evidence for a universal gram-type of irrealis that is in any way comparable to other identifiable gram-types, such as perfective, future, progressive, obligation, etc. This does not mean that there is no dimension of conceptual space that includes imagined, projected or otherwise unreal situations, nor does it mean that the concept or the label "irrealis" might not sometimes be descriptively useful, it simply means that there is no widespread cross-linguistic evidence that such a semantic space has a single grammatical marker.

Instead, the cross-linguistic survey found precisely what the papers in this volume report: for any given language there are several grams that mark off portions of the conceptual space for situations that are not asserted to exist, or if there is a highly generalized gram, it does not cover all "irrealis" situations and furthermore does not actually have one invariant meaning but rather takes its meaning from the construction in which it occurs.

So far, no proposal has been made in the literature for a specific characterization of the prototypical uses and common semantic attributes of either "realis" or "irrealis". Indeed, it appears unlikely that any such proposal could be forthcoming, given the disparate uses to which grams labeled "irrealis" are put. Nor are there any proposals concerning the basic or core uses of irrealis. It appears, then, that "irrealis" should not be treated as the same type of grammatical category as perfective, i.e. it is not a universal gram-type.

Given, then, this lack of strict correspondence between the notional domain and grammatical expression, what can we make of the irrealis notion? Clearly there is a conceptual domain that contains many ways in which a situation can be conceived of as unreal. In fact, it is largely coextensive with the domains of modality as outlined above. But perhaps lack of reality is not the most important feature of these domains; perhaps from the point of view of what people want to communicate, the more specific meanings such as obligation, permission, imperative, possibility, are more useful. A highly generalized notion such as "lacking in reality" is probably too abstract to be of much communicative use.

Given all these considerations, I conclude that instances where the label "irrealis" has been used to characterize the meaning of a grammatical morpheme fall into one of two categories: either they are cases in which a more specific characterization would be more useful or they are cases in which the analyst has tried to come up with a single meaning for an element that is common to many different constructions, where in fact it is the construction as a whole that is supplying the (usually more specific) sense. In other words, it appears that the term "irrealis" is simply too general to be useful, except as a pointer to a very broad domain.

The underlying theoretical question that ultimately must be addressed, then, is the extent to which users of language form abstract generalizations concerning the meanings and functions of grammatical forms and constructions. It was once believed that maximal generality of description was necessary because it allowed for the productive use of language. How could speakers extend constructions to new situations if they were not of a very abstract and general nature? It is now known that extension to new situations can be accomplished by a vari-

ety of mechanisms, including the use of metaphor and metonymy and the exploitation of commonly-occurring inferences. It is possible that new occurrences arise on the basis of very local analogical processes rather than by the use of very abstract and general schemas.

Langacker argues that the representation of grammatical schemata links specific constructions with specific and concrete contexts of use. The representation is very local and highly redundant, but local schemas may be organized into increasingly abstract and general schemas at higher levels. However, at higher levels of abstraction it is increasingly difficult to find evidence for generalizations. We simply do not know whether language users form abstractions across many uses of highly grammaticized forms, or whether they manipulate more specific constructions with more concrete meanings and contexts of use.

Questions:

1. What conceptual domains does modality encompass?
2. What are the proofs of the absence of a universal grammatical category of "irrealis", according to the author?
3. How does J. Bybee treat the irrealis notion?

3.

Palmer F.R. Linguistic

Study of the English Verb

Time and Tense

The traditional statement of tense in terms of present, past and future, exemplified by "I take", "I took" and "I shall take", has no place in the analysis presented here.

The main reason for this is [...] that while "I take" and "I took" are comparable within the analysis, in that they exemplify the formal category of tense as established in the primary pattern, "I shall take" belongs to the secondary pattern and ought not, therefore, to be handled together with the other two.

There are other characteristics of the verb that support the decision to separate future time reference from reference to past and present. First there is the fact that we have already noted, and will examine later in more detail, that many of the verbal forms of the primary pattern may refer to the future. What is important is that past tense forms, no less than present tense forms, may refer to the future. As a result future/non-future cuts across past/present, giving us 4 possibilities, not three. This is shown by:

Present non-future	"I'm reading (at the moment)."	"I'm
Present future	reading a paper tomorrow."	"I was
Past non-future	reading when he arrived."	"I was reading
Past future	a paper tomorrow."	

The second point is that there is really very little justification for the selection of "will" and "shall" as the markers of future tense in English, even if we rely heavily upon time reference. For, in the first place, "will" and "shall" are not the only ways of referring to future time; in fact there are 4 quite common constructions - as illustrated by:

(i) I'm reading a paper next Wednesday, (ii) I read my paper next Wednesday, (iii) I'm going to read a paper next Wednesday, (iv) I shall read a paper next Wednesday.

The first two are examples of the primary pattern forms used with future reference (the subject of the first point made). But the third type - with "going to" - is very common, indeed, probably more common than sentences with "will" and "shall" in ordinary conversation.

A second difficulty about "will" (though not "shall") is that it often does not refer to the future at all. It may, for instance, indicate probability: "That'll be the postman", or it may refer to habitual activity: "She'll sit for hours watching the television".

Even when it does refer to the future it may suggest not merely futurity but willingness as in: "Will you come?" (which is different from "Are you coming?")

It is, moreover, characteristic of the other modal auxiliaries that they may refer to the future (though with additional reference to ability, probability, etc.) as in: "I can/may/must/ought to come tomorrow".

There is clearly an over-riding case for handling "will" and "shall" with the other modal auxiliaries in the secondary pattern and not together with the past and present distinction of tense that belongs to the primary pattern.

Questions:

1. How does F.R. Palmer explain his deviation from the traditional system of tenses?
2. What evidence does he provide to prove that the future tense doesn't refer to the primary pattern?

4.

Joos M. The English

Verb, Form and Meaning

Basic Meanings and Voice

Passive Voice

The term "passive voice" here refers to the grammatical form, that has the marker "be ... -n"; the term "passive meaning" is here used as a rather general term which the examples will have to define for us as they accumulate; but the expression "the meaning of passive voice" is rather a strict term definable as the meaning, whatever it turns out to be, that is strictly correlated to the use of the passive marker [...]

If we begin with:

This is the first cross-examination, practically the first time the voice of the defense is heard.

Something certainly is expected.

The estate was cleared up.

We have examples of passive voice which no grammarian can quarrel with, either as to form or as to meaning. [...]

Now what sort of meaning do these passives have that is not shared by the corresponding non-passive verbs? The pairs (25) "Well, then,

members of the jury, there is a long gap of some 6 years, and it is right that you should be reminded". (26) "Mr. Lawrence reminded you, that at the end there was no suspicion at all about the way in which Mrs. Morell died" and (35) "Then we know that inquiries were made from the nurses by Superintendent Hannam", (36) "They made statements I upon which no doubt these proceedings in due course were founded" show that the difference can be that particular reversing of meaning for which we possess no better definition than just such pairs - and equivalent pairs in Latin and German and many other languages: the "you" with (26) is the victim of the reminding (this is in turn the definition of the term "victim" which I need for our present purposes), and that same victim is designated by the other "you" with (25). With (25) the designation of the victim is the subject of the passive verb; for identically the same event and the same dramatis personae (only real instead of hypothetical, which makes no difference here) the designation of the victim is in the role of object with (26).

Since this is the same event and the same victim, there is necessarily a compensatory shift in meaning between the verbs (25) and I (26). Now that shift is customarily ascribed entirely to the passive I verb, the non-passive meaning being taken as basic or unshifted, and that custom can serve us here too for the present. Accordingly, we can say: The meaning of such a passive voice is the meaning that (25) has and (26) does not have, with the understanding that precisely that meaning recurs in an indefinitely large number of other pairs. This definition is the best we can get, simply because it is I axiomatic. [...]

So far, this is only the definition of the primary passive meaning. Now the primary passive is the only kind that is in use in most neighboring languages and in classical Latin; and Latin can serve as our typical language of that sort. From Caesar we learn that people in-colunt "inhabit" a region and that they appellatur "are called" various names, and we feel sure of grasping how all that works. But then Latin takes us into mysterious regions inhabited by deponent verbs where English can't follow; and English wanders off into another area where patterns are called idiomatic to excuse us from understanding how they work. Instead of calling them that, I will give them names and display their employment. [...]

From the citations and other sources I construct various non-passive and passive sentences; the labeled display will serve also as a set of definitions.

Non-passive: *She left him a car in the will (-D LEA VE - left)*

Non-passive: *In the will she left him a car.*

Primary passive: *A car was left him in the will (-D BE -N LEA VE)*

Primary passive: *In the will a car was left him.*

Secondary passive: *He was left a car in the will.*

Secondary passive: *In the will he was left a car.*

Non-passive: *They gave her a whole grain of heroin.*

Primary passive: *When this heroin was given, ...*

Secondary passive: *She was given a whole grain of heroin.*

Non-passive: *They telephoned for Dr. Harris.*

Primary passive: *Dr. Harris was summoned.*

Tertiary passive: *Dr. Harris was telephoned for.*

Tertiary passive: *I was being made a fool of.*

Non-passive: *You can't sit down in such a dress.*

Tertiary passive: *Such a dress can't be sat down in [...]*

For the primary passive and that alone, a comprehensive description of the employment could be: the subject of the verb designates the victim in the event rather than the actor. That would be appropriate to every Latin or German passive; for when there is no victim there is no subject either: "Bei Tisch wurde über die Nachbarschaft gesprochen".

For all the English passive verbs together, a comprehensive description has to be made broader by claiming less: the meaning of the passive is that the subject does not designate the actor. This is in fact all that can be said about the meaning. As for the form of predication, that is to say the partnership of subject and verb, what we have already learned is still valid: the subject designates some entity which is intimately involved in the event. Then we can cover the whole range of three passives by remarking: (1) When the subject designates the victim, the pattern is called primary passive voice. (2) If the non-passive clause would designate not only the victim but also another entity designated without a preposition (or with the empty preposition "to" of equivalent value: "They gave heroin to the patient"), but now the designation of that other entity is the subject, the pattern is called second-

ary passive voice. (3) When the subject of the passive verb designates an entity involved in the event in a way that has to be specified by a preposition, the pattern is called tertiary passive voice. The preposition then is placed after the verb as if it were an adverb. [...].

To sum up: the English passive is a word-order device. It is marked by BE...-N to show that its subject is not actor, and that is all the device "means". The rest is automatic.

Aspect, Tense, and Phase

In theory it is equally possible to discuss each of the categories "aspect", "tense" and "phase" by itself, for they are all similarly autonomous. But there is more than one reason why I choose to cover them all in a single chapter. The discussion of phase can begin late in this chapter, and it will be too short to constitute a respectable chapter by itself. Aspect and tense are best discussed together, not because they are essentially correlated [...] but because the discussion of either would be rather uninteresting if the other were disregarded as we have a theoretical right to do. [...]

Temporary Aspect

Plainly we must distinguish between "tense" used (however strangely) as a grammatical term on the one hand, and the everyday word "time". Now present time will serve as our name for a very sharply restricted sort of occurrence: the speaker confines his remarks (or else we can infallibly sort out those of his remarks which are confined) to what is being done, or simply is, there where he can and does report on it currently. [...]

Then the first clearly defined group of citations - consistent in form and in meaning both - is a small group here:

"Am I really hearing what you are saying?"

"Are you standing there... and saying... that when you wrote those words... they were intended to mean something quite different?"

One tradition calls this "progressive" and holds that the specifying done by the marker BE -ING adds the meaning that the action is making headway; but that is preposterous in the face of "standing" and others. Another name, more recent and especially in use in Great Britain, is "continuous"; this emphasizes the point that the other verbs

(lacking BE -ING) are apt to refer to isolated acts occurring again and again. There is a grain of truth in this, but there are too many counter-examples: "Do you plead Guilty or Not Guilty?" and many others here. It has been called "imperfect" with a name borrowed from Latin and Romance-language grammar; but then there are too many counter-examples in both directions: moreover, the English marked aspect is not confined to a past tense as those are. It has a resemblance in form, and a frequent coincidence in reference, with a Spanish (and Portuguese) formula: *que Ustedestd diciendo* "what you are saying". But both this Iberian formula and the Slavic imperfective differ crucially from the English marked aspect: they are specifications of the nature of the event, while the English marked aspect instead specifies something about the predication. I have borrowed the Slavic technical term "aspect" for lack of a better, but the English marked aspect has an essentially different meaning. [...]! call it the temporary aspect. [. . .] ^

BE -ING is an elementary signal known to all five-year-old native speakers. [...]

Generic Aspect

[...] When the speaker is himself responsible for the event, as in the citations listed just above - and this is true under the usual understanding that we have a right to transform a question "Do you call that an independent record?" into a statement "I call that..." and a negative statement "I do not agree if you refer to heroin" into a positive one "I agree" before we scrutinize it for our present purposes - the meaning is utterly specific and exact: it is what I call asseveration, meaning that the speaker makes his statement valid by speaking it.

An easy relaxation of this strict condition gives us the use of generic aspect for demonstration - the mode of speaking which we have learned to describe more or less in Shakespeare's words: "Sute the Action to the Word, the Word to the Action.", e.g.: "Now watch -1 drop the tablet into this warm water, and you see it dissolves quite nicely."

[...] the generic aspect has no meaning of its own. It gets its meaning entirely from the context; and for our purposes the "context" includes the lexical meaning of the verb-base, so that, for example, the asseverative use is confined to "verbs of saying". [...]

Now it has become clear what the marker BE -ING of the tempo-I rary aspect does: from among all possible aspectual significances of the generic aspect, it singles out one "by obliterating all the others." [...] [...] how does the speaker choose between the aspects? [...] The difference between this, the privative significance of the English temporary aspect, and the Iberian formula already mentioned or the Romance-language imperfect tense or the Slavic imperfective or "durative" aspect, aside from the fact that they all characterize the event while English here characterizes predication, is that in those others the duration is primary (and in the Iberian formula the intensity of commitment of the actor to the event) while in the English temporary aspect it is the probabilistic limitation in the primary significance. The meaning of our temporary aspect is limitation of duration.

Tense

Now tense is our category in which a finite verb (non-finites can have voice and aspect and phase, but not tense) is either marked with -D or lacks that marker. Then by definition there can be only two tenses.

In the folklore, an English verb has a good many tenses; this notion derives [...] from Greek, Latin, and Romance-language gram-I matical tradition. The corresponding reaction to our dichotomy is that we are disregarding the tense-paradigm of the English verb.

What we are actually doing is making adequate use of the term "tense" at last. This is not my invention; for over a century grammarians have been saying that English (like the other Germanic languages and Russian and many others) has only two tenses: past and non-past. That is not quite our dichotomy as we will see; but a maximally useful dichotomy has to be recognized somehow and we need a name for it. If we took over the folklore sense of "tense", we would have only occasional rather literary uses for it, and another name would have to be invented for the dichotomy which is our proper topic.

The unmarked tense will be called "actual" and the marked one "remote". The latter name fits the meaning precisely. The Modern English remote tense has the categorial meaning that the referent (what is specified by the subject-verb partnership) is absent from that part of the real world where the verb is being spoken. In some languages, there are several kinds or degrees of such absence; for instance, on

the time-scale alone, apart from other kinds of absence, French and many other languages have two possibilities: past time and future time. On this scale, English has only one, for English treats future time as not remote from the present occasion, and remoteness in time in English is always categorically past time.

Phase

[...] first the meaning of phase has to be explored. It was given this untraditional name some 15 years ago by George L. Trager and Henry Lee Smith, Jr., "An Outline of English Structure".

The name derives from the special relation between cause and effect signified by verbs in the perfect phase.

Any event is not only sure to have a cause, though sometimes its cause may be difficult to ascertain; it is likely to have effects too, and here the relation is clearer or even obvious. A finite verb will hardly be used to specify an event unless there are effects; it is fair to say that language is not organized for entirely idle talk but is rather well adapted to mentioning things because they matter. Let us take it as axiomatic that the referent of a finite verb is regularly the cause of certain effects - unknown perhaps, often unforeseen, but in any case not assumed to be non-existent - since otherwise the finite verb would be idle, otiose, and rather left unused.

Now in all this chapter so far we have been concentrating our attention upon verbs in the current phase (lacking HAVE -N); and both here and previously when voice was discussed in the preceding chapter, the effects of the specified event have either been simultaneous with their cause (this event) or have been not substantially delayed: "The Judge came on swiftly" is the beginning of Trial, and the simultaneous effect is that he is seen to come, the immediate effect is that he is there, and later (perhaps delayed) effects can be taken for granted. Using the terminology borrowed from electrical circuit theory, used there for cyclically recurrent causes and effects, the cause and the principal effects are "in phase with each other", as the amount of moonlight is in phase with the phases of the moon (the two waxing and waning together) and the visibility of the moon is in phase with its being above the horizon time after time (the two occurring together cyclically), the effect never delayed behind the

» recurrent cause. In its English grammar use, the regular cyclic feature of that electrical phase drops out, though of course recurrence does not drop out with it: after all, the reason why items are in the vocabulary and in the grammar of English is that they are kept alive by recurrent use, and the events that they designate are not unique. For our purposes, then, the sense of phase is adequately defined so far by one example.

So much for current phase; the principal effects are in phase with the specified event, their cause. Now consider the very first appearance of the perfect phase in Trial: "*The high-backed chair has been pulled, helped forward, the figure is seated, has bowed, and the hundred or so people who had gathered themselves at split notice to their feet rustle and subside into apportioned place.*"

This is not simply a narration of events in sequence; instead, certain of them (is seated, rustle and subside) are presented as effects (or at least the possibility of their occurrence is an effect) of the earlier-in-time events stated in the perfect phase. Their presentation as effects is not marked in their own verbs; that marking is done by the perfect marker on the verbs for the precedent events. The perfect-marked verbs are there specifically for the sake of the effects of the events they designate, and that is the essential meaning.

True, the events designated by perfect verbs may be interesting in themselves, and may have simultaneous effects, but all that is now treated as uninteresting; the focus of attention is entirely in the delayed effects which remain uncertain until separately specified by other verbs. It is this focus of attention that determines what effects will figure as principal effects. The name "perfect" is traditional and entirely misleading; the essential point here is that the meaning of perfect phase is that the principal effects of the event are out of phase with it, which of course can only be true if they are delayed. [...] The perfect phase means that the event is not mentioned for its own sake but for the sake of its consequences.

Before leaving this topic, it is appropriate to mention some of the things that the English perfect phase does not mean, either because they appear in many books about English as misinterpretation of it or because they are meanings or uses of the similarly-shaped perfects of other languages such as French and German.

First, the English perfect does not mean that the specified event occurred previous to some other event specified with the current phase. That is a possible interpretation of it, but it is not what it means, just as many other kinds of utterances can be interpreted into messages that they do not intrinsically mean: "How do you do?" meaning "I'm pleased to meet you" but interpretable as an inquiry about health. The previous occurrence is at most a connotation of the perfect phase; its denotation indeed contradicts that by telling us that the event presented in the perfect phase is not being presented for its own sake but only as a means to a separate end, and its denotation positively is that we must look elsewhere for the important message. "You have seen the Cheshire reports" is not a past tense message; it belongs solely to the actual or "present tense". Conversely, the English actual perfect cannot be used for narration: "I have seen him yesterday" is not English. The nearest thing to it is "I have seen him. Yesterday." But this is two separate messages, the second is a one-word sentence without a verb.

Second, a French or a German perfect does not mean that the specified event is uninteresting in itself, which is always part of what the English perfect means. In both those languages it is a narrative tense, used for presenting events interesting for their own sake; and to the extent that those events can serve as preparation for later affairs the English meaning can be read out of them - but only as a connotation! As we have seen, the English past can do that too; and we can also say, "As we saw..."

Finally, by virtue of all such connotations in all languages and other connotations too, it is possible to employ any West-European perfect to convey to a reader or listener a complete sequence of events and lay out the sequence into at least six different times of occurrence. But, for reasons which ought to have become clear by now, that does not mean that the English perfect formulas are tenses in any sense of the term, however loose.

"Shall" and "Will"

[...] it's about time to dispose of the notion that "will" is a "future tense" auxiliary. Like every modal, and simply because "time will tell" whether the asserted relation of the specified event to the real

world suffices to bring about its occurrence, it has a connotation of futurity; but no modal has a denotation of futurity. [...]

But now if this is not the English future, then what is? Well, a good many languages get along without any, but not English. Besides the use of future-time adverbs (*He leaves tomorrow; He is leaving tomorrow*) whose equivalents are found in all languages as far as we know, English has the quasi-auxiliary BE GOING TO. [...] It is used 28 times in Trial, 10 times looking ahead from a past epoch ("The Superintendent told the accused that he was going to charge him with murder") and 18 times looking ahead from the present time - which is what we mean by future. [...] "I am going to suggest to you that he never said these words."

[...] "will" serves best when the anticipated time of the event is near at hand (and indeed it was, in nearly every case), while "shall" is used when the interval is capacious enough to provide for alterations, frustrations, loss of opportunity - or when "shall" is negated, emergence of an unforeseen opportunity: *We shall not know what was in this man's heart.* [...]

Of course there is also the folklore theory in the schoolbooks which says that "I'll" is colloquial for "I shall" as well as for "I will", but that is nothing but a measure of desperation, an attempt to save the rule where it conflicts with the facts of usage in standard British English. Nowadays, people who bear a substantial burden of responsibility for realistic English teaching have turned their backs on those books.

Whether "I'll" represents "I will" or "I shall" is perhaps an academic question. Who knows? We often say "I'll" and then have to write down what we say: when we put pen to paper, we then find ourselves wondering whether we should write "I'll", "I will" or "I shall". In reaching our decision, we are usually guided by the "rule" that prescribes "I shall, you will, he will" and we therefore turn "I'll" into "I shall". Personally, I agree with Daniel Jones, and think if one uses "shall" meaningfully (and not simply because a pedantic rule prescribes) then the weak pronunciation becomes "shall".

Questions: 1. How does M. Joos describe

the categorial meaning of the passive?

2. What are the principles of identifying the primary passive, the secondary passive, and the tertiary passive?
3. How does M. Joos substantiate the syntactic relevance of the passive?
4. How does M. Joos characterize the English marked aspect?
5. What does M. Joos mean saying that the English generic aspect has no meaning of its own?
6. How does he define the meaning of the English temporary aspect in contrast to the similar language phenomena in other languages?
7. How does M. Joos treat the two primary tenses: the unmarked tense and the marked remote tense?
8. What does the term "phase" imply?
9. Why does he find the traditional term "perfect" misleading?
10. Why does M. Joos exclude the English perfect formulas from the system of tenses?
11. What peculiarities of "shall" and "will" does M. Joos point out?

5.

Francis W.N. The Structure of American English

English verbs exhibit formal distinctions which can be classed under seven heads: person, tense, phase, aspect, mode, voice, and status.

Person

All English verbs except the modal auxiliaries (can, may, shall, will, dare, need) have 2 persons, which can be called "common" and "third singular". Verb forms consisting of base form + *-s* inflection are in the third-singular person; all others (except certain forms of "be") are in the common person. The distribution of these 2 forms is governed by a type of correlation with the subject which grammarians call "concord". Concord may be defined as the complementary distribution of linguistic forms having the same syntactic function in systematic correlation with other formally distinct forms with which they are syntactically linked. Since this gives us two criteria of syntactic similarity and complementary distribution,

we have a structural situation similar to that of allophones and allomorphs. Concord is not so prominent in the structure of English as it is in some other languages, but it occasionally becomes important, as in the matter with which we are now dealing, the person of verbs.

The distribution of the third-singular form of English verbs is quite complicated and exhibits some variation from one dialect to another. It can, however, be described in general terms as follows. The third-singular person is used whenever a simple verb is the head-verb in a predicate whose subject is one of the following:

- (1) A noun for which "he", "she", or "it" may be substituted.
- (2) One of the pronouns "he", "she", or "it".
- (3) The function-nouns "this" or "that".
- (4) A structure of modification of which one of the above is head.
- (5) Any other part of speech besides a noun, or a structure of modification or complementation with such part of speech as head or verbal element.
- (6) One of certain special structures of predication: the included clause and the infinitive clause.
- (7) A structure of coordination in which the coordinator is "or, nor, (n)either... (n)or, or not (only)... but (also)" and in which the last coordinate element belongs to (1)-(6) above; also one of certain other special structures of coordination.

These generalizations are admittedly imprecise. They have been so stated in the interests of brevity and because of dialectical and individual variations.

The seven types of subjects correlating with third-singular verbs may be illustrated as follows:

- (1) *the man walks; the sun sets; snowfalls.*
- (2) *he feels; she speaks; it comes (but note exceptions in watch it come).*
- (3) *this looks good; that goes here.*
- (4) *the tall man in the car drives; that in the dish tastes good.*
- (5) *here seems like a good place; eating candy causes tooth decay.*
- (6) *what I want costs money; how it got there remains a mystery.*
- (7) *either his mistakes or his bad luck keep him poor; peace and quiet seems (or seem) unattainable.*

All other kinds of subjects correlate with the common form of the verb. Chief of these are nouns for which they can be substituted; the pronouns *I, you, we, they, me, him, her, us, them*, the function nouns *these* and *those*; structures of coordination with coordinators *and, both ...* and the like; a few special included clauses. Some

		examples:	
	<i>Dogs bark</i>	<i>walk</i>	
	(<i>watch</i>)		
	<i>you</i>	} <i>walk</i> (<i>both</i>) <i>the knife and the fork shine brightly</i> <i>either his bad luck or his mistakes keep him</i> <i>poor</i>	
	<i>we</i>		
	<i>they</i>		
as auxiliary,	} <i>me</i> <i>whatever jobs are available suit me</i>	One verb, "be" whether as full verb or	
"am", which			<i>him</i> has an additional form, the first-singular
common			<i>her</i> correlates with the subject "I", and a
the base, "be".			<i>us</i> person form "are", which is different from
			<i>them</i>

Tense

All English verbs except a few auxiliaries (ought, must) have two tenses, the common tense (usually called "the present") and the past (or preterit) tense. These are formally distinguished by inflections. The past-tense form consists of the base + the inflectional suffix -ed; the common-tense forms are the base alone and the third-singular (base + -s). As we have already seen the past-tense suffix -ed has various allomorphs, sometimes involving morphophonemic changes in the base. But with the single exception of "be", each verb has a single past-tense form, which correlates with all subjects. The verb "be" has two past-tense forms, "was" and "were" (each with several allomorphs) which show number concord. That is, in the standard dialects, "was" correlates with singular subjects (nouns in base form, the substitutes *I, he, she, it,*

other parts of speech and special structures), and "were" correlates with plural subjects, including the pronoun "you" regardless of the nature of its referent. In many dialects, however - those usually labeled "substandard" - only the single form "was" is used.

Phase

All English verbs except a few auxiliaries have two phases, the simple and the perfect. The perfect phase is marked by the use of various forms of the auxiliary "have" with the past-participle form of the verb: "He has spoken, we may have been, I should have worked, he has gone". In addition, certain verbs, all of the kind we shall later define as intransitive, have a resultative phase, formed with the auxiliary "to be" and the past-participle form of the verb: "He is gone / They are finished with the work / I am done with you." Verbs not formally marked as in the perfect or resultative phase are in the simple phase.

Aspect

English verbs have three aspects, the simple, the durative, and the inchoative. The simple aspect is unmarked. The durative is formed by the auxiliary "be" and the present-participle (base + -ing) form of the verb. The inchoative aspect is formed by the auxiliary "get" and the present-participle form of the verb.

DURATIVE

he is talking
she was swimming
we ought to be working

INCHOATIVE

we got talking
let's get going
we ought to get working

Mode

English verbs have a variety of modes, the number varying somewhat between dialects. The modes can be classified on the basis of form into two groups: (1) those formed by the modal auxiliaries with the base form of the verb, and (2) those formed by certain other auxiliaries with the infinitive (to + base) form of the verb. The modal auxiliaries are *can, may, shall, will, must, dare, need, do*. All of these except "must" and "need" have past-tense forms; "do" also has a

third-singular form, "does". The auxiliaries which form modes with the infinitive are "have", "be", "be going", "be about", "used", "ought", "get", "have got". The modes formed by these various auxiliaries have no separate names; they can be rather clumsily designated as "the shall-mode", "the ought-mode", and so on. The following examples illustrate some of the many possible forms:

MODAL AUXILIARIES **OTHER AUXILIARIES**

<i>he can go</i>	<i>we might see</i>	<i>they have to go</i>
<i>they should have spoken</i>	<i>we are to see</i>	
<i>you will come</i>	<i>he was going to speak</i>	
<i>everybody must die</i>	<i>people were about to leave</i>	
<i>nobody dared do it</i>	<i>you she used to sing</i>	
<i>need not worry</i>	<i>he does that man ought to have quit</i>	
<i>study</i>	<i>I never got to see Paris</i>	
	<i>he has got to study</i>	

A verb-phrase may belong to two modes at the same time. In such a case, only one may be from the modal-auxiliary group, and its auxiliary always comes first in the phrase. Thus, we may have forms such as:

he would have to work *he could be about to work* *he may be going to tell us* *he used to have to work*

But not

**/? has to can work* or
**he is going to must work*

As has already been pointed out, the large variety of modal forms is one of the marked features of English, permitting very fine distinctions of meaning in English predicates.

Voice

English verbs have two voices, the normal or active voice and the passive voice. Passive voice forms consist of some form of the auxiliary "be" with the past-participle form of the verb. Another passive,


formed with "get" as auxiliary and the past-participle, seems to be increasing in frequency, though grammarians are not at present agreed as to its status. The three types of voice-forms are illustrated in the following examples:

ACTIVE	BE-PASSIVE	GET-PASSIVE
<i>he kills</i>	<i>he is killed</i>	<i>he gets killed</i>
<i>they build a house</i>	<i>the house was built</i>	<i>the house got built</i>
<i>we have done the work</i>	<i>the work has been done</i>	<i>the work has got done</i>

Two structures which are exactly alike in the written form and sometimes alike in speech are the "be-passive" and the verb "be" with a past participle as subjective complement. Consider the following sentences:

- (a) *the house was built by experts*
(b) *the house was built of wood*

The difference in structure here, sometimes marked in speech by a pause either after or before "built", can be clearly revealed by diagrams



Status

English verbs have 4 statuses, the affirmative, the interrogative, the negative, and the negative-interrogative. The interrogative status is marked by a change in word order, involving the inversion of the subject and the auxiliary, or the first auxiliary if more than one are present. Verbs which have no auxiliary in the affirmative status use

the auxiliary "do"/"does"/"did" to form the interrogative, except "be", which always simply inverts subject and verb, and "have", which may invert or may use the forms of "do". The auxiliaries "get", "used (to)" and "have (to)" also use the forms of "do". The following examples illustrate interrogative statuses:

INVERTED FORMS

*is he working has he worked
should he have worked is he going
to work*

DO-FORMS

*does he work did he
work did he get
killed does he have
to work did he use to*

Note that this inversion produces *work* a structure in which one immediate constituent is split into two parts and the other inserted between. [...]

The negative status is marked by the insertion of the special function word "not", which has various allomorphs such as [not, nt, ant, an, n], immediately after the first auxiliary. Again the forms of "do" are used if no auxiliary is otherwise present, although "do" is not used with "be" and not always with "have". The forms of "do" are used when the auxiliary is "used (to)", "have (to)", or a simple form of "get". The following examples illustrate various cases of negative status:

*he is not ([iz not, izant, z+not, izan]) working he is
he has not worked not here has
he should not have worked he { has not
he { does not have } any money
he is not going to work he did not used to work*

The negative-interrogative status combines the two former, as its name indicates. The use of the auxiliary "do" follows the same pattern as in the interrogative forms. This structure brings the subject and the function word "not" together at the same point in the middle of the split verb-phrase. Either of them may come first, but the form with the subject before "not" is somewhat more formal, as the following examples show:

NOT-FIRST FORM

*isn 't he working hasn 't
he worked shouldn 't he
have worked doesn 't he
work hasn't he doesn't he
have*

SUBJECT-FIRST FORM

*is he not working
has he not worked
should he not have worked
does he not work
has he not
does he not have]*

Notice that in the left-hand column the allomorph of "not" is under weak stress, while in the right-hand column it has at least tertiary and sometimes secondary stress. [...]

It should be apparent by now that when all seven of these qualities of verbs are considered, a large, varied, and complicated series of verb-phrases is possible. This is one of the most striking aspects of present-day English grammar. Much of this complexity has developed since Old English times (that is, since A.D. 1150), so that the development can be traced in written records. When historical linguists have thoroughly studied this phase of the history of English, it should provide just as spectacular an illustration of the adaptation of the language to new demands as does the tremendous growth of the vocabulary over the same period.

We may summarize this sevenfold classification of verbs by a tabular analysis of four typical verb-phrases:

- he is to be told*
- they should not have been working*
- ought we to get going*
- might he not have been getting run over*

	(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)
Person	Third-singular	Common	Common	Common
Tense	Common	Past	Common	Past
Phase	Simple	Perfect	Simple	Perfect
Aspect	Simple	Durative	Inchoative	Durative
Mode	Be to	Shall	Ought to	May
Voice	Be-passive	Active	Active	Get-passive
Status	Affirmative	Negative	Interrogative	Negative-interrogative

Questions:

1. What opposition of forms, according to W.N. Francis, underlies the category of person?
2. How does W.N. Francis characterize the system of English tenses?
3. What is the basis of the category of phase?
4. What are the principles of differentiation among the simple, the durative, and the inchoative aspects?
5. What criteria of classifying modes does W.N. Francis suggest?
6. What voice forms of the verb does W.N. Francis single out?
7. What does W.N. Francis mean by "status"?
8. How does he characterize the four statuses?
9. How does W.N. Francis try to prove the relevance of his sevenfold classification of verbs? What is its peculiar feature?

6.

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University Grammar of English

The Verb Phrase

3.1 Types of Verb

There are various ways in which it will be necessary to classify verbs in this chapter. We begin with a classification relating to the function of item in the verb phrase. This distinguishes lexical verbs from the closed system of auxiliary verbs, and subdivides the latter into primary and modal auxiliaries.

LEXICAL	walk, write, play, beautify, etc.
AUXILIARY	r Primary do, have, be
	\ Modal can, may, shall, will, could, might, should, would, must, ought to, used to, need, dare

The verb forms operate in finite and non-finite verb phrases. Finite verb phrases have tense distinction.

- (1) Finite verb phrases have mood. In contrast to the "unmarked" INDICATIVE mood, we distinguish the "marked" moods IMPERATIVE and SUBJUNCTIVE.
- (2) The non-finite forms of the verb are the infinitive ((to) call), the -ing participle (calling), and the -ed participle (called). Non-finite verb phrases consist of one or more such items. Compare:

FINITE VERB PHRASES NON-FINITE VERB PHRASES

<i>He smokes heavily</i>	<i>To smoke like that must be dangerous</i>
<i>He is working</i>	<i>I found him working</i>
<i>He had been offended before</i>	<i>Having been offended before, he was sensitive</i>

3.25 Contrasts Expressed in the Verb Phrase

In addition to the contrasts of tense, aspect, and mood it may be convenient to list here the other major constructions which affect the verb phrase or in which verb-phrase contrasts play an important part.

- (a) Voice, involving the active-passive relation, as in
A doctor will examine the applicants.
The applicants will be examined by a doctor.
- (b) Questions requiring subject movement involve the use of an auxiliary as operator:
John will sing ~ Will John sing?
John sang ~ Did John sing?
- (c) Negation makes analogous use of operators, as in
John will sing ~ John won't sing
John sang ~ John didn't sing
- (d) Emphasis, which is frequently carried by the operator as in
John WILL sing! John DID sing!
- (e) Imperatives, as in "Go home, John", "You go home, John", "Don't (you) go yet", "Let's go home".

3.26 Tense, Aspect, Mood

Time is a universal, non-linguistic concept with three divisions: past, present, and future; by tense we understand the correspondence

between the form of the verb and our concept of time. Aspect concerns the manner in which the verbal action is experienced or regarded (for example as completed or in progress), while mood relates the verbal action to such conditions as certainty, obligation, necessity, possibility. In fact, however, to a great extent these three categories impinge on each other: in particular, the expression of time present and past cannot be considered separately from aspect, and the expression of the future is closely bound up with mood.

3.27 We here consider the present and past tenses in relation to the progressive and perfective aspects. The range can be seen in the sentence frame "I----- with a special pen", filling the blank with a phrase having the verb base "write":

SIMPLE	COMPLEX	
Present <i>write</i>	progressive <i>am writing</i>	present past <i>was writing</i>
Past <i>wrote</i>	perfective <i>have written</i> <i>had written</i>	(present) perfect past (or plu-) perfect
	perfect progressive <i>have been writing</i> <i>had been writing</i>	(present) perfect past (or plu-) perfect

3.28 Present

We need to distinguish three basic types of present:

- (a) Timeless, expressed with the simple present form:
I (always) write with a special pen (when I sign my name).

As well as expressive habitual action as here, the timeless present is used for universal statements such as: *The sun sets in the west. Spiders have eight legs.*

- (b) Limited, expressed with the present progressive:

I am writing (on this occasion) with a special pen (since I have mislaid my ordinary one).

Normally he lives in London but at present he is living in Boston.

In indicating that the action is viewed as in progress and of limited duration, the progressive can express incompleteness even with a verb like "stop" whose action cannot in reality have duration; thus "the bus is stopping" means that it is slowing down but has not yet stopped. The progressive (usually with an adverb of high frequency) can also be used of habitual action, conveying an emotional colouring as irritation:


He's always writing with a special pen -just because he likes to be different.

- (c) Instantaneous, expressed with either the simple (especially in a series) or the progressive form:

Watch carefully now: first, I write with my ordinary pen; now I write with a special pen.

As you see, I am dropping the stone into the water.

3.29 Past



An action in the past may be seen

- (1) as having taken place at a particular point of time; or
- (2) over a period; if the latter, the period may be seen as
 - (a) extending up to the present, or
 - (b) relating only to the past; if the latter, it may be viewed as
 - (i) having been completed, or as
 - (ii) not having been completed.

(1)(2)

- a) Typical examples will be seen to involve the perfective and
- (2bi)

progressive aspects as well as the simple past:

- (1) / wrote my letter of 16 July 1972 with a special pen.
 (2a) / have written with a special pen since 1972.
 (2bi) / wrote with a special pen from 1969 to 1972.
 (2bii) / was writing poetry with a special pen.

3.36 The Future

There is no obvious future tense in English corresponding to the time/tense relation for present and past. Instead there are several possibilities for denoting future time. Futurity, modality, and aspect are closely related, and future time is rendered by means of modal auxiliaries or semi-auxiliaries, or by simple present forms or progressive forms.

3.37 Will and Shall

will or 'll + infinitive in all persons

shall + infinitive (in 1st person only; chiefly BrE)

/ will/shall arrive tomorrow.

He'll be here in half an hour.

The future and modal functions of these auxiliaries can hardly be separated but "shall" and, particularly, "will" are the closest approximation to a colourless, neutral future. "Will" for future can be used in all persons throughout the English-speaking world, whereas "shall" (for 1st person) is largely restricted in this usage to southern BrE.

3.45 Mood

Mood is expressed in English to a very minor extent by the subjunctive as in

So be it then! to a much greater extent by

past form as in

If you taught me, I would learn quickly. but above

all, by means of the modal auxiliaries, as in

// is strange that he should have left so early.

3.46 The Subjunctive

Three categories of subjunctive may be distinguished:

- (a) The MANDATIVE Subjunctive in that-clauses has only one form, the base (V); this means there is lack of the regular indicative concord between subject and finite verb in the 3rd person singular present, and the present and past tenses are indistinguishable. This subjunctive can be used with any verb in subordinate that-clause when the main clause contains an expression of recommendation, resolution, demand, and so on (*We demand, require, move, insist, suggest, ask, etc., that...*). The use of this subjunctive occurs chiefly in formal style (and especially in AmE) where in less formal contexts one would rather make use of other devices, such as to-infinitive or should + infinitive. *It is necessary that every member inform himself of these rules. It is necessary that every member should inform himself of these*

rules. It is necessary for every member to inform himself of these rules.

- (b) The FORMULAIC Subjunctive also consists of the base (V) but is only used in clauses in certain set expressions which have to be learned as wholes:

Come what may, we will go ahead.

God save the Queen!

Suffice it to say that...

Be that as it may...

Heaven forbid that...

- (c) The SUBJUNCTIVE "were" is hypothetical in meaning and is used in conditional and concessive clauses and in subordinate clauses after optative verbs like "wish". It occurs as the 1st and 3rd person singular past of the verb "be", matching the indicative "was", which is the more common in less formal style:

If she { were / was } to do something like that ...

He spoke to me as if I { were / was } deaf

I wish I { were / was } dead

Questions:

1. What classification of verbs did the authors work out?
2. What principles do they suggest to differentiate between finite and non-finite verbs?
3. What criteria of classifying verb phrases do they suggest?
4. How do they define the categorial meanings of tense, aspect, and mood?
5. Why do they treat tense, aspect, and mood as interconnected categories?
6. What does the analysis of the present and past tenses in relation to the progressive and perfective aspects show?
7. How do they substantiate the absence of the future tense in English?
8. What three categories of subjunctive do they distinguish?

7.

Qraustein G., Hoffmann A., Schentke M.

English Grammar. A University Handbook**The Category of Mood**

The verbal category of mood serves to express the speaker's attitude towards the factuality ("Faktizität") of a state-of-affairs described in a sentence. By means of this category the speaker can present the state-of-affairs as real, existing in fact, or as hypothetical, i.e. not necessarily real. In contemporary English the category of mood is decaying, the forms of the hypothetical mood (subjunctive) falling more and more into disuse and in many cases being replaced by modals.

Structure and Functions

The category of mood consists of three constituents, the indicative and the subjunctives I and II. They form a binary opposition, the unmarked member (indicative) being opposed to the marked member, which appears in two variants (subjunctive I and II):

„ (~ _____ f call-0 (no '-s'/tense/correlation/aspect)
call-0 _____ +lcall-ed

The categorial meaning of the category of mood indicates the hypothetical nature of the state-of-affairs described as seen from the speaker's point of view. The functions of the marked forms are identical with the categorial meaning of the category of mood:

Long live the workers' revolution.

It is time Kurt went on a diet.

The function of the unmarked form negates this categorial meaning in that it indicates the "reality of the state-of-affairs":

A small section of the working class has now more access to culture than it had in the 1930's.

These formal and functional relations form the mood paradigm:

	invariant	variant
indicative	call, etc.	-Ø
subjunctive I	call, etc.	-Ø (no '-s'/tense/correlation/aspect)
subjunctive II	call, etc.	-ed

It is only the indicative that has full tense, correlation and aspect marking. [...] The subjunctive I form of the verb is homonymous with the SimPres (0) form: "I suggest that he *come/write/go*". "Be" has the subjunctive I form "be". Subjunctive I, which is more common in AmE than in BrE where it is used only in formal style, occurs in an optative or a possibility function:

The boss insisted that Willard arrive at eight sharp. She suggested that I be the cook. (AmE) [...] If any person be found guilty, he shall have the right of appeal. The subjunctive II form of the verb is homonymous with its Sim-• Past form and may be used with reference to the present and future: »• "if I called/wrote/went". "Be" has "were" in all persons, in colloquial , speech also "was". Reference to the past (or anterior

present) is made I, by adding "have -ed-participle": "if I *had called/written/gone*". Sub-I junctive II may combine with aspect markers: "if I were going to call/ were calling". It represents a state-of-affairs as imaginary. [...] / *wish I had thought of him before.*

He took it from me as if I were handing him the Cullinam diamond.

(pp. 174-175)

Questions:

1. What is the categorial meaning of mood?
2. What types of mood forms do the authors recognize?
3. What functions are performed by Subjunctive I and Subjunctive II according to the authors?

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Seminar 8

ADJECTIVE AND ADVERB

1. A general outline of the adjective.
2. Classification of adjectives.
3. The problem of the stative.
4. The category of adjectival comparison.
5. A general outline of the adverb.
6. Structural types of adverbs. Modern interpretations of the "to bring up" type of adverbs.
7. The lexemic subcategorizations of the adverbs ending in "-ly".

1. Adjective as a Part of Speech

The adjective expresses the categorial semantics of property of a substance. It means that each adjective used in the text presupposes relation to some noun the property of whose referent it denotes, such as its material, colour, dimensions, position, state, and other characteristics both permanent and temporary. It follows from this that, unlike nouns, adjectives do not possess a full nominative value.

Adjectives are distinguished by a specific combinability with nouns, which they modify, if not accompanied by adjuncts, usually in pre-position, and occasionally in post-position; by a combinability with link-verbs, both functional and notional; by a combinability with modifying adverbs.

In the sentence the adjective performs the functions of an attribute and a predicative. Of the two, the more specific function of the adject-

tive is that of an attribute, since the function of a predicative can be performed by the noun as well.

To the derivational features of adjectives belong a number of suffixes and prefixes, of which the most important are: *-ful (hopeful)*, *-less (flawless)*, *-ish (bluish)*, *-ous (famous)*, *-ive (decorative)*, *-ic (basic)*; *un-* (*unprecedented*), *in-* (*inaccurate*), *pre-* (*premature*). Among the adjectival affixes should also be named the prefix *a-*, constitutive for the stative subclass.

The English adjective is distinguished by the hybrid category of comparison. The ability of an adjective to form degrees of comparison is usually taken as a formal sign of its qualitative character, in opposition to a relative adjective which is understood as incapable of forming degrees of comparison by definition. However, in actual speech the described principle of distinction is not at all strictly observed.

On the one hand, adjectives can denote such qualities of substances which are incompatible with the idea of degrees of comparison. Here refer adjectives like *extinct*, *immobile*, *deaf*, *final*, *fixed*, etc.

On the other hand, many adjectives considered under the heading of relative still can form degrees of comparison, thereby, as it were, transforming the denoted relative property of a substance into such as can be graded quantitatively, e.g.: *of a military design - of a less military design - of a more military design*.

In order to overcome the demonstrated lack of rigour in the differentiation of qualitative and relative adjectives, we may introduce an additional linguistic distinction which is more adaptable to the chances of usage. The suggested distinction is based on the evaluative function of adjectives. According as they actually give some qualitative evaluation to the substance referent or only point out its corresponding native property, all the adjective functions may be grammatically divided into "evaluative" and "specificative". In particular, one and the same adjective, irrespective of its being basically "relative" or "qualitative", can be used either in the evaluative function or in the specificative function.

The introduced distinction between the evaluative and specificative uses of adjectives, in the long run, emphasizes the fact that the morphological category of comparison (comparison degrees) is potentially represented in the whole class of adjectives and is constitutive for it.

2. Category of Adjectival Comparison

The category of adjectival comparison expresses the quantitative characteristic of the quality of a noun referent. The category is constituted by the opposition of the three forms known under the heading of degrees of comparison; the basic form (positive degree), having no features of comparison; the comparative degree form, having the feature of restricted superiority (which limits the comparison to two elements only); the superlative degree form, having the feature of unrestricted superiority.

Both formally and semantically, the oppositional basis of the category of comparison displays a binary nature. In terms of the three degrees of comparison, at the upper level of presentation the superiority degrees as the marked member of the opposition are contrasted against the positive degree as its unmarked member. The superiority degrees, in their turn, form the opposition of the lower level of presentation, where the comparative degree features the functionally weak member, and the superlative degree, respectively, the strong member. The whole of the double oppositional unity, considered from the semantic angle, constitutes a gradual ternary opposition.

The analytical forms of comparison, as different from the synthetic forms, are used to express emphasis, thus complementing the synthetic forms in the sphere of this important stylistic connotation. Analytical degrees of comparison are devoid of the feature of "semantic idiomatism" characteristic of some other categorial analytical forms, such as, e.g., the forms of the verbal perfect. For this reason the analytical degrees of comparison invite some linguists to call in question their claim to a categorial status in English grammar.

3. Elative Most-Construction

The *mosJ*-combination with the indefinite article deserves special consideration. This combination is a common means of expressing elative evaluations of substance properties.

The definite article with the elative *raosr*-construction is also possible, if leaving the elative function less distinctly recognizable. Cf: *They gave a most spectacular show - I found myself in the most awkward situation*. The expressive nature of the elative superlative as such

provides it with a permanent grammatico-stylistic status in the language. The expressive peculiarity of the form consists in the immediate combination of the two features which outwardly contradict each other: the categorial form of the superlative, on the one hand, and the absence of a comparison, on the other.

4. Less/Least-Construction

After examining the combinations of *less/least* with the basic form of the adjective we must say that they are similar to the *more/most*-combinations, and constitute specific forms of comparison, which may be called forms of "reverse comparison". The two types of forms cannot be syntagmatically combined in one and the same form of the word, which shows the unity of the category of comparison. Thus, the whole category includes not three, but five different forms, making up the two series - respectively, direct and reverse. Of these, the reverse series of comparison (the reverse superiority degrees, or "inferiority degrees", for that matter) is of far lesser importance than the direct one, which evidently can be explained by semantic reasons.

5. Adverb as a Part of Speech

The adverb is usually defined as a word expressing either property of an action, or property of another property, or circumstances in which an action occurs. This definition, though certainly informative and instructive, fails to directly point out the relation between the adverb and the adjective as the primary qualifying part of speech.

To overcome this drawback, we should define the adverb as a notional word expressing a non-substantive property, that is, a property of a non-substantive referent. This formula immediately shows the actual correlation between the adverb and the adjective, since the adjective is a word expressing a substantive property.

In accord with their categorial semantics adverbs are characterized by a combinability with verbs, adjectives and words of adverbial nature. The functions of adverbs in these combinations consist in expressing different adverbial modifiers. Adverbs can also refer to whole situations; in this function they are considered under the heading of "situation-determinants".

In accord with their word-building structure adverbs may be simple and derived.

The typical adverbial affixes in affixal derivation are, first and foremost, the basic and only productive adverbial suffix *-ly* (*slowly*), and then a couple of others of limited distribution, such as *-ways* (*sideways*), *-wise* (*clockwise*), *-ward(s)* (*homewards*). The characteristic adverbial prefix is *a-* (*away*). Among the adverbs there are also peculiar composite formations and phrasal formations of prepositional, conjunctive and other types: *sometimes*, *at least*, *to and fro*, etc.

Adverbs are commonly divided into qualitative, quantitative and circumstantial. Qualitative adverbs express immediate, inherently non-graded qualities of actions and other qualities. The typical adverbs of this kind are qualitative adverbs in *-ly*. E.g.: *bitterly*, *plainly*. The adverbs interpreted as "quantitative" include words of degree. These are specific lexical units of semi-functional nature expressing quality measure, or gradational evaluation of qualities, e.g.: of high degree: *very*, *quite*; of excessive degree: *too*, *awfully*; of unexpected degree: *surprisingly*; of moderate degree: *relatively*; of low degree: *a little*; of approximate degree: *almost*; of optimal degree: *adequately*; of inadequate degree: *unbearably*; of under-degree: *hardly*. Circumstantial adverbs are divided into functional and notional.

The functional circumstantial adverbs are words of pronominal nature. Besides quantitative (numerical) adverbs they include adverbs of time, place, manner, cause, consequence. Many of these words are used as syntactic connectives and question-forming functionals. Here belong such words as *now*, *here*, *when*, *where*, *so*, *thus*, *how*, *why*, etc. As for circumstantial notional adverbs, they include adverbs of time (*today*, *never*, *shortly*) and adverbs of place (*homeward(s)*, *near*, *ashore*). The two varieties express a general idea of temporal and spatial orientation and essentially perform deictic (indicative) functions in the broader sense. On this ground they may be united under the general heading of "orientative" adverbs.

Thus, the whole class of adverbs will be divided, first, into nominal and pronominal, and the nominal adverbs will be subdivided into qualitative and orientative, the former including genuine qualitative adverbs and degree adverbs, the latter falling into temporal and local adverbs, with further possible subdivisions of more detailed specifications.

As is the case with adjectives, this lexemic subcategorization of adverbs should be accompanied by a more functional and flexible division into evaluative and specificative, connected with the categorial expression of comparison. Each adverb subject to evaluational grading by degree words expresses the category of comparison, much in the same way as adjectives do. Thus, not only qualitative, but also orientative adverbs, proving they come under the heading of evaluative, are included into the categorial system of comparison, e.g.: *ashore - more ashore - most ashore - less ashore - least ashore*.

Questions:

- * 1. What categorial meaning does the adjective express?
- 2. What does the adjectival specific combinability find its expression in?
- 3. What proves the lack of rigid demarcation line between the traditionally identified qualitative and relative subclasses of adjectives?
- 4. What is the principle of differentiation between evaluative and specificative adjectives?
- * 5. What does the category of adjectival comparison express?
- 6. What arguments enable linguists to treat the category of adjectival comparison as a five-member category?
- 7. What does the expressive peculiarity of the relative superlative consist in?
- 8. What is the categorial meaning of the adverb?
- ¹ 9. What combinability are adverbs characterized by?
- 10. What is typical of the adverbial word-building structure?
- 11. What semantically relevant sets of adverbs can be singled out?
- 12. How is the whole class of adverbs structured?
- ' 13. What does the similarity between the adjectival degrees of comparison and adverbial degrees of comparison find its expression in?

I. State the classification features of the adjectives and adverbs used in the given sentences.

MODEL: *"I found myself weary and yet wakeful, tossing restlessly from side to side..."*

"weary" - a qualitative evaluative adjective;
 "wakeful" - a qualitative speculative adjective;
 "restlessly" - an evaluative qualitative adverb.

1. Rosemary Fell was not exactly beautiful. Pretty? Well, if you took her to pieces... But why be so cruel as to take anyone to pieces? She was

young, brilliant, extremely modern, exquisitely dressed, amazingly well-read in the newest of the new books, and her parties were the most delicious mixture of the really important people and... artists - quaint creatures, discoveries of hers, some of them too terrifying for words, but others quite presentable and amusing (Mansfield).

2. He was in a great quiet room with ebony walls and a dull illumination that was too faint, too subtle, to be called a light (Fitzgerald).
3. "There!" cried Rosemary again, as they reached her beautiful big bedroom with the curtains drawn, the fire leaping on the wonderful lacquer furniture, her gold cushions and the primroses and blue rags (Mansfield).
4. Medley had already risen hurriedly to his feet. The look in his eyes said he was going straight to his telephone to tell Doctor Llewellyn apologetically that he, Llewellyn, was a superb doctor and he, Medley, could hear him perfectly. Oxborrow was on his heels. In two minutes the room was clear of all but Con, Andrew, and the remainder of the beer (Cronin).
5. She was helpful, pervasive, honest, hungry, and loyal (Cheever).
6. Dr. Trench. I will be plain with you. I know that Blanche has a quick temper. It is part of her strong character and her physical courage, which is greater than that of most men, I can assure you. You must be prepared for that. If this quarrel is only Blanche's temper, you may take my word for it that it will be over before to-morrow (Shaw).
7. The elder man was about forty with a proud vacuous face, intelligent eyes, and a robust figure (Fitzgerald).
8. He was tall and homely^ wore horn-rimmed glasses, and spoke in a deep voice (Cheever).

II. Comment on the use of the forms of superlative degree of the adjective and on the use of the words "more" and "most" in the following sentences.

MODEL: *"It was a most unpleasant telephone call."* This is a case of the relative "most/-construction". The morphological form "a most unpleasant" is not a superlative degree of the adjective but an relative form expressing a high degree of the quality in question.

a)

1. She who had been most upset and terrified at the morning's discovery now seemed to regard the whole thing as a personal insult (James).
2. The Fifth Symphony by Beethoven is a most beautiful piece of music.
3. I have been with good people, far better than you (Ch. Bronte).
4. Sure, it's difficult to do about in the wrongest way possible (Wilson).
5. The more we go into the thing, the more complex the matter becomes (Wilson).

b)

1. When Sister Cecilia entered, he rose and gave her his most distinguished bow (Cronin).
2. And he thought how much more advanced and broad-minded the younger generation was (Bennett).
3. She was the least experienced of all (Bennett).
4. She is best when she is not trying to show off (Bennett).
5. He was none the wiser for that answer, but he did not try to analyse it (Aldridge).

c)

1. You're the most complete man I've ever known (Hemingway).
2. Now in Hades - as you know if you ever had been there the names of the more fashionable preparatory schools and colleges mean very little (Fitzgerald).
3. As they came closer, John saw that it was the tail-light of an immense automobile, larger and more magnificent than any he had ever seen (Fitzgerald).
4. It was a most unhappy day for me when I discovered how ignorant I am (Saroyan).
5. "Have you got a dollar?" asked Tripp, with his most fawning look and his dog-like eyes that blinked in the narrow space between his high-growing matted beard and his low-growing matted hair (O. Henry).

d)

1. She had, however, great hopes of Mrs. Copleigh, and felt that once thoroughly rested herself, she would be able to lead the conversation to the most fruitful subjects possible (Christie).
2. "Still on your quest? A sad task and so unlikely to meet with success. I really think it was a *most* unreasonable request to make." (Christie)
3. "I know. I know. I'm often the same. I say things and I don't really know what I mean by them. Most vexing." (Christie)
4. "Then it is he whom you suspect?" "I dare not go so far as that. But of the three he is perhaps the least unlikely." (Doyle)
5. In the first place, your Grace, I am bound to tell you that you have placed yourself in a most serious position in the eyes of the law (Doyle).

III. Give the forms of degrees of comparison and state whether they are formed in a synthetic, analytical or suppletive way,

- a) wet, merry, real, far;
- b) kind-hearted, shy, little, friendly;

- c) certain, comical, severe, well-off;
- d) sophisticated, clumsy, old-fashioned, good-looking.

IV. Translate the given phrases into English using Adjective + Noun, Noun + Noun combinations where possible, or else prepositions or genitive case (give double variants where possible):

- a) каменная стена, выражение сочувствия (кому-то), Пражская конференция, проблемы воспитания и образования, падение метеорита, музыка Вагнера, музей Рублева, договор о мире, текст договора, обсуждение договора, чайная чашка, чашка чая, чайная администрация президента, выступление президента, выражение печали, болеутоляющее, снотворное, кулинарная книга, птичий рынок, журнал для подростков, план модернизации завода;
- b) солнечный луч, солнечная энергия, солнечная батарея, солнечная система, солнечная улыбка, солнечный год, солнечный зайчик, закат солнца, шляпа от солнца, солнечная сторона, солнечная комната; лунный месяц, лунное затмение, восход луны, лунный свет, лунная поверхность, лунный камень;
- c) железный человек, железная воля, железный занавес, железный век, железорудная шахта, торговец склянками товарами, железная руда, железный блеск, железный купорос, железный лом, железная дорога, железная дисциплина;
- d) картина, изображающая небо, небоскреб, небесный свод, небесные светила, божественный поэт, небесная красота, небожитель, Отец Наш Небесный;
- e) морской берег, морской флот, морское путешествие, морской офицер, морской министр, морская война, морской бой, морское училище, морская карта, морская держава, морская пехота, морская миля, морская торговля, морской разбойник, морская свинка, морской котик, капитан дальнего плавания, морской скат, морская профессия, цвет морской волны.

V. Give the Russian equivalents for the English word combinations:

- a) iron rations, iron foundry (ironworks), iron industry, ironware (ironmongery), ferrous metal, ferrous oxide;
- b) celestial map, sky-force, celestial food, sky-line, skyway, celestial navigation;
- c) sea-boy, sea-water, naval base, "sea dog", Admiralty, Admiralty mile, sea-cock, dog-fish, echinus;
- d) sea-hedgehog, starfish, sea-horse, sea-dye, grass-wrack, sea kale, "old salt", sea-cliff, sea-cow, sea-lane.

VI. Account for the peculiarity of the underlined word-forms:

1. I am the more bad because I realize where my badness lies.
2. Wimbledon will be yet more hot tomorrow.
3. The economies are such more vulnerable, such more weak.
4. Certainly, Ann was doing nothing to prevent Pride's finally coming out of the everything into the here.
5. He turned out to be even more odd than I had expected.
6. That's the way among that class. They up and give the old woman a friendly clap, just as you or me would swear at the missus.
7. "You see, by this time we was on the peacefulest of terms." (O.Henry)
8. "Well, you never could be fly," says Myra with her special laugh, which was the provokingest sound I ever heard except the rattle of an empty canteen against my saddle-horn (O.Henry).

Selected Reader

1.

Quirk R., Greenbaum S., Leech Q., Svartvik J.

A University Grammar of English**Adjectives****5.1. Characteristics of the Adjective**

We cannot tell whether a word is an adjective by looking at it in isolation: the form does not necessarily indicate its syntactic function. Some suffixes are indeed found only with adjectives, e.g.: -ous, but many common adjectives have no identifying shape, e.g.: good, hot, little, young, fat. Nor can we identify a word as an adjective merely considering what inflections or affixes it will allow. [...]

5.2.

Most adjectives can be both attributive and predicative, but some are either attributive only or predicative only.

Two other features usually apply to adjectives:

- (1) Most can be premodified by the intensifier "very", e.g.: *The children are very happy.*
- (2) Most can take comparative and superlative forms. The comparison may be by means of inflections, e.g.: "The children are happier now", "They are the happiest people I know" or by the addition of the premodifiers "more" and "most" (periphrastic comparison), e.g.: "These students are more intelligent", "They are the most beautiful paintings I have ever seen." [...]

5.4.

Adjectives can sometimes be postpositive, i.e. they can sometimes follow the item they modify. A postposed adjective (together with any complementation it may have) can usually be regarded as a reduced relative clause.

Indefinite pronouns ending in *-body, -one, -thing, -where* can be modified only postpositively: *I want to try on something larger (7.e, "which is large")*.

Postposition is obligatory for a few adjectives, which have a different sense when they occur attributively or predicatively. The most common are probably "elect" ("soon to take office") and "proper" ("as strictly defined"), as in: "the president *elect*" "the City of *Бод. don proper*". In several compounds (mostly legal or quasi-legal) the adjective is postposed, the most common being: *attorney general, body politic, court martial, heir apparent, notary public (AmE), postmaster general*.

Postposition (in preference to attributive position) is usual for a few a-adjectives and for "absent", "present", "concerned", "involved", which normally do not occur attributively in the relevant sense:

The house ablaze is next door to mine.

The people involved were not found.

Some postposed adjectives, especially those ending in "-able" or "-ible", retain the basic meaning they have in attributive position but convey the implication that what they are denoting has only a temporary application. Thus, *the star visible* refers to stars that are visible at a time specified or implied, while *the visible stars* refers to a category of stars that can (at appropriate times) be seen.

If an adjective is alone or premodified merely by an intensifier, postposition is normally not allowed. [...]

[...] Common a-adjectives are: *ablaze, afloat, afraid, aghast, alert, alike, alive, alone, aloof, ashamed, asleep, averse, awake, aware*.

Note (a) "Alert" and "aloof" are freely used attributively. Some of the other a-adjectives occasionally function attributively, though normally only when they are modified: *the half-asleep children, a somewhat afraid soldier, a really alive student ("lively"), a very ashamed girl*. (b) Some a-adjectives freely take comparison and premodification by "very", e.g.: *afraid, alert, alike, aloof, ashamed, averse*. Others do so marginally, e.g.: *asleep and awake*. "Alive to" in the sense "aware of" can be premodified by "very" and compared. Some of the a-adjectives, like many verbs, can also be premodified by "very much" (particularly *afraid, alike, ashamed, aware*), and "aware" can be premodified by "(very) well" too.

Adverbs

5.21. Characteristics of the Adverb

The most common characteristic of the adverb is morphological: the majority of adverbs have the derivational suffix -ly.

There are two types of syntactic function that characterize adverbs, but an adverb need have only one of these:

- (1) adverbial
- (2) modifier of adjective and adverb.

5.22. Adverb as Adverbial

An adverb may function as adverbial, a constituent distinct from subject, verb, object, and complement.

Three classes of adverbials are established [...] adjuncts, disjuncts, conjuncts.

Adjuncts are integrated within the structure of the clause to at least some extent. E.g.: *They are waiting outside. I can now understand it.*

Disjuncts and conjuncts, on the other hand, are not integrated within the clause. Semantically, disjuncts express an evaluation of what is being said either with respect to the form of the communication or to its content. E.g.: *Frankly, I am tired.*

Semantically, conjuncts have a connective function. They indicate the connection between what is being said and what was said before. E.g.: *We have complained several times about the noise, and yet he does nothing about it. If they open all the windows, then I'm leaving.*

5.23. Modifier of Adjective

An adverb may premodify an adjective: *That was a very funny film.*

5.24. Modifier of Adverb

An adverb may premodify another adverb, and function as intensifier: *They are smoking very heavily.*

As with adjectives, the only postmodifier is enough, as in "cleverly enough".

5.25. Modifier of Prepositional Phrase

The few adverbs that premodify particles in phrasal verbs also premodify prepositions or (perhaps rather) prepositional phrases: *The nail went right through the wall.*

5.31. Comparison and Intensification

There are three degrees of comparison:

Absolute:	young/easily
Comparative:	younger/more easily
Superlative:	youngest/most easily

The comparative is used for a comparison between two, and the superlative where more than two are involved. The superlative is sometimes used for a comparison between two, "He is the youngest (of the two brothers)", but this is considered loose and informal by many.

Comparison is expressed by

- (1) the inflected forms in -er and -est,
- (2) their periphrastic equivalents in "more" and "most",
- (3) the forms for equational, lesser and least degrees of comparison, notably as "less", "least". [...]

5.32. Basis of Comparison

We can make the basis of comparison explicit. The most common ways of doing so include correlative constructions introduced by "than" (correlative of "more", "less") and by "as" (correlative to "as"), and prepositional phrases with "of":

John is more/less stupid than Bob (is).

John behaves more/less politely than Bob (does).

John is as stupid as Bob (is).

John behaves as politely as Bob (does).

John is the stupider of the (two) boys.

Of the (two) boys, John behaves the more politely.

John is the most stupid of the (three) boys.

Of the (three) boys, John behaves the most politely.

(pp. 108-123)

Questions:

1. What makes it difficult to generalize on the part of speech features of the adjective?
2. What additional meanings do postposed adjective convey?
3. What morphological and syntactic features of the adverb do the authors single out?
4. How do they characterize the three classes of adverbials: adjuncts, disjuncts, and conjuncts?
5. What degrees of comparison of adjectives and adverbs do they single out?
6. What is peculiar to prepositional adverbs?

2.

Francis W.N. The Structure of American English

Adjectives

The primary defining or identifying quality of adjectives is their exclusive ability to fit into both the environments left blank in a structure such as:

the ... man seems very ...

To avoid lexical incompatibility, the noun and noun-determiner in this pattern may be varied without affecting the structure. Likewise, the verb may be replaced by "is", "becomes", "looks", and certain similar verbs from a limited list. Thus, the framework identifies as adjectives all of the various underlined words in the following sentences: *this strong man is very strong his uncomfortable position is very uncomfortable the relaxed spectator looks very relaxed the self-centered girl seems very self-centered any interesting story sounds very interesting* These two positions may be described as (1) between noun-determiner and noun, and (2) immediately following the function word "very" (or some other *qualifier* from a list to be given shortly), which in turn follows a verb of the *linking* or *copulative* type, which we shall define when we come to consider structures of complementation. In order to qualify as an adjective, a word must be able to fit both these positions. If we adopt this frame as the defining criterion of adjectives, we must accept the consequences. Two of these may bother the reader accustomed to classifications of the traditional grammar. The first is that some words customary considered adjectives do not fit the pattern; thus *chief* and *main* can fill the first position but not the second, while *alive* and *alone* can fill the second position but not the first. Thus, we can say:

the chief man is very alive

(though many would prefer "very much alive"), but we cannot say:

**the alive man is very chief*

A bit of study will lead us to the conclusion that these words do not need to be classed as adjectives. Thus, *chief* and *main* are nouns which behave exactly like the noun *head*, or in more colloquial speech, *boss* or *top*. On the other hand, *alive* and *alone* are adverbs, functioning just like *abroad*, *away*, *along*, etc. There are a few adjectives, such as *sole* and *unique*, which do not fit the second position because they are lexically incompatible with the qualifier "very". But if we substitute *quite* for *very*, they fit the second position quite satisfactorily.

The other problem concerns the last three of our examples, which have the suffixes [-t, -d] and [-irj], already identified as inflectional suffixes of verbs. At first glance, it would seem that there is no formal

distinction between these adjectives as the {-edj (past-participle) and {-ingj (present-participle) inflections of verbs. But again closer scrutiny reveals that though true participles may fit the first of our adjective positions, they will not fit the second. They cannot follow the qualifier "very", or, indeed, any other qualifier. Thus we can say "the running horse" but not "the horse is very running". Likewise, we can say "the murdered man" but not "the man is very (rather, quite) murdered". On the other hand, these participles can occupy a position almost never occupied by adjectives alone: the position immediately after a noun. Thus, we can say both "a running horse" and "a horse running"; both "the murdered man" and "the man murdered". But we cannot say "a girl charming" or "the man tired". Clearly, then, there is a sharp distinction on the basis of word order between adjectives and the verb-inflections called participles. Therefore we identify the adjective-forming suffixes [-t, -d, -id] and [-irj], as distinct morphemes, which we can call {-ed₃} and {-ing₃} ([-ing₂] is a derivational suffix of nouns) to distinguish them from homonymous inflectional and derivational suffixes. Later on we shall note some other formal distinctions between adjectives and participles.

When we come to examine the other formal criteria which help to mark adjectives, we find that we must immediately recognize two large subclasses, which between them include all but a very few adjectives. These subclasses may be called *base adjectives* and *derived adjectives*.

BASE ADJECTIVES. This class includes those adjectives which, in addition to fitting both positions in the adjective-identifying frame, also exhibit the following formal qualities:

(1) Base adjectives take the inflectional suffixes {-er} and {-est} to form the comparative and superlative degrees. These suffixes are seldom sufficient by themselves to identify adjectives, since the principal allomorph of {-er}, [-9], is phonemically identical with the noun-forming derivational suffix {-er} (spelled variously *-er*, *-or*, *-ar*, *-our*), and the principal allomorph of {-est} may in some dialects, at least, be phonemically identical with the noun-forming derivational suffix {-ist}. Thus, in isolation we cannot tell whether *blinder*, *sharper*, and *cooler*, for instance, are nouns or adjectives. They may even be ambiguous in short phrases like "the blinder bats", "the sharper cheats", or "the cooler ices". Similarly, [hjumamst] may be either the adjective

"humanest" or the noun "humanist", though it is hard to imagine a context in which they might be confused. The following might serve as a facetious example:

Of the deist, the theist, and the humanist, the humanist is humanest. This is hardly a sentence one is likely to encounter very often. As we might expect, some morphophonemic changes occur when these inflections are added to base adjectives. Most familiar to all speakers of English is the suppletion which occurs in the following paradigmatic sets:

<i>good</i>	<i>better</i>	<i>best</i>
<i>bad</i>	<i>worse</i>	<i>worst</i>

(2) Base adjectives are also distinguished formally by the fact that they serve as stems from which nouns and adverbs are formed by the derivational suffixes {-ness} and {-ly}. (Some, but not all, derived adjectives also use both these suffixes.) This gives us a derivational paradigm of great importance in English, as illustrated by the following examples:

adjective	noun	adverb
strange	strangeness	strangely
black	blackness	blackly
false	falseness	falsely
bad	badness	badly
good	goodness	well

Note that in the last case the force of paradigm leads us to class "well" as a suppletive equivalent of "*goodly".

Some other variations on this paradigm might also be noted here. For instance, some base adjectives use other derivational suffixes besides {-ness} to form nouns. But in virtually all such cases the noun in {-ness} is also used, though sometimes in a specialized meaning or as so-called *nonce-word*. (*Nonce-word* is a term made up by the editors of the Oxford Dictionary to describe words coined/or *the nonce*, that is, to fit an immediate situation. In a way, every newly coined word is at first a nonce-word; it only remains such, however, if it is not taken up and given further use by other speakers. The same form may be a nonce-word many times, if each person to whom it occurs to coin the word is unaware of previous nonce-uses by other people.)

The result is a situation that can be represented as in the table below. An interesting by-product of this table is the obvious complementary distribution of the noun-forming derivational suffixes {-th} and {-ity}. Historical linguistics supplies a simple explanation of this: the adjectives which form nouns in {-th} are of native (Anglo-Saxon) stock, while those that form nouns in {-ity} are ultimately from Latin, borrowed into English either directly or by way of French.

There are a few base adjectives besides "good" which do not form adverbs in {*ly*}: *small, little, long, fast, ill, hard* (*hardly* is best considered as a function word). A few more have related adverbs both in {-ly,} and without any suffix at all, hence identical with the adjective (the so-called "flat" adverbs): *slow, quick, soft, clean*.

Base Adjectives	Noun in -ness	Adverb in -ly	Noun in -th	Noun in -ity	Other Nouns
dead	deadness	deadly	death		
true	trueness	truly	truth		
young	youngness	youngly	youth		
deep	deepness	deeply	depth		deep
sane	saneness	.sanely		sanity	
sober	soberness	soberly		sobriety	
rare	rareness	rarely		rarity	
safe	safeness	safely		safety	safe
human	humanness	humanly	humanity	human	
clear	clearness	clearly		clarity	clearing, clear
hot	hotness	hotly			heat
cold	coldness	coldly			cold
green	greenness	greenly			green

(3) Most base adjectives are of one syllable, and none have more than two syllables except a few that begin with a derivational prefix like {un-}: *uncommon, inhuman*.

(4) A fair number of base adjectives form verbs by adding the derivational suffix {-enj}, the prefix {en-}, or both: *brighten, cheapen, enlarge, embitter, enlighten, enliven*.

DERIVED ADJECTIVES. The other large class of adjectives, the *derived adjectives*, are those which are formed by the addition of adjective-forming suffixes to free or bound stems. There is a relatively large number of these suffixes, and the resulting array of adjectives is much larger than the class of base adjectives. The relative frequency of the two types varies a great deal from one type of discourse to another. Ordinary speech and simple prose tend to have few adjectives of any sort, with a preponderance of base adjectives; formal, technical, or "highbrow" speech and writing use more adjectives, with the derived type predominating. [...]

Some of the more important suffixes which form derived adjectives are the following:

(a) {-y}, added to one- and two-syllable nouns and bound stems, as in *faulty, leafy, healthy, rickety, holy*.

(b) {-al}, added to nouns and bound stems: /ata/, *natural, national, traditional, local, physical, racial*.

(c) {-able}, added to verbs and bound stems. This very common suffix is a *live* one which can be added to virtually any verb, thus giving rise to many new coinages and nonce-words. Since it is the descendant of an active derivational suffix in Latin, it also appears as part of many words borrowed from Latin or French. Examples formed from verbs: *remarkable, understandable, adaptable, conceivable*, examples formed from bound stems: *viable, portable, capable, terrible, visible*. Many words of both groups have related nouns formed by adding {-ity} to a special allomorph of {-able}: *adaptability, capability, visibility*.

(d) {-ful} and {-less}, added to nouns: *hopeful, hopeless, useful, useless, plentiful, penniless*.

(e) {-ar}, {-ary}, {-ic}, {-ish₂}, and {-ous}, added to nouns and bound stems: *columnar, popular, regular, legendary, literary, climatic, comic, childish, lavish, marvelous, pernicious*.

(f) {-ent} and {-ive}, added to verbs and bound stems: *abhorrent, significant, convenient, active, native, impulsive*.

(g) {-en₂}, added to nouns: *woolen, waxen, oaken*. [...]

(h) {-ed₃}, added to verbs, nouns and some bound stems. This suffix has three allomorphs, [-t, -d, -id], distributed on the whole like the regular allomorphs of the verb-inflectional suffixes {-ed_j and {-ed_j}. There are some exceptions, however, notably a group which has [-id] instead of the expected [-d] after voiced consonants other than [d]: *raged, beloved, rugged, aged, learned*. Other examples of {-ed₃} added to nouns are *garlanded, overcoated, booted, flowered*. Sometimes an adjective modifier of the noun stem is included in the structure, producing elaborate compound derivatives like *old-fashioned, long-tailed, ruddy-countenanced*, and so on. Examples of this suffix added to verbs are *tired, bored, complicated, devoted*. As adjectives these are distinguished from homophonous verb-inflections by the fact that they may follow the various qualifiers but may not come after the nouns they modify.

(i) {-ing₃}, added to verbs: *interesting, exciting, revealing, tiring, pleasing*. These are distinguished from homophonous verb-inflections (present participles) by their ability to follow qualifiers and by the fact that a noun denoting the receiver of the action named by the stem appears before the derived adjective but after the present participle. A few contrasting examples will make clear this difference between verbs and adjectives in [-IQ]:

Verbs	Adjectives
a man eating fish a job	a man-eating tiger
killing chickens a speech	a soul-killing job
rousing the rabble he was	a rabble-rousing speech
boring his friends	he was very boring to them

(j) {-Iy₂}, added to nouns and some bound stems. This is distinguished from the adverb-forming suffix {-ly,} by the fact that its stems are nouns and bound stems, while the stems from which adverbs are formed are adjectives. The following examples illustrate the contrast:

Adjectives	Adverbs
Noun or Base + {-Iy ₂ }	Adjective + {-ly,}
friendly	widely
orderly	crazily
homely	formally
mannerly	remarkably
ugly	exceedingly

Apparent exceptions to this rule are the adjectives *goodly*, *deadly*, and *lively*, and the adverbs *early*, *chiefly*, and *mainly*.

In addition to being marked by derivational suffixes, derived adjectives contrast with base adjectives in the fact that they virtually never have the inflectional suffixes {-er} and {-est} except for some two-syllable ones like *friendly*. (Derived adjectives are sometimes given the inflected forms for humorous effect, as in the "Curiouser and curiouser" of *Alice in Wonderland*.) Their comparative and superlative degrees are formed instead by the use of qualifiers *more* and *most*. They may however, form nouns in {-ness} and virtually all of them form adverbs in {-ly}, including even some of those which themselves end in {-ly}. [...]

ADJECTIVE QUALIFIERS. We have already had occasion to allude more than once to the important group of function words which we have called *qualifiers*. These words, usually classed as adverbs in traditional grammar, appear immediately before an adjective (or in two cases immediately after) and have the function of indicating the degree to which the meaning of the adjective is applicable. The principal qualifiers common to most dialects of English are the following:

very	somewhat	more	indeed
quite	a bit	most	enough
rather	a little	less	
pretty	so	least	
mighty	too		

In addition to these, *real* and *awful* are common qualifiers in all but the most formal spoken English, though they appear less frequently in writing. Various regional and social dialects also use *that*, *some*, *right*, *plenty*, *wonderful*, *powerful*, as well as *darn(ed)*, *damn(ed)*, and other "swear words", shading off into those usually considered unprintable.

Since virtually all these qualifiers can appear with adverbs as well as with adjectives, they cannot serve as adjective-determiners. Some of them exhibit peculiarities of distribution which can only be touched on here, since we have not space for a complete list. Thus, we may mention that *more* and *most* commonly appear only with derived adjectives, since base adjectives use the inflected forms for the comparative and superlative. The qualifier *enough* always follows the adjective with which it appears except when the adjective is a base adjective in the comparative degree; compare the following two sentences:

the music was loud enough

the music was enough louder so that it could be heard •

On the other hand, the qualifier *indeed* may either precede or follow its adjective:

the music was loud indeed

the music was indeed loud

When an adjective is in the comparative degree, whether the inflected comparative with {-er} or the phrasal comparative formed with "more", the list of qualifiers that may be used with it is different from the list given above, though there is some overlapping [...]:

rather *much* *a good deal*

somewhat *lots* *a great deal*

no *a (whole) lot* *a little*

still *a (good) bit* *even*

As in the case of the other qualifiers, dialects supply further forms, such as *a heap*, *heaps*, *a touch*, *a mite*, *(a) way*, *some*, *that*, as well as "swear words" forms like [*ahelavalot*] and many others. [...]

Adverbs

Adverbs make up a rather complicated group of words, varying widely in form and distribution. Their primary identifying characteristic is their ability to fill certain positions in utterances, the chief of which is illustrated in the following sentence:

I (1) *hopefully*

(2) *eagerly*

the man told (us) his story

(3) *a*
loud
and

(4) *actor-wise*

(5) *backwards*

(6) *somehow*

(7) *over*

(8) *here*

This position, which may be described as utterance-final following a noun or nouns in the position of [...] a complement, is the primary structural criterion for adverbs. Any word which fits this position is an adverb (though on other positions the "same word" - or its

homophone - may be another part of speech). Furthermore, any ad-

the man walked his dog	{ (3) away (7) past (8) home (8) back	verb will fit this position, though we may have to change the specific words in the framework to avoid lexical incompatibility, as in the following:
the man drove his car	{ (6) anywhere (8) fast (8) right	

[...] If we go back to our first illustration of the basic adverb position above and look at the assortment of adverbs there, it is immediately apparent that there are various formal markers which identify certain words as adverbs, even when they appear in isolation rather than in certain context. In fact, we have numbered 8 illustrative adverbs to show that they are examples of the 8 subgroups into which the whole class of adverbs may be divided on the basis of their form. Let us now look briefly at each of these.

1. The largest and most clearly marked group of all comprises those adverbs which are formed by the addition of the derivational suffix {-ly,} to derived adjectives, as in our example *hopefully*. Assuming that we know the derivational suffixes that characterize derived adjectives, we can infallibly identify adverbs of this sort. Furthermore, the adverb-forming suffix {-ly,} can be added to any derived adjective except a few in {-ly₂}, so that there are just about as many adverbs in this group as there are in the large class of derived adjectives. It is hardly necessary to cite examples, but we may list one derived from each main type of derived adjective: *healthily, traditionally, remarkably, visibly, hopefully, uselessly, climatically, legendarily, marvelously, popularly, impulsively, conveniently, woodenly, learnedly, exhilaratingly, friendlily*.

2. Almost as unmistakable are the adverbs formed by the addition of the suffix {-ly,} to base adjectives, such as our example *eagerly*. Others are *slowly, strangely, falsely, blackly*, and so on. [...] There are a few which do not run true to form, however, such as *goodly, deadly, and lively*, which are usually adjectives, though they are formed by addition of {-ly} to base adjectives. (*Deadly* and *lively* are also

adverbs, but much less frequent as such; *goodly* is never an adverb in standard English.)

3. Another well-marked group of adverbs consists of those that are formed by adding the derivational prefix {a-} to nouns, verbs, adjectives, and stems, like our example *aloud* [...]. Of about 60 of them in more or less common use, nearly half are formed from nouns: *ahead, away, abroad*, etc. The rest are about equally divided among those formed from verbs (*adrift, astir*), from adjectives (*anew, abroad*), and from bound stems (*akimbo, anon*). The traditional grammar classes most of these as both adjectives and adverbs, and they are so listed in most dictionaries. But since they all fit our basic adverb position and since none of them can fit the basic adjective positions between determiner and noun (we do not say *the aloud voice* or *the drift boat*), it is clear that from our structural point of view they are always adverbs.

4. A group of adverbs originally small but at present exhibiting signs of rapid growth includes those formed by adding the derivational suffix {-wise} to nouns. A few in this group are well-established words like *lengthwise*; others are recent coinages or nonce-uses like *crabwise* and our example *actor-wise*. In the speech of some Americans, {-wise} is a very active "live" suffix, which can be attached to many nouns to create adverbs like *personnel-wise*. The ephemeral nature of such forms is recognized in writing by the use of the hyphen. Whether the popularity of these forms will add a new large class of adverbs to the language or whether it is only a passing linguistic fad, only time can tell. Careful speakers are inclined to view the proliferation of noun + {-wise} adverbs as linguistically disreputable. From our descriptive point of view we need only note that this is the principal way in which adverbs are made directly from nouns without an intervening adjective form. It might further be conjectured that the present popularity of this derivational paradigm is related to the popularity of the noun-adjunct, or noun used as noun-modifier.

5. A smaller group of adverbs is formed by the addition of the derivational suffix {-ward(s)} to a limited group of nouns: *backward(s), forward(s), homeward(s)*. Most adverbs of this group have two forms, one with final {-s} (phonemically [-z]) and one without, variously distributed. The forms without final {-s} are ambiguous, since they

may be either adjectives or adverbs. Usually position prevents ambiguity; thus, in the "backward child" *backward* is clearly an adjective, since it occupies an adjective position, while in "he walked backward" it is equally clear an adverb. When one of these is found in a position that can be occupied by both adverb and adjective, structural ambiguity results, as in:

the child looks backward

This may mean "the child appears to be backward" (*backward* as adjective) or "the child gazes backward" (*backward* as adverb). The forms with final {-s}, however, are always adverbs; there is no ambiguity about "the child looks backwards".

7. Another relatively small group of adverbs includes those that are formally identical with certain function words of the class called *prepositions*. [...] A large number of them have homophonous adverbs: *in, on, out, up, down, over, under, inside, around*, etc. As adverbs, they frequently appear, as we should expect, in the characteristic adverb position at the end of an utterance, with primary stress, as in *he brought the cat in the drowning man went under I left my hat and coat inside*

8. The last group of adverbs is the miscellaneous class of those that have no formal markers at all to distinguish them in isolation; we know them as adverbs because we find them in adverb positions in utterances in which the other parts of speech are clearly identifiable. Many in this group are exceedingly frequent in occurrence and are memorized by all speakers of the language, just as function words are; such are *now, then, here, there, often, seldom, perhaps, still, even, always*. Others in this group are words which may also appear as other parts of speech, such as *yesterday, downstairs, home, later, little, fast, slow, early, far, near*.

ADVERB INFLECTIONS. A few adverbs make comparative and superlative forms by means of the inflectional suffixes {-er} and {-est}, already discussed in connection with adjectives. Most of those that do so are the so-called "flat adverbs", that is, those that are morphemically identical with certain base adjectives like *slow, quick, cheap, hard, fast*. Some irregular and suppletive forms are well-known:

<i>well</i>	}	<i>better</i>	<i>best</i>
<i>bad(ly)</i>		<i>worse</i>	<i>worst</i>
<i>ill</i>			
<i>far</i>	}	<i>farther</i>	<i>farthest</i>
		<i>further</i>	<i>furthest</i>

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ADVERB QUALIFIERS. Like adjectives, most adverbs may appear with function words of the kind we have called qualifiers. The complete rules governing the distribution of the various qualifiers with various types of adverbs are matter for a full grammar, not for a sketch such as this, but we may note a few of the more important ones here.

(a) All adverbs in -ly and a few others, such as *often* and *alive* may appear with any of the list of qualifiers given above, as in *very easily*, *more slowly*, *rather often*, *alive enough*.

(b) Many adverbs in group 7 (the "preposition-type" adverbs) and some in group 3 (formed with {a-}) use /ar or *much* as a qualifier: *far ahead*, *far down*, *much alive*.

(c) Adverbs in the comparative degree, whether formed with the inflectional suffix {-er} or with the qualifier "more", may use the same set of qualifiers that comparative adjectives use, as in *lots often-er*, *still more easily*, *a little slower*.

(d) Some of the adverbs of group 7 and 8 use *right* as a qualifier, as in *come right in*, *he drove right past*, *I want my dinner right now*.

(e) Older English used *well* and *full* as qualifiers. The latter survives in the phrase *know full well*.

ADVERB-SUBSTITUTES. Four adverbs, *then*, *there*, *thus*, and *so* and the adverb-phrases *this way* and *that way* frequently act as adverb-substitutes. That is, they appear in place of an adverb already expressed in the immediate linguistic context. In this respect they operate just as do the noun-substitutes *he*, *she*, *it*, and *they*, and the verb substitute *do*. Thus, in each of the following examples, the second underlined adverb is the structural and lexical equivalent of the first, and could be replaced by it:

I didn't see him yesterday because I wasn't here then.
I am looking forward to going abroad, since I have never been there.
He writes very gracefully; I wish I could write so (or thus, that way).

CLASSIFICATION OF ADVERBS BY SUBSTITUTE-GROUPS. Just as nouns can be grouped according to the substitutes which may replace them, so may adverbs. Specifically we may recognize three groups: a *then-group*, a *there-group*, and a *thus/so-group*. A few examples from each will show that, like the substitute-groups of nouns, these groups of adverbs are based on meaning rather than on form.

<i>then-group</i>	<i>there-group</i>	<i>thus/so-group</i>
Today	outside	easily
Daily	ahead	slowly
Seldom	backward	regularly
Early	somewhere	aloud
Still	past	fast
Sometimes	indoors	(most -ly adverbs)

These classes are rather flexible and subject to change, and some adverbs like *instead*, *perhaps*, *again*, do not fit readily into any of them. But this classification is important because it governs the order in which adverbs appear in certain complex structures of modification.

(pp. 268-288)

Questions:

1. What criteria does W.N. Francis apply to the identification of the adjective and the adverb?
2. What classes of adjectives does he recognize? On what principles are they singled out?
3. How does W.N. Francis treat the a-adjectives?
4. What classes of adverbs does he single out? What principle underlies this classification? What does the classification of adverbs by substitute groups reveal?

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Seminar 9

SYNTAGMATIC CONNECTIONS OF WORDS, SENTENCE: GENERAL

1. **The basic units of syntax: the phrase and the sentence. Differential features of the phrase and of the sentence. The phrase in the hierarchy of language units.**
2. **The notion of collocation and its semantic status.**
3. **The traditional part of speech classification of phrases. Nominative classification of phrases. The problems of interpretation of predicative phrases.**
4. **Agreement and government as two main types of syntactic relations.**
5. **Classification of word combinations in structuralism.**
6. **Adjoinment and enclosure as special means of expressing syntactic relations.**

1. Basic Units of Syntax: Phrase and Sentence

Syntax treats phrases and sentences. Both syntactic units are studied in paradigmatic and syntagmatic syntax.

The phrase is the object of minor syntax. The phrase is usually understood as a combination of two or more words which is a grammatical unit but is not an analytical form of a word.

The sentence belongs to a different language level - the level lying above the phrasemic level. The sentence is the immediate integral unit

of speech built up of words according to a definite syntactic pattern and distinguished by a contextually relevant communicative purpose. Any coherent connection of words having an informative destination is effected within the framework of the sentence. Therefore the sentence is the main object of syntax as part of the grammatical theory.

The nominative meaning of the syntagmatically complete average sentence (an ordinary proposemic nomination) reflects a processual situation or event that includes a certain process (actional or statal) as its dynamic centre, the agent of the process, the objects of the process, and also the various conditions and circumstances of the realization of the process. This content of the proposemic event forms the basis of the traditional syntactic division of the sentence into its nominative parts.

The difference between the phrase and the sentence is fundamental: the phrase is a nominative unit which fulfils the function of polynomination denoting a complex referent (phenomenon of reality) analyzable into its component elements together with various relations between them; the sentence is a unit of predication which, naming a certain situational event, shows the relation of the denoted event towards reality. Taking into consideration the two-aspective character of the sentence as a meaningful unit of language, predication should be interpreted not simply as referring the content of the sentence to reality, but as referring the nominative content of the sentence to reality. It is this interpretation of the semantico-functional nature of predication that discloses, in one and the same generalized presentation, both the unity of the two identified aspects of the sentence, and also their different, though mutually complementary, meaningful roles. Hence, the sentence as a lingual unit performs not one, but two essential signemic (meaningful) functions: first, substance-naming, or nominative function; second, reality-evaluating, or predicative function.

Phonetically, the sentence is distinguished by a relevant intonation (intonation contour).

Intonation separates one sentence from another in the continual flow of uttered segments and, together with various segmental means of expression, participates in rendering essential communicative-predicative meanings (such as, e.g., the syntactic meaning of interrogation in distinction to the meaning of declaration).

Within each sentence as an immediate speech element definite standard syntactico-semantic features are revealed which make up a typical model, a generalized pattern repeated in an indefinite number of actual utterances. This complicated predicative pattern does enter the system of language. It builds up its own level in the hierarchy of lingual segmental units in the capacity of a "linguistic sentence" and as such is studied by grammatical theory.

Between the sentence and the substantive word combination of the full nominative type, direct transformational relations are established: the sentence, interpreted as an element of paradigmatics, is transformed into the substantive phrase, or "nominalized", losing its processual-predicative character.

2. Traditional Classification of Phrases

Linguists discuss different classifications of phrases, all of them having their own advantages. These classifications help reveal those aspects of phrases which are determined by the grammatical features of phrase constituents and by the syntactic functions of the phrase as a unit.

The traditional classification of phrases is based on the part of speech status of the phrase constituents. In accordance with this criterion, the following types of phrases can be identified: "noun + noun", "adjective + noun", "verb + noun", "verb + adverb", "adverb + adjective", "adverb + adverb", etc. Phrases are made up not only by notional words but also by functional words, e.g.: "in accordance with", "due to", "apart from", "as soon as" - such phrases perform in a sentence preposition-like and conjunction-like functions.

3. Agreement and Government as Two Main Types of Syntactic Relations

Syntactic relations of the phrase constituents are divided into two main types: agreement and government.

Agreement takes place when the subordinate word assumes a form similar to that of the word to which it is subordinate. In English agreement is typical only of the category of number in demonstrative pronouns.

Government takes place when the subordinate word is used in a certain form required by its head word, the form of the subordinate

word not coinciding with the form of the head word. The expression of government is the use of the objective case of personal pronouns and of the pronoun "who" when they are used in a verbal phrase or follow a preposition.

4. Nominative Classification of Phrases

Phrases can also be classified according to the nominative value of their constituents. As a result three major types of phrases are identified: notional (consisting of grammatically connected notional words), formative (made up by notional and functional words), and functional (consisting of functional words alone). Notional phrases are subdivided into two groups on the principle of the constituent rank: equipotent phrases (the phrase constituents are of an equal rank) and dominational phrases (the syntactic ranks of the constituents are not equal). They refer to one another as the modifier and the modified). Further subdivision of equipotent notional word groupings into coordinative and cumulative is carried out on the principle of the character of nomination realized by the phrase constituents: coordinative phrases are based on the consecutive connections, cumulative phrases are characterized by the constituent inequality in the character of nomination realized and the presence of coordinative conjunction. In their turn, dominational notional phrases are subdivided into consecutive and cumulative: the classification principle of the character of nomination realized by the phrase constituents remains valid. Dominational consecutive phrases fall into minor groupings according to the specific features of dominational connection.

5. Special Means of Syntactic Connection of Phrase Constituents

Agreement and government are considered to be the main types of expressing syntactic relations by phrase constituents. Yet, there exist some special means of expressing syntactic relations within a phrase, they are adjoinment and enclosure. Adjoinment is usually given a "negative" definition: it is described as absence both of agreement and of government, it is typical of the syntagma "adverb + head word".

If adjoinment is typical of Russian, enclosure is peculiar to Modern English. By enclosure some element is put between the two parts of another constituent of a phrase. One of the most widely used types


of enclosure in English is the enclosure of all kinds of attributes between the article (determiner) and its head-noun.

Questions:

1. What are the differential features of the phrase?
2. What are the differential features of the sentence?
3. What makes the sentence the main object of syntax?
4. What functions does the sentence perform?
5. In what way does the notion of nominative aspect of the sentence specify the notion of predication?
6. What are the strong points of the traditional classification of phrases?
7. What does agreement as a syntactic relation consist in?
8. What differentiates government from agreement?
9. What principles is the nominative classification of phrases based upon?
10. What syntactic relations of the phrase constituents does enclosure imply?
11. What type of syntagma is adjoinment typical of?

Nominative Classification of Phrases

Notional				Formative Functional
equipotent		dominational		
coordinative	cumulative	consecutive	cumulative	
		predicative complete		



I. Define the properties of word-groupings on the lines of different classifications.

MODEL: "a self-reliant student"

It is a notional, dominational, consecutive, completive monolateral, qualifying attributive phrase. It comprises an article, an adjective, and a noun.

- | | |
|------------------------|-----------------------|
| 1. to fully understand | a) |
| 2. is seriously ill | 4. claimed the land |
| 3. for us to expect | 5. young, |
| | nonchalant, charming |
| | 6. a cat licking milk |

7. the "I'm sorry" response
rather doubtful

1. the train moved
2. can come, supposedly
3. cakes and ale
4. a stifling weather
5. projected onto the token

1. the world beyond
2. really amazing
3. laughed a little
4. familiar noise
5. to feel foolish

1. had definitely been
2. a summer wedding
3. came in to ask
4. the butcher and the grocer
5. might correspond
6. eavesdropping, ingenuity, or
anything else

9. think of an idea 10.
happy but not quite

6. in spite of
7. a man, having no scruples
8. pleased, or almost so
9. enthusiastic but not cultured
10. ought to give up

6. sanity and rationality
7. almost insignificant
8. extremely tempting
9. eggs and cheese
10. delivered for a friend

7. time-tables, books, maps, and
what not
8. a flowery hat
9. kicking off the shoes
10. a wedding or a christening

II. Account for the peculiarity of the following sentences.

1. You might write to Miss What's-her-name and say we're corning (Christie).
2. It's the "Save Mrs. Lancaster" that I'm going to be busy with (Christie).
3. He felt much less vulnerable in jeans and a MEET ME IN FAIR VIEW T-shirt... (King).
4. The idea that such off-the-wall-things as gypsy curses exist at all... is anathema to everything Michael Houston has ever believed in (King).
5. This last was in a lower I'm-talking-to-myself voice, and was followed by a thump as Ginelli threw his shoulder against the door (King).
6. *Thinner*, just that one word, but it was malediction enough, Halleck saw, because everyone in this affluent upper-class-commute-to-the-city-and-have-a-few-drinks-in-the-club-car-on-the-way-home suburb, everyone in this pretty little new England town set squarely in the heart of John Cheever country, everyone in Fairview was starving to death (King).

Selected Reader

1.

Palmer F.R. **Semantics. A** **New Outline**

Collocation

It was Firth who argued that "You shall know a word by the company it keeps". His familiar example was that of *ass* which occurred (in a now defunct variety of English) in *You silly* -, *Don't be such an* - and with a limited set of adjectives such as *silly*, *obstinate*, *stupid*, *awful* and (occasionally!) *egregious*. But for Firth this keeping company, which he called COLLOCATION, was merely PART of the meaning of a word. As we have seen, meaning was also to be found in the context of situation and all the other levels of analysis as well. Moreover, he was concerned not with total distribution, but with the more obvious and more interesting co-occurrences, the "mutual expectancy of words", as he put it. We may see here that his collocation differed from the distributional analysis of Harris and others in much the same way as his context of situation differed from the behaviourist approaches. For Firth was concerned only with selecting those characteristics of the linguistic or non-linguistic context that he considered relevant, not with the totality of such contexts. The study of linguistic context is of interest to semantics for two reasons.

First, by looking at the linguistic contexts of words we can often distinguish between different meanings. Nida, for instance, discussed the use of *chair* in:

- (1) *sat in a chair*
- (2) *the baby's high chair*
- (3) *the chair of philosophy*
- (4) *has accepted a University chair*
- (5) *the chairman of the meeting*
- (6) *will chair the meeting*

(7) *the electric chair*

(8) *condemned to the chair*

These are clearly in pairs, giving four different meanings of the word. But this does not so much establish, as illustrates, differences of meaning. Dictionaries, especially the larger ones, quite rightly make considerable use of this kind of contextualisation.

Secondly, although in general the distribution of words may seem to be determined by their meaning (rather than vice versa) in some cases, this is not entirely true. We have already briefly noted that *rancid* occurs with *bacon* and *butter*, and *addled* with *brains* and *eggs*, in spite of the fact that English has the terms *rotten* and *bad* and that *milk* is never *rancid* but only *sour*. We shall see that *pretty child* and *buxom neighbour* would normally refer to females; here it is relevant to point out that we should not normally say *pretty boy* or *buxom man*, though *pretty girl* and *buxom woman* are quite normal. This characteristic of language is found in an extreme form in the collective words *-flock of sheep*, *herd of cows*, *school of whales*, *pride of lions*, and the rather more absurd examples such as *chattering of magpies*, *exaltation of larks*.

It is also the case that words may have more specific meanings in particular collocations. Thus we can speak of *abnormal* or *exceptional weather* if we have a heat wave in November, but an *exceptional child* is not an *abnormal child*, *exceptional* being used for greater than usual ability and *abnormal* to relate to some kind of defect (though, oddly, for "euphemistic" reasons, *exceptional* is now being used by some people, especially in America, in place of *abnormal*).

It would, however, be a mistake to attempt to draw a clear distinguishing line between those collocations that are predictable from the meanings of the words that co-occur and those that are not (though some linguists have wished to restrict the term *collocation* to the latter). There have been some extensive investigations of collocation within texts and the results suggest that the co-occurrences are determined both by the meaning of the individual words and (though to a much lesser extent) by conventions about "the company they keep". For this reason, we cannot restrict the term in any precise way, though this does not necessarily preclude us from following Firth and investigating only those collocations that we feel to be interesting.

In spite of what has been said, it has been argued that ALL collocations are determined by the meaning of the words, though this point of view seems rather perverse. Thus it might be said that *pretty* means *handsome* in a female (or feminine) way, and that for this reason we can say *a pretty child* to mean "a pretty girl" and not "a handsome boy". This is a little implausible and it is even less plausible to say that *rancid* means "rotten in a butter-like or bacon-like way" or that *addled* means "rotten in the way that brains or eggs can be". For there are no obvious qualities of being rancid or addled that distinguish them from any other kind of rottenness. To say "rotten (of butter)", "rotten (of eggs)" is not then establishing a specific meaning for *rancid* or *addled*; it is merely indicating that these are the words to refer to rottenness when used with *butter* and *eggs*. The same point is even more obvious with the collective words. There is no meaning distinction between *herd* and *flock*, except that one is used with *cows* and the other with *sheep*. Part of the difficulty arises from the fact that a word will often collocate with a number of other words that have something in common semantically. More strikingly (for negative examples often make the point more clearly), we find that individual words or sequences of words will NOT collocate with certain groups of words. Thus, though we may say *The rhododendron died*, we shall not say *The rhododendron passed away*, in spite of the fact that *pass away* seems to mean "die". But equally, of course, we should not *use pass away* with the names of any shrubs, not even with a shrub whose name we had heard for the first time. It is not very plausible to say that *pass away* indicates a special kind of dying that is not characteristic of shrubs. It is rather that there is a restriction on its use with a group of words that are semantically related. The restrictions are, it has been suggested (by A. McIntosh), a matter of RANGE - we know roughly the kind of nouns (in terms of their meaning) with which a verb or adjective may be used. So we do not reject specific collocations simply because we have never heard them before - we rely on our knowledge of the range.

We can, perhaps, see three kinds of collocational restriction. First, some are based wholly on the meaning of the item as in the unlikely *green cow*. Secondly, some are based on range - a word may be used with a whole set of words that have some semantic features in com-

mon. This accounts for the unlikeliness of *The rhododendron passed away* and equally of *the pretty boy* (*pretty* being used with words denoting females). Thirdly, some restrictions are collocational in the strictest sense, involving neither meaning nor range, as *addled* with *eggs* and *brains*. There may, of course, be borderline cases. It might be thought that *rancid* may be used with animal products of a certain type - perhaps *butter* and *bacon* have something in common. But why not *rancid cheese* or *rancid milk*?

Idioms

Idioms involve collocation of a special kind. Consider, for instance, *kick the bucket*, *fly off the handle*, *spill the beans*, *red herring*. For here we not only have the collocation of *kick* and *the bucket*, but also the fact that the meaning of the resultant combination is opaque - it is not related to the meaning of the individual words, but is sometimes (though not always) nearer to the meaning of a single word (thus *kick the bucket* equals *die*).

Even where an idiom is semantically like a single word it does not function like one. Thus we will not have a past tense **kick-the~bucketed*. Instead, it functions to some degree as a normal sequence of grammatical words, so that the past tense form is *kicked the bucket*. But there are a great number of grammatical restrictions. A large number of idioms contain a verb and a noun, but although the verb may be placed in the past tense, the number of the noun can never be changed. We have *spilled the beans*, but not **spill the bean* and equally there is no **fly off the handles*, **kick the buckets*, **put on good faces*, **blow one's tops*, etc. Similarly, with *red herring* the noun may be plural, but the adjective cannot be comparative (the *-er* form). Thus we find *red herring* but not **redder herring*.

There are also plenty of syntactic restrictions. Some idioms have passives, but others do not. *The law was laid down* and *The beans have been spilled* are all right (though some may question the latter), but **The bucket was kicked* is not. But in no case could we say *It was the - (beans that were spilled, law that was laid down, bucket that was kicked, etc.)*. The restrictions vary from idiom to idiom. Some are more restricted or "frozen" than others.

A very common type of idiom in English is what is usually called the "phrasal verb", the combination of verb plus adverb of the kind *make up*, *give in*, *put down*. The meaning of these combinations cannot be predicted from the individual verb and adverb and in many cases there is a single verb with the same or a very close meaning - *invent*, *yield*, *quell*. Not all combinations of this kind are idiomatic, of course. *Put down* has a literal sense too and there are many others that are both idiomatic and not, e.g. *take in* as in *The conjuror took the audience in*. *The woman took the homeless children in*. There are even degrees of idiomaticity since one can *make up* a story, *make up* a fire or *make up* one's face. Moreover, it is not only sequences of verb plus adverb that may be idiomatic. There are also sequences of verb plus preposition, such as *look after* and *go for*, and sequences of verb, adverb and preposition, such as *put up with* ("tolerate") or *do away with* ("kill").

There are also what we may call partial idioms, where one of the words has its usual meaning, the other has a meaning that is peculiar to the particular sequence. Thus *red hair* refers to hair, but not hair that is red in strict colour terms. Comedians have fun with partial idioms of this kind, e.g. when instructed to *make a bed* they bring out a set of carpenter's tools. An interesting set involves the word *white*, for white coffee is brown in colour, white wine is usually yellow, and white people are pink. Yet *white* is, perhaps, idiomatic only to some degree - it could be interpreted "the lightest in colour of that usually to be found". Not surprisingly *black* is used as its antonym for coffee and people (though again neither are black in colour terms), yet it is not used for wine. Thus it can be seen that even partial idiomaticity can be a matter of degree and may in some cases be little more than a matter of collocational restriction. On a more comic level there is partial idiomaticity in *raining cats and dogs* (in Welsh it rains *old women and sticks!*).

What is and what is not an idiom is, then, often a matter of degree. It is very difficult, moreover, to decide whether a word or a sequence of words is opaque. We could, perhaps, define idioms in terms of non-equivalence in other languages, so that *kick the bucket*, *red herring*, etc., are idioms because they cannot be directly translated into French or German. But this will not really work. The French for nurse is *isgarde-malade*, but while this cannot be directly translated into English it is quite transparent, obviously meaning someone who looks after the sick.

On the other hand, *look after* seems quite idiomatic, yet it can be quite directly translated into Welsh (*edrych ar 61*).

Firth saw collocation as just one of his levels or statements of meaning. Others have attempted to integrate it more closely to the other levels of linguistic analysis, to argue, for instance, that it may be handled within the level of lexis, which is related in a fairly direct and, in theory, precise way to grammar.

(pp. 94-100)

Questions:

1. What proves that collocation and the semantics of the word are closely connected?
2. What types of collocation are distinguished in linguistics? Is it possible to draw a clear-cut borderline between the two types of collocation?
3. What determines the collocation of the word?
4. What types of idioms are recognized in English? What are their specific features?

2.

Burchfield R. **The English Language**

The Syntactic Arrangement of Words

// was an effort to think I might have had a good brush with you and did not. No grammar in that sentence. No cohesion in my mind.

Virginia Woolf to Ethel Smyth, 4 September 1936, in Letters F/(1980), p. 70.

The grammatical arrangement of words in speech or writing to show their connection and relation; a set of rules governing this relationship; an analysis of such rules. This slightly adapted definition of *syntax* (from Greek *syn* "together" and *taxis* "an arranging") in the

current (seventh) edition of the *Concise Oxford Dictionary* will serve as an introduction to a notoriously difficult subject. Educated speakers of English can string together sentences in both spoken and written form without having an explicit book of rules at hand. By contrast numerical problems of comparable complication cannot be solved without the aid of a pocket calculator, log tables, or some much more complicated devices. Somehow categories of words - nouns, verbs, pronouns, etc. - become established as distinguishable entities in our minds at an early age, and also the means of cementing them together in an acceptable orderly sequence. We also learn that some of them have a fixed and unchanging form (*but, with, sheep*) but that the vast majority is malleable, however slightly, by inflexional additions or other modifications (*hat/hats, bird/bird's/birds', goose/geese*) and must be altered in such ways to meet the needs of a given context.

This chapter will be concerned with the morphological elements and grammatical rules within which speakers and writers feel that they can proceed without error or ambiguity. I shall also attempt to show how the "rules" and "feelings" change over the centuries, with legacies of varying degrees of acceptability for very long periods.

When I was at school I was taught that a sentence (which itself needed no explanation) consisted of a subject and a predicate. The subject was obvious (*The cow*) and the predicate was the rest (*jumped over the moon*). More advanced grammar had to do with the way in which subordinate clauses were attached to main clauses, and what they were called - noun clauses, adverbial clauses, and so on. I was also taught that there were certain hazards to avoid - split infinitives, confusion of *may* and *might*, prepositions at the end of sentences, and so on - and marks were awarded in the matriculation (roughly 0-level) examinations to those who could spot such errors in sentences specially constructed for the purpose. From time to time, my teachers would murmur, "just as in Latin" (no one ever said "just as in Greek" as no one knew any Greek at my school). English appeared to be a language with minimum inflexions but with inflexions nevertheless - closer, that is, to Latin and its European descendants than to certain nameless languages (doubtless they meant Chinese among others) which appeared to fit words together without a connecting array of inflexions. When a sentence did not seem to be a complete

sentence, something called "ellipsis" was brought in to account for the missing element.

This comfortable, and sometimes irritatingly imprecise, method of analysis has a long history and has been beneficial to millions of English students throughout the world over many generations. It has by no means died out.

It is well illustrated, I discovered much later, in C.T. Onions's *An Advanced English Syntax* (1904 and later slightly corrected editions). Five types of predicate were identified and presented in the following manner:

		First	
Subject	Predicate		
<i>Day</i>	<i>dawns is</i>		predicate contains a verb
<i>My hour</i>	<i>come</i>		
		Second	
	<i>was rich or a king</i>		predicate contains a verb
<i>Croesus</i>	<i>lay dead</i>		and a noun or adjective
<i>Many</i>			
		Third	
<i>Cats</i>	<i>catch mice</i>		predicate contains a verb
<i>Many</i>	<i>make light</i>		and an object
<i>hands</i>	<i>work</i>		
		Fourth	
<i>We</i>	<i>taught the dog</i>		predicate contains a verb
<i>I</i>	<i>ask you this question</i>		and two objects
		Fifth	
<i>Nothing</i>	<i>makes a Stoic angry</i>		predicate contains a verb,
<i>People</i>	<i>called Duns Scotm the</i>		an object, and an adjective
	<i>Subtle Doctor</i>		or noun

The whole point of analysis was to apportion the right label to the constituent parts of simple sentences like "I stood on the bridge at midnight", or of complex sentences like

I had a strong hope, which never left me, that I should one day recover my liberty; and, as to the ignominy of being carried about for a monster, I considered myself to be a perfect stranger in the country, and that such a misfortune should never be charged upon me as a reproach if ever I should return to England; since the King of England

himself, in my condition, must have undergone the same distress (Jonathan Swift).

Dr Onions analyzed this passage on pp. 26-7 of his book (6th edn., 1932).

Other grammatical notions came into it, of course. "A wild beast fed him" is an active expression. "He was fed by a wild beast" is its passive equivalent. Many verbs govern an infinitive preceded by *to* (I *expect to* arrive tomorrow); others proceed without *to* (I *can* drive a car, I *may* come tomorrow). Some, like *dare* and *need*, hover between the two uses (He *dare* not speak / Does he *dare* to say so? He *need* not iknow / The clothes *need* to be dried).

A range of sentences forming statements, commands, questions, and exclamations cause us to draw on a more sophisticated battery of orderings and arrangements. It is a long way from the simplicity of "I am happy" (a statement) to "May I never see his face again!" (a wish in the form of a request); from "Are you ready?" (a simple question) to "What mean these torn and faded garments?" (a more complex question); and from "Alas! Alack!" (an exclamation) to "Oh, what a fall was there, my countrymen!" (a more complex exclamation).

Temporal clauses (*When it is fine*, I go for a walk), local clauses (The house stood *where three roads met*), causal clauses (*Since you insist on it*, I will consider the matter), concessive clauses (*Although you are rich*, you are not happy), absolute clauses (*The signal being given*, we set off), relative clauses (This is the house *that Jack built*), and many other types of clause seemed to account for the sentences that appeared in the books we read and the sentences we used in the English we spoke. In broad terms they still do.

Case-endings in English, set against the traditional array of those in Latin and Greek (nominative, accusative, genitive, dative, ablative, and instrumental) are extremely simple. Only two can be clearly distinguished - the possessive (*man's*, *men's*, *ladles'*) and an unchanged form in all other cases (He met the *man*; he went up to the *man*, etc.). Old English had four case-forms (nominative, accusative, genitive, and dative), and occasional examples of a fifth, the instrumental. Most of these cases had distinctive endings in the various classes of nouns. It is obvious that the system in present-day English is radically different, and that the notion of case (i.e. a form or mod-

ification of a declinable word) is now of very little significance. The survival of the objective case in English pronouns (*me, him, her, us, them, whom*), however, causes many difficulties, as in the notorious type *^between you and I* (correctly *me*).

In such traditional grammar the notion of possessiveness (that is, the genitive case in Old English, Latin, etc.) is conveyed by an apostrophe or by *of*. The apostrophe is used in various types of construction:

- The doctor's house* (simple attributive)
- This house is the doctor's* (predicative)
- My father's brother's daughter* (double possessive)
- The Emperor of Germany's mother* (group genitive)
- Of is* used where fully inflected languages would use a partitive genitive (This is an old book of *my mother's*; *of all men* the most accomplished), an objective genitive (love of *God*; their fear of *the enemy* was great (that is, they feared the enemy greatly)), a genitive of description (a man of *great honesty*), and an appositive genitive (the continent of *Africa*). The apostrophe and *of* are sometimes in-*^*ter-changeable (e.g. *the sun's rays* or *the rays of the sun*).

Traditional grammar places great stress on prepositions and the positioning of them in a sentence; on tenses of verbs and tense-equivalents, including the complications of the continuous tenses (*he is writing* the book all over again; we shall *be going* home tomorrow); the subjunctive mood; the infinitive (including the split infinitive, *to continually refer*); impersonal verbs (verbs with a vague subject "it", *it is raining, it is time to go home*); anomalous verbs like *shall/will, should/would, can/could, may/might, dare, need, must*, and so on; and many other matters.

Traditional grammar was largely unchallenged before the 1960s. It was nurtured and supported by generations of teachers at schools and universities. And it neatly dovetailed in with the nomenclature used for the teaching of ancient languages like Greek, Hebrew, and Latin, and of modern European languages.

Revolutionary new methods of parsing, most of them synchronic (or descriptive), that is without any reference to older forms of English, have swept into prominence in the last twenty years or so. The messianic figure was Noam Chomsky and the starting-point his book *Syntactic Structures* (1957). He sought a simple linguistic theory which


would "generate all the sequences of morphemes (or words) that constitute grammatical English sentences" (p. 18). For him a "constituent analysis" of the sentence *The man hit the ball* would require (and I quote from Chomsky): 1.

- (i) Sentence -> NP + VP²
- (ii) NP -> T + N³
- (iii) VP -> Verb + NP
- (iv) T -> the
- (v) N -> man, ball, etc.
- (vi) Verb -> hit, took, etc.

In each case -> represents the word "rewrite", and each statement in (i) to (vi) is an instruction of the type "rewrite X as Y". The following series (2) shows what happens to the sentence *The man hit the ball* if it is rewritten in terms of the "grammar" (1) given above:

- 2. NP + VP (i)
- T + N + VP (ii)
- T + N + Verb + NP (iii)
- the + N + Verb + NP (iv)
- the + man + Verb + NP (v)
- the + man + hit + NP (vi)
- the + man + hit + T + N (ii)
- the + man + hit + the + N (iv)
- the + man + hit + the + ball (v)

This derivation, as Chomsky called it, can be represented in a diagram:



From such elementary rules and diagrams has emerged a school of grammar that has shaken the foundations of traditional grammar. In its developed form it has been taken up by scholars of foreign languages. It has also been applied as a technique to older forms of English, and older forms of other languages. Transformation is one of its techniques: the apparent grammatical identity of the sentences *She made him a good husband* *She made him a good wife* *She made him a good dinner*

is removed when algebraic symbols are assigned to their parts and tree-diagrams of the type shown above are provided for each of them. Its weakness is that it depends on intuition about grammatical acceptability. But a more fundamental weakness lies in its failure to produce a grammar of English that can be consulted ... as an aid to the disentangling and ascertainment of the language that lies about us. Despotic professors of linguistics vying with one another about the nature of grammatical embeddedness and "disambiguating" sentences by contrastive methods have failed to notice that they have taken the subject beyond the reach of intelligent laymen.

The parts and parcels of speech can be understood, rather grimly and with pedantic pleasure, from Onions, Fowler, and the great historical grammarians like Poutsma and Visser. The syntactical arrangements of English can be made to stand out very clearly, but only like dead flowers in a dry landscape, by nonsense sentences of a type invented by Chomsky ("Colourless green ideas sleep furiously"). The differences between acceptable constructions like "Have you a book on modern music?" and unacceptable ones like "Read you a book on modern music?" need no Chomskyan signposts for a native speaker, and have very little to do with statistical probability but a lot to do with common sense. Anyone knows that *have*, as an anomalous verb, is likely to behave differently from *read*.

Much ground has been lost and many fine minds blunted on the complications of transformational generative grammar. But traditional approaches to grammar have been successfully developed in a synchronic (or descriptive) form, that is with historical elements stripped away, and yet not partial or negative or idiosyncratic, by Randolph Quirk and colleagues in *A Grammar of Contemporary English* (1972).

Subject and predicate come sailing back into view. SVO (= subject/verb/object) and SOV (= subject/object/verb) stand as lighthouses to those adrift in the stormy sea of grammar. The acceptability of *some* adverbs in *some* contexts is brought out:


carefully
slowly

John searched the room *noisily*
sternly

without delay

but not when the verb is stative: **carefully*
The girl is now a student.. **slowly*
She saw this... **noisily* **sternly*
John knew the answer... *^without delay*

The tree-diagrams present a pleasant and intelligible face, for example:



In every section of this invaluable work new light is thrown on ancient problems - phrasal verbs (*bring up, put off*), phrasal-prepositional verbs (*catch up on, come up with*), constraints of various kinds (for example, verbs which have no passive, *he lacks confidence* but not *Confidence is lacked by him*), intensifiers, duratives, sentence adverbs, and so on. One disadvantage from the point of view of the literate widely-read person who is concerned about constructions in (say) the works of Virginia Woolf or Evelyn Waugh is that there are

no literary examples at all in this clinical and compendious work. The examples are like lifeless membranes in a laboratory, lacking even the flexibility and unpredictability of living speech. Moreover, people suffering from the "split infinitive" syndrome, those concerned with the dramatic problems of taste, choice, and acceptability described by H. W. Fowler - battered ornaments, pairs and snares, sturdy indefensibles, and all the rest (to use his terminology) - are given little or no help. Such problems, it would appear, do not exist. The choice lies between the older grammars which cite evidence from Swift, Tennyson, and Conrad as if they were contemporaries writing in the same medium, and the quasi-scientific grammars of Randolph Quirk and his colleagues and adherents who seldom get beyond the factual-ity of utterances like "Their safe arrival in Cairo" and "Lobster New-burg is difficult to prepare".

Syntactic Change

In this book I have been much concerned with showing that linguistic rules and attitudes change as the centuries pass. It is self-evident that the same principle applies to syntax. In Old English, an inflected language, customary but not obligatory rules affected the normal subject-verb-object rule: *seo cwen beswdc pone cyning* "the queen betrayed the king" could be changed to *"pone cyning beswac seo cwen"* without change of meaning. The endings unmistakably revealed the subject and object. In post-Conquest English the ordering of words can and normally does reverse the meaning. In Old English two negatives strengthen the negativity of a sentence (*nads me nsefre gewunelic* "it was never customary for me"). In post-Renaissance English one negative normally cancels the negativity of a second one. In Old English the title of a monarch or other person of rank normally followed the name (*Alfred cyning*), whereas of course the order is now reversed *Queen Elizabeth*. Old English had no distinctive future tense: the present tense was used to express future time: *"gageon mmne winjeard, andic selle eowpset riht bip"* "go into my vineyard, and I will give you what is right". The future tense came into being as the verbs *sculan* and *willan* lost their ancient power as finite verbs and turned into future auxiliaries. Old English had a present participial form but it ended in *-ende* or

(in some regions) *-Me* or *-ande*. The *-ing* form emerged after the Conquest from an array of disintegrating and jostling forms, with the process still not fully understood by scholars. Visser in the Second Half of Volume III of his *Historical Syntax of the English Language* (1973) devotes nearly 200 pages to the development of the second verb as a form in *-ing*, as in "I've so much enjoyed talking to you", "Have you tried shopping in the Berwick Market?", "He wouldn't have risked killing me", "What are you getting at?", "You are being silly", and so on. His examples are drawn from medieval chronicles and poems and stretch out in great historical swathes down to the works of Aldous Huxley and Kingsley Amis. No construction is everlastingly stable, no cherished rule remains unbroken. At any given time it is safe to assume that permissible patterns of syntax are ascertainable if one has the means of identifying and classifying them. Go back a century or so and the rules are radically different even if on the surface they appear to be the same. Go back two centuries and more and one must call for help from scholars with a particular knowledge of the rules and constraints of the time. It is risky without such help to read the works of any writer whose writings were published more than two centuries ago. And it is unhelpful when scholars yoke constructions together without regard to chronology, geography, type of writing, and social class. We still lack an authoritative grammar based on spoken and written British English of the period since 1945, let alone one that looks further afield. Also lacking is a systematic synchronic treatment of the syntax of (for example) Chaucer, Shakespeare, and Milton. It seems wrong that so much scholarly endeavour is devoted to the algebra and tree-diagrams of impenetrably complex modern syntactic problems when the language of some of our greatest writers remains inadequately analysed.

(pp. 149-158)

Questions:

1. What is the traditional approach to grammatical phenomena?
2. What new methods of grammatical analysis were introduced by N. Chomsky?
3. What proofs of constant syntactic change in English does R.B. Burchfield comment on?

Seminar 10

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ACTUAL DIVISION OF THE SENTENCE. COMMUNICATIVE TYPES OF SENTENCES

1. The basic principles of sentence division. Actual division of the sentence. The correlation of the "1" syntactic ("nominative") division and actual division of the sentence. The notion of theme and rheme. The notion of transition. The notions of topic and comment. Topicalization. The notion of presupposition.
2. Language means of expressing the theme.
3. Language means of expressing the rheme.
4. Actual division of sentences with non-finite forms of the verb. Constructions with the double/triple rheme. Double theme-rheme construction.
5. Classification of sentences according to the purpose of communication: traditional classification, Ch. Fries' classification. Modern classification of communicative sentence types. The problem of exclamatory sentences. Actual division and communicative sentence types.
6. Constructions with mixed communicative features.
7. Classifications of speech acts (J. Austin, J.R. Searle). The basic notions of pragmatics. Context of situation.

1. The Main Principles of Actual Division of the Sentence

The actual division of the sentence exposes its informative perspective showing what immediate semantic contribution the sentence parts make to the total information conveyed by the sentence.

From the point of view of the actual division the sentence can be divided into two sections: thematic (theme) and rhematic (rheme). The theme expresses the starting point of communication; it means that it denotes an object or a phenomenon about which something is reported. The rheme expresses the basic informative part of the communication, emphasizing its contextually relevant centre. Between the theme and the rheme intermediary, transitional parts of the actual division can be placed, also known under the term "transition". Transitional parts of the sentence are characterized by different degrees of their informative value.

2. Language Means of Expressing the Theme and the Rheme

Language has special means to express the theme. They are the following: the definite article and definite pronominal determiners, a loose parenthesis introduced by the phrases "as to", "as for", and the direct word-order pattern.

In comparison with the language means used to express the theme, language has a richer arsenal of means to express the rheme because the rheme marks the informative focus of the sentence. To identify the rhematic elements in the utterance one can use a particular word-order pattern together with a specific intonation contour, an emphatic construction with the pronoun "it", a contrastive complex, intensifying particles, the so-called "there-pattern", the indefinite article and indefinite pronominal determiners, ellipsis, and also special graphical means.

3. Actual Division and Communicative Sentence Types

The theory of actual division has proved fruitful in the study of the communicative properties of sentences. In particular, it has been demonstrated that each communicative type is distinguished by features which are revealed first and foremost in the nature of the rheme.

As a declarative sentence immediately expresses a proposition, its actual division pattern has a complete form, its rheme making up the centre of some statement.

As an imperative sentence does not directly express a proposition, its rheme represents the informative nucleus not of an explicit proposition, but of an inducement in which the thematic subject is

usually zeroed. If the inducement is emphatically addressed to the listener, or to the speaker himself, or to the third person, thematic subjects have an explicit form.

The differential feature of the actual division pattern of an interrogative sentence is determined by the fact that its rheme is informationally open because this type of sentence expresses an inquiry about information which the speaker does not possess. The function of the rheme in an interrogative sentence consists in marking the rhematic position in a response sentence, thus programming its content. Different types of questions are characterized by different types of rhemes.

The analysis of the actual division of communicative sentence types gives an additional proof of the "non-communicative" nature of the so-called purely exclamatory sentences (e.g. "Oh, I say!"): it shows that interjectional utterances of the type don't make up grammatically predicated sentences with their own informative perspective; in other words, they remain mere signals of emotions.

The actual division theory combined with the general theory of paradigmatic oppositions can reveal the true nature of intermediary predicative constructions distinguished by mixed communicative features. In particular, this kind of analysis helps identify a set of intermediary communicative sentence types, namely, the sentences which occupy an intermediary position between cardinal communicative sentence types.

Questions:

1. What are the main principles of the actual division of the sentence?
2. What sentence elements can be called "thematic"?
3. What language means mark the theme of the sentence?
4. What is understood by the rheme of the sentence?
5. What language means are used to express the rheme of the sentence?
6. In what do you see the connection of the actual division and the communicative sentence types?
7. What actual division pattern is typical of the declarative sentence?
8. What actual division pattern characterizes the imperative sentence?
9. What kind of rheme is peculiar to the interrogative sentence?
10. In what way does the actual division help reveal the differential features of intermediary communicative sentence types?

I. Dwell upon the actual division of the sentences and the language means used to mark it.

MODEL: a) *The time came for her to dance with Adams.*

$T_2 \rightarrow R_2$

This sentence represents a case of double theme-rheme construction:

$T_2 \rightarrow R_2$.

b) *Asforla_ Falterpna, she had a natural and healthy contempt for the arts.*

The antetheme "la Falterona" is introduced with the help of the phrase "as for"; the theme of the sentence is "she", the rheme is "had a natural and healthy contempt for the arts".

a)

1. I must take some definite actions tonight (Doyle).
2. I cannot allow the examination to be held if one of the papers has been tampered with (Doyle).
3. The situation must be faced (Doyle).
4. "In that case, your Grace, since you have yourself stated that any unhappiness in your married life was caused by his presence, I would suggest that you make such amends as you can do to the Duchess, and that you try to resume those relations which have been so unhappily interrupted." "That also I have arranged." (Doyle)
5. He heard her singing in her snatchy fashion (Lawrence).
6. "Teddilinks, light a fire, quick." (Lawrence)
7. Why don't you sew your sleeve up? (Lawrence)
8. With a little flash of triumph, she lifted a pair of pearl ear-rings from the small box (Lawrence).
9. The exterior of the building was a masterpiece of architecture, elegant and graceful (Sheldon).

b)

1. It was Mr. Eccles I particularly wanted to see (Christie).
2. Somebody *ought* to be getting rich. Somebody ought to be *seen* to be getting rich (Christie).
3. Baxter Doves he knew and disliked (Lawrence).
4. For me to get up early was something like a deed.

5. I have never been told to come there to retype the papers.
6. "How long have you lived in Hollowquay?" "Barely a month."
7. "Well, that's all right. No need to give me a whole account of your literary triumphs in early youth." (Christie)
8. She remained clinging round his neck (Lawrence).
9. Sunday was a holiday for Dad, not for Mum (Leacock).

c)

1. Triumphant, that's what she was at the prospect (Christie).
2. Aunt Ada was silent until Tuppence had gone out of the door with Miss Packard and Tommy followed her. "Come back, *you*" said Aunt Ada, raising her voice. "I know you perfectly. You're Thomas." (Christie)
3. "Red-haired you used to be. Carrots, that's the colour your hair was." (Christie)
4. Desperately you want something to do to amuse yourself so you try on some public character and see what it feels like when you are it (Christie).
5. "You'd be surprised the way she got to know things. Sharp as a needle, she was." (Christie)
6. "Miss Fanshawe was never dull. Grand stories she'd tell you of the old days." (Christie)
7. That was when he saw Ginelli wasn't in the car (King).
8. The pie sat on the seat beside him, pulsing, warm (King).
9. It's the people who aren't scared who die young (King).

d)

1. It was then that Constantin Demiris entered Melina Labrou's life (Sheldon).
2. Modern hotels and office buildings were everywhere amid the timeless ruins, an exotic mixture of the past and present (Sheldon).
3. In the beginning, she had asked questions (Sheldon).
4. The Blue House was opened to special patrols only (Sheldon).
5. Again he wasn't sure - rather vague, the whole thing (Christie).
6. "Isn't it a long time after to be looking for her?" (Christie)
7. Apparently he only heard there *was* a child quite recently (Christie).
8. "She's a striking looking woman, isn't she? Interesting, I always think. Very interesting." (Christie)
9. Who does it actually belong to *now*? (Christie)

II. Define the communicative sentence type, dwell on the actual division of the following sentences. Define the speech-act features of these sentences.

MODEL: "What have you got?" "His book. "

The first sentence is interrogative and its rheme "what have ... got" is informationally open. As it is a special question, the nucleus of inquiry is marked by the interrogative pronoun which is the rhematic peak. The theme of the sentence is "you". The second sentence is elliptical and rhematic. The rhematic peak of the answer ("His book") is the reverse substitute of the interrogative pronoun. As the two sentences make up a thematic unity, the theme in the answer is zeroed.

a)

1. "I'd like to know what you think of her. Go and see Dr. Rose first." (Christie)
2. Why not walk down to the village after tea? (Christie)
3. "I would strongly advise you, Mr. Worthing, to try and acquire some relations as soon as possible, and to make a definite effort to produce at any rate one parent, of either sex, before season is quite over." (Wilde)
4. Suppose you fetch your bricks and build a nice house, or an engine (Christie).
5. "The Duke is greatly agitated - and as to me, you have seen yourself the state of nervous prostration to which the suspense and the responsibility have reduced me." (Doyle)
6. "Mr. Holmes, if ever you put forward your full powers, I implore you to do so now." (Doyle)
7. "I beg you, Mr. Holmes, to do what you can." (Doyle)
8. "You will kindly close the door," said Holmes. "Now, Banister, will you please tell us the truth about yesterday's incident?" (Doyle)
9. "Would you please remain in the room? Stand over there near the bed room door. Now, Soames, I am going to ask you to have the great kindness to go up to the room of young Gilchrist, and to ask him to step down into yours." (Doyle)
10. Can the leopard change his spots?

b)

1. "I wonder why you never answered her letter." (Maugham)
2. Over the breakfast she grew serious (Lawrence).
3. "We can be perfectly frank with each other. We want to know, Mr. Gilchrist, how you, an honorable man, ever came to commit such an action as that of yesterday?" (Doyle)
4. "You will show these gentlemen out, Mrs. Hudson, and kindly send the boy with this telegram. He is to pay a five-shilling reply." (Doyle)
5. "I wish you, Mr. Holmes, to come to Mackleton with me by the next train." (Doyle)

6. "You will kindly sign that paper, Mr. Sandeford, in the presence of these witnesses." (Doyle)
7. "I suppose you haven't such a thing as a carriage in your stables?" (Doyle)
8. "Tell us about your last talk with Dr. Wilbour." (Schrieber)
9. Paul felt as if his eyes were coming very wide open. Wasn't he to take Clara's fulminations so seriously, after all? (Lawrence)
10. "I hope you won't let him keep the stocking." "You are not going to tell me everything I shall do, and everything I shan't." (Lawrence)

c)

1. Oh, Mr. Holmes, you must save him - you must save him! I tell you 'that you must save him!' (Doyle)
2. "Mrs. Hudson," I said, going out to her, "I want you to pack my bags, please." (Hardwick)
3. I suppose you were in a convent? (Hemingway)
4. "Listen," George said to Nick. "You better go see Ole Anderson." (Hemingway)
5. Thanks for coming to tell me about it (Hemingway).
6. Don't you want me to go and see the police? (Hemingway)
7. "Why don't you try to go to sleep?" (Hemingway)
8. "Don't be melodramatic, Harry, please," she said (Hemingway).
9. "How do you feel?" she said. "All right." (Hemingway)
10. "Who likes to be abused?" (Sheldon)

d)

1. "You don't want to go mixing yourself up in things that are no business of yours -" "There's nothing to be mixed up in according to you," said Tuppence. "So you needn't worry at all." (Christie)
2. "And there are people who are terribly unhappy, who can't help being unhappy. But what else is one to do, Tommy?" "What can anyone do except be as careful as possible." (Christie)
3. "No, I don't want you to go. After all, the last time, remember how frightfully rude she was to you?" (Christie)
4. Would you like to come up now? (Christie)
5. "I'll put them (roses) in a vase for you," said Miss Packard. "You won't do anything of the kind." (Christie)
6. "You go away," added Aunt Ada as a kind of postscript, waving her hand towards Tuppence who was hesitating in the doorway (Christie).
7. "I hope they brought you some coffee?" (Christie)
8. "The old lady I was talking to," said Tuppence. "Mrs. Lancaster, I think she said her name was?" (Christie)

9. "Can you tell me a little more about her, who her relations were, and how she came to come here?" (Christie)
10. "God help the home of the aged that you go to. You'll be Cleopatra most of the time, I expect." (Christie)

Selected Reader

1.

Dijk T.A. van.

Text and Context. Explorations in the Semantics and Pragmatics of Discourse

Topic, Comment, Focus, and the Functions in Discourse

In this and the previous chapters the notions TOPIC OF CONVERSATION and TOPIC OF DISCOURSE have been used in order to define connectedness of sentences and coherence of discourse. It has been assumed that such topics are to be defined in terms of propositions, sets of propositions and/or propositions entailed by such sets. At the level of sentence structure another notion of TOPIC has been used in recent linguistics, often in combination with the notions of COMMENT and FOCUS. In that research a sentence may be assigned, besides its usual syntactic and semantic structures, a binary TOPIC-COMMENT STRUCTURE. The definition of such structures is specified both in semantic and pragmatic terms of information and information distribution in sentences and their canonical or transformed syntactic and morpho-phonological expression. The intuitive idea behind the assignment of such structures in a grammar is that in a sentence we may distinguish between what is being said (asserted, asked, promised...) and what is being said "about" it, a distinction closely parallel to the classical SUBJECT-PREDICATE distinction in philosophy and logic. Thus in a sentence like: [42] *John is rich*.

the part "John" is topic because it denotes the thing about which something is asserted, whereas "is rich" is the comment or focus of the sentence, denoting the thing (property) said about (predicated of) John. This comment may be much more complex as in sentences like: [43] *John inherited a large estate from his old uncle who lived in Australia*.

where *John* could be assigned the topic function and the rest of the sentence would be assigned the comment function.

Now, although our linguistic intuitions about the topic-comment distinction may be correct, the theoretical reconstruction is by no means straightforward. Confusion about the levels of description and about their appropriate definition is widespread in the literature. Some of the questions arising are, for example, the following:

- (i) is the topic-comment distinction to be defined in syntactic, semantic or pragmatic terms, i.e. do these terms denote parts or functions of syntactic structures of sentences, of meaning or reference of propositions, or of contextual structures of speech acts, knowledge and information transmission?
- (ii) do all sentences have such a structure, and by what explicit rules and procedures can topic and comment be assigned?
- (iii) do sentences have topic-comment structure independent of text structure and/or of their use in communicative contexts? In other words: can the "same" sentence have different topic-comment structure in different (con-)texts?
- (iv) what are the relationships to notions such as "subject" (grammatical, logical, psychological) and "predicate", presupposition and assertion, etc.?
- (v) which grammatical, in particular morpho-phonological and syntactic, structures are systematically related to the topic and comment functions?
- (vi) what are the relationships to notions like topic of a conversation or of a discourse as used semi-technically above? These questions cannot possibly be answered here in a systematic and explicit way. Some of them relate to characteristic properties of sentence structure which are outside the scope of this book. Our attention, therefore, will be focused upon the role of the topic-comment distinction in the account of discourse coherence.

6.2

However, some preliminary remarks about the theoretical status of topic and comment are necessary. From sentences such as [42] and [43] it seems as if the topic of a sentence coincides with, or is expressed by, the subject of the sentence, which in turn is normally associated with the left-most (or first) noun phrase of the sentence, as also in:

[44] *The estate John has inherited from his rich uncle is in Australia.*

where the topic is expressed by the complex noun phrase. The comment, thus, would in that case be related to the predicate, or the predicate phrase, of the sentence. This general, informally formulated, rule holds for what could be called the NORMAL ORDERING of sentences in English, but not for sentences such as: [45] *London is a town I like!* [46] *No, Peter has stolen the book.*

where the first noun phrases have particular stress. For such sentences the grammatical subject or the first noun phrase does not carry the topic function: the first sentence is not about London but about towns I like, the second not about Peter but about someone who has stolen a book, intuitively speaking, whereas it is asserted that London and Peter are individuals satisfying the particular property or relation, respectively. That is, comments are normally in second (predicate) position or in positions with particular stress. In the latter case, the cleft sentence construction (*it was ... who/which ...*) may also be used to make comments out of categories with topic function. By particular stress assignment or cleft sentences, nearly any grammatical category can thus be assigned comment function, the rest of the sentence becoming topic:

[47] a: *Harry paid for the book with a ten-dollar bill.*

b: *Harry paid for the book with a ten-dollar bill.*

c: *Harry paid for the book with a ten-dollar bill.* and so on for the major categories (and in some cases also for prefixes, suffixes, prepositions, articles, demonstratives, etc.).

Without giving a more precise analysis and syntactic description of these examples, it will be assumed that the notions of topic and comment cannot possibly coincide with or be identical to particular syntactic categories, and that they must at least have a semantic status. This semantic status most clearly manifests itself in a further

analysis of the "intuitions" referred to above: a topic is some function determining about which item something is being said. Similarly, a topic is often associated with what is "already known" (to the hearer) in some context of conversation, or what is "presupposed" (to be identified) by some sentence. The comment, then, associates with what is "unknown" (to the hearer) and asserted. An explication of these terms would have to be framed in a referential semantics and a pragmatic component.

The link between topic and presupposition in the given examples shows in the fact that, for instance, [47]a presupposes the proposition "Someone paid for the book with a ten-dollar bill", and [47]c presupposes "Harry paid for something with a ten-dollar bill", where it is asserted that the variables "someone" and "something" are identical with "Harry" and "the book", respectively. Note also that comments do not simply denote "unknown" individuals (objects, properties, relations or facts): both Harry and the book are "known" in the given examples: they are identified by the hearer (the speaker uses, characteristically, the definite article in the phrase *the book*). It is only unknown that Harry and the book have the specific (complex) property referred to.

By examining the semantic functions of normal sentence orderings or of stress distribution, we may often decide which sentence part expresses the topic and which part expresses the comment. This is less easy in the normal form of [47]a-c:

[47] *Harry paid for the book with a ten-dollar bill.*

It is not at all obvious whether this sentence is about Harry, about the book, or even about both, especially since both referents are "known". Could a sentence have two topics or should we perhaps speak of one compound topic, e.g. the ordered pair ("Harry", "the book") of which it is asserted that the first bought the second with a ten-dollar bill?

A typical test for establishing the topic-comment structure of sentences is to use preceding questions. If [47] is used as an answer to the question

[48] *What did Harry do?*

we may conclude that "Harry" or "Harry did something" is the topic of [47]. If the question were:

[49] *What happened to the book?*

it would be "the book" which would be the topic. Similarly, after a question like:

[50] *What did Harry do with the book?*

the ordered pair ("Harry", "the book") would be the topic. What is being established by questions can be established by PRECEDING DISCOURSE in general:

[51] *At last Harry found the book he wanted to give Laura as a present. He paid for it with a ten-dollar bill.*

Characteristically, noun phrases with topic function may then, or must be, pronominalized. Thus topic can be associated with the logical category of BOUND VARIABLES, ranging over both individuals and properties or relations. Less strictly speaking, it may be said that topics are those elements of a sentence which are BOUND by previous text or context. We should therefore investigate how topic-comment structure is to be determined relative to (con-)textual structure. **6.3**

In order to understand the topic-comment articulation of sentences and their (con-)textual dependence, some remarks are necessary about the COGNITIVE BASIS OF INFORMATION PROCESSING in communicative contexts.

As will be shown in detail in the next part of this book, sentences (discourses) are uttered within the framework of specific speech acts and speech interaction. Thus, one of the purposes of the act of asserting a proposition is that the hearer be informed about a certain matter. This information increase is an enlargement or other change in his set of knowledge and beliefs, brought about by understanding of the meaning of the perceived utterance. The details of the actions involved here are less important for the moment. The point is that all "new information" is usually integrated into information already known. Thus, when I say that Peter is ill, it is assumed that my speech participant already "knows" Peter, i.e. knows that Peter exists, and knows his main properties. In this case, general or specific knowledge about Peter is "enriched" with the proposition "that he is ill (now)", to be attached to the complex "Peter" concept already present in the hearer's knowledge.

Now, the topic of a sentence has the particular cognitive function of selecting a unit of information or concept from knowledge. This may be a more general concept (like love or renting a flat) or an individual concept (Peter, this particular book, etc.). In the latter case, the individual referred to may already have been "introduced" into the context of communication either by direct action or perception of certain objects (*That chair must be painted red*) or by previous sentences of the discourse. In such a way many objects may be introduced into the context, and for each sentence it must be established which of these objects is (again) "picked up", i.e. referred to, in order to make a statement about it.

Cognitively, this "topicalization" of certain phrases is probably a process whereby knowledge of certain individuals is "foregrounded", i.e. taken from long-term memory stores to some working memory, in which the established information may be combined with the incoming new information.

This new information, usually called the "COMMENT" or also the "FOCUS" of the sentence, may be in various forms: it may assign a general or particular property to a known and identified individual, or a relation between individuals of which one or more are known (*Peter met a girl. He kissed her*), or the instantiation by one or more individuals of a known property or relation (*Peter hasn't committed the murder*), or the assignment of various higher level properties or operators to events or propositions (*The robbery had been planned cleverly. Your appearance was really unexpected, you know*). From these assumptions it follows that in principle any phrase of a sentence may express topic function, or even several, discontinuous phrases like subject noun phrase and (in-)direct object noun phrase.

6.4

This is roughly the general theoretical basis for the topic-comment articulation in natural language: it is mainly a result of the constraints of effective information processing. Now, what are the implications for the structure and interpretation of discourse?

The first point to be made here is that, according to the principles adopted, certain sentences beginning a discourse or a section of discourse (e.g. a paragraph) may not always have a topic, viz in those

cases where no individual object or property known to the hearer is selected for "comment", as in:

[52] *A man was walking slowly along a beach.* Here, individuals (person, place) and a relation are introduced at the same time. Although, intuitively, we might say that this sentence is "about" a man, according to the canonical topic-comment mapping onto the subject-predicate structure of the sentence, there is, formally speaking, no topic in [52] but topic introduction. In cognitive terms: the hearer's knowledge "slate" is still clean with respect to a topic of conversation. Note, however, that sentences like [52] are rather unusual, and occur more in literary narrative than in everyday, natural narratives, where we would have something like: [53]a: *This afternoon a strange man came to my office (...)* Again, we could speak of topic introduction, but there is already established knowledge (time: a specific afternoon, determined by time of context of communication, and place: a particular, known, office), which is formally the topic of [53]a. In other words, [53]a is not primarily about a strange guy, but rather about what happened this afternoon, to me, in my office. We see that the notion of ABOUT-NESS is not very precise, and, at least for sentences, not always de-cidable. A sentence like [52] may be about a man, his walk or about a beach, or about all of them. More in general, aboutness should be established in (con-)textual terms, perhaps in such a way that a discourse or a passage of the discourse is about something if this "something" is referred to by most phrases with topic function. In this case, however, we no longer deal with the topic of a sentence but with a TOPIC OF DISCOURSE or a TOPIC OF CONVERSATION. We here find ourselves at a more global level of discourse description, to be discussed in the next chapter. Such a topic may be "a strange man" even if in the individual sentences the topics may be "his cigarette", "his trousers", "I", etc., i.e. those referring phrases of which the referents are associated with the strange man. It will appear, however, that aboutness at this more global level is again ambiguous: a story may be about Romeo, about Juliet, about both, about a specific (forbidden or impossible) love or about certain political structures in the middle ages. Often, however, the "aboutness" pertains to a given individual object or person, if most properties and relations are as-

I signed to one permanent referent or to those objects/persons introduced in relation to it.

Topics are established not only with respect to explicit previous information but also with respect to implicit information as defined above. If we continued [53]a with a sentence like

[53]b: *His nose was nearly purple (...)*

the phrase *his nose* would be assigned topic function even if its referent has not been explicitly referred to before. However, the concept "man" entails the meaning postulates of being a human adult male and of having a nose. The proposition "*a* has a nose" is therefore implied by [53]a, referred to definitely (by possessive pronoun) in [53]b, and therefore implicit. In cognitive terms: the hearer already knows that if there is a man he also has a nose. Topics, thus, may be expressed by any phrase referring to an individual (con-)textually identified by the hearer, but also by all other expressions for individuals or properties belonging to what may be called the EPISTEMIC RANGE of that object.

In this semi-formal framework, topic function may be related to any object of previous models, also to facts or possible worlds. This would explain the notorious difficulty of assigning topic-comment structure to such sentences

[54] // *is hot.*

[55] *It was raining.*

It would express a topic by referring to some particular time-place or world. Similarly, in sentences like [52] which have no apparent topic part, but in which some particular real, fictitious, or narrated world is taken as the (implicit) topic. In fact, the sentence specifies a number of properties of such a world (that there is a man, that the man is walking, that the man/his walking is slow, and that the walking takes place along a beach, in the past).

Note that this textual approach to the problem of sentential topics does not always guarantee that the subject of a sentence is automatically the topic of that sentence, even in normal ordering. After the question "What happened to the jewels?", we may have

[56] *They were stolen by a customer.*

where the topic function is indeed assigned to the first noun phrase (subject), but we may also have a sentence like

[57] *Peter has sold them to a diamond merchant from Antwerp.* where the topic is assigned to the predicate noun phrase *them*, although according to some theories of topic the phrase *Peter* would be assigned topic function. Besides syntactic ordering and stress distribution, we thus have indications from definite articles and pronouns about the topic function of certain phrases.

It should be stressed that (con-)textually identified individuals determining topic function need not be "expressed" by the same lexical units:

[58] *Now, Fairview had had its golden age (...) The little town's methods of production could not compete with the modern factories (...)* (Chase, p. 5).

In this passage from the same crime story taken as an earlier example, part of the complex noun phrase of the second sentence, viz *the little town* is topic, due to referential identity with *Fairview*, introduced before. In case the epistemic range of the concept of town includes the existence of factories and hence of methods of production, the whole noun phrase *the little town's methods of production* would be assigned topic function, as is also indicated by the definite article.

In general, topical noun phrases may be used even in those cases where the referent is not an essential (necessary) part of a previously introduced referent with which it is associated. The definite noun phrase in a later passage,

[59] *The more progressive businesses had transferred to Bentonville*
)

would in such a case receive topic function, although no progressive businessmen have been introduced above.

Theoretically speaking this is possible only if we assume that a proposition like "Fairview has progressive businessmen" is introduced as a missing link. This would mean that some topics still have an IMPLICIT COMMENT function. Conversely, we might speak of IMPLICIT TOPIC function in those cases where previously identified referents are assigned to a previously identified property or relation:

[60] *Paul stole the diamonds!*

where the phrase *Paul* (with specific stress) has comment function if the topic is "Somebody had stolen the diamonds". In case we should, for theoretical reasons, be reluctant to assign comment function to referring phrases, and especially to those referring to previously iden-

tified referents, sentences of the type exemplified by [60] may be considered as having a relation as comment, viz IDENTITY, [...] as is also expressed in the natural language variants of [60]:

[61] *It was Paul, who stole the diamonds.*

[62] *The one who stole the diamonds was Paul.*

Note that in such examples (initial) stress does not only mean that a phrase which would have topic function in normal ordering now has comment function, but also that CONTRAST and implicit DENIAL are involved. In those cases where it is assumed by the hearer that $x = a$, and it is asserted by the speaker that $x = b$, the noun phrase (viz its last main category) referring to b has marked stress. The reverse applies to explicit internal (phrasal) negation, as in:

[63] *Paul did not steal the diamonds.*

where *steal* has marked stress: the speaker assumes some belief in the hearer to the effect that the relationship g between Paul and the diamonds, is that of stealing: $g = \text{"steal"}$, and it is asserted in the comment that $g \neq \text{"steal"}$. Taking natural language negation as an expression of a specific speech act, as the "converse" of assertion, namely of DENIAL, the whole sentence would have topic function and the "new" element would be a change in illocutionary force.

6.5

At this point it becomes necessary to say something more about the precise status of such categories as topic and comment. It has been shown that they cannot possibly be syntactic, but must at least have a SEMANTIC nature. It has also been shown that there are no meaning relations involved: phrases may be assigned topic function even if related to phrases with different meaning in previous sentences. The topic-comment distinction essentially is a structure relating to the REFERENTS of phrases: in general a phrase is assigned topic function if its value in some possible world has already been identified as a value of expressions in preceding implicit or explicit (con-)textual propositions.

[...] any expression in a sentence which denotes something denoted before is assigned topic function, whereas the other expressions are assigned comment function.

This is the most general statement about topic-comment functions in sentences. This proposal, however, should be made more specific. First

of all, it might be assumed that all (formal) INFORMATION is PROPOSITIONAL, whatever the precise cognitive implications of this assumption. That is, we reconstruct knowledge as a set of propositions. A simple argument and predicate like "the book" or "is open" are not, as such, elements of information, only a proposition like "the book is open". [...] In still simpler terms: at some point *i* of the discourse the participants know a common set of facts, namely those denoted by the (propositions expressed by the) previous sentences. Note that such atomic propositions may be expressed simply as phrases of sentences. That is, the fact "that there is a girl" is expressed in the verb phrase of the sentence *Peter met a girl*. In a following sentence *The girl is from Italy* this information is also expressed, or rather embedded in the definite expression *the girl* ("The only *x* such that λ : is a girl"). If this proposition denotes the same fact as the one denoted in the previous sentence, then the phrase expressing this proposition is assigned topic function.

This approach to topic-comment structures, however, is clearly too rigid. First of all, it would become problematic to assign topic function to those phrases which are not likely to have underlying propositional structure, like the pronoun in *She is from Italy*. Secondly, the notion of (propositional) transmission of information should rather be made explicit in pragmatic terms. Here we are concerned first of all with giving a semantic characterization of topic-comment structure. Finally, it may be assumed that the assignment of topic function to a phrase, PRESUPPOSES propositional information, without expressing it as such. Thus, even in *She is from Italy* it is presupposed that there exists a certain female human being (or other object pronominalizable with *she*).

We may therefore uphold the hypothesis that all categories may be assigned topic function, where the topic is assigned to contextually bound elements of the atomic or complex proposition. These bound elements may denote objects, but also properties, relations, facts or possibly functions. The "free" (comment) elements would then be assigned to the expressions denoting properties of (known) objects, relations between (known) objects, objects of (known) properties or relations, properties of facts, etc., as was indicated earlier. According to these principles, any phrase with the referential character mentioned would be assigned topic function.

S'

Note that, strictly speaking, this formal condition also holds for those examples where the surface structure phrase denoting an individual which has already been introduced (and which hence is known to the hearer) seems to have comment function, as in *I met him*, where *him* has heavy stress. That is, both the speaker and the referent of *him* have been identified, and hence are assigned topic function. Comment function, then, is assigned to that part of semantic structure which is not yet introduced [...]. In other words, it is the identity of Peter with the one I met which is the (asserted) comment of this sentence. English has only limited possibilities to express such comments, for instance by stressing the phrase expressing part of the relation. In this case the sense is ambiguous: the stress may either be interpreted as expressing the fact that there were several people I could have met, but that it actually was (the known) man, e.g. Peter, or else it may be interpreted as expressing the fact that the speaker denies or contradicts an assumption of the hearer [...]. The first use could be called "contrastive" or "selective", the second "contradictive" or "corrective", which means that the specific stress is semantically determined in the first usage, and pragmatically in the second. Contrastive selection is not limited to cases where the predicate (relation) is already known, as may be seen in: *Finally I listened to him, and ignored her*.

It follows that rule [64] is still theoretically correct if assumed to operate on expressions of some semantic language: topic-comment assignment is not always unambiguous for phrases in surface structure. The rule seems to apply correctly when only one such phrase is expressed:

[65] *Peter is ill.*

[66] *Peter met a girl.*

[67] *That Peter met a girl was unexpected.*

As soon as we have several phrases denoting identified individuals, the situation is less straightforward. Earlier it was suggested that in that case we might assume several topics, or one complex topic:

[68] *The boy went with the girl to the cinema.*

Here, two or possibly three referents have been identified. The simplest solution is to assume as topic the triple ["the boy", "the girl", "the cinema"], and to assign comment function to the predicate this triplet belongs to, viz "to go" and the past tense. This assumption is

not in accordance with the intuitive way in which topics are established, e.g. by question tests like "What about the boy?", or "What did the boy do?", which would identify *the boy* as the phrase expressing the topic function. Instead of assigning a particular relation to a pair or triplet, we then seem to assign a complex property ("going to the cinema with the girl") to a certain object, as in the classical subject-predicate distinction. Along the same line, the pair ("the boy", "the girl") would have topic function in [68] when it answers the question "What did the boy do with the girl?". Such questions are means of expressing a certain communicative situation: they indicate where the interests of the hearer are, what he wants to know or expects to be informed about, given a certain context and part of discourse. In an explicit account it should be made clear how such questions "follow from" a certain part of the discourse. Whereas the knowledge deficit of hearers, or rather the speaker's assumptions about what the hearer may want to know should be treated in pragmatic terms, this account should first of all be semantic.

Take as sentences previous to [68] the following:

[69] *Mary was glad to go out that night.* [70] *Peter was glad to go out that night.*

It is understood that *the boy* and *the girl* (or their pronominal forms) are referentially identical with *Peter* and *Mary*, respectively. Given [69] as previous discourse, we could say that [68] is saying something about the girl, at least primarily. Similarly for the boy after [70]. Apparently, the topicality of "the boy" or "the girl" depends on the topicality of referentially equivalent phrases in the previous sentence, as is also the case in the test questions establishing a certain epistemic context. If this sort of "relative" establishment of topics held, we would have to conclude that "the boy" is assigned topic in [68] after a sentence like *Peter met a girl this afternoon*, in which "a girl" is not topic but part of the comment according to rule [64]. And the same for "the girl" after a sentence like *That afternoon Mary met a boy*. After such sentences, as after [70] and [69], respectively, the sentence [68] would be interpreted as being primarily about the boy or the girl, respectively.

However, apart from other difficulties, the rule of relative topic assignment (if there is more than one topical phrase in a sentence,

then the phrase co-referential with the last topical phrase has topic function) meets with difficulties. That is, after the sentence *Peter met a girl this afternoon* we may have the sentence *The girl was very pretty*. According to the rule, this would mean that "the girl" would be assigned topic function in [68], although it may be maintained that the sentence is primarily about the boy - intuitively speaking at least. This intuition may be based on the fact that the girl has been introduced after the introduction of the boy, and relative to it, viz as the "object" of the meeting relation. This intuition is not always accurate, as shown by this simple story:

[71] *Once upon a time there was an old king. He had seven daughters. One of them was called Bella. She loved her father very much. [...]*

Although the daughter Bella has been introduced relative to her father the king, we would not say that *her father* in the fourth sentence has (primary) topic function: the sentence is intuitively about Bella, introduced in the previous sentence. Note that the sentence *He was her best friend* would be unacceptable as a fourth sentence in [71], whereas the sentence *He loved her most of all* would be acceptable, as well as the full version *Her father was her best friend*. The first of the acceptable sentences would re-establish the "father" as the topic, or at least the pair ("the father", "the daughter"). In the second acceptable sentence the expression *her father* may not be pro-nominalized, apparently because it does not express a topic but part of the comment, where *she* or *her best friend* are topic (or derived topic).

The difficulty arising in these cases seems in part due to the fact that the establishment of topic function in individual sentences with several bound elements also depends on what could be called the topic of the passage, or the topic of discourse in general. Thus, in [71] we intuitively know that in the third sentence the topic of the discourse changes to the daughter. This is not the case for "intermediary" sentences such as *She was very pretty* after which "Peter" can still stay topic of the discourse taken as an earlier example. How topics of (parts of) discourse are to be denned is a problem for the next chapter. It will be provisionally assumed however that if a phrase has topic function and if a phrase in the next sentence is co-referential with it, then the topic will be "continued". A change of topic seems to follow automatically with reference to previously identified things referred to by comment-phrases:

[72] a: *I am looking for my typewriter.*

b: *It is no longer on my desk.*

Whereas the contextually identified "I" is assigned topic function in [72]a the topic is changed to the argument referring to the typewriter in [72]b. It will, however, be difficult to maintain that since "I" is assigned topic in [72]a this topic remains the same in the subsequent sentence:

[72] c: *I do not see it in my office.*

which seems to be also about the typewriter (as is indicated by the pro-nominalization *it*). As before, we thus must assume that sets or ordered pairs may be topics in a sentence (if no further information is established about topicality by the whole passage/discourse).

Note, incidentally, that arguments referring to identified members of the context (e.g. speaker and hearer) need not be explicitly introduced into the discourse in order to be topic. With normal ordering and stress they always have topic function.

Note also that not all definite noun phrases must express topic function. Definite noun phrases are also used in those cases where there is obviously only one object of the kind in the universe of the particular discourse. In order to become topic, however, such individuals must first be introduced into the set of referents:

[73] *Leonard ran off with the maid.*

Here "the maid" may well belong to the comment.

6.6

It is not easy to draw unambiguous CONCLUSIONS from these observations about the topic-comment articulation in sentences, not even for sentences in (con-)text. We have a clear formal criterion, viz [64], possibly corresponding to a cognitive principle of information expansion, but our intuitions do not always seem to match with these rules. At the same time it is not simple to distinguish at this point between sentential topics, on the one hand, and sequential or discourse topics on the other hand. [...] Besides the referential conditions stated above, the assignment of sentential topic function also seems to be determined by rules of topic continuity and topic change, and further by pragmatic factors like "interest", "importance" or "relevance", rather vague notions to be further discussed in Chap-

ter 8. It has been clear in this last section that certain problems of discourse semantics are still very puzzling: even if there are some fairly general rules, there are many very subtle differences which seem to obey other constraints.

(pp. 114-126)

Questions:

1. How do topic-comment and subject-predicate distinctions correlate?
2. Should topic and comment be viewed as semantic, pragmatic, logical or formal?
3. What are the functions of topic and comment in a sentence?
4. Is there any correspondence between topic and presupposition? Do these notions fully coincide? What differentiates them?
5. What procedures help recognize the topic and the comment of a sentence?
6. What is "topicalization"? What is its function?
7. What is the significance of propositions for informational processing?

2.

Johnson L. Meaning and Speech Act Theory

"Words have meaning." This seems to be about as simple and clear an assertion of a factual state of affairs as any statement that one can make. On closer inspection however, it merely raises the question as to what "meaning" is. If in saying: "Words have meaning" one intends to convey the idea that meaning is a property of words in the same way that a dog has four legs and a tail, then I would suggest that the speaker has a rather inaccurate notion of what meaning is. In order to clarify the nature of meaning, this paper will examine how speech act theory explains some of the many different ways in which meaning is communicated through speech acts. However, before doing that, it is important to give some consideration to the ontological status of words and meaning so as to avoid some of the common misconceptions which seem to be associated with this type of analysis.

First, it should be noted that words are not "objects" or "things" that have properties of their own in the same way that actually existing things do. Words are relational entities. Which is to say that words are composed of parts that are not integrated by any form or structure intrinsic to the word itself. The symbols (marks/sounds) which taken together constitute a word, make the word real insofar as it exists outside the mind; but, as vibrations in the air or as marks on paper, words exist as relational entities and not as actual things. This is due to the fact that the medium which carries the word is not proportionate to the idea or concept which constitutes the form of the word. All that the air or paper and ink can carry is the symbolic representation of the actual form which is understood within the mind, and not the form itself.

When a word is spoken or written it becomes a relational entity which lacks the power to do or to cause anything. While it is true that the vibrations in the air or the marks on a piece of paper can stimulate the senses, a word as such cannot cause knowledge. As Augustine noted:

We learn nothing by means of these signs we call words. On the contrary, as I said, we learn the force of the word, that is the meaning which lies in the sound of the word, when we come to know the object signified by the word. Then only do we perceive that the word was a sign conveying that meaning.

The person who hears or sees the word must already know what it means if she is to be able to understand it. That is why, if someone does not understand the meaning of a word, you must explain it using other words which she does understand, give examples, or point to some real thing so that she can come to know what it is that you are talking about. If human beings could directly cause knowledge in one another, then we would communicate through a direct spiritual contact such that one person would be able to directly infuse a specific form into the mind of another. Since that is not how we communicate however, it is clear that our words do not directly cause knowledge to appear in the mind of another. Instead, our words are tokens or signs which can only function as a formal cause in that if the other person already knows what the word means, she will be able to recognize it and form the appropriate concept in her own mind.

Communication between human beings, therefore, involves an active receptivity on the part of the hearer and not a mere passivity. The spoken or written word does not directly actualize some potency in the mind of the receiver. Rather, it prompts him or her to look at things in a new way so as to be able to form new concepts and thereby grow in understanding. Thus, words are not in themselves "things" which cause knowledge, but relational entities which carry the value of meaning. It is meaning which must be present for communication to occur. It follows that, although words are not actual things, and as such, are not the efficient cause of the knowledge one gains through the use of language, words do have value. Their value lies precisely in the meaning which they carry.

It is important to note that the concept which gives a word its meaning is only joined to the word in the mind of the person who understands it. The spoken or written word is in itself, just a symbol which must have a concept attached to it; first, by the person who speaks or writes the word, and secondly, by the person who hears or reads the word. So it is that the meaning which a word has is totally subject dependent, both from the standpoint of the person who speaks a word, and from that of the person who hears it.

The meaning of a word is something which is simply projected onto the token which carries it. This is done, not only by the person who first speaks the word, but also by the person who hears it. Therefore, if any meaningful communication is to occur between persons, there must be at least some intersubjective agreement as to what the words mean, given the context in which they are used. The fact that there are many different languages and many different words which all can be used to refer to the same thing, shows just how subjective the whole process of communication through the use of words really is. If it were not for definitions, grammar, and all the other rules concerning how to use a particular language, we would hardly be able to communicate with each other at all.

Given the relational status of words, and the subject dependency of the meanings which they carry, one should anticipate a degree of complexity to the word - meaning relation that would render any simplistic or reductionist theory of meaning untenable. It is for this reason that speech act theory becomes very helpful at this point be-

cause it reveals how a difference in use also entails a difference in meaning. The distinction which J.L. Austin makes between locutionary, illocutionary, and perlocutionary acts illustrates this point very well. Austin writes:

We first distinguished a group of things we do in saying something, which together we summed up by saying we perform a *locutionary act*, such which is roughly equivalent to uttering a certain sentence with a certain sense and reference, which again is roughly equivalent to "meaning" in the traditional sense. Second, we said that we also perform *illocutionary acts* such as informing, ordering, warning, undertaking, etc., i.e. utterances which have a certain (conventional) force. Thirdly, we may also *perform perlocutionary acts*: what we bring about or achieve *by* saying something, such as convincing, persuading, deterring, and even, say, surprising or misleading. Here we have three, if not more, different senses or dimensions of the "use of a sentence" or of "the use of language" (and, of course, there are others also).

The illocutionary force is of course, distinct from "meaning" in the sense in which Austin uses the word. Even if the force of an expression is determined primarily by using the expression according to some established convention, however, it also seems to be the case that the force is attached to and carried by an utterance in much the same way as the sense and reference are, except that the force is attached through a social convention, while sense is attached through a linguistic convention, and reference is attached intentionally by the speaker.

For example, if I say to a friend: "I promise that I will help you paint your house on Saturday." I use the sentence to refer to myself (I), another person (you), an activity (paint), an object (your house), a time (Saturday), and a condition (help). Thus, I intentionally fix the reference of these words, which in turn means that specific definitions of words are applicable in this situation and others are not. The word "promise" is added in order to clarify the illocutionary force of the sentence so that my friend knows that I am undertaking an obligation to help him and am not merely expressing an intention or making a prediction about what I will probably do on Saturday. All of this taken together and spoken within an appropriate context is what I mean by the sentence and is the meaning which the sentence has when I speak it.

It is true that the meaning of an utterance is not complete apart from an inclusion of the illocutionary force as an aspect of the meaning of the utterance.

The principle that the meaning of a sentence is entirely determined by the meaning of its meaningful parts I take as obviously true; what is not so obviously true, however, is that these include more than words (or morphemes) and surface word order. The meaningful components of a sentence include also its deep syntactic structure and the stress and intonation contour of its utterance. Words and word order are not the only elements which determine meaning.

The speech act or acts performed in the utterance of a sentence are in general a function of the meaning of the sentence. The meaning of a sentence does not in all cases uniquely determine what speech act is performed in a given utterance of that sentence, for a speaker may mean more than what he actually says, but it is always in principle possible for him to say exactly what he means.

When speaker meaning and the literal meaning of a sentence coincide the meaning of a sentence is that which is in accord with all of the relevant linguistic and social conventions which apply to the normal use of the sentence. If a speaker uses a sentence metaphorically, however, he gives the sentence a metaphorical meaning such that it does not have a literal meaning unless a hearer misinterprets the speaker and takes the sentence literally and gives it a literal interpretation. In which case, the hearer has misunderstood the speaker by paying more attention to the linguistic conventions associated with the sentence than to the intentions of the speaker.

Questions:

1. What speaks for the fact that a word is a relational entity?
2. What do flexibility and intersubjectivity of the word meaning involve?
3. What is meant by locutionary, illocutionary, and perlocutionary acts?
4. What are the constituents of sentence meaning?
5. What determines the meaning of a sentence?

3.

Searle J.R.

Speech Acts. An Essay in the Philosophy of Language

Chapter 2. Expressions, Meaning, and Speech Acts

The hypothesis then of this work is that speaking a language is engaging in a rule-governed form of behavior. To put it more briskly, talking is performing acts according to rules. In order to substantiate that hypothesis and explicate speech, I shall state some of the rules according to which we talk. The procedure which I shall follow is to state a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for the performance of particular kinds of speech acts and then extract from those conditions sets of semantic rules for the use of the linguistic devices which mark the utterances as speech acts of those kinds. That is a rather bigger task than perhaps it sounds, and this chapter will be devoted to preparing the ground for it by introducing distinctions between *different kinds of speech acts*, and discussing the notions of *propositions, rules, meaning, and facts*.

2.1 Expressions and Kinds of Speech Acts

Let us begin this phase of our inquiry by making some distinctions which naturally suggest themselves to us as soon as we begin to reflect on simple speech situations. (The simplicity of the sentences in our examples will not detract from the generality of the distinctions we are trying to make.) Imagine a speaker and a hearer and suppose that in appropriate circumstances the speaker utters one of the following sentences:

1. *Sam smokes habitually.*
2. *Does Sam smoke habitually?*
3. *Sam, smoke habitually!*
4. *Would that Sam smoked habitually.*

Now let us ask how we might characterize or describe the speaker's utterance of one of these. What shall we say the speaker is doing when he utters one of these?

One thing is obvious: anyone who utters one of these can be said to have uttered a sentence formed of words in the English language. But clearly this is only the beginning of a description, for the speaker in uttering one of these is characteristically saying something and not merely mouthing words. In uttering 1 a speaker is making (what philosophers call) an assertion, in 2 asking a question, in 3 giving an order, and in 4 (a somewhat archaic form) expressing a wish - or desire. And in the performance of each of these four different acts the speaker performs certain other acts which are common to all four: in uttering any of these the speaker *refers to* or mentions or designates a certain object Sam, and he predicates the expression "smokes habitually" (or one of its inflections) of the object referred to. Thus we shall say that in the utterance of all four the reference and predication are the same, though in each case the same reference and predication occur as part of a complete speech act which is different from any of the other three. We thus detach the notions of referring and predicating from the notions of such complete speech acts as asserting, questioning, commanding, etc., and the justification for this separation lies in the fact that the same reference and predication can occur in the performance of different complete speech acts. Austin baptized these complete speech acts with the name "illocutionary acts", and I shall henceforth employ this terminology⁸. Some of the English verbs denoting illocutionary acts are "state", "describe", "assert", "warn", "remark", "comment", "command", "order", "request", "criticize", "apologize", "censure", "approve", "welcome", "promise", "object", "demand", and "argue". Austin claimed there were over a thousand such expressions in English⁹.

The first upshot of our preliminary reflections, then, is that in the utterance of any of the four sentences in the example a speaker is characteristically performing at least three distinct kinds of acts: (a) the

⁸ J.L. Austin. *How to Do Things with Words* (Oxford, 1962). I employ the expression, "illocutionary act", with some misgivings, since I do not accept Austin's distinction between *locutionary* and *illocutionary* acts.

⁹ Austin, *op. cit.* p. 149.

uttering of words (morphemes, sentences); (b) referring and predicating; (c) stating, questioning, commanding, promising, etc.

Let us assign names to these under the general heading of speech acts:

- (a) Uttering words (morphemes, sentences) = performing *utterance acts*.
- (b) Referring and predicating = *performing propositional acts*.
- (c) Stating, questioning, commanding, promising, etc. = performing *illocutionary acts*.

I am not saying, of course, that these are separate things that speakers do, as it happens, simultaneously, as one might smoke, read and scratch one's head simultaneously, but rather that in performing an illocutionary act one characteristically performs propositional acts and utterance acts. Nor should it be thought from this that utterance acts and propositional acts stand to illocutionary acts in the way buying a ticket and getting on a train stand to taking a railroad trip. They are not means to ends; rather, utterance acts stand to propositional and illocutionary acts in the way in which, e.g., making an "X" on a ballot paper stands to voting.

The point of abstracting each of these kinds is that the "identity criteria" are different in each case. We have already seen that the same propositional acts can be common to different illocutionary acts, and it is obvious that one can perform an utterance act without performing a propositional or illocutionary act at all. (One can utter words without saying anything.) And similarly, if we consider the utterance of a sentence such as:

5. *Mr Samuel Martin is a regular smoker of tobacco.* we can see reasons for saying that in certain contexts a speaker in uttering it would be performing the same propositional act as in 1-4 (reference and predication would be the same), the same illocutionary act as 1 (same statement or assertion is made), but a different utterance act from any of the first four since a different sentence containing none of the same words and only some of the same morphemes, is uttered. Thus, in performing different utterance acts, a speaker may perform the same propositional and illocutionary acts. Nor, of course, need the performance of the same utterance act by two different speakers, or by the same speaker on different occasions, be a performance of the same proposi-

tional and illocutionary acts: the same sentence may, e.g., be used to make two different statements. Utterance acts consist simply in uttering strings of words. Illocutionary and propositional acts consist characteristically in uttering words in sentences in certain contexts, under certain conditions and with certain intentions, as we shall see later on.

So far I make no claims for dividing things up this way, other than its being a permissible way to divide them - vague though this may be. In particular, I do not claim that it is the only way to divide things. For example, for certain purposes one might wish to break up what I have called utterance acts into phonetic acts, phonemic acts, morphemic acts, etc. And, of course, for most purposes, in the science of linguistics it is not necessary to speak of acts at all. One can just discuss phonemes, morphemes, sentences, etc.

To these three notions I now wish to add Austin's notion of the *perlocutionary act*. Correlated with the notion of illocutionary acts is the notion of the consequences or *effects* such acts have on the actions, thoughts, or beliefs, etc. of hearers. For example, by arguing I may *persuade* or *convince* someone, by warning him I may *scare* or *alarm* him, by making a request I may *get him to do something*, by informing him I may *convince him* (*enlighten, edify, inspire him, get him to realize*). The italicized expressions above denote perlocutionary acts.

Correlative with the notion of propositional acts and illocutionary acts, respectively, are certain kinds of expressions uttered in their performance: the characteristic grammatical form of the illocutionary act is the complete sentence (it can be a one-word sentence); and the characteristic grammatical form of the propositional acts are parts of sentences: grammatical predicates for the act of predication, and proper names, pronouns, and certain other sorts of noun phrases for reference. Propositional acts cannot occur alone; that is, one cannot *just* refer and predicate without making an assertion or asking a question or performing some other illocutionary act. The linguistic correlate of this point is that sentences, not words, are used to say things. This is also what Frege meant when he said that only in the context of a sentence do words have reference - "Nur im Zusammenhang eines Satzes bedeuten die Wörter etwas."¹⁰ The same thing in my terminology: One only refers as part of

G. Frege. Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik (Breslau, 1884), p. 73.

the performance of an illocutionary act, and the grammatical clothing of an illocutionary act is the complete sentence. An utterance of a referring expression only counts as referring if one says something.

(pp. 22-25)

Questions:

1. What makes communicative behaviour orderly?
2. What types of speech acts are singled out by J. Austin? What modification does J.R. Searle introduce into J. Austin's classification of speech acts? Define different types of speech acts.
3. What is specific for perlocutionary acts?

4.

Kraustein Q., Hoffmann A., Schentke M.

English Grammar. A University Handbook

2.2. Content and Form of Sentences

2.2.0. General

Sentences were explained [...] as the prime object of our grammatical description. They combine information and situation in a dialectical unit, which can be used in various ways in communication.

The **content** of sentences is outlined as


- communicational frame,
- prepositional content.

Its formal reflection - together with the elements and constituents [...] is described in terms of

- communication types,
- relation types.

2.2.1. Communicational frame

Every description of some state-of-affairs (in the form of a sentence) is made in a communicational situation - speaker/writer, hearer/reader, situation, intention. This embedding in a communicational situation is called the **communicational frame of the sentence** (CF):



The communicational frame reflects what the speaker/writer wants to effect with his utterance and how the hearer/reader is influenced by it, where and when the speaker/writer utters something about objective reality and his psychic attitude to either hearer/reader or objective reality or both.

The communicational frame may be analysed into the following properties and relations contained in it:

- (1) Partner-oriented relations between speaker/writer and hearer/reader,
- (2) Context-oriented relations between speaker/writer and prepositional content,
- (3) Speaker-oriented properties of the speaker/writer himself.

(1) Partner-oriented relations affecting the sentence as a whole include the speaker/writer's **intent** to inform the hearer/reader (which is called assertion), to have this information confirmed, negated or completed by the hearer/reader (which is called inquiry) or to make the hearer/reader implement the action plan contained in this information (which is called request). These types of intent are reflected by declarative, imperative sentences, questions (communication types of sentences) and their phonological/orthographical features:

I've just stepped off the plane.

How the hell should I?

Ask the stewardess, ask the captain, ask a dozen of people!

Again affecting the whole sentence, the speaker/writer's perspective of communication selects certain parts of the information to make them the theme of communication, or not, as the case may be. This is reflected by re-ordering of sentence parts, voice, non-specified constituents and others:

At first you think of it as just a matter of growing bigger. Then ... you may think of it as "learning tricks", vs.: You think of it at first... You may think then ...

We have been informed of the killing, vs.: *They have informed us* ... The whole of the sentence is subject to the speaker/writer's tendency towards comprehensibility and economy for the benefit of the hearer/reader, which is reflected by expansive, effective, circumstantial complex sentences, reductions, (pro)nominalizations, etc.: *Our ancestors stood up because they had found more useful things to do with their hands than walking on them*, vs.: *They had found more useful things to do ... The things could be done with their hands* (comprehensibility of expressing an explicative relation, reduction by means of to-phrase), *they had found more useful things to do ...* vs.: *The things were very useful to do...* *Walking on hands was not so useful* (comprehensibility of expressing a comparative relation, reduction by means of ing-phrase), *our* vs.: *the writer and the reader have ancestors* (pronominalization by "we", comprehensibility of expressing an explicative relation, reduction by means of nominalization), *they* vs.: *the ancestors* (pronominalization by "they", not expressing a relation type). The speaker/writer's partner-oriented volition mainly concerns the verb phrase/verb and is reflected by modal verbs and their analogues, respectively:

Shall I put those on here? (obligation - command) ... *the Well Hall... should be made safe* (obligation - advice) / *am to speak to you* (obligation - invitation) *May I ask you a question?* (permission - polite) *You can sleep here if you like* (permission - informal) (2) Context-oriented relations are, for instance, reflected through the speaker/writer's local and temporal situation within noun, adverbial and prepositional phrases, respectively. His local situation (person and locality) is reflected by pronouns, determiners, local adverbs, etc.: *There were two others aboard that plane* vs.: *this plane* *A t first you think of it as just a matter of growing bigger* vs.: *I think of it Then I will be able to wear a small earring* vs.: *now I am able...* His temporal situation (tense and temporality) is reflected by verbs, temporal adverbs, prepositions, etc.:

He's celebrating that period millions of years ago when man's ancestors got up off all fours vs.: *this period ... now when I get up...* [...]

The verb phrase is again affected by the speaker/writer's **valuation** of the propositional content as possible, necessary, existent or

not, as the case may be. This is reflected by mood, modal verbs and their analogues, adverbs, etc.:

Long live the workers' revolution! vs.: *live*

You may think of it as "learning tricks" (possibility)

You've got to wear boots as well (necessity)

It's really more complicated... than that (existence)

Within the verb phrase, the speaker/writer's **affirmation** and confirmation intensify or simply confirm an utterance. This is done by special finites in combination with stress and intonation:

I longed to speak out, and in the end I did speak.

He was discretion itself. All top people are.

The war is really over, isn't it, eh Mother?

The speaker/writer's decision on **countability, definiteness and comparability** of objective quantity and quality concerns only noun and adjective, or adverb, respectively. It is reflected by number, determiners and degree of comparison:

substances... escaping... into food, water and the air vs.: *in British waters* (countability)

... even if these tenants receive a subsidy ... the subsidy (definiteness) *will only go to pay, or partly pay, those considerable rent rises.*

Her face went white vs.: *The washing was whiter* (comparability) *than ever.*

Countability may be looked upon from the aspects of continuity or discontinuity, that which is formless or has form, and thus is non-articulate or articulate, and if so, mass or unit/specimen. These aspects are contained in the meaning of nouns and expressed by various types of determiners:

much water (continuous, formless, non-articulate, mass = non-countable) vs.: *many people* (discontinuous, having form, articulate, specimen = countable)

(3) Of speaker-oriented properties, the speaker/writer's **emotionality** concerns sentence, phrase and word and is reflected by exclamation, re-ordering and by phonological/orthographical features:

"Good God!" I said. "Did I do that? ... I'm terribly sorry. " vs.: *"Well, that may happen. Sorry. "*

There were four people on the platform and the first of them ... I recognized at once, vs.: *I recognized the first of them at once.*

Seminars on Theoretical English Grammar

The verb phrase/verb is concerned with the speaker/writer's 302 speaker-oriented volition reflected by modal verbs and their analogues:

Whether this is a valid assumption or not we will not discuss at this point.

Neither the airline nor the Federal Bureau of Investigation would say whether the ransom had been paid.

Again, the verb phrase/verb is subject to the speaker/writer's involvement reflected by the morphological category of aspect (expanded or plain form):

each child ... is retracing the whole history of mankind he's celebrating that period million of years ago the baby is learning to use his fingers with skill vs.: each child retraces ... he celebrates... the baby learns...

2.2.2. Propositional Content

As stated earlier, the communicational frame of the sentences embraces, as it were, its propositional content. The proposition is the reflection of a state-of-affairs and consists of reference and predication. Reference is the denotation of a thing, person or idea, predication assigns a property or relation to the denoted thing, person or idea.

Therefore, propositional content may be described as references to things, persons, ideas and their predication in terms of properties of, and relations between them in objective reality:

propositional content		
reference	predication	reference
to thing, person, idea (= propositional roles)	of property, relation (= propositional predicate)	to thing, person, idea (= propositional roles)
property relation	<i>Somebody</i> <i>is</i> <i>does</i>	<i>something</i> <i>something</i>

Predication may be looked upon as the script of a stage-play and references as its roles. Here, the propositional predicate stands for verbal meaning and the propositional roles for the meaning of its partners in the sentence. This shall be illustrated by some verbs of locomotion of man through air: "move, fly, helicopter". The predicate and roles concerned may be shortly described as follows:


Verbs of motion, here: *move /fly /helicopter*- predicate: MOTIONAL

Person moving something, here: *the pilot* = role: AGENTIVE Thing moved by = role: OBJECTIVE = role: MEDIUM = role: INSTRUMENTAL = role: GOAL

Seminar 10. Actual Division of the Sentence


somebody, here: *the mail* Medium of motion, here: *through the air* Instrument of motion, here: *in a helicopter* Goal of motion, here: *to the city*

Predicates and roles may be illustrated by way of a hexagon (with a line each for a role or semantic feature of the verb, respectively), so that verbal meaning and the meaning of its partners are simultaneously represented in each figure (----- = empty; ----- = filled):




move the pilot, the main, through the air, in a helicopter, to the city


Sentence: *The pilot moved the mail through the air in a helicopter to the city.*



fly (MEDIUM) Sentence: *The pilot flew the mail in a helicopter to the city.*




helicopter (MEDIUM, INSTRUMENTAL) the pilot, the mail, to the city




move the pilot, the main, through the air, in a helicopter, to the city

Sentence: *The pilot moved the mail through the air in a helicopter to the city.*



fly (MEDIUM) the pilot, the mail, in a helicopter, to the city

Sentence: *The pilot flew the mail in a helicopter to the city.*



helicopter (MEDIUM, INSTRUMENTAL) the pilot, the mail, to the city

Sentence: *The pilot helicoptered the mail to the city.*

the pilot, the mail, in a helicopter, to the city

As may be seen in the figures, the meaning of "move" is supplemented by its partners in all five places in the sentence. The meaning of "fly", however, includes in itself MEDIUM (air) and is therefore, as a rule, supplemented by four partners only. And similarly for "helicopter", which includes in itself MEDIUM (air) and INSTRUMENTAL (helicopter) and is accordingly only supplemented by three partners. This shows that the verb and its partners are supplementary in that they contain certain corresponding places (in meaning or predicate) to be filled (by semantic features or verbal partners) to form a grammatical sentence. Any place filled in the verbal meaning cannot be sensibly filled by verbal partners and vice versa, or only at the risk e.g. of tautology:

The pilot helicoptered (MEDIUM - air, INSTRUMENTAL - helicopter) through the air / in a helicopter.

Negation

Within prepositional content, negation concerns the prepositional predicate and/or its roles (examples with "not"):

- (1) the entire prepositional content is negated (sentence negation) - *John will not sell the car (but Mary will buy the house).*
- (2) the predicate is negated (negation of the verb) - *John will not sell the car (but he will buy it).*
- (3) the roles are negated (negation of verbal partners) - *John will sell not the car, but the house. Not John will sell the car but Mary will.*

Negation may also be expressed by other "n"-words, restrictives and semantic negatives. [...]

Roles contain the semantic features of

- abstract : concrete, animate : inanimate, human : non-human, etc. These are reflected in noun phrases and elements of complex sentences:
 - abstract - *peace* : concrete - *this ship*
 - animate - *the cow* : inanimate - *our ship*
 - human - *John/the man, who* : non-human - *our cow*
- quantified : non-quantified, graded : non-graded. These are reflected in noun, adjectival and adverbial phrase:
 - quantified - *all/three* : non-quantified - *any*
 - graded - *very useful* : non-graded - *triangular*

- local, temporal, causal, etc. These are reflected in adverbial and prepositional phrase and complex sentences: local - *here/there/at this/that place*

She ran into the house where the baby was crying.

temporal - *now/then/at this/that time*

She ran into the house when the baby was crying.


causal - *for this/that reason*

You can't have any tea because I haven't put on the kettle yet.

Within predicates, processes developing in time and modality are reflected by the semantic features of past-present-future and necessity-reality-possibility, respectively, in the verb phrase: past - *The men wanted tea* present - *The men want tea* future - *The men will want tea* necessity - *All men must die* reality - *I'm making a salad for supper* possibility - *I can sleep 10-12 hours every night*

2.2.3. Communication Type

One of the forms in which the communicational frame (CF) and prepositional content (PC) are reflected is **the communication type of sentence** (CT). It occurs together with the sentence base:



This diagram does not represent the constituent structure of syntactic units, but is intended to illustrate the interplay of meaning (semantics) and form (syntax). Part of this interplay is, for example, that elements described within the propositional content (negation, non-subjective modality) are expressed in the communication type and that elements described in the communicational frame (local, temporal, situationing, etc.) are expressed in the sentence base.

The communication type is a combination of different features. Due to factors in PC and CF, communication types may be grouped together as declarative, question, imperative (intent), negated (negation), exclamatory, affirmed (emotionality), reduced (economy) and re-ordered (perspective). This communicational diversity is also reflected in their syntactic structures by different combinability of sentence types. Thus declarative, question and imperative exclude each other (due to different intent), while the other types combine with them in a cumulative way.

For the sake of the foreign learner, we basically proceed from a standard sentence type as an expression of CT elements. The standard sentence type for the speaker/writer's intent is as follows:

(assertion) declarative:

At first you think of it as just a matter of growing bigger.

(inquiry) question:

Do you at first think of it as just a matter of growing bigger?

(request) imperative:

At first think of it as just a matter of growing bigger.

Communicational deviations from this standard type are declarative sentences used for expressing an inquiry or request and questions used for expressing an assertion or request:

(assertion) question:

Don't you at first think of it as just a matter of growing bigger?

(inquiry) declarative:

At first you think of it as just a matter of growing bigger?

(request) question:

Won't you at first think of it as just a matter of growing bigger?

declarative:

At first you think of it as just a matter of growing bigger.

Negated, exclamatory, affirmed, reduced and re-ordered are combined with the above three sentence types in a cumulative way:

Father wanted his dinner. CT

declarative

- negative
- reduced
- affirmed
- re-ordered.

Didn't want his dinner! CT

declarative + negative


- + reduced
- affirmed
- re-ordered

Didn't Father want his dinner? CT

yes/no question +

- negative
- reduced
- affirmed
- re-ordered

A syntactic diagram of the sentence "Did Father want his dinner?" would be as follows (constituent structure of the sentence base is not given in detail):



(pp. 40-49)

Questions:

1. How do the authors define the communicational frame and prepositional content?

2. What relations constitute the communicationai frame? Dwell on each type of the relations.
3. What are the components of the prepositional content of the sentence?
4. What semantic features of roles and predication do the authors single out?
5. What sentence types do the authors recognize? In what way does their classification of sentence types differ from the traditional classification of communicative sentence types?

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Seminar 11

SIMPLE SENTENCE: CONSTITUENT STRUCTURE

1. The notion of sentence. The sentence as a language unit. The two aspects of the sentence. The notions of predication and modality.
2. Structural classifications of simple sentences:
 - a) one-member and two-member sentences; different approaches to the interpretation of one-member sentences; the notion of a predicative line;
 - b) complete and elliptical sentences: representation and substitution; the problems of differentiation of one-member and elliptical sentences;
 - c) structural classification of simple sentences: according to the number of predicative lines, according to the type of the subject; the notions of an elementary sentence and of an extended sentence.
3. Sentence parts classification:
 - a) the traditional scheme of sentence parsing; the main sentence parts (the subject and the predicate, their types); secondary sentence parts (attribute, object, adverbial modifier, parenthetical enclosure, address ing enclosure, interjectional enclosure);
 - b) the model of immediate constituents (the IC-model).
4. Functional classification of sentence constituents. The notion of situational semantics of the sentence, "the deep case" ("semantic role"): Agent, Nom inative, Experiencer, Natural Force, Patient, Beneficiary, Object, Dative, Factitive, Cause, Participant, Instrument, Means, Place, Time.

1. Structural Classification of Simple Sentences

In traditional linguistics sentences, according to their structure, are divided into simple and composite, the latter consisting of two or more clauses. The typical English simple sentence is built up by one

"predicative line" realized as the immediate connection between the subject and the predicate of the sentence.

Simple sentences are usually classified into one-member and two-member sentences. This distinction is based on the representation of the main parts of the sentence: sentences having the grammatical subject and the grammatical predicate are termed "two-member" sentences; if sentences have only one of these main parts they are termed "one-member" sentences.

Another structural classification of simple sentences is their classification into complete and elliptical. The language status of the elliptical sentence is a disputable question; many linguists connect the functioning of elliptical sentences with the phenomena of representation and substitution.

2. Analysis of Sentence Parts

The study of the constituent structure of the sentence presupposes the analysis of its parts. Traditionally, scholars distinguish between the main and secondary parts of the sentence. Besides, they single out those parts which stand outside the sentence structure. The two generally recognized main parts of the sentence are the subject and the predicate. To the secondary sentence parts performing modifying functions linguists usually refer object, adverbial modifier, attribute, apposition, predicative, parenthetical enclosure, and addressing enclosure.

The description of sentence parts is usually based upon semantic and syntactic criteria and is supplemented by the correlation of sentence parts and parts of speech.

3. IC-Model of the Sentence

Building up the "model of immediate constituents" is a particular kind of analysis which consists in dividing the sentence into two groups: the subject group and the predicate group, which, in their turn, are divided into their subgroup constituents according to the successive subordinative order of the constituents. The advantage of the IC-model is that it exposes the binary hierarchical principle of subordinative construction. The widely used version of the IC-model is the "IC-derivation tree". It shows the groupings of sentence constituents by means of branching nodes: the nodes symbolize

phrase-categories as unities, while the branches mark their division into constituents.

Questions:

1. What do the structural classifications of simple sentences reveal?
2. What does the difference between the one-member and the two-member sentence consist in?
3. What makes up the basis for identifying the elliptical sentence?
4. What sentence parts are usually identified?
5. What criteria is the description of sentence parts based on?
6. What does the IC-model of the sentence show?

I. State the structural type of the sentences.

MODEL: "Who is poor in love? No one."

The first sentence is a complete two-member (two-axis) sentence, the second sentence is elliptical (one-axis).

a)

1. If you wish to destroy yourself, pray do so. Don't expect me to sit by and watch you doing so (Hardwick).
2. "Don't they look nice?" she said. "One from last year and one from this, they just do. Save you buying a pair." (Lawrence)
3. She intended to come on Sunday. But never did (Lawrence).
4. "They came as valentines," she replied, still not subjugated, even if beat en. "When, to-day?" "The pearl ear-rings to-day - the amethyst brooch last year." (Lawrence)
5. Waves. Small sounds as of soft complaint. Cedars. Deep-blue sky. He was suddenly aware of a faint but all-penetrating sense of loss (Fitzgerald).
6. Scene I. A room in Harley Street furnished as the Superintendent's office in a Nursing Home (Christie).
7. "How on earth did she do a thing like that?" "Does it for fun. Always doing it." (Christie)
8. "Don't get rattles, Peter." (Chesterton)

b)

1. Do you know Opperton Heath? You do? (Priestley)
2. Not a soul in sight. Very quiet (Priestley).
3. "Well, what does she feel for me?" "Indifference, I should say." (Maugham)

4. "You swine. Don't you see what a position I'm in?" (Maugham)
5. "You put the detectives on. I want to know the truth." "I won't, George." (Maugham)
6. "The world moves so quickly and people's memories are so short. They'll forget." "I shan't forget." (Maugham)
7. "Now, help yourself, Mr. Holohan!" (Joyce)
8. Something was stirring in the depths of her subconscious. A happy anticipation - a recognition. Measles. Yes, measles. Something to do with measles (Christie).

c)

1. "Who sat for you?" "Well, no one." (Saroyan)
 2. "I couldn't start by telling him what he could and couldn't do." "Why not?" (Fitzgerald)
 3. "Tell me about your plans, Michael." (Fitzgerald)
 4. "Do you live in Paris?" "For the moment." (Fitzgerald)
 5. "What is the name of your book?" "Yes'." "An excellent title." (Saroyan)
 6. "Your damned money was my armor. My Swift and my Armor." "Don't." (Hemingway)
 7. "Let's not quarrel any more. No matter how nervous we get." (Hemingway)
 8. Anthea was Tuppence's god-daughter - and Anthea's daughter Jane was at school - her first term - and it was Prize Giving and Anthea had rung up - her two younger children had come out in a measles rash and she had nobody in the house to help and Jane would be terribly disappointed if nobody came. Could Tuppence possibly? - (Christie)
1. "We have to do everything we can." "You do it," he said. "I'm tired." (Hemingway)
 2. "Where did we stay in Paris?" "At the Crillon. You know that." (Hemingway)
 3. "I'm full of poetry now. Rot and poetry." (Hemingway)
 4. What was in this? A catalogue of old books? (Hemingway)
 5. You spoiled everything. But perhaps he wouldn't (Hemingway).
 6. "Well, aren't you glad?" "About his sister? Of course." (Saroyan)
 7. "My father will help." "I'd rather he didn't." (Saroyan)
 8. That was the house she had seen from the train three years ago. The house she had promised to look for someday - (Christie)

II. Define the type of the subject and the predicate of the following sentences.

MODEL: *It was a cold autumn weather.*

The subject of this sentence "it" is impersonal factual. The predicate "was cold autumn weather" is compound nominal.

a)

1. Car's right outside. You might want to button your coat up, though, it's freezing out there (Baldacci).
2. Good gracious, Mr. Holmes, you are surely not going to leave me in this abrupt fashion! (Doyle)
3. Tomorrow is the examination (Doyle).
4. She began to cry again, but he took no notice (Lawrence).
5. A great flash of anguish went over his body (Lawrence).
6. She walked away from the wall towards the fire, dizzy, white to the lips, mechanically wiping her small, bleeding mouth (Lawrence).
7. He sat motionless (Lawrence).
8. Then, gradually, her breath began to hiss, she shook, and was sobbing silently, in grief for herself. Without looking, he saw. It made his mad desire to destroy her come back (Lawrence).

b)

1. They got back rather late. Miriam, walking home with Geoffrey, watched the moon rise big and red and misty (Lawrence).
2. It felt to her as if she could hear him (Lawrence).
3. The insult went deep into her, right home (Lawrence).
4. There was a pause (Lawrence).
5. At any instant the blow might crash into her (Lawrence).
6. Suddenly a thud was heard at the door down the passage (Lawrence).
7. It's a valentine (Lawrence).
8. "I should like to have a peep at each of them," said Holmes. "Is it possible?" "No difficulty in the world," Soames answered (Doyle).

c)

1. I'm going to take some railway journeys (Christie).
2. There's a tin of pate in the larder (Christie).
3. The question was really purely rhetorical (Christie).
4. The train began to slow down (Christie).
5. It's the kind of house I'd like to live in (Christie).
6. The house must be lived in, but now, at this moment, it was empty (Christie).


7. It was the time when things were beginning to happen to railways (Christie).
8. Someday had come. Someday was tomorrow (Christie).
9. The actual land, of course, might always prove valuable in the future - the repair of derelict houses is seldom profitable (Christie).

d)

1. The angle of approach would be quite different (Christie).
2. There seemed to be a certain cunning about this part of the road system of England (Christie).
3. This must be presumably the front door, though it didn't look like a front door (Christie).
4. The house looked quite different from this side (Christie).
5. One hardly has to imagine anything to explain oneself (Christie).
6. She might be able to do spells (Christie).
7. It was rather dark inside (Christie).
8. I suppose someone must have known all about her (Christie).
9. Their front door had recently been repainted a rather bilious shade of green, if that was accounted to be a merit (Christie).

III. Build up the IC-model of the sentences.

MODEL: *The exhausted boy greeted his father rather unwillingly.*



b) The exhausted boy greeted his father rather unwillingly.

	The	exhausted	boy	greeted	his	father	rather	unwillingly.
		A	N	V	pron	N	D	D
det	NP		VP	NP		D	DP	
	NP-subj.			VP-pred.				

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a)

1. The pearl ear-rings dangled under her rosy ears (Lawrence).
2. The Whistons' kitchen was of fair size (Lawrence).
3. She slowly, abstractedly closed the door in his face (Lawrence).

b)

1. The concert on Thursday night was better attended (Joyce).
2. Soon the name of Kearney began to be heard often on people's lips (Joyce).
3. My good man is packing us off to Skerries for a few weeks (Joyce).

c)

1. The pocketknife's worn bone handle fitted comfortably into his hand (King).
2. His brother-in-law was anathema to him (Sheldon).
3. This large, shambling, good-natured man suddenly frightened her (Christie).

d)

1. The key turned rustily in the lock (Christie).
2. For a moment his mind seemed to separate from his physical self (King).
3. The limousine passed a large park in the center of the city, with sparkling, dancing fountains in the middle (Sheldon).

IV. Analyze the semantic structure of the following sentences, defining the

semantic roles (deep cases) of the underlined constituents.

MODEL: / am the one to hear it.

The semantic structure of the given sentence includes the following semantic roles: the agent (the one), the nominative (I), and the object (it).

a)

1. I am not the man to stop behind after serving you for 20 years (Hag gard).
2. Thereon let him build and stand erect, and not cast himself before the image of some unknown God, modeled like his poor self, but with a bigger brain to think the evil thing, and a longer arm to do it (Hag gard).
3. There was a bit of a battle to be fought between the two women (Lawrence).
4. There is nothing to be alarmed about (Christie).

5. Whether it was a sick peon in one of the little houses... or the yellow, yellow beewax to be made into little bowlfuls, or the turkey to be overlooked, she saw to it along with Teresa (Lawrence). . 6. For 2000 years I had none to converse with (Haggard).

b)

1. I had something to hold to, but my arm was nearly torn from its socket by the strain (Haggard).
2. I love a good detective story... Give me a lady in evening dress, just streaming with diamonds, lying on the library floor with a dagger in her heart, and I know Pm going to have a treat (Maugham).
3. There's something peculiarly attractive to the reader in the murder of a middle-aged gentleman of spotless reputation (Maugham).
4. In America she was almost completely unknown; and though Mr. Carl von Vechten had written an article berating the public for its obtuseness, the public remained callous (Maugham).
5. But the physical mortification of being extremely seasick and the intellectual humiliation of discovering that the inhabitants of that popular seaside resort could not understand her fluent and idiomatic French made her determine not to expose herself a second time to experiences that were at once undignified and unpleasant... (Maugham).
6. Each work she published, a slender volume beautifully printed and bound in white buckram, was hailed as a masterpiece, always to the length of a column, and in the weekly reviews which you see only in the dusty library of a very-long-established club even to the extent of a page; and all well-read persons read and praised it (Maugham).

c)

1. There was nothing to suggest that anyone lived in it (Christie).
2. "Thank goodness," Tuppence thought, "this woman is extraordinarily easy to talk to. One hardly has to imagine anything to explain oneself." (Christie)
3. But it is a comfortable house to live in (Christie).
4. Poor children, they don't know any better, I suppose. Can't think of anything more amusing to do than to smash things (Christie).
5. "I never believed a word of that myself. That Badcock girl would say anything. We weren't listening much to hearsay and stories just then - we'd had other things to worry about." (Christie)
6. Wish I had Tommy here to talk to (Christie).

d)

1. Probably the best thing to do would be to ask his wife, his widow rather (Christie).
2. Tommy told his story without undue apologies for the triviality of it. Ivor, he knew, was not a man to despise triviality (Christie).
3. Anyway, Miss Packard is very efficient and she has all the means to hand whereby she could produce a nice natural death without suspicion (Christie).
4. "Quite a handy weapon," she said. She put it down. "Just the thing to cosh anyone with from behind." (Christie)
5. Going down there she had been absorbed in a magazine she had bought, but coming back she had had nothing to read, and she had looked out of the window until, exhausted by the activities of the day, and the pressure of her shoes, she had dropped off to sleep (Christie).
6. She parked the car by the side of the road, got out and went over to look through the ironwork of the gate (Christie).

Selected Reader

1.

Hill A. Introduction to

Linguistic Structures

Main Sentence Elements. Subject and Subjectival

2. Simple Subject and Subjectival

The first main sentence element is the subject. It is a construction bounded by a juncture point with minimal linkage, and must occur in a sentence in which there is a verb. No nominal sentence element can be identified except in terms of its relation to other sentence elements, so that minimal sentences like "John!" or even "Good boys!" do not contain identifiable elements and will be called elementless sentences.

When the sentence contains recognizable verb material and non-verbal material as well, this nonverbal material can be identified as the subject by the fact that the subject is linked to the verb by the process known as selection. Above we stated that the suffix [-z] occurs in sentences like "He goes" [...]

[...] In defining the subject, the term "selection" means that a gender-bearing noun or pronoun requires the [-z] suffix in any verbal situation where that suffix is possible, and it is this requirement which identifies a noun or pronoun as subject. Thus, in the sentence "Man makes laws", there are two nouns, but only one of them can be replaced by a gender-bearing pronoun: "man" can be replaced by "he", but "laws" only by the genderless "them". It is therefore "man" which bears gender and which has selected the verbal suffix.

In the sentence we have been discussing, it is clear that "man" is the subject. The instances in which a subject selects a distinctive verb form are limited, however. Thus, our sentence can be varied to give: "Men make law. Men make laws. Men made laws. Men made law. Man makes laws. Man makes law. Man made laws. Man made law." That is, out of 8 possible variations in gender-bearing or non-gender-bearing nouns and non-past and past verbs, only two forms have any selection distinguishing which noun is the subject. Selection clearly marks the subject when only one of the nouns can be expressed by a gender pronoun and when the gender suffix is not suppressed.

Thus, it is possible to find a distinctively selected morpheme in only two out of eight sentence types. [...] In ordinary language use, we interpret sentences without resort to variation. If our sentence is "The whale swallowed Jonah", we do not try "whale" in singular and plural and "swallow" in the two forms of the non-past to discover that variation in the form of "whale" controls the variation in the form of the verb.

In sentences of this sort we rely on sentence element order alone, and the significance of sentence element order is quickly shown by variation to "Jonah swallowed the whale". The new order gives us a different subject. The significant order of sentence elements is an important fact of major syntax, which deals with the relation of main sentence elements. [...]

If we define the primary identification of the subject as its features of selection and its sentence element order as secondary, we can use

! these characteristics to make a useful distinction. This is the distinction between subject and subjectival. Sentence elements made up of

- nominals or pronominals which occur in preverbal position but which do not affect the verb form are to be defined as subjectivals. A genuine noun or pronoun will be taken as subject in preverbal position, unless that interpretation is contradicted by the features of selection, in which case the noun or pronoun will be defined as part of the complement, not as a subjectival. In short, genuine nouns and pronouns are either subjects or complements in preverbal position, never subjectivals.

An instance of a subjectival occurs when a pronominal such as "here" occurs before a verb, as in "Here goes!" Such pronominals are extremely common as subjectivals: "Which is?" "What does?" None of these are true subjects, since no selection occurs, as variations such as "Which are?" "What do?" prove. When the first position is occupied by a subjectival, there may then be a genuine subject in postverbal position, as in "Here comes the teacher" and "Here come the teachers". Both these sentences are then to be analyzed as subjectival-verb-subject. [...]

Predicator and Predicative

1. Simple Predicator and Predicative

The second main sentence element is the verb, or verbal construction, which we can call the predicator. [...] Syntactically, the predicator can be defined as that sentence element whose form is selected by the subject. Thus we have no difficulty in recognizing the predicator in the following pair of sentences: Man "makes" laws. Men "make" law.

Logically, there is an apparent difficulty in that we have defined subject as that which selects the verb and are now defining the predicator as that which is selected by the subject. The difficulty disappears if we remember the procedure and its steps. In sentences such as "Man makes laws" or "The little girls are going to school", the initial elements are first examined as words or phrases and are identified as containing nouns or nominal constructions. The borders of the construction are further identified by juncture points, the position at which a terminal can occur without pitch linkage by complex

contour. The following material is simply examined and identified as verbal. Only then are the two constructions considered as sentence elements, and since their content has been shown to be different, our definitions are more accurately statable in some such forms as "The subject is that noun or pronoun material which selects the form of the verb" and "The predicator is that verb or verbal material whose form is selected by the subject."

When the predicator is defined in this way, it follows that it is useful to make a distinction which is parallel to that between subject and subjectival. There are forms in the verb paradigm which do not vary with a nominal sentence element which is in the position of subject. Note the lack of variation in the following pair: *The window being open, John felt cold. The windows being open, John felt cold.*

If the initial material is treated as an independent sentence, the noun construction is clearly the subject, as in:

The window was open. John felt cold.

The failure of such forms as "being" to vary as the noun form varies will not prevent us from identifying "the window" and "the windows" as subjects, since the sentences are fully variable with constructions in which selection occurs. A verb consisting of an -ing form, on the other hand, will be defined as a predicatal rather than as a predicator, since, though the -ing form belongs to the verb paradigm, the resultant sentence element does not show selection. A second instance of a predicatal, rather than a true predicator, is the verbal material which appears in subjectless sentences of the type described as imperative. Examples are "Open the window!", "Open the windows", "Be a good boy", "Be good boys". All of these are subjectless, since the nominal material does not select the verb form. The nominal material must therefore belong to the complement. [...]

Complement and Adjunct

1. Single Complement

[...] Probably the commonest sentence type - certainly commonest if we exclude the sentences which are used as responses only - consists of a noun construction, a verb, and a following noun or noun

construction. Under normal conditions, we expect the initial noun or noun construction to be the subject and the final noun construction to be the remaining principal component of a three-part sentence, the complement. A preliminary definition of a nominal complement, then, is that it is a noun or noun construction which is not the subject and which has its normal position immediately after the predicator. There are a great many sentences where it is the sentence element order alone that signals which of two nouns or noun constructions is subject and which complement. These are sentences like most of the variations on the type "Men make laws", which were used in discussing subject and subjectival sentence elements. In three-part sentences, it is the subject which is most clearly marked; the second noun or noun construction is then automatically the complement.

A noun complement, further, can duplicate the internal structure of a noun subject. A simple noun complement can therefore contain all the normal sequences of modifiers, as in: "The company sold aU the ten fine old stone houses." Like a subject, the complement may be composed of more than one noun construction. [...]

The company sold all the old houses and all the new lots.

2. Double Complement

Within the class of sentences containing a nominal or pronominal complement are sentences in which there are two complements. A typical example of this construction is: "I gave John a book". [...]

The presence of two complements is familiar under such names as "indirect object", and "direct object" for sentences of the type of "I gave John a book", and "object" and "objective complement" for "I called John a fool". It should be emphasized that these names indicate semantic distinction only and that nothing in the formal structure distinguishes one relationship from the other. English signals both relationships in the same way, leaving the proper interpretation to the probabilities involved in the lexical sequences. We shall therefore avoid the traditional terminology.

3. Complements Containing Adjectival Material

In dealing with complements, we have thus far described only those which consist of nominal and pronominal material. In describ-

ing adjectival material earlier, however, we pointed out that adjectives can occur in post-verbal position. Such adjectives and adjectivals are also complements. Thus sentences like "My house is white", "We are seven", "His face went white", all contain complements. "White" is a true adjective, so defined because it can be compared, while "seven" is adjectival, so defined because of its position in modifier groups and its lack of comparison. Adjective and adjectival complements are commonest, perhaps, after the verb "to be", but it is by no means true that they are rare or strange after other verbs. [...]

6. Adjuncts

Stated most briefly, sentence adjuncts are words or phrases not definable as subject, verb, or component or as parts of those three sentence elements. They are characteristically set off by terminal with minimal linkage, and these terminals are required except when the sentence adjunct follows the complement, in which case the juncture may be lost. When lost, however, the juncture point remains. Characteristic sentence adjunct material consists of prepositional phrases and overtly marked adverbs. In a sentence consisting of the normal elements of subject, verb, and complement, an adjunct has four possible positions, since it may occur initially, finally, or between any two sentence elements. Thus, if we take the sentence:

Subject	Verb	Complement
<i>The council</i>	<i>holds</i>	<i>meetings</i>

we can add to it an adjunct consisting of the adverb "frequently", or the prepositional phrase "in our town". We get, then, the following sets:

Frequently, the council holds meetings.
The council -frequently - holds meetings.
The council holds -frequently - meetings.
The council holds meetings frequently. [...]

If we return to adjunct sentence elements, we can now sum up by saying that in any situation in which an apparent second complement is freely capable of being placed in pre-subjectival position, post-subjectival position, or both, it is preferable to analyze it as an adjunct sentence element. Our rule for treating noun material as a sentence adjunct is dependent on the recognition of other noun material as a complement. It is only a noun phrase which occurs initial-

ly, or preverbally, set off by terminals, and followed by a verb and complement which can be called a sentence adjunct. The rule can now be applied not only to "Three miles he drove the car", "Three years she grew in beauty", and others of the same type, but also to sentences in which we have a noun placed first, with a normal sentence following it, and a pronoun, replacing either the subject, the complement, or both. Examples are:

The cookies - John ate them. t

The dishes - they washed them.

John - he ate the cookies.

Adjunct sentence elements are typically made up of adverbial material, of prepositional phrases, and, under limited conditions, of nominal material followed by a normal sentence structure of three or two elements. [...]

We have implied throughout that a sentence adjunct must be a form not identifiable with one of the other types of sentence elements, though we have shown that this statement does not mean that an adjunct sentence element needs to be semantically unrelated to subject or complement. Our sentence "The cookies - John ate them" contains two items presumably referring to the same thing, but the formal complement is "them". The rule that an adjunct sentence element cannot contain one of the other elements gives rise to a natural extension. Even though a form like the following is independent in position, and set off by (/), it is not an adjunct sentence element:

Burning them/Mary spoiled the cookies.

The initial element here contains a verbal and a complement and so must be treated as a dependent sentence. Our rule, in short, is that an adjunct sentence element cannot itself consist of more than one element; anything containing more than one sentence element is a sentence, dependent or independent.

Questions:

1. How does A. Hill characterize the relations of the main sentence elements?
2. What do the subject and the subjectival differ in?
3. How does A. Hill define the predicator?
4. What is the differential feature of the predicatal?

5. What is A. Hill's definition of the complement?
6. What is the double complement?
7. Why does A. Hill prefer the term "complement" to the term "object"?
8. What is typical of adjectival complements?
9. How does A. Hill define adjuncts?
10. What language units can be used in the function of an adjunct?

2.

Strang B. Modern English Structure

Sentence Structure

[...] the components of a sentence function not only by means of their inherent lexical meaning, but also by various kinds of **class-meaning**. The first is the class-meaning directly contributive to sentence structure, and this is most clearly differentiated in full sentences of the non-command type. This kind of study can best be achieved by the method described in Pickett (1956), namely, the identification of "function-spots", structurally meaningful places in the sentence, and of the kinds of forms that can fill them. In these terms, our first dichotomy is between **subject** and **predicate** - not because any sentence must have one or other or both, but because they are very commonly filled "spots". The terms "subject" and "predicate" have been used in so many different ways that they are now slippery customers; we must be quite clear how we are using them ourselves. Looking at the total meaning of a sentence, we can often distinguish two main elements in it, the topic, and comment upon it (Pickett's terms). What concerns the grammarian is the forms used to express these things, i.e. the possible subject and predicate **spot-fillers**. Awkwardly, but not unexpectedly, there is not just one sign that a form in English is functioning as a subject. The chief sign is that the subject is what selects the form of the verb, but position is also an important criterion. We must examine these signs more closely. The finite verb is often the chief or only spot-filler of the

predicate, and there is more than one form a finite verb can take. From the paired forms "go / goes", "was / were", etc., and the three forms "am/is/are", one has to be selected to the exclusion of the other(s). What does the selecting is generally the subject; we say, "She is coming tomorrow" but "They are coming tomorrow". Such linking of forms from the paradigm of different parts of speech is called **concord**; the kind of concord in which one term is the controlling partner, the selector of the other, is called **government**. So the first criterion for the subject is that it is what governs the verb.

But there are many cases not covered by this principle. For instance, some noun-forms do not make the selections we might expect; you will find sentences like "The committee was all at sixes and sevens", "The committees were all at sixes and sevens", but also "The committee were all at sixes and sevens"; in two of these the predicted selection is made, in the third it is not. And in many constructions no selection is possible; we say, "She came yesterday" and "They came yesterday". In such cases, the formal clue that we are dealing with the same function-spot is **position**, namely, that the subject spot has a definite positional relation to the finite verb - normally directly preceding it in affirmative sentences, directly following it in interrogative ones (and in the great majority of cases this agrees with the principle of government). But although we sometimes have to give this criterion priority, we cannot use it alone, for in sentences like "Here comes the bride", the selecting form follows the verb. [...]

Finally, it is necessary to underline what has already been implied, that although a subject often has a referring function, it need not do so. Non-referring subjects are common in English, where there is strong feeling for the pre-verb position as subject-position, and a form is often put in to occupy the subject spot without having any lexical meaning (cf. "It's raining again"). And in sentences used rather to relate than to refer, it is artificial to speak of one of the terms as topic rather than another. These include sentences with objects like "It returns your money automatically", passive constructions like "I was hurt by his refusal to come", and comparative ones like "John is taller than Peter". The notion of subject is one in which the linguistic and non-linguistic worlds meet, but at a given moment we must be clear which world we are talking about, for though there is often

A

correspondence, a linguistic subject may not be the topic of a sentence, nor the topic be expressed by the linguistic subject. And we must not expect every sentence to have a subject. [...]

A major, and sometimes the only, component of the predicate is the verb. This is peculiar in having not only sentence-structure class-meaning, but also form-class class-meaning. [...] From this point of view, verbs divide into two main classes, **linking** verbs and **non-linking** verbs. Linking verbs tend to the pole of being lexically empty; they serve the grammatical purpose of indicating the relationship between the subject and the complement in those sentences where the complement is not an object ("is" in "He is a nice man", "got" in "I got colder and colder"). Non-linking verbs are lexically full words, they constitute the predicate or relate subject to object if there is one ("threw" in "Elizabeth threw the ball with all her strength").

The difference between the two kinds is of function, not form: indeed, the same verb (in one sense of that expression) can be both linking (symbolized L) and non-linking (without symbol), as is "turn" in "It turned colder very suddenly" (L), and "She turned it over and over in her hands".

The principal non-verb component of the predicate, if there is one, is the **complement**. We have already seen that complements are of more than one kind, distinguished by their relationship through the verb to the subject. This different relationship manifests itself not through the form of any single sentence, but in the relationship of used sentences with other that might be used; this relationship is called **transformation**. Meanwhile, we will take for granted that "a lawyer" and "me" are doing different things in the sentence "He became a lawyer" and "He hit me". After a linking verb there is simply a complement, or to be more precise, a **non-object complement**: after a non-linking verb the situation is more complicated. In active constructions, i.e. where the subject is actor, the primary component of the complement is called **the (direct) object** ("me" in "He hit me"); if there is another, it may be the **indirect object, or a second direct object**. The signs that a form is (first) direct object are that it precedes the indirect object, which then has a particle before it ("He gave the book to me", the book - direct, (to) me - indirect), or follows the indirect, which then has no particle ("He gave me the book"). The construction with two direct objects is

exemplified in "I want to ask you a question". The order in this case, and the need for distinguishing these different kinds of complements, can only be explained in terms of the notion of transformation. The general label for verbs taking (in a given construction) some kind of object, is **transitive**; or those not doing so, **intransitive**. Since there is a good deal of overlap of membership between the two classes, it is sometimes clearer to speak of a verb used transitively or intransitively than of a transitive or intransitive verb.

The remaining component can be labeled **adjunct**, which is simply an envelope term for what is left. We could go on classifying in more detail, but in practice it turns out not to be advisable. We can, however, distinguish four kinds of adjuncts: **subject-adjuncts**, like "alone" in "He alone knew when I was coming"; **verb-adjuncts**, like "quickly" in "He came quickly"; **complement-adjuncts**, like "with the fastest bicycle"; and **clause-adjuncts**, like "obviously" in "Obviously it isn't altogether satisfactory".

Questions:

1. What are the differential features of the subject?
2. How does B. Strang define concord and government?
3. What quasi-criteria of subject identification does B. Strang point out?
4. What are peculiar features of the verb as the major component of the predicate?
5. How does B. Strang differentiate between linking and non-linking verbs?
6. What proves the relevance of transformation for the identification of sentence parts?
7. What sentence components besides subject and predicate does B. Strang single out?

3.

Hida E.

Morphology

Immediate Constituents

4.41 Significance of Immediate Constituents

The distribution of any morpheme must be given in terms of its environment, but some of its environment may be important and the rest relatively unimportant. This is true of both morphology and syntax, and perhaps it is more easily illustrated by the syntax. For example, in the sentence "Peasants throughout China work very hard" we could describe the environment of "very" as bounded by a preposed "work" and a postposed "hard" and of "work" as bounded by a preposed "China" and a postposed "very", but this kind of description of the environment does not seem to be quite pertinent. We "feel" that "very" goes first with "hard" and that "very hard" then goes with the verb. Similarly, "throughout" and "China" appear to "go together", and these in turn "modify" "peasants". We unite the subject "peasants throughout China" with all of the predicate "work very hard". What we have done in this simple sentence is to discover the pertinent environment of each word or group of words. These sets of pertinent environments correlate with what we shall call immediate constituents, i.e. the constituent elements immediately entering into any meaningful combination. In terms of the above sentence we would describe the most inclusive set of immediate constituents as consisting of "Peasants throughout China / work very hard". The successive sets of immediate constituents may be marked as follows: "Peasants // throughout /// China / work // very /// hard". This may be diagramed somewhat differently as:

Peasants throughout China work very hard.

The situation in morphology is analogous to what we find in syntax, though the immediate constituents are usually not so involved and there are fewer successive sets.

Questions:

1. How does E. Nida define immediate constituents of the sentence?
2. Does the IC-analysis have relevance only for syntax?

4.

**Wells R. Immediate
Constituents**

Now the simple but significant fact of grammar on which we base our whole theory of ICs is this: that a sequence belonging to one sequence-class A is often substitutable for a sequence belonging to an entirely different sequence-class B. By calling the class B "entirely different" from the class A we mean to say that A is not included in B, and B is not included in A; they have no member sequences in common, or else only a relatively few - the latter situation being called "class-cleavage". For instance, "Tom and Dick" is substitutable for "they", wherever "they" occurs: "They wanted me to come" is a grammatical sentence, and so is "Tom and Dick wanted me to come". [...] Similarly, "The stars look small because they are far away" and "The stars look small because Tom and Dick are far away" are both grammatical, the second sentence being uncommon (or not used) for semantic reasons only.

We may roughly express the fact under discussion by saying that sometimes two sentences occur in the same environments even though they have different internal structures. When one of the sequences is at least as long as the other (contains at least as many morphemes) and is structurally diverse from it (does not belong to all the same sequence-classes as the other), we call it an EXPANSION of that other sequence, and the other sequence itself we call a MODEL. If A is an expansion of B, B is a model of A. The leading idea of the theory

of ICs here developed is to analyze each sequence, so far as possible, into parts which are expansions; these parts will be the constituents of the sequence. The problem is to develop this general idea into a definite code or recipe, and to work out the necessary qualifications required by the long-range implications of each analysis of a sequence into constituents.

A preliminary example will give an inkling of how the method works. "The king of England opened Parliament" is a complete sentence, to be analyzed into its constituent parts; we ignore for the time being its features of intonation. It is an expansion of "John", for "John" occurs as a complete sentence. But it is an expansion of "John" only in this special environment, the zero environment - not in such an environment as () *worked* (*John worked*). It helps the IC-analysis to show that the sequence being analyzed is an expansion, but only if it is an expansion of the same shorter sequence in all, or a large proportion, of the environments where the shorter sequence occurs. For the sequence taken as an example, "The king opened", or "The king waited", or "John worked" will serve as shorter sequences. (It is not necessary, in order for A to be an expansion of B, that A should contain all the morphemes of B and in the same order. This is only a special case of expansion, called by Bloomfield "endocentric". Moreover, "the king of England" is an endocentric expansion of "a queen" - insofar as "a" and "the" belong to the same morpheme-classes - just as much as of "the king".)

Our general principle of IC-analysis is not only to view a sequence, when possible, as an expansion of a shorter sequence, but also to break it up into parts of which some or all are themselves expansions. Thus in our example it is valuable to view "The king of England opened Parliament" as an expansion of "John worked" because "the king of England" is an expansion of "John" and "opened Parliament" is an expansion of "worked". On this basis, we regard the ICs of "The king of England opened Parliament" as "the King of England" and "opened Parliament".

"The king of England" is in turn subject to analysis, and "John" is no help here because it is a single morpheme. "The king" will serve: "the king of England" is an expansion of "the king" and, in turn, "king of England" is an expansion of "king". "The king of England"

is accordingly analyzed into "the" and "king of England". The reasons for analyzing the latter into "king" and "of England" (rather than "king of and "England") will be given later.

As for the second half of the sentence, "opened Parliament", besides the obvious analysis into "opened" and "Parliament", is another, instantly rejected by common sense but yet requiring to be considered into "open" and "-ed Parliament". The choice between these two analyses is dictated not by the principle of expansions as stated and exemplified above but by two other principles of patterning, equally fundamental for English and very probably for other languages: the principle of choosing ICs that will be as independent of each other in their distribution as possible, and the principle that word divisions should be respected.

Let us call the ICs of a sentence, and the ICs of those ICs, and so on down to the morphemes, the **constituents** of the sentence; and conversely whatever sequence is constituted by two or more ICs let us call a **constitute**. Assuming that the ICs of "The king of England opened Parliament" are "the king of England" and "opened Parliament", that those of the former are "the" and "king of England" and those of the latter are "opened" and "Parliament", and that "king of England" is divided into "king" and "of England", "of England" is divided into the morphemes "of" and "England" and "opened" is divided into "open" and "-ed" - all of which facts may be thus diagrammed: the // king /// of/// England / open /// ed // Parliament - then there are 12 constituents of the sentence: (1) the king of England, (2) the, (3) king of England, (4) king, (5) of England, (6) of, (7) England, (8) opened Parliament, (9) opened, (10) open, (11) -ed, (12) Parliament, and the 6 constituents (1, 3, 5, 8, 9) that are not morphemes, plus the sentence itself. According to this analysis the sequence "the king of, for instance, or "England opened", is in this sentence neither a constituent nor a constitute. And in terms of this nomenclature the principle relating words to IC-analysis may be stated: every word is a constituent (unless it is a sentence by itself), and also a constitute (unless it is a single morpheme). But if "opened Parliament" were analyzed into "open" and "-ed Parliament", the word "opened" would be neither a constituent nor a constitute.

Questions:

1. How do the notions of expansion and model enter into the immediate constituents analysis?
2. What general principle of IC-analysis does R.S. Wells adhere to?

5.

Oleason H. Linguistics and English Grammar

Cutting

A satisfactory IC diagram of a sentence is dependent on some reasonable and consistent procedures for dividing constructions into their ICs, that is, for what the linguist calls "cutting". The procedures must be consistent; otherwise structural similarities of sentences may be disguised or wholly hidden. The cuts should also reflect the real and significant patterns of the language system. To meet the first condition is relatively simple. A set of cutting rules can be formulated so that a particular pattern of cutting is specified for every situation - at least for every common situation. Such rules do not automatically meet the second condition, however.

Fries gives the general outline for a set of cutting rules in his "The Structure of English". These have been taught in some recent textbooks, and form the basis of most presentations which introduce the notion of ICs.

After the parts of speech have been identified and the various structure markers have been found, there are six rules for the actual cutting.

1. Cut off sequence signals: *However, /that is probably the best he can do. In any case, /I won't do it.*
2. Cut off any adverbial clause that stands at the beginning of the sentence: *If you go, /I'll be left alone. When he dies, /his son will be a millionaire.*

3. Cut between the subject and the predicate: *Albert /was certainly the outstanding student in the class. That funny old man with the long white beard/tripped.*
4. Cut off any modifiers of the head noun of the subject, one by one:
 - a) first those following the noun, beginning with the most remote: *that funny old man/with the long white beard; some one // there / who can take care of if,*
 - b) then those preceding the noun, beginning with the most remote: *that /funny //old///man; his brother's /very efficient //secretary.*
5. Cut off any modifiers or complements of the verb head of the predicate, one by one:
 - a) first those that precede the verb, beginning with the most remote: *certainly / saw him yesterday; probably / never // would'///have ////done that;*
 - b) then those that follow the verb, beginning with the most remote: *done /that; saw //him/yesterday.*
6. Following similar procedures cut all word groups that were treated as single units in previous cuttings: *very /efficient; my /brother's.*

These rules, of course, presuppose others which identify how much of sequence of words is to be treated as a single modifier. Fries does not state these explicitly, but many of them are clearly enough implied in his discussion. Occasionally there will be some difficulty:

the man in the car /I saw yesterday
or *the man / in the car I saw yesterday*

The problem in this case is in the ambiguity of the construction, and either analysis might be correct. Labeling it as structurally ambiguous and saying that there are two different ways to analyze it into ICs are essentially equivalent statements of the problem.

Fries' rules for cutting are open to a number of criticisms. These are of at least three different kinds: First, they are inadequate at many points. Second, they may be incorrect at certain points. Third, they may not always be relevant. Each type of criticism deserves some discussion.

The last rule merely says "following a similar procedure". This is vague. An example will show its inadequacy. "Much better than average" is best considered as an adjective phrase containing two modifiers, one preceding and one following. We are given a rule for noun phrases (the following is cut first) and a rule for verb phrases (the preceding is cut first). The rules as formulated do not indicate which model is to be followed with an adjective phrase. That is, they do not decide between:

much /better //than average
much //better / than average

In a noun phrase like "a better house than average", it would be possible to consider "than average" as modifying the remainder. In this case the cutting can proceed according to Fries' rule:

a //better ///house / than average

But it would seem preferable to consider "than average" as modifying "better", and "better ... than average" as being a single modifier in the noun phrase. In this case the rules are not adequate. Fries makes no provision for a modifier surrounding the head. Should this adjective phrase be cut off before "a" (as a modifier following the noun would be), or after "a" (as would a preceding modifier less remote from the head)? The two possibilities are:

- A. *a /better house than average*
a/better ... than average//house
- B. *a ... house /better ... than average*
a //house /better ... than average

Many other cases of the same type of deficiency can be cited. But all such difficulties can easily be remedied by adding the necessary provisions to the rules.

The second kind of difficulty may also be shown by examples. In a few cases the rules given by Fries may produce what seem to many people to be incorrect cuts. For example, his rules would produce the following: .

/ can //see ///it.

But a good case can be made for the following, in which "can see" is a verb phrase having it as direct object:

I / can/// see / it.

Nida has several examples where he follows the second pattern of cutting. Fries does not actually give any example with an auxiliary in his chapter on immediate constituents, so that it is not certain exactly what he intended. But if the second pattern is preferred, the rules can easily be amended to cover:

5. Cut off any modifiers or complements of the verb head of the predicate, one by one:
- first those other than auxiliaries that precede the verb, beginning with the most remote;
 - then those that follow the verb, beginning with the most remote;
 - then the auxiliaries.

Fries' rules seem to imply that cuts must come between words, and so the example "my brother's" above was cut "my / brother's". This seems clearly wrong as will be shown in the next section. The correct cut must be "my brother / -s". Again the rules can be amended to cover this case.

Both types of criticism already raised - that the rules are inadequate and that they are wrong in specifiable places - can easily be corrected. They are criticisms of the specific set of rules, not of the general principles of analysis.

Questions:

1. What rules for the actual cutting, formulated by Ch. Fries, does H. Gleason discuss?
2. What does H. Gleason mean when he says that Fries' rules for cutting are open to criticism?

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Seminar 12

SIMPLE SENTENCE: PARADIGMATIC STRUCTURE

1. **Syntagmatics and paradigmatics of the sentence. Paradigmatic syntax as a branch of linguistics. The notions of deep structure and surface structure. Base pattern and transformation. The notions of dictum and modus. Proposition.**
2. **The notion of syntactic derivation. Derivation as a process of elementary transformational procedures. Six major classes of transformational procedures.**
3. **The constructional relations of the kernel sentence. Clausalization and phrasalization; nominalization.**
4. **The predicative relations of the kernel sentence. Lower and higher predicative functions of the sentence. Syntactic categorial oppositions underlying the principal predicative functions.**
5. **The notion of the "predicative load" of the sentence.**

1. Notion of Syntactic Derivation

Paradigmatic syntax studies the sentence from the point of view of its oppositional and derivational status. Paradigmatics finds its expression in a system of oppositions which make the corresponding meaningful (functional) categories. Syntactic oppositions are realized by correlated sentence patterns, the observable relations

between which can be described as "transformations", i.e. as transitions from one pattern of certain notional parts to another pattern of the same notional parts. These transitions, being oppositional, at the same time disclose derivational connections of sentence-patterns.

Paradigmatic principles of investigation allowed linguists to find the initial, basic element of syntactic derivation. This element is known under different names: "the basic syntactic pattern", "the structural sentence scheme", "the elementary sentence model", "the base sentence", "the kernel sentence". The kernel sentence is a syntactic unit serving as a "sentence-root" and providing an objective ground for identifying syntactic categorial oppositions. The pattern of the kernel sentence is interpreted as forming the base of a paradigmatic derivation in the corresponding sentence-pattern series.

Syntactic derivation should not be understood as an immediate change of one sentence into another; it should be understood as paradigmatic production of more complex pattern-constructions out of kernel pattern-constructions as their structural bases.

2. Constructional Relations of the Kernel Sentence

The derivational procedures applied to the kernel sentence can introduce it into such a type of derivational relations which is called "constructional" type. The constructional derivation affects the formation of more complex clausal constructions out of simpler ones; in other words, it is responsible for the expression of the nominative-notional syntactic semantics of the sentence. As part of the constructional system of syntactic paradigmatics, kernel sentences undergo derivational changes into clauses and phrases. These transformational procedures are termed, correspondingly, "clausalization" and "phrasalization". Phrasalization resulting in a substantive phrase (noun-phrase) is called "nominalization".

3. Predicative Relations of the Kernel Sentence

The predicative derivation realizes the formation of predicatively different units without affecting the constructional volume of the sentence base; in other words, it is responsible for the expression of the predicative syntactic semantics of the sentence.

The predicative syntactic semantics of the sentence is very intricate, but being oppositional by nature, it can be described in terms of "lower" and "higher" predicative functions expressed by primary sentence patterns. The lower functions express the morphological categories of tenses and aspects and have the so-called "factual" semantics. The higher functions are "evaluative" because they immediately express the relationship of the nominative content of the sentence to reality.

The main predicative functions expressed by syntactic categorial oppositions can be described on the oppositional lines, e.g.: "question - statement", "unreality - reality", "phase of action - fact", etc.

4. The Notion of the "Predicative Load" of the Sentence

The notion of the "predicative load" of the sentence is used to describe the total volume of the strong members of predicative oppositions actually represented in the analyzed sentence. So, from the point of view of the comparative volume of the predicative meanings actually expressed, the sentence may be predicatively "loaded" or "unloaded". If the sentence is predicatively unloaded, it means that in oppositional terms its predicative semantics will be characterized as "negative", i.e. "weak". If the sentence is predicatively loaded, it means that it expresses, at least, one "positive", i.e. "strong", predicative meaning.

Questions:

1. What does syntactic derivation imply?
2. What is considered to be the basic element of syntactic derivation?
3. What do the constructional relations of the kernel sentence consist in?
4. What syntactic units are formed by the processes of clausalization, phrasalization, and nominalization?
5. What is realized on the basis of the predicative derivation?
6. What does the difference between lower and higher predicative functions consist in?
7. What oppositions are used to describe the predicative semantics of the sentence? Make up a list of them.
8. In what way does the notion of the "predicative load" of the sentence help describe the predicative semantics of the sentence?
9. In what do you see the correlation between the two notions: the "loaded sentence" and the "strong predicative meaning"?

10. What should be done to transform an unloaded sentence into a loaded one? Give an example of the transformation in question.

I. Define the predicative load of the sentences.

MODEL: *You needn't have asked him.*

The syntactic predicative load of this sentence is 2, as it renders two strong syntactic oppositional meanings: those of the modal subject-object relation (*need*) and negation. The morphological load is presented by the perfect (*have asked*).

a)

1. You mayn't care much for Czars or millionaires (Chesterton).
2. "I might happen to have murdered my own brother-in-law?" (Chesterton)
3. It might have been a model of the Holy Grail (Chesterton).
4. "Have you succeeded in avenging your holy and sainted millionaire?" (Chesterton)
5. "Why didn't you murder him?" (Chesterton)
6. Only one other complication seemed to call for consideration (Chesterton).

b)

1. Mr. Fitzpatrick seemed to enjoy himself (Joyce).
2. Shouldn't I be an awful nuisance? (Maugham)
3. You might make a story out of it (Maugham).
4. She began to giggle (Maugham).
5. It must be settled once for all (Maugham).
6. How should I know? (Maugham)

c)

1. Now he would never have a chance to finish it (Hemingway).
2. Wouldn't you like me to read? (Hemingway)
3. You're not going to die (Hemingway).
4. Can't you let a man die? (Hemingway)
5. You might think about someone else (Hemingway).
6. Couldn't I read to you? (Hemingway)

d)

1. You shouldn't drink (Hemingway).
2. Don't let me find you here when I come back! (Fitzgerald)
3. But that's not possible, is it? (Saroyan)
4. She didn't like to get to the hotel first (Thurber).

5. She had begun to cry (Cheever).
6. Don't tell anyone, Gertrude (Cheever).

II. Build up the constructional paradigm based on the two primary sentences.

MODEL: *He was annoyed. His sister was at home.*

- 1) As his sister was at home, he was annoyed.
- 2) His sister was at home, so he was annoyed.
- 3) He was annoyed because his sister was at home.
- 4) He was annoyed at his sister's being at home.
- 5) He was annoyed at his sister's presence at home.
- 6) His sister's presence at home annoyed him.
- 7) His annoyance was caused by his sister's being at home, etc.

a)

1. We stayed a bit longer. Mike enjoyed it.
2. Jennifer heard him. He walked downstairs.
3. She was sure. Her husband didn't meet anyone in London.

b)

1. We read about it in the newspaper. James Hooligan was acquitted.
2. There is Miss Sands here. She wants to see you.
3. I have a grandmother in New York. I must take care of her.

c)

1. I don't deny. She was marvelous.
2. The girl bumped into the passer-by. He was smoking at the corner of the street.
3. He was late. We were getting anxious.

1. The girl grew up. She became quite a beauty.
2. He is my servant. He must obey me.
3. She saw them. They were entering the office.

III. Form sentences with greater predicative load taking as the basis the following kernel sentences.

MODEL: *He was upset.*

- a. Was he upset? (1)
- b. Wasn't he upset? (2)
- c. Can he be upset? (2)

- d. Cannot he be upset? (3)
- e. He didn't seem to be upset. (2)
- f. He can't have been upset. (3)
- g. Couldn't he have been upset? (4)

a)

- 1. The shaft was material (Chesterton).
- 2. This man was a gambler (Chesterton).
- 3. They are both rather curious reading (Chesterton).

b)

- 1. He looked through the agony column (Doyle).
- 2. We played bridge (Christie).
- 3. They met at the club (Doyle).

c)

- 1. His performance that night was the best of his career (Saroyan).
- 2. He found an excuse for going off (Saroyan)
- 3. "You're driving too fast." (Thurber)

d)

- 1. "I said nonsense." (Chesterton)
- 2. They cut down all the trees in the garden (Doyle).
- 3. He instantly changed the expression on his face (Saroyan).

IV. Account for the use of nominalized forms in the following extract:

It is regrettably true that in these days there is in nearly every family, the problem of what might be called an "Aunt Ada". The names are different - Aunt Amelia, Aunt Susan, Aunt Cathy, Aunt Joan. They are varied by grandmothers, aged cousins and even great-aunts. But they exist and present a problem in life which has to be dealt with. Arrangements have to be made. Suitable establishments for looking after the elderly have to be inspected and full questions asked about them. Recommendations are sought from doctors, from friends, who have Aunt Adas of their own who had been "perfectly happy until she had died" at "The Laurels, Bexhill", or "Happy Meadows at Scarborough" (A. Christie "By the Pricking of My Thumbs").

Selected Reader

1.

Chomsky II. Studies on Semantics in Generative Grammar

I will assume that a grammar contains a base consisting of a categorial component (which I will assume to be a context-free grammar) and a lexicon. The lexicon consists of lexical entries, each of which is a system of specified features. The nonterminal vocabulary of the context-free grammar is drawn from a universal and rather limited vocabulary, some aspects of which will be considered below. The context-free grammar generates phrase-markers, with a dummy symbol as one of the terminal elements. A general principle of lexical insertion permits lexical entries to replace the dummy symbol in ways determined by their feature content. The formal object constructed in this way is a DEEP STRUCTURE. The grammar contains a system of transformations, each of which maps phrase-markers into phrase-markers. Application of a sequence of transformations to a deep structure, in accordance with certain universal conditions and certain particular constraints of the grammar in question, determines ultimately a phrase-marker which we call a SURFACE STRUCTURE. The base and the transformational rules constitute the syntax. The grammar contains phonological rules that assign to each surface structure a phonetic representation in a universal phonetic alphabet. Furthermore, it contains semantic rules that assign to each paired deep and surface structure generated by the syntax a semantic interpretation, presumably, in a universal semantics, concerning which little is known in any detail. I will assume, furthermore, that grammatical relations are defined in a general way in terms of configurations within phrase-markers and that semantic interpretation involves only those grammatical relations specified in deep structures (although it may also involve certain

properties of surface structures). I will be concerned here with problems of syntax primarily. It is clear, however, that phonetic and semantic considerations provide empirical conditions of adequacy that must be met by the syntactic rules.

As anyone who has studied grammatical structures in detail is well aware, a grammar is a tightly organized system; a modification of one part generally involves widespread modifications of other facets. I will make various tacit assumptions about the grammar of English, holding certain parts constant and dealing with questions that arise with regard to properties of other parts of the grammar. In general, it is to be expected that enrichment of one component of the grammar will permit simplification in other parts. Thus certain descriptive problems can be handled by enriching the lexicon and simplifying the categorial component of the base, or conversely; or by simplifying the base at the cost of greater complexity of transformations, or conversely. The proper balance between various components of the grammar is entirely an empirical issue. We have no a priori insight into the "trading relation" between the various parts. There are no general considerations that settle this matter. In particular, it is senseless to look to the evaluation procedure for the correct answer. Rather, the evaluation procedure must itself be selected on empirical grounds so as to provide whatever answer it is that is correct. It would be pure dogmatism to maintain, without empirical evidence, that the categorial component, or the lexicon, or the transformational component must be narrowly constrained by universal conditions, the variety and complexity of language being attributed to the other components.

Crucial evidence is not easy to obtain, but there can be no doubt as to the empirical nature of the issue. Furthermore, it is often possible to obtain evidence that is relevant to the correct choice of an evaluation measure and hence, indirectly, to the correct decision as to the variety and complexity that universal grammar permits in the several components of the grammar."

To illustrate the problem in an artificially isolated case, consider such words *as feel*, which, in surface structure, take predicate phrases as complements. Thus we have such sentences as:

(1) *John felt angry (sad, weak, courageous, above such things, inclined to agree to their request, sorry for what he did, etc.).*

We might introduce such expressions into English grammar in various ways. We might extend the categorial component of the base, permitting structures of the form **noun phrase-verb-predicate**, and specify *ing/ee/* in the lexicon as an item that can appear in prepredicate position in deep structures. Alternatively, we might exclude such structures from the base, and take the deep structures to be of the form **noun phrase-verb-sentence**, where the underlying structure *John felt [_xJohn be sad]_s*¹² is converted to *John felt sad* by a series of transformations. Restricting ourselves to these alternatives for the sake of the illustrative example, we see that one approach extends the base, treating *John felt angry* as a NP-V-Pred expression roughly analogous to *his hair turned gray* or *John felt anger* (NP-V-NP), while the second approach extends the transformational component, treating *John felt angry* as a NP-V-S expression roughly analogous to *John believed that he would win* or *John felt that he was angry*. A priori considerations give us no insight into which of these approaches is correct. There is, in particular, no a priori concept of "evaluation" that informs us whether it is "simpler", in an absolute sense, to complicate the base or the transformational component.

There is, however, relevant empirical evidence, namely, regarding the semantic interpretation of these sentences.¹³ To feel angry is not necessarily to feel that one is angry or to feel oneself to be angry; the same is true of most of the other predicate expressions that appear in such sentences as (1). If we are correct in assuming that it is the grammatical relations of the deep structure that determine the semantic interpretation, it follows that the deep structure of (1) must not be of the NP-V-S form, and that, in fact, the correct solution is to

¹¹ Needless to say, any specific bit of evidence must be interpreted within a fixed framework of assumptions, themselves subject to question. But in this respect the study of language is no different from any other empirical investigation.

¹² Henceforth I shall use labeled brackets to indicate structures in phrase-markers; an expression of the form $X[_L Y]_AZ$ signifies that the string Y is assigned to the category A in the string XYZ.

¹³ There are a number of suggestive remarks on this matter in Kenny (1963).

extend the base. Some supporting evidence from syntax is that many sentences of the form (1) appear with the progressive aspect (*John is feeling angry*, like *John is feeling anger*, etc.), but the corresponding sentences of the form NP-V-S do not (**John is feeling that he is angry*). This small amount of syntactic and semantic evidence therefore suggests that the evaluation procedure must be selected in such a way as to prefer an elaboration of the base to an elaboration of the transformational component in such a case as this. Of course this empirical hypothesis is extremely strong; the evaluation procedure is a part of universal grammar, and when made precise, the proposal of the preceding sentence will have large-scale effects in the grammars of all languages, effects which must be tested against the empirical evidence exactly as in the single case just cited.

This paper will be devoted to another example of the same general sort, one that is much more crucial for the study of English structure and of linguistic theory as a whole.

Among the various types of nominal expressions in English there are two of particular importance, each roughly of propositional form. Thus corresponding to the sentences of (2) we have the gerundive nominals of (3) and the derived nominals of (4).¹⁴

- (2) a. *John is eager to please.*
 b. *John has refused the offer.*
 c. *John criticized the book.*
- (3) a. *John's being eager to please.*
 b. *John's refusing the offer.*
 c. *John's criticizing the book.*
- (4) a. *John's eagerness to please.*
 b. *John's refusal of the offer.*
 c. *John's criticism of the book.*

Many differences have been noted between these two types of nominalization. The most striking differences have to do with the productivity of the process in question, the generality of the relation between the nominal and the associated proposition, and the internal structure of the nominal phrase.

Gerundive nominals can be formed fairly freely from propositions of subject-predicate form, and the relation of meaning between the nominal and the proposition is quite regular. Furthermore, the nominal does not have the internal structure of a noun phrase; thus we cannot replace *John's* by any determiner (e.g., *that*, *the*) in (3), nor can we insert adjectives into the gerundive nominal. These are precisely the consequences that follow, without elaboration or qualifications, from the assumption that gerundive nominalization involves a grammatical transformation from an underlying sentence like structure. We might assume that one of the forms of NP introduced by rules of the categorial component of the base is (5), and that general rules of affix placement give the freely generated surface forms of the gerundive nominal.¹⁵

(5) [sNP *nom* (Aspect) VP]s

The semantic interpretation of a gerundive nominalization is straightforward in terms of the grammatical relations of the underlying proposition in the deep structure.

Derived nominals such as (4) are very different in all of these respects. Productivity is much more restricted, the semantic relations between the associated proposition and the derived nominal are quite varied and idiosyncratic, and the nominal has the internal structure of a noun phrase. I will comment on these matters directly. They raise the question of whether the derived nominals are, in fact, transformationally related to the associated propositions. The question, then, is analogous to that raised earlier concerning the status of verbs such as *feel*. We might extend the base rules to accommodate the derived nominal directly (I will refer to this as the "lexicalist position"), thus simplifying the transformational component; or, alternatively, we might simplify

¹⁵ I follow here the proposal in Chomsky (1965, p. 222) that the base rules give structures of the form NP-Aux-VP, with Aux analyzed as Aux. (Aspect), Aux. being further analyzed as either Tense (Modal) or as various nominalization elements and Aspect as (perfect) (progressive). Forms such as **John 's being reading the book* (but not *John's having been reading the book*) are blocked by a restriction against certain -ing -ing sequences (compare **John 's stopping reading, John's having stopped reading, etc.*). Tense and Modal are thus excluded from the gerundive nominal, but not Aspect. Nothing that follows depends on the exact form of the rules for gerundive nominalization, but I think that a good case can be made for this analysis

the base structures, excluding these forms, and derive them by some extension of the transformational apparatus (the "transformationalist position"). As in the illustrative example discussed earlier, there is no a priori insight into universal grammar — specifically, into the nature of an evaluation measure — that bears on this question, which is a purely empirical one. The problem is to find empirical evidence that supports one or the other of the alternatives. It is, furthermore, quite possible to imagine a compromise solution that adopts the lexicalist position for certain items and the transformationalist position for others. Again, this is entirely an empirical issue. We must fix the principles of universal grammar — in particular, the character of the evaluation measure — so that it provides the description that is factually correct, noting as before that any such hypothesis about universal grammar must also be tested against the evidence from other parts of English grammar and other languages.

(pp. 12-17)

Questions:

1. What is meant by "deep structure" and "surface structure"?
2. How are grammatical relations defined within the framework of the generative analysis?
3. How are meanings ascribed to syntactic structures?
4. What types of nominalization does N. Chomsky discuss in this paper? What is specific for each of them?

2.

Roberts P.

English Syntax

Transformation

[...] The kernel is the part of English that is basic and fundamental. It is the heart of the grammar, the core of the language. All other structures of English can be thought of as deriving from this kernel. All the more complicated sentences of English are derivations from,

or the transformations of, the K-terminal strings. For example, the question "Can John go?" is easily seen to be related to the statement "John can go." Given the K-terminal string for any sentence like "John can come," we can make it into a corresponding question by applying the rule for question-making. Such a rule is called a transformation rule. It tells us how to derive something from something else by switching things about, putting things in or leaving them out, and so on. Thus we derive "Can John go?" and "Did John go?" from "John can go" and "John went". But we can't derive "John can go" and "John went" from anything. There are no sentences underlying them. They are basic and fundamental, a part of the kernel.

It is in terms of kernel structures that *all* grammatical relations are defined. The kernel gives all the grammatical relations of the language. The grammatical relations are then carried over into transforms, so that they will hold among words which are arranged in many different ways and which may actually be widely separated.

For example, the sentence "The dog barked" indicates a certain relationship between the noun *dog* and the verb *bark*. We find exactly the same relationship in such transforms as "The barking dog frightened me", "The barking of the dog kept us awake", "I hate dogs that are always barking". The relationship shown between *dog* and *sad* in the kernel sentence "The dog is sad" carries over in the transforms "The sad dog wailed", "The dog's sadness was apparent", "I don't like dogs that are too sad".

We shall see that there are two kinds of transformation rules: *obligatory rules* and *optional rules*. An obligatory rule is one that must be applied to produce a grammatical sentence. An optional rule is one that may be applied but doesn't have to be. Some obligatory rules apply only when certain elements occur in the sentence. Sometimes the elements do not occur, so the rule does not apply. One rule, however, applies to all kernel sentences, and we shall begin with that one. It is a rule for putting the elements of the auxiliary in their proper order.

Our first transformation rule is this: $Af + v \Rightarrow v + Af$. We call this rule T-af,¹⁶ in which T stands for transformation. The double arrow

¹⁶stands for "affix". The three affixes that the author is concerned with are *tense*, *participle* and *-ing*.

will be regularly used for transformation rules, distinguishing them from kernel rules.

T-af is an obligatory transformation rule. This means that it must be applied to every sequence of Af + v before a grammatical sentence can be produced. Every K-terminal string will contain at least one sequence of Af + v.

(pp. 105, 151, 158, 231)

Questions:

1. What role do kernel sentences play in grammar?
2. What kinds of transformational rules are distinguished by P. Roberts?

3.

Thomas O.

Transformational Grammar and the Teacher of English

Nominalization

Robert B. Lees has made an extensive investigation of nouns, substantives, and nominalizations (i.e. ways of creating new nominals), and has reported the results of this investigation in a monograph, "The Grammar of English Nominalizations", originally published in 1960. [...] Lees gives hundreds of examples of various kinds of nominalizations. Briefly, each of these is a transformation that alters or rearranges a word or group of words so that they are able to perform the function of a noun phrase in a sentence. [...] We can get an approximate idea of the notion of nominalization by showing how some of the kernel sentences can be transformed into nominals.

The following sentences were cited earlier as kernels:

The aardvark may be happy.

The forest is sleeping.

The Frenchman drank the wine yesterday.

Suppose we now have a sentence in which the subject is indicated only symbolically:

Noun Phrase + completely enchanted the poet.

We can insert a simple noun phrase in the subject position of this sentence:

The girl completely enchanted the poet.

Or we can create substitutes for the noun phrase by transforming the kernel sentences:

The happy aardvark completely enchanted the poet.

The sleeping forest completely enchanted the poet.

The Frenchman drinking the wine completely enchanted the poet.

Yes/No Questions and Proverbs

5.44a *The boy would run.*

5.45a *The boy would have run.*

5.50a *The boy was running. [...]*

[...] Consider Sentence 5.44 — Sentence 5.50, all of which contain auxiliary verbs. Any one of these can be transformed into a yes/no question by simply moving the auxiliary verb (or the first auxiliary, when there is more than one) to the first position in the sentence. Thus, selecting at random, we have:

5.44b *Will the boy run?*

5.46b *Will the boy be running? [...]*

But if there are no auxiliary verbs, we cannot move the main verb; that is, in Modern English there are no sentences of the form:

**Runs the boy? *Ran the boy?*

Instead we must utilize the present or past form of the special auxiliary verb *to do*:

5.51b *Does the boy run? [...]*

A similar condition prevails when we introduce the negative morpheme (*Ng*) into a sentence. [...]



Passive Voice

There is still more debate among transformational linguists as to the best method of introducing the passive morpheme (*by + Psv*) into the phrase-structure rules. For our purposes we can assume that

it is introduced optionally after any regular transitive verb (but not after any middle verb). We might, therefore, derive a string such as follows:

7.31 *the boy + Pres + have + en + buy + by + Psv + the car* The transformation that applies to strings like this operates in three steps: (1) it replaces the symbol *Psv* with the first nominal; (2) it moves the direct object into the position formally occupied by the subject; and (3) it introduces *be + en* after the auxiliaries and before the main verb. Thus, in three steps, we have:

7.31a *+Pres + have + en + buy + by + the boy + the car* 7.31b *the car + Pres + have + en + buy + by + the boy* 7.31c *the car + Pres + have + en + be + en + buy + by + the boy* After applying the affix transformation and the relevant morpho-graphemic rules, we have: 7.31d *The car has been bought by the boy*. Optionally, and as a fourth step, we may delete the combination of *by + the original subject*. This would give: 7.31 e *The car has been bought*.



Questions:

1. What definition does R.B. Lees give to nominalization?
2. What method of representing the sentence does O. Thomas demonstrate? What advantages does this method have?

4.

Lyons J. Introduction to Theoretical Linguistics

Transformational Ambiguity

One reason for introducing the notion of "bracketing" (or constituent-structure) into the theory of grammar is that it enables us to account systematically for various kinds of grammatical ambiguity. But there are many other ambiguous constructions in different languages which depend upon the "deeper connexions" we have decided to call transformational rather than upon a difference of "bracketing".

Let us begin by taking a well-known example from traditional grammar. The Latin phrase "amor Dei", like its English translation

"the love of God" is ambiguous (out of context). Traditional grammars of Latin would say that the word "Dei" ("of God") is either a subjective or objective "genitive". This is a transformational explanation of the ambiguity: it implies that the phrase "amor Dei" is related to, and indeed in some sense derivable from, two sentences: (i) a sentence in which "Deus" (cited now in the "nominative" case) is the subject of the verb "amare" ("to love"); (ii) a sentence in which "Deum" (cited now in the "accusative") is the object of the verb "amare". Similarly, "the love of God" is related to two sentences in English: (i) a sentence in which "God" is the subject of the verb "love" (cf.: *God loves mankind*); (ii) a sentence in which "God" is the object of the verb "love" (cf.: *Mankind loves God*). The phrase might be still ambiguous in particular sentences: "It is the love of God which inspires men to work for their fellows".

One of Chomsky's most famous examples, the phrase "flying planes" (in a sentence such as "Flying planes can be dangerous"), is ambiguous for much the same reasons as "the love of God" is ambiguous: under one interpretation "flying planes" is related to a sentence in which "planes" is the subject of "fly" or "are flying", under the other to a sentence in which "planes" is the object of "fly" (cf. *Planes fly* vs. *John flies planes*).

In traditional grammar, there is a distinction drawn between the "participle" and the "gerund". In so far as this distinction applies in English (and there are situations in which it is unclear) it might be formulated as follows: (a) A participle is a word which is derived from a verb and used as an adjective, (b) A gerund is a word which is derived from a verb and used as a noun. This distinction is clearly relevant to the analysis of an ambiguous phrase like "flying planes". If we consider the following two sentences (in which the principles of subject-verb concord "disambiguate" the phrase in question):

(1) *Flying planes are dangerous.*

(2) *Flying planes is dangerous.*

the difference between the "participle" and "gerund" comes out quite clearly. The verb "are" in (1) is "plural" because its subject is "planes", a plural noun, which is head of the endocentric phrase "flying planes": moreover, in (1) "flying" is distributionally equivalent to an adjective (e.g. "supersonic"). The recognition of a head and a modifier in "flying

planes" in (2) is more problematic: but "flying" is nominal and the whole phrase is the subject (cf. "Flying is dangerous."). Traditional statements about the "participle" and the "gerund" are transformational in nature. We can interpret them to mean that a particular word may be "verbal" in one sentence and "adjectival" in a transformationally-related phrase, or "verbal" in one sentence and "nominal" in a transformationally-related phrase. Without, for one moment, considering the nature of the rules which might account for these relationships, let us merely say that in (1) the phrase "flying planes" is to be derived by a rule which "transforms" the structure underlying a sentence like "Planes are flying" and assigns to the resultant noun-phrase the derived structure of adjective + noun; and that in (2) the phrase "flying planes" is to be derived by transformational rule from the structure underlying a sentence like "John flies planes" and assigns to the resultant noun-phrase the derived structural description noun + noun (the first of the two nouns, if any, being the one that controls concord). If we now assume that the rules of the grammar generate sentences like (1) and (2) with both an "underlying" ("deep") and a "derived" ("surface") structural description, we have in principle explicated the "subjective" and "objective" interpretations of noun-phrases like "flying planes".

Consider now a phrase like "eating apples": this is also ambiguous. Under one interpretation (cf. "to eat apples" and "to fly planes") it is structurally comparable with "flying planes" in (2). But the other interpretation which is illustrated by:

(3) *Eating apples costs more than cooking apples.*

cannot be accounted for by saying that "apples" is in a "subjective" relationship with "eating" in the deep structure of (3). The subjective interpretation of "eating apples" might be possible in somewhat unusual, or bizarre, situations in which apples are "personified" (to use the traditional term). In such situations a sentence like the following

(4) *Apples eat with a hearty appetite.*

would, presumably, be equally acceptable. Let us grant, however, that (4) is "abnormal"; and that, whatever account we give of its "abnormality", this account simultaneously explains the "abnormality" of the "subjective" interpretation of "eating apples".

There are many phrases of the form V + ing + N which are multiply-ambiguous: indeed, one might maintain that "flying planes" can

be interpreted in the sense suggested by the paraphrase "version" "planes for flying". In the case of "flying planes", this third interpretation is perhaps tautologous. It is quite likely, however, that any grammar which defines "eating apples", etc., to have at least two deep-structure analyses will also assign at least three analyses to "flying planes".

[...] These phrases are said to be grammatically, and not just semantically, ambiguous [...]. To illustrate this point with reference to another of Chomsky's examples (which is very similar to "the love of God" discussed above): a phrase like "the shooting of the hunters" is ambiguous (if it occurs in a context which does not "disambiguate" it) because (a) "shoot" may be used both "transitively" and "intransitively" (more precisely, both "transitively" and "pseudo-intransitively") and (b) "the hunters" may occur in sentences containing the verb "shoot" as either the subject of the "intransitive" (e.g. "The hunters shoot") or the object of the "transitive" (e.g. "John shot the hunters"). It is worth pointing out that the objective interpretation of the phrase "the shooting of the hunters" is closely related to passive constructions: cf. "The hunters were shot (by John)". With a "fully transitive" verb (i.e. with a verb which has an overt and specific object) phrases of the form "the V + ing of NP" do not normally admit of the subjective interpretation: they cannot be extended with an objective "of NP" ("*the shooting of the hunters of the deer"). Instead, the subjective "NP" takes the "possessive" suffix and the objective "NP" the preposition "of": cf. "the hunters' shooting of the deer" [...].

Let us now introduce the purely *ad hoc* convention (which is frequently used for this purpose in the literature) of employing numerical subscripts to identify the words and phrases which are said to be in correspondence in transformationally related constructions. For example, we will say that a sentence like "John shoots the deer" has the form NP, V_{tr}NP₁ (NP₁ = *John*; V_{tr} stands for a particular member of the class of transitive verbs, *shoot*; and NP₂ = *the hunters*); and a sentence like "The hunters shoot" the form NP, V_{intr} (NP₁ = *the hunters* > ^intr stands for a particular member of the class of intransitive verbs). Given this convention, we can say that a phrase of the form "the V + ing of NP" is *grammatically* ambiguous (and may or may not be semantically ambiguous) if, and only if, the grammar generates sentences of the form:

(5) NP, V_{tr}, NP₂ (6)

NP, V_{intr}

if (a) the "V of the V + ing of NP" is identical with a member of [V_{tr} in (5) and a member of V_{intr} in (6), and (b) the "NP of the V + ing of NP" can occur both as NP₂ in (5) and NP₁ in (6). These conditions are satisfied in the case of "the shooting of the hunters". But are they satisfied in the case of "the eating of the apples"? The verb "eat" (for simplicity, we will assume that the "transitive" and the "intransitive", or "pseudo-transitive", "eat" are instances of the "same" verb, although this begs certain theoretical questions) occurs in sentences of the form represented in (5) and (6): cf. *John eats the apples* and *John is eating*. The phrase "the eating of the apples" is therefore interpretable "objectively" (*the apples* is NP₂ in a transitive sentence with the verb "eat"). Whether it is defined as being "subjectively" interpretable, from the syntactic point of view, will depend upon the generation or exclusion of a sentence like "The apples are eating". The point is that a phrase like "the eating of the apples" manifests the same "deep" relationships between "the apples" and "eat" as does the sentence (or non-sentence) "The apples are eating". In other words, either the "subjective" phrase "the eating of the apples" and the sentence "The apples are eating" should both be generated as grammatical (and systematically related to one another in terms of their "deep" structure) or they should both be excluded as ungrammatical. And their grammaticality or ungrammaticality will depend upon whether the noun "apple" and the verb "eat" are subclassified in the lexicon [...] in such a way that the grammatical rules will admit or prohibit the combination of a noun with a given "feature" (e.g. [inanimate]) as the subject of the verb-class of which "eat" is a member.

(pp. 249-253)

Questions:

1. What makes the phrases "love of God", "flying planes" and the like grammatically ambiguous?
2. What criteria does J. Lyons apply to identify cases of grammatical ambiguity?
3. What makes the "subjective" interpretation of the phrase "eating apples" abnormal? What other interpretations can be given to this phrase, if any?

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Seminar 13**COMPOSITE SENTENCE**

1. **Classification of sentences according to the number of predicative lines: simple sentence, composite sentence, semi-composite sentence.**
2. **Compound sentence. Semantico-syntactic relations rendered by coordination.**
3. **Complex sentence. The notions of matrix sentence and insert sentence. The main principles of classifying subordinate clauses. Monolithic and segregative sentences. Parallel and consecutive subordination.**
4. **Semi-composite sentence: semantico-syntactic types.**
5. **The notions of linking and binding. Types of logical relations between clauses: elaboration, extension, enhancement.**

1. Classification of Sentences According to the Number of Predicative Lines

According to the number of predicative lines sentences are classified into simple, composite and semi-composite. The simple sentence is built up by one predicative line, while the composite sentence is built up by two or more predicative lines. As a polypredicative construction, the composite sentence, from the referential point of view, reflects a few elementary situations as a unity.

2. Compound Sentence

The compound sentence is based on parataxis, i.e. coordination. By coordination the clauses in the composite sentence are arranged as units of syntactically equal rank. The position of the coordinate

clause is always rigidly fixed and it serves as one of the differential features of coordination as such.

It is usual to single out the following types of semantic relations between coordinative clauses: copulative, adversative, disjunctive, causal, consequential, and resultative.

Coordinating connectors are divided into proper and semi-functional, the latter revealing adverbial features.

3. Complex Sentence

The complex sentence is based on hypotaxis, i.e. subordination. By subordination the principal clause positionally dominates the subordinate clause making up with it a semantico-syntactic unity. The subordinate clause can be joined to the principal clause either by a subordinating connector, or, with some types of clauses, asyndetically.

Subordinate clauses can be classified on different principles: either functional, or categorial.

In accord with the functional principle, subordinate clauses are classified on the analogy of the positional parts of the simple sentence. As a result of this classification, subordinate clauses are classed into subject, predicative, object, attributive, and adverbial.

The categorial classification is aimed at revealing the inherent nominative properties of the subordinate clauses irrespective of their immediate position in the sentence.

According to their integral features all subordinate clauses are divided into four generalized types: clauses of primary nominal positions, clauses of secondary nominal positions, clauses of adverbial positions, clauses of parenthetical positions.

4. Semi-Composite Sentence and Its Types

Semi-composite sentences are sentences in which one predicative line is represented by a semi-predicative construction. Semi-composite sentences are divided into semi-complex and semi-compound according to the type of relations between the semi-clause and the main clause - subordinative and coordinative, respectively.

The semi-complex sentence is a semi-composite sentence built up on the principle of subordination. It is derived from minimum two base sentences, one matrix and one insert. In the process of semi-

complexing, the insert sentence is transformed into a partially depre-dicated construction which is embedded in one of the syntactic positions of the matrix sentence. In the resulting construction, the matrix sentence becomes its dominant (main) part and the insert sentence, its subordinate semi-clause.

The semi-complex sentences fall into a number of subtypes. Their basic division is dependent on the character of predicative fusion: this may be effected either by the process of position-sharing (word-sharing), or by the process of direct linear expansion. The sentences based on position-sharing fall into those of subject-sharing and those of object-sharing. The sentences based on semi-predicative linear expansion fall into those of attributive complication, adverbial complication, and nominal-phrase complication. Each subtype is related to a definite complex sentence (pleni-complex sentence) as its explicit structural prototype.

The semi-compound sentence is a semi-composite sentence built up on the principle of coordination. The structure of the semi-compound sentence is derivationally to be traced back to minimum two base sentences having an identical element belonging to one or both of their principal syntactic positions, i.e. either the subject, or the predicate, or both. According to the process of semi-compounding, coordinative fusion can be either syndetic or asyndetic. Thus, from the formal point of view, a sentence possessing coordinated notional parts of immediately sentential reference (directly related to its predicative line) is to be treated as semi-compound. But different structural types of syntactic coordination even of direct sentential reference (coordinated subjects, predicates, objects, adverbial modifiers) display very different implications as regards semi-compounding composition of sentences.

Questions:

1. What is the main principle of differentiating between the simple sentence and the composite sentence?
2. What are the two main syntactic types of clause connection?
3. What are the differential features of the compound sentence?
4. What semantic relations underlie coordinative clauses?
5. What are the differential features of the complex sentence?

6. What principles are used for classifying subordinate clauses?
7. What sentence is termed "semi-composite"?
8. What is the nature intermediary syntactic character of the semi-composite sentence?
9. What types of semi-composite sentences are singled out?
10. What are the differential features of the semi-complex sentence?
11. What is peculiar to the semi-compound sentence?

I. Define the relations between the clauses of the compound sentences:

a)

1. One's mode of life might be high and scrupulous, but there was always an undercurrent of greediness, a hankering, and sense of waste (Galsworthy).
2. She was outlined against the sky, carrying a basket, and you could see that sky through the crook of her arm (Galsworthy).
3. You see my dilemma. Either I must find the man or else the examination must be postponed until fresh papers are prepared, and since this cannot be done without explanation there will ensue a hideous scandal, which will throw a cloud not only on the college, but on the university (Doyle).
4. It was Saturday, so they were early home from school: quick, shy, dark little rascals of seven and six, soon talkative, for Ashurst had a way with children (Galsworthy).

b)

1. "You've got to come, or else I'll pull your hair!" (Galsworthy)
2. You were equipped with good insides so that you did not go to pieces that way, the way most of them had, and you made an attitude that you cared nothing for the work you used to do, now that you could no longer do it (Hemingway).
3. His heart, too sore and discomfited, shrank from this encounter, yet wanted its friendly solace - bore a grudge against this influence, yet craved its cool innocence, and the pleasure of watching Stella's face (Galsworthy).
4. She remained faithful to the Elegy, and the Sonnet claimed much of her attention; but her chief distinction was to revive the Ode, a form of poetry that the poets of the present day somewhat neglect (Maugham).

c)

1. The newcomer was pleasant in his manners and exceedingly well dressed even for St. Midas', but for some reason he kept aloof from the other boys (Fitzgerald).

2. She had gone to kill a piece of meat and, knowing how he liked to watch the game, she had gone well away so she would not disturb this little pocket of the plain that he could see (Hemingway).
3. And - strange! - he did not know whether he was a scoundrel, if he meant to go back to Megan, or if he did not mean to go back to her (Galsworthy).
4. Africa was where he had been happiest in the good time of his life, so he had come out here to start again (Hemingway).

d)

1. There was no hardship; but there was no luxury and he had thought he could get back into training that way (Hemingway).
2. She had been married to a man who never bored her and these people bored her very much (Hemingway).
3. It was very pleasant and we were all great friends. The next year came the inflation and the money he had made the year before was not enough to buy supplies to open the hotel and he hanged himself (Hemingway).
4. But that night he was caught in the wire, with a flare lighting him up and his bowels spilled out into the wire, so when they brought him in, alive, they had to cut him loose (Hemingway).

II. Define the types of clauses constituting the following sentences:

a)

1. She was looking for a place where they might lunch, for Ashurst never looked for anything (Galsworthy).
2. They were fleeting as one of the glimmering or golden visions one had of the soul in nature, glimpses of its remote and brooding spirit (Galsworthy).
3. Life no doubt had moments with that quality of beauty, of unbidden flying rapture, but the trouble was, they lasted no longer than the span of a cloud's flight over the sun: impossible to keep them with you, as Art caught beauty and held it fast (Galsworthy).
4. But in a last word to the wise of these days let it be said that of all who give gifts these two were the wisest (O. Henry).
5. While they were driving he had not been taking notice... (Galsworthy)
6. And a sudden ache beset his heart: he had stumbled on just one of those past moments in his life, whose beauty and rapture he had failed to arrest, whose wings had fluttered away into the unknown... (Galsworthy)
7. "Can you tell us if there's a farm near here where we could stay the night?" (Galsworthy)
8. "It is a pity your leg is hurting you." (Galsworthy)

9. That he was wealthy went without saying, but beyond a few such deductions John knew little of his friend, so it promised rich confectionery for his curiosity when Percy invited him to spend the summer at his home "in the West" (Fitzgerald).

b)

1. "A further knowledge of facts is necessary before I would venture to give a final and definite opinion." (Doyle)
2. "Can you ask me, then, whether I am ready to look into any new problem, however trivial it may prove?" (Doyle)
3. "I know it looks as if I've got you here on false pretences but we really ought to be thinking about the possible dates." (James)
4. "I am about to write your cheque, however unwelcome the information which you have gained may be to me." (Doyle)
5. Did it matter where he went, what he did, or when he did it? (Galsworthy)
6. The flying glamour which had clothed the earth all day had not gone now that night had fallen, but only changed into this new form (Galsworthy).
7. "It's I who am not good enough for you." (Galsworthy)
8. And he uttered a groan which made a nursemaid turn and stare (Galsworthy).
9. If he were drowned they would find his clothes (Galsworthy).

c)

1. If she was what most American girls were, he was quite confident that this would not be too difficult, although he had once or twice been giggled at by young ladies when they had finally found a moment in which to be alone with him at a party and he had spoken to them tenderly (Saroyan).
2. She could not understand why, instead of smiling at such good news, Miss Elizabeth covered her eyes with her hands and groaned (Forster).
3. There are two very good reasons why she should under no circumstances be his wife (Doyle).
4. On the face of it the case is not a very complex one, though it certainly presents some novel and interesting features (Doyle).
5. He did not speak intimately again that night to Laura Slade, for he knew her aunt would send her back to Philadelphia immediately if she knew their secret, but when he came on stage at Monday night's performance and acknowledged the applause that greeted him he saw that she was in the seat he'd had the management put aside for her and he was able quite unobtrusively, as he bowed very low, to look her straight in the eye, and to throw her a kiss, as if to the entire audience (Saroyan).

6. All he wanted to do was help her (Saroyan).
7. She was terrified and she was rapt, as if the sight of the wolves moving over the snow was the spirit of the dead or some other part of the mystery that she knew to lie close to the heart of life, and when they had passed she would not have believed she had seen them if they had not left their tracks in the snow (Cheever).
8. Jud was a monologist by nature, whom destiny, with customary blundering, had set in a profession wherein he was bereaved, for the greater portion of his time, of an audience (O. Henry).
9. I never noticed anything in what she said that sounded particularly destructive to a man's ideas of self-consciousness; but he was set back to an extent you could scarcely imagine (O. Henry).

1. If I drew from a photograph my drawing showed up characteristics and expressions that you couldn't find in the photo, but I guess they were in the original, all right (O. Henry).
2. At that adoring look he felt his nerves quiver, just as if he had seen a moth scorching its wings (Galsworthy).
3. In the bewildering, still, scentless beauty of that moment he almost lost memory of why he had come to the orchard.
4. He was the only son of a late professor of chemistry, but people found a certain lordliness in one who was often so sublimely unconscious of them (Galsworthy).
5. "There's trout there, if you can tickle them." (Galsworthy)
6. It was about the period of the Celtic awakening, and the discovery that there was Celtic blood about this family had excited one who believed that he was a Celt himself (Galsworthy).
7. Salamat, still chatting with Mrs. Boake-Rehan Adams, was about to ask who the young lady was who looked like a Renoir girl and gave one the feeling of having been created out of rose petals and champagne when the girl herself came leaping and laughing through the excited people to her aunt to ask whether she might not stay with her an extra day before going home to Philadelphia (Saroyan).
8. Jud laid down his sixshooter, with which he was preparing to pound an antelope steak, and stood over me in what I felt to be a menacing attitude (O. Henry).
9. He put his hands on the dry, almost warm tree trunk, whose rough mossy surface gave forth a peaty scent at his touch (Galsworthy).

Selected Reader

1.

LockQ. Functional English Grammar

12. Combining Messages: Complex Sentences

Example 1 is a sentence from the speech of a primary school teacher. Sentence 2 is from Extract 7.

(1) *The things will be here and you will know what to do, as you will be able to carry on by yourself if you've finished your other work, so long as you tidy up at the end.*

(2) *The payoff for the rigours and longueurs of scientific research is the consequent gain in understanding of the way the world is constructed.*

Even without knowing the source of these two sentences, it would be clear that they are from very different contexts. At the very least, most readers would probably identify number 1 as spoken language and number 2 as written language.

One of the ways in which these two extracts differ from each other is that number 2 has very long noun groups (*the payoff for the rigours and longueurs of scientific research* and *the consequent gain in the way the world is constructed*) and a great deal of nominalization. Number 1, on the other hand, has relatively short noun groups (*the things, you, your other work*) and little or no nominalization (*work* is the only word that might be considered a nominalization)¹⁷.

A second way in which these two extracts differ is that number 1 consists of a number of structurally related clauses:

¹⁷ In some analyses, *what to do* would be treated as a nominal clause and therefore also as a kind of nominalization. However, following Halliday 1994, it is here analyzed as a ranking clause.

*The things will be here
and you will know
what to do
as you will be able to carry on by yourself
if you've finished your other work
so long as you tidy up at the end.*

Number 2, on the other hand, consists of just one clause (excluding embedded clauses). Number 2 is in fact an identifying clause consisting of two noun groups (functioning as the Identified and the Identifier) joined by the linking verb *is*.

A sentence which consists of only one ranking (i.e., nonembedded) clause such as number 2, is known as a **simple sentence**, while a sentence which consists of more than one ranking clause, such as number 1, is known as a **complex sentence**.¹⁸ The word *sentence* is actually somewhat problematic. In written language, a sequence of structurally related clauses normally begins with a capital letter and ends with a full stop. In other words, the sequence is marked as being a *sentence*. In spoken language, however, one has to take intonation into account, as well as the presence of conjunctions such as *and*, *if*, and *so long as* to decide whether clauses are structurally related or not. In addition, a sequence of structurally related clauses in speech might not be acceptable as a sentence in written language. If number 1 were to be written, for example, it would probably be split up into two or more sentences. There is, in fact, a general tendency for such sequences to be longer and more complex in speech than in writing. For such reasons, the term *sentence* is sometimes used to refer only to written language, and a different term is used to refer to sequences of structurally related clauses in speech. In this book, the familiar term *sentence* is retained for both written and spoken language. However, it is important to bear in mind that a sentence of spoken language may look very different from a sentence of written language.

In traditional grammar, a distinction is made between *compound* sentences, which contain only linked independent clauses, and *complex* sentences, which contain dependent clauses. In this book, no such distinction is made. Any sentence containing more than one ranking clause will be called a *complex sentence*.

The first part of this chapter will consider the *structural* relationships between clauses in complex sentences. The second part will look at complex sentences from the point of view of the *logical* relationships between clauses.

12.1 Independent and Dependent Clauses

Clauses can be independent or dependent. **Independent** clauses can potentially stand alone and are not structurally dependent on other clauses. If a sentence has only one clause, that clause is, of course, normally an independent clause. The following sentence consists of two independent clauses.

(3) *You get off at the stop just before the beach and on the left you 'll see Bell-view Drive.*

A **dependent clause** is structurally dependent on another clause, as in the following example:

(4) *While it was cooling, they went into the woods in search of sweet honey.*

Dependent clauses cannot normally stand alone. A corollary of that is, of course, that every sentence must have at least one independent clause. Apparent exceptions are cases such as answers to questions, for example:

(5) *A: Why did you switch it off?
B: 'cause the picture was so bad.*

The clause in the answer can be regarded as dependent on */switched it off*, which has been omitted because it is understood from the question. In other words, it can be analyzed as a case of ellipsis of the independent clause.

12.2 Structural Relationships Between Clauses

There are two basic kinds of structural relationships between clauses - **linking** and **binding**.

12.2.1 Linking

The following examples (as well as number 3 in Section 12.1) illustrate linking:

(6) *Don't worry about it: Grandma doesn't know what she means.*

(7) *Put up or shut up!*

(8) *(I want it) because I need it and I was promised it.*

(9) *While soaking oneself in the hot water and letting the cares of the day dissolve away, one can contemplate the strangeness of a society which allows...*

In linking, the clauses are in a relationship of equality. They must all be independent clauses (as in numbers 6 and 7) or all dependent clauses (as in numbers 8 and 9). The clauses are either simply juxtaposed (in writing, often with a comma, colon, semicolon, or dash between them) or they are joined by a *linking conjunction* (*and, but, or, etc.*).

A sequence of two linked clauses can occasionally be reversed with no significant change in the logical relationship between the two clauses. For example, the two linked clauses in number 8 could be reversed, as could the clauses in the following sentence:

(10) *Dino wanted the supreme but I wanted the one with anchovies.
I wanted the one with anchovies but Dino wanted the supreme.*

Note that the linking conjunction *but* does not belong to either clause and therefore stays between them when the sequence is reversed.

Very often, however, the logical relationship between the messages in linked clauses depends upon the sequence. This is often the case even where the conjunction is *and*, for example:

(11) *She came in. took her coat off. and went straight upstairs.*

In this sentence, the sequence of the clauses represents the chronological sequence of the three actions.

Similarly, in the following sentence, the cause and effect implication depends upon the sequence:

(12) *I felt very tired and decided to have an early night. ('compare: I decided to have an early night and felt very tired.)*

A further characteristic of clauses linked by conjunctions is that if the subject of two or more linked clauses is the same, it can be omitted in the second and any subsequent clauses. This is illustrated in numbers 11 and 12 above. This is one of the few contexts in which *Subject ellipsis* is permissible in English.

12.2.2 Binding

Examples 13 through 19 illustrate binding:

(13) Although the sun is shining, it's shining in my heart.

(14) *These are bony growths up to one and a half meters long, which are used as weapons in fights with other stags during the mating season.*

(15) Had it been left to me, I would have forgotten the whole thing.

(16)... *thick columns of thunder cloud are formed, creating almost vertical walls...*

(17) *These books appealed to Eros while educating it.*

(18) By ordering directly from the publisher, we can avoid all the delay.

(19) Although not entirely happy with it, we accepted the compromise agreement.

In binding, the clauses are in a relationship of inequality. In each of the preceding examples, the underlined clause is dependent on an independent clause. However, a clause may also be dependent on another dependent clause, as shown in the following example:

(20) *Because we were unhappy about the initial results, which were frankly a bit of a mess, we rethought the whole thing.*

In this sentence, *which were frankly a bit of a mess* is dependent on *Because we were unhappy about the initial results*, which in turn is dependent on the only independent clause in the sentence: *we rethought the entire thing*. There are a number of ways in which a clause may be marked as a dependent clause:

- By a *binding conjunction* such as *although*, *if*, and *because* (e.g., number 13).
- By w/z-words such as *who* and *which* (e.g., number 14).
- By word order (e.g., number 15).

- By being a nonfinite clause - either with no other marking (e.g., number 16) or preceded by a binding conjunction (e.g., number 17) or a preposition (e.g., number 18).

Dependent clauses without a Predicator also sometimes occur as in number 19. These are probably best regarded as elliptical versions of clauses with Predicators.

In binding, the sequence of clauses is usually much freer than in linking. A dependent clause may precede, follow, or interrupt the clause it is dependent on. It may also occur internal to the clause. For example:

(21) Despite being so unpopular, the present administration has managed to push through some important reforms.

(21) a. *The present administration has managed to push through some important reforms, despite being so unpopular.*

(21) b. *The present administration, despite being so unpopular, has managed to push through some important reforms.*

Note that the preposition *despite* is part of the dependent clause and therefore moves with it.

Some cases in which the sequence of clauses in binding is not so flexible are covered later in Section 12.3.1.

12.2.3 Clause Combining and Textual Meaning

As stated previously, linking is a relationship of equality. This means that the messages in the clauses are presented as more or less of equal significance. In binding, however, one piece of information is subordinate to another. In the last chapter, we saw how information which the speaker wishes to present as more important or newsworthy is typically placed toward the end of a clause. This principle extends to the sequencing of structurally related clauses in binding. The last clause in a complex sentence typically contains the most important, newsworthy information. In fact, speakers or writers may select to bind rather than link clauses precisely because binding gives them greater freedom to select which clause to put first and which clause to put last. In other words, they may be able to more easily achieve the textual meaning most appropriate to the context. Some of the differences in textual meaning inherent in the

sequencing of clauses can be illustrated by the following three sentences:

- (22) *They left Paris and took the train to Rome.*
 (22) a. *After they had left Paris, they took the train to Rome.*
 (22) b. *They took the train to Rome after they had left Paris.*

In number 22, their leaving Paris and their taking the train to Rome are two more or less equally significant pieces of new information. The sentence could answer a question such as, *What did they do next?* The sequence of the clauses cannot be changed as it reflects the chronological relationship between the two processes.

In version 22a (given unmarked intonation), the information about their leaving Paris is treated as assumed or known information and it sets the temporal frame for the important new information that they took the train to Rome. The sentence could answer a question such as, *What did they do after they had left Paris?* However, in version 22b (again given unmarked intonation), the newsworthy information is the time of their taking the train to Rome, that is, the information in the second clause. The sentence could answer a question such as, *When did they take the train to Rome?*

12.2.4 Learning and Teaching Linking and Binding

For most learners, linking of independent clauses is relatively straightforward. The two clauses are either simply juxtaposed or linked by a conjunction. However, the possibility of ellipsis in the second and any subsequent clauses can lead to problems. Subject ellipsis has been noted above. Ellipsis can be extended to other constituents which are the same in both clauses; for example, there is ellipsis of both Subject and Finite (*he was*) in the following sentence:

- (23) *He was severely beaten and left for dead.*

Learners sometimes overdo ellipsis, as in the following example in which the whole verb group (presumably *have been*) has been omitted from the second clause:

- (24) * *Our parents forgive us even though we have done wrong or unfaithful to them (Crewe 1977).*

Another problem that sometimes occurs with linking is that learn-ers may use Conjunctive Adjuncts as if they were linking conjunctions, for example:

- (25) *?Only four students came therefore the presentation was cancelled.*
 (26) **We were out looking for clients meanwhile they just sat in their offices.*

This is not particularly surprising, as many such Adjuncts do commonly occur in the second of two linked clauses where they make explicit the logical meaning between two clauses linked by *and*. For example:

- (27) *The anticyclone is colder, drier and heavier than the ascending warm moist air and therefore flattens out the rising thunderstorm tops...*
 (28) *They sat all night in front of the fire planning the next stage of the journey, and meanwhile the storm raged outside.*

[...] The binding relationship tends to cause more problems for learners. Learners sometimes write sentences consisting of only dependent clauses, for example:

- (30) **Because it was very dark. The boys missed the road.*
 (31) **/ did my homework. While my brothers just watched television.*

Such mistakes may be due to confusion over the difference between Conjunctive Adjuncts and conjunctions. For example, compare number 31 with the following:

- (32) *I did my homework. Meanwhile my brothers just watched television.*

[...] Some languages regularly mark twice the logical relationship between two clauses, once in the dependent clause and once in the independent clause. This can lead to learners producing sentences such as:

- (33) **Although they lay fewer eggs but they look after them more carefully.*

The use of conjunctions like *although* and *but* together like this does occasionally occur in English, particularly in instances of spoken English where there is a great distance between the beginning of the dependent clause and the independent clause. However, it is regarded as incorrect in written English.

The distinction between finite and nonfinite dependent clauses can also cause problems. A finite dependent clause must have both a Finite and a Subject. To form a nonfinite dependent clause both the Finite and the Subject must be omitted, for example:

(34) *While she was working in Zimbabwe, she developed a great love for the African landscape.*

(34)a. *While working in Zimbabwe, she developed a great love for the African landscape.*

Learners sometimes produce intermediate forms such as:

(35) * *While she working in Zimbabwe, she ...*

(36) * *While was working in Zimbabwe, she ...*

A related problem concerns the use of conjunctions and prepositions with finite and nonfinite dependent clauses. Some binding conjunctions can only be used in finite clauses, for example, *as*, *wherever*, *because*, *in order that*, *so that*, and *as long as*. Other binding conjunctions can be used in both finite and nonfinite clauses, for example, *while*, *when*, *since*, *until*, *if*, *unless*, and *although*. Prepositions, such as *in*, *by*, *without*, *despite*, *in spite of*, *as a result of*, and *because of* can only be used in nonfinite clauses. Learners sometimes use the wrong combinations, for example:

(37) * *Because living far away from the college, I must get up very early every day.*

(38) ^*Despite I have studied English for so many years, I find it difficult to understand native speakers.*

Nonfinite dependent clauses may have no Subjects, and there are often more restrictions on their positioning than with finite dependent clauses because it must be clear which participant in the independent clause the dependent clause relates to. Learners sometimes produce sentences such as:

(39) ?*While waiting for a bus, a beggar asked me for some money.*
^compare: *While I was waiting for a bus, a beggar asked me for some money.*

Perhaps one of the most difficult problems facing the learner is to develop the sense of when it is best to express two messages as two separate sentences, when to combine them through linking, and when to combine them through binding. As noted previously, the choice is highly context-dependent.

Learners are often given practice in linking and binding by being required to combine separate sentences into one sentence or to transform a linking relationship between two clauses into a binding relationship. Out of context, such exercises are likely to be very mechanical and may do little to enable learners to use the structures appropriately. Alternatively, clauses to be combined can be presented in complete texts, so that the learners have to pay attention to the flow of information to decide where and how to combine clauses. This allows learners to appreciate that the structures are not arbitrary but contribute to the coherence of a text. In general, the structural relationships are best learned along with the *logical* relationships (cause, purpose, time, place, etc.) between clauses. These will be explored in the next section.

12.3 Logical Relationships Between Clauses

A wide range of logical relationships can hold between structurally related clauses. Following Halliday (1994), these relationships can be classified into three broad types: **elaboration**, **extension**, and **enhancement**¹⁹.

12.3.1 Elaboration

One clause may elaborate the message in another clause by restating it in different words, giving more details, being more specific,

Halliday (1994) in fact makes a distinction between expansion - which includes the three categories of elaboration, extension, and enhancement - and projection. This latter term refers to dependent clauses following mental and verbal processes.

giving an example, or otherwise clarifying it in some way. Elaboration can be combined with both linking and binding, as the following examples show.

Elaboration and Linking

(40) *Today we stand at the brink of the Thoughtware Revolution; we've only just begun to assimilate the lessons of the information revolution.*

(41) *7 was surrounded by birds - they were tuis.*

(42) *Frogs are members of the amphibia group of animals, that is they live on land and water. [...]*

Elaboration and Binding With Finite Dependent Clause

(45) *These are bony growths up to one and a half meters from base to tip, which are used as weapons in fights with other stags during the mating season.*

(46) *I managed to get two A 's and a B, which is not too bad, I reckon.*

Elaboration and Binding With Nonfinite Dependent Clause

(48) *Heading dogs move sheep quietly, taking them where their master tells them.*

(49) *...thick columns of thunder cloud are formed, creating almost vertical walls.*

As the preceding examples show, elaboration combined with linking takes the form of two juxtaposed clauses (sometimes referred to as *apposition*). In writing there may be a semicolon, comma, or dash between the linked clauses. In speech, it is intonation that indicates that two such juxtaposed clauses should be regarded as structurally combined rather than separate sentences, although it is not always clear-cut. In numbers 40 and 41 the precise logical meanings of the elaboration are not explicitly marked. In number 42 the logical meaning is marked by *that is*. Some other markers of elaboration are *in other words*, *for instance*, *in particular*, *in fact*, *actually*, *for example* and *indeed*.

Elaboration combined with binding, where the dependent clause is finite, as in numbers 45 and 46, gives the structure which in traditional grammar is referred to as a *nonrestrictive relative clause* or some-

times a *nondefining relative clause*. The elaboration is sometimes just of one noun group within the independent clause, as in number 45, and sometimes of a larger part of the clause or of the whole clause, as in number 46. Note that such elaborating clauses are exceptions to the generalization that with binding the sequence of the independent and dependent clauses can be changed.

This kind of elaboration should be distinguished from the defining or restrictive relative clauses (i.e., embedded clauses). The following examples should make this clear:

(50) *My brother, who lives in the U.K., is getting married in June.*

(50)a. *My brother who lives in the U.K. is getting married in June.*

In number 50 the elaborating clause *who lives in the U.K.* provides some additional information about *my brother*. The implication is that I have only one brother. In number 50a, the embedded clause serves to identify which of my brothers is being referred to. The implication is that I have other brothers who do not live in the U.K. In speech, a defining relative clause is normally part of the same tone group as the noun group within which it is embedded and there is therefore no pause before it. An elaborating (nondefining relative) clause, however, normally has its own tone group and there may thus be a pause both before and after it. This is usually (but not invariably) reflected in writing by putting commas around the elaborating clause.

12.3.2 Extension

One clause may extend the meaning in another clause by **addition**, glossed as the *and* relationship; by **variation**, glossed as the *instead* relationship; or **alternation**, glossed as the *or* relationship.

The following sentences exemplify the *addition* type of extension.

Addition and Linking

(51) *7 had caught food on the way and shared it with the dog.*

(52) *He always preferred classical music but his wife was really into jazz.*

(53) *They have not learned to read, nor do they have the expectation of delight or improvement from reading.*

Addition and Binding With Finite Dependent Clause

(54) *A LAN is a network over a small geographical area, while a WAN is a number of LANs linked together...*

Addition and Binding With Nonfinite Dependent Clause

(55) *Input, storage, retrieval, processing and display (or redistribution) are archival functions, as well as being computer functions.*

(56) *...seeking for enlightenment wherever it is readily available, without being able to distinguish between the sublime and the trash.*

Number 51 represents a simple additive relationship. In number 52 there is some contrast between the added information and the information in the first clause, and so the linker *but* is used (in fact, the logical relationship can be conceptualized as *and but*). This relationship is usually described as *adversative*. Number 53 represents a negative additive relationship.

Among the examples of binding, number 56 also represents an adversative relationship, marked by the preposition *without*. However, where the Independent clause is finite, it is hard to draw a line between a simple additive relationship and an adversative relationship (out of context, number 54 could be interpreted either way).

The following sentences are examples of the *variation* and *alternation* types of extension.

Variation and Linking

(57) *Don't cut the wire, but slice away just enough insulation on each to expose a section of bare wire.*

Alternation and Linking

(58) *You either freeze to death or you burn up.*

Variation and Binding

(59) *They also improve productivity by allowing people to focus on more creative work instead of having to spend lots of time doing the mundane work...*

Alternation and Binding

(60) *If it's not too cold it's too hot!*

Note that *but* can be used to mark both an additive or adversative and a variative relationship

12.3.3 Enhancement

One clause may enhance the meaning of another clause by providing circumstantial information, including the basic categories of time, space, means, comparison, cause or reason, purpose, condition, and concession. Enhancement combined with binding gives what in traditional grammar are called *adverbial clauses*.

Time

(61) *It can become an expert in the thought ways of the individual students and then propose learning levels appropriate to that student.* (linking)

(62) *While it was cooling they went into the woods in search of sweet honey,* (binding)

Space

(63) *Somebody has been lying on my bed! - and there she is!* (linking)

(64) *However, where publishing does become electronic, it will seriously affect conventional publishing,* (binding)

Means

(65) *They crawled silently along on their bellies and in that way were able to get very close to the animals,* (linking)

(66) *He tells Bob which way to go by whistling and shouting,* (binding)

Comparison

(67) *We looked to the East for adventure and opportunity and in the same way they looked to the West,* (linking)

(68) *It blots the liquid up as a paint brush holds paint,* (binding)

Cause or reason

(69) *How she found her way home we do not know, for she had been brought to our new house by car.* (linking)

(70) *As the air from the upper atmosphere is clear, the eye of the hurricane is typically cloudless and relatively calm,* (binding)

Purpose

(71) *She is studying English so that she can get a white collar job.*
(binding)²⁰

Condition (positive)

(72) *They may turn us down and in that case we 'll just have to start again from scratch.* (linking)

(73) *If you wish to fit a flush socket in a lath-and-plaster wall try to locate it over a stud or nogging.* (binding)

Condition (negative)

(74) *You'd better return it immediately, otherwise they're likely to accuse you of stealing it.* (linking)

(75) *Unless they are given explicit instructions, they just sit around on their backsides all day long.* (binding)

Concession

(76) *He knows his stuff alright but doesn't seem to be able to get it across to the students.* (linking)

(77) *There are some attractive tree-lined streets, although most of the trees look pretty bare and scrawny.* (binding)

12.3.4 Nonfinite Enhancement Clauses and Circumstantial Adjuncts

The meanings in context of enhancement clauses and of Circumstantial Adjuncts can be very close. Structurally, too, the dividing line between nonfinite enhancement clauses and Circumstantial Adjuncts is not altogether clear, for example:

(78) *When we arrived at the wharf, we found that the boat had already left.*

(78) a. *Arriving at the wharf, we found that the boat had already left.* (78)

b. *On arriving at the wharf, we found that the boat had already left.*

(78) c. *On arrival at the wharf, we found that the boat had already left.*

²⁰ The logical relationship between two linked clauses such as *she wants to get a white collar job, so she is studying English* could be interpreted as purpose. However, strictly speaking, the logical relationship here is of reason.

The underlined units in the preceding examples vary in the extent to which the process is nominalized. Most linguists would agree in regarding numbers 78 and 78a as finite and nonfinite dependent clauses \ and number 78c as a prepositional phrase (realizing a Circumstantial \ Adjunct), on the grounds that *arrival* is clearly a noun. Analysis of number 78b depends upon whether one regards it as more like 78a or more like 78c. Following Halliday (1994), structures like 78b have been treated in this chapter as nonfinite clauses, on the grounds that forms like *arriving* are still more verbal than nominal. However, some linguists would prefer to treat all such structures as prepositional phrases.

For learners, it does not matter what labels one attaches to these structures, providing that their meanings are clear and that learners know when they can and when they cannot use them (see Section 12.2.4).

12.3.5 Learning and Teaching Logical Relationships Between Clauses

The fact that the same conjunction or preposition may have different meanings, depending on context, can be a problem. For example:

(79) *Goldilocks was hungry, so, she decided to eat some of the porridge.*

(80) *I only went there so_ I could see what he looks like in the flesh.*

In number 79 the logical relationship is of cause, while in number 80, it is of purpose (*that* could be added after *so*). Similarly, in number 81 the logical relationship is of time, in number 82 it is of reason, and in number 83 it is of comparison, although the same conjunction is used in all three sentences.

(81) *As our standard of living improves, we may come to look upon more of our wants as needs.*

(82) *As this air from the upper atmosphere is clear, the eye of the hurricane is clear.*

(83) *It blots the liquid up as a paint brush holds paint.*

It is not likely to be very useful for learners to go through a list of conjunctions one by one and illustrate all their possible meanings. It makes more sense to explore separately the major logical relationships, properly contextualized, establishing the most commonly used realizations for each.

Questions:

1. What problems does the recognition of the complex sentence involve?
2. What is meant by a dependent/independent clause?
3. Define the notions of linking and binding. Do these terms entirely correspond to the traditional terms of coordination and subordination? Where does the difference lie?
4. What is the informational role of linking and binding within an utterance?
5. What kinds of logical relationships between clauses does G. Lock single out?
6. What ways to learn and teach the means of combining messages does G. Lock suggest?

2. Sweet

H.

A New English Grammar Parti

Relations Between Sentences

Simple sentences are of two kinds, independent and dependent. An independent sentence is one whose grammatical structure allows it to stand alone. A dependent sentence is one that cannot stand alone, but makes us expect another - generally an independent sentence to complete its meaning. Thus in the complex sentence *When I came back, I found no one at home* the first sentence is dependent, the second independent. All prepared sentences²¹ introduced by dependent words, whether pronouns, adverbs, or conjunctions, are necessarily dependent. Thus in the above example the dependent sentence *when I came back* is introduced by the dependent adverb or conjunction *when*. Unprepared dependent sentences may generally be expanded into prepared sentences. Thus the unprepared sentences in *You are the*

²¹ That is, clauses introduced by connectives.

man I want; I see you are mistaken may be expanded into *whom I want; that you are mistaken*.

460. Sentences are also distinguished as coordinate and subordinate, according as they are introduced by a coordinative or a subordinative conjunction. [...]

Clauses and Complexes

Two or more sentences may be joined together to form a single complex sentence, or complex, as we may call it for the sake of brevity. When simple sentences are joined together in this way we call them clauses.

In every complex there is one independent clause, called the principal clause, together with at least one dependent clause, which stands in the relation of adjunct to the principal clause. The dependent clause may be either coordinate or subordinate. We call a coordinate clause a co-clause, a subordinate clause a sub-clause. Thus in *you shall walk, and I will ride*, the first clause is the principal clause, and the second is a co-clause. In *You are the man I want*, the second clause - / *want* - is a sub-clause. So also in *You shall walk while I ride*.

• A complex in which the principal clause is modified by a co-clause is called, for the sake of brevity, a co-complex, and one in which it is modified by a sub-clause is called a sub-complex. Thus the first complex in the paragraph above is a co-complex, the other two are sub-complexes.

Sequences

In a complex the clauses must be joined together by conjunctions, or else the adjunct-clauses must be dependent, as in *you are the man I want*. When two or more independent sentences are associated together logically in the same way as in complex, the combination is called a sequence. Thus we have an adversative sequence in *Am I right, am I wrong?* which is logically equivalent to the complex *Am I right, or am I wrong?* Such a sequence is therefore equivalent to a complex. Such a causal sequence *as I am sure of it: I saw it myself is*, on the other hand, equivalent to the sub-complex */ am sure of it, because I saw it myself*. In both of these examples the adjunct-sentence is prepared. We call such sequences unprepared fences.

A word-group containing a verbal often differs only grammatically from the same group with the verbal made into a finite verb, that is, from a sentence. Hence such a simple sentence as *I heard of his coming home* can be expanded into complex *I heard that he had come home*. So also *I wish him to come back* may be expanded into *I wish he would come back*. Such sentences as *I heard of his coming home*, *I wish him to come back*, which contain in themselves the germs of dependent sentences, are called extended sentences.

Another way in which complexes are shortened is by making sentence-connecting into word-connecting conjunctions, as when the complex *He is tall, but he is not strong* is made into a simple sentence with a group predicate - *He is tall, but not strong*. Such sentences may be regarded as a kind of extended sentences, but it is better to distinguish them from the extended sentences we have just been considering by calling them contracted sentences.

(pp. 160-168)

Questions:

1. What kinds of clauses does H. Sweet recognize?
2. What is meant by unprepared sentences?
3. What is an extended sentence?

3.

Kruisinga E. **A Handbook of Present-Day English, Part II, 3**

The Compound Sentence

A sentence may consist of elements that have more or less completely the appearance of sentences. An example is: *I believe you are right*. In this sentence we have the group *you are right*, which may have the function of a sentence in a given context. The first element *I believe* can hardly have such a function, although it is evidently not

impossible. But we should not be justified in considering the sentence *I believe you are right* as a group of two sentences, for neither of the two elements fully expresses its meaning except as part of the whole sentence; this is expressed by calling the two elements **clauses**, and giving the name **sentence** to the whole group only. A sentence containing two or more clauses is called a **compound sentence**.

In every compound sentence there is one member that is, syntactically speaking, the leading element; this is called **the main clause**; the other clauses are called **the sub-clauses**.

The main clause is **the leading clause** of the whole sentence. The sub-clauses may form a group of which each member is directly connected with the main clause (a); but it may also be that two or more sub-clauses form a closer group, one serving as the leading clause of this group (b).

- a. *It was seized by Saxons, who speedily reached the limits of their expansion and settled down as the small and backward kingdom of Sussex.*
- b. *The authority for it all is the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, which certainly does tell a story that can read in this way...*

From what has been said it follows that the distinction of main and sub-clauses is a purely grammatical one, without any bearing on the meaning of the whole sentence. [...]

With regard to the functions of sub-clauses it is evident that these are generally parallel to, but not always identical with, the functions of the elements of a simple sentence. Accordingly, we can distinguish subject clauses²², object clauses, predicate clauses, attributive clauses, and adverb clauses. We can also consider the apposition clauses as a separate class. There are no clauses in English that can be considered as parallel to the predicative adjunct of an object (as *a mistake* is in a sentence like: *I consider your decision a great mistake*).

²² The author restricts the group of subject clauses in the following way: "It is usually supposed that English also has subject clauses following the main clause, as in *It is certain he doesn't want to come*". However we may interpret this compound sentence, it is clear that the main clause has a subject. It is true that the subject *it* expresses no meaning, but that is of no essential importance grammatically, for the circumstance does not alter the structure of the sentence.

J

Loose Sentence-Groups

In the chapter on Syntactic Groups it has been shown that words are sometimes grouped in such a way that no element of the group can be considered as the leading member; such groups have been called loose groups. This grouping is also possible in the case of two or more sentences or clauses; we call them **loose sentence-groups, or clause-groups**.

The traditional name for this kind of grouping is **coordination**; there is little objection to this term as long as it is understood that the logical relation of the members of the group does not form the foundation of the distinction. It sometimes occurs, indeed, that we have loose grouping although there is logical subordination [...].

The classification of the loose word-groups can also be applied to the sentence-groups; we thus speak of linked and unlinked sentences (or clauses), and of double, triple, and multiple sentences (clauses).

It is generally said that the sub-clause is the logical subject, the subject-pronoun *it* serving as a provisional subject. This would be a reasonable interpretation if we were justified in starting from the supposition that the subject necessarily expresses a meaning. But it should be considered that it is not possible to invert the order of the two clauses without changing the meaning of the whole sentence. Sometimes, indeed the inversion is hardly possible, as in *It seemed almost dreadful they should be able to sing like that*. And in a sentence of the type *It is time we gave a second thought to Puritanism* few will be prepared to explain the sub-clause as being a subject clause.

(pp. 361-364, 467-470)

Questions:

1. What types of clauses does E. Kruisinga single out?
2. What is meant by loose sentence-groups?

4.

Curme Q.O.A Grammar of the English Language, Vol. 3

Complex Sentence. Function and Form of Subordinate Clauses

The complex sentence consists of a principal clause and one or more subordinate clauses. This is true, however, in only a general sense. In an exact sense there is often no principal clause at all: "*Whoever comes* will be welcome." Here one of the essential elements of the sentence, the subject, has the full form of a subordinate clause, but there is no principal clause in the sentence distinct from the subordinate clause. The so-called principal clause is merely the predicate. Not only an essential element but also a subordinate element can have the form of a clause: "I have heard *that he has come*." Here the object has the form of a clause, an object clause. The subordinate clause may also be merely a modification of some word within one of the component elements of the sentence: "The book *which I hold in my hand* is an English grammar." Here the clause is not the subject but only a modifier of it, hence is an adjective clause.

According to their grammatical function, subordinate clauses are divided into subject, predicate, adjective, object, adverbial clauses. These clauses may be reduced to three if we divide them according to the part of speech which they represent: (1) substantive clauses, i.e., clauses with the functions of a substantive, including subject, predicate, object clauses, and such adjective clauses as represent a noun in the attributive relation of appositive, genitive, or prepositional phrase [...]; (2) adjective clauses; (3) adverbial clauses.

(p. 175)

Questions:

1. What are the functions of subordinate clauses?
2. What types of clauses does G.O. Curme recognize?

5.

Stokoe H.R. **The Understanding of Syntax**

"Sentence": "Clause": "Phrase"

These are three terms that we apply to word-groups and we must guard against the idea that they are names or "terms" applied to three mutually exclusive classes of word-groups, for, as we shall find, "Sentences" and "Clauses" are not mutually exclusive classes. Some "Sentences" are "Clauses" and some "Clauses" are "Sentences". [...]

Simple Sentences

We have seen that a Sentence is defined as follows: "A Sentence is a word-group which expresses a complete thought, i.e. a Statement or a Question or a Desire or an Exclamation" [...].

A Simple Sentence is a Sentence which contains only one Finite Verb, expressed or understood [...].

§131 Complex Sentences: Double Sentences: Multiple Sentences

What do we call a Sentence which contains more than one Finite Verb, expressed or understood?

There are three terms which we apply to such Sentences, viz. "Complex", "Double" and "Multiple". And once more we must be on our guard against thinking that they are names or "terms" applied to three mutually exclusive classes of such Sentences. "Complex" is a term used to mean "containing a Subordinate Clause". [...]

Thus we get as the Definition of a Complex Sentence: -

"A Complex Sentence is a Sentence which contains a Subordinate Clause."

"Double" and "Multiple"²³ are terms used to mean respectively "consisting of two coordinated parts" and "consisting of more than two coordinated parts". [...]

Therefore as Definitions of "Double Sentence" and "Multiple Sentence" we get: —

"A Double Sentence is a Sentence which consists of two Coordinated Sentences."

"A Multiple Sentence is a Sentence which consists of more than two Coordinated Sentences."

Since either of two Coordinated Sentences of which a Double Sentence consists, and any one of the Coordinated Sentences of which a Multiple Sentence consists, may be a Complex Sentence containing a Subordinate Clause, it follows that either a Double Sentence or a Multiple Sentence may be at the same time a Complex Sentence as containing a Subordinate Clause, for the whole contains what the part contains. Complex, Double and Multiple Sentences are not three mutually Exclusive Classes of Sentences: some Double Sentences and some Multiple Sentences are at the same time "Complex Sentences" and some "Complex Sentences" are at the same time "Double Sentences" or "Multiple Sentences".

Each of the Sentences so coordinated is a "Clause" in the Double or Multiple Sentence of which it forms a part.

§132 The Terms

"Clause" and "Phrase"

[...] A Clause is a word-group which (a) forms part of a Sentence and (b) has a Finite Verb, expressed or understood, as its main word.

A Phrase is a word-group which has not a Finite verb, expressed or understood, as its main word. [...]

²³ The terms "double" and "multiple" sentences were for the first time introduced by Nesfield in his *Grammar* (1924): "A Double sentence is one made up of two, and a Multiple sentence is one made up of more than two, Coordinate (that is, equal or independent) clauses. [...] Double and Multiple sentences often appear in a contracted or shortened form, so as to avoid the needless repetition of the same word: — The sun *rose* and (the *sun*) *filled* the sky with light." (Nesfield 1924: 106, 108)

A Noun Clause is a Subordinate Clause that does the work of a Noun, i.e. all Subordinate Clauses that do the work of Nouns are Noun Clauses.

A Noun Phrase is a Phrase that does the work of a Noun, i.e. all Phrases that do the work of Nouns are Noun Phrases.

Subordinate Noun Clauses may be:

1. Subordinate Noun Clauses of Indirect Statement introduced in English by *that*, expressed or understood.
2. Other Subordinate Noun Clauses introduced by *that* in English, when *that* means e.g. "the fact that".
3. Subordinate Noun Clauses of Indirect Question or Indirect Exclamation.
4. Subordinate Noun Clauses of Indirect Desire (Command, Petition, etc.).
5. Subordinate Noun Clauses introduced by Relatives.

Adjective Clauses and Adjective Phrases

An Adjective Clause is a Subordinate Clause that does the work of an Adjective, i.e. all Subordinate Clauses that do the work of Adjectives are Adjective Clauses.

An Adjective Phrase is a Phrase that does the work of an adjective, i.e. all Phrases that do the work of Adjectives are Adjective Phrases.

All Adjective Clauses are introduced by Relativ words (Rel. Pronouns, Rel. Adjectives or Rel. Adverbs), i.e. by Rel. Sub. Conjs., which are at the same time Rel. Prons. or Rel. Adjs. or Rel. Advs. [...]

The word-groups in italics in the following Sentences are Adj. Clauses: "He threatened to punish the boys *who did this*." "I wish to visit the place *where I was born*: I remember the time *when this was customary*." [...]

§178 Adverb Clauses and Adverb Phrases

An Adverb Clause is a Subordinate Clause that does the work of an Adverb, i.e. all Subordinate Clauses that do the work of Adverbs are Adverb Clauses.

An Adverb Phrase is a Phrase that does the work of an Adverb, i.e. all Phrases that do the work of Adverbs are Adverb Phrases.

An Adverb Clause or an Adverb Phrase therefore is a Sub. Clause or a Phrase so used that it "qualifies" (*or* "modifies") a Verb or a Verbal Noun, or an Adj., or another Adv., or the equivalent of any of these, by answering some such question as "Under what circumstances?", "When?", "Where?", "Why?" ("From what cause?" or "For what purpose?"), "In spite of what?", "On what hypothesis or condition?", "How?", "To what extent or degree?", "How many times?"

Thus in "He failed *because he did not work*" the Sub. Clause is Causal and qualifies the main Verb.

In "I know [that he failed (*because he did not work*)]", the Causal Clause qualifies the Sub. *Verb failed*, i.e. does Adv. work in the Sub. Clause introduced by *that*.

In "He is so idle *that he learns little*" the Sub. Clause qualifies the Adv. *so* in the Main Clause and is Consecutive, as expressing the consequence of his being "so idle" [...]

(pp. 96-109, 126-147)

Questions:

1. What kind of correlation exists between a sentence and a clause?
2. What is meant by a complex sentence/double sentence/multiple sentence? Are these terms mutually exclusive?
3. What types of clauses does H.R. Stokoe single out?

6.

Bryant M. A

Functional English Grammar

Structure of Sentences

Clause Structure. The preceding chapter divided sentences into types called imperative, exclamatory, interrogative, and declarative. The present chapter will divide sentences upon a different basis, that of clause struc-

ture. These structural divisions have an artistic as well as a grammatical significance, since they bear on the problem of literary style. Their names are simple, complex, compound, and compound-complex. In order to understand them we must first understand the clause.

The Dependent Clause. It is easy to see that "Who knows?" is a sentence, with the subject *who* and the verb *knows*. But in the sentence "The man *who knows* succeeds", the verb *knows* is not the main sentence verb, and the words "*who knows*" are felt as distinctly subordinate to the sentence as a whole. They form an adjective clause modifying *man*.

The dependent, or subordinate, clause is a group of words including a finite verb and its subject, or subject and compound, but not constituting an independent sentence. [...]

The Verbid Clause. It will be well to explain the verbid clause here since it is really a dependent clause. Recent grammars speak of infinitive clauses, participial clauses, and condensed clauses because of the clausal nature of such groups of words as the italicized expressions in the following: "*To write a letter* is easy." "*Writing a letter* is a hard work." "I saw him *writing the letter*." "I saw him *write*." These will be termed verbid clauses in this book.

The verbid clause is a clause containing a verbid with subject, complement, or subject and complement. [...]

§137 The Independent Clause

The relationship between the two dependent clauses in a sentence like "*The wind blew* and *the rain poured*" is very different from that of regular dependent clauses or of verbid clauses and their main clauses. Each clause makes a separate and distinct statement and can stand alone as a separate sentence with a subject and a verb. They are joined by the conjunction *and* which is not a part of either clause. The two clauses are independent of each other and are therefore known as independent or coordinate clauses, for they are of the same rank.

An independent clause is one that is not subordinate to another clause or part of another clause; the statement it makes does not limit or modify another.

Always the independent clause might be a separate sentence. [...]

§139 The Compound Sentence

The compound sentence is one containing two or more independent clauses with no dependent clause. This type of sentence was illustrated in § 137 in explaining independent or coordinate clauses: "The wind blew and the rain poured." [...]

§140 The Complex Sentence

The complex sentence is one containing one independent clause and one or more dependent clauses.

The dependent clause tells something about the main clause and is used as a part of speech - as an adverb ("He has come *that he might see you*"), an adjective ("A document *which is worthless* was found"), or a noun ("He knows that John is here"). In the first sentence, *that he might see you* is an adverbial clause stating the purpose of his coming and therefore modifying the verb *has come*. In the second, *which is worthless* describes the subject *document* and is used as an adjective. In the third, *that John is here* is used as a noun, object of the verb *knows*. The subordinate clause may modify various parts of the independent clause or function as a noun in the sentence.

§141 The Compound-Complex Sentence

The compound-complex sentence combines the two previous types. [...]

§212 Complicated Clause Structure

Combining dependent and verbid clauses may give a sentence an extremely complicated structure: "Considering what she said convinced him that to buy the farm would be to court disaster." In this sentence there are no fewer than six nexuses, three of them verbid clauses, two dependent clauses with finite verbs, and one the main sentence nexus. This main nexus consists of the entire sentence.

(pp. 105-108, 154)

Questions:

1. What types of clauses does M. Bryant single out? What new types of clauses (compared to the classification given above) does the author introduce?
2. What status does the verbid clause have?

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Seminar 14**LINGUISTICS OF TEXT**

1. The tasks of the linguistics of text. Text as an object of research. The problem of text in the hierarchy of language levels.
2. Textual units. The notions of supra-phrasal unity, cumuleme and courseme. Dicteme as the central textual unit. The correlation of a paragraph and a dicteme. Parcellation and its stylistic load.
3. Textual categories. The category of time in fiction. Retrospect and prospect. Modality. The category of the author.
4. Language means of textual cohesion. Representation and substitution. Correlative means of textual cohesion. Conjugational means of textual cohesion. The role of actual division of sentences, presupposition, and implication in the formation of text.

1. Text as a Linguistic Notion

Any text is a coherent stretch of speech which is a semantico-topical and syntactic unity. Sentences organized in dictemes make up textual stretches on syntactic lines according to a communicative purpose in a particular communicative situation. As a result, a textual stretch has a unifying topic. So, in syntactic terms a text is a strictly topical stretch of talk (a continual succession of dictemes) centering on a common informative purpose. In the framework of the given understanding of text, it has two main differential features: topical (semantic) unity and semantico-syntactic cohesion.

2. Textual Units. The notions of "Cumuleme", "Occursemе", and "Dicteme"

One can single out different types of textual stretches (units). Irrespective of their specific features, all textual units are united by their common function - they represent the text as a whole integrally expressing the textual topic.

Earlier, analysing the structure of text linguists identified semantically connected sentence sequences as certain syntactic formations. These formations, or unities, were given the names of "complex syntactic unity", or "super-phrasal unity", or "supra-sentential construction".

Since sentences in these unities are joined by means of syntactic cumulation, it stands to reason to call such sentence sequences "cumulemes".

The cumuleme is essentially a constituent part of one-direction sequence of sentences forming monologue speech. Besides one-direction sequences, i.e. cumulemes, two-direction sequences should be recognized that essentially build up constituent parts of dialogue speech. The component constructions-utterances in these sequences are positioned to meet one another, hence their name "occursemes" (of the Latin root meaning "to meet").

The new approach to the nature of text has been proposed by the introduction of the notion of dicteme - the elementary topical textual unit. The dicteme occupies the highest position in the hierarchy of segmental levels of language. It can be expressed either by a cumuleme (a sequence of two or more sentences), or by one single sentence placed in a topically significant position. The dicteme, as an elementary topical textual unit, is polyfunctional. In the text it performs the functions of nomination, predication, topicalization, and stylization.

3. Textual Categories. Topical Unity and Semantico-Syntactic Cohesion as Basic Textual Categories

Textual categories appear and function only in the text as a language unit of the highest rank. Textual categories reveal the cardinal and the most general differential features of the text.

Today the list of textual categories is open: linguists name different textual categories because they approach the text from different

angles. To the list of textual categories scholars usually refer cohesion, informativeness, retrospection, modality, causality, implication, the author's image, and some others.

In spite of the diversity of opinions on the question, most linguists agree that the basic textual categories are topical unity and semantico-syntactic cohesion. It is conditioned by the fact that the general idea of a sequence of sentences forming a text includes these two notions. On the one hand, it presupposes a succession of spoken or written utterances irrespective of their forming or not forming a coherent semantic complex. On the other hand, it implies a strictly topical stretch of talk, i.e. a continual succession of sentences centering on a common informative purpose. It is this latter understanding of the text that is syntactically relevant. It is in this latter sense that the text can be interpreted as a lingual entity with its two distinguishing features: first, semantic (topical) unity, second, semantico-syntactic cohesion.

Questions:

1. What definition of text is syntactically relevant?
2. What are the principles of identifying textual units?
3. What is the basic difference between a cumuleme and an occursemе?
4. What is the role of the dicteme in the formation of text?
5. What basic functions are performed by the dicteme?
6. What textual categories do scholars usually identify?
7. What enables linguists to regard topical unity and semantico-syntactic cohesion as the basic textual categories?

I. Dwell on the means of cohesion in the given text fragments.

MODEL: *Ten minutes later, with face blanched by terror, and eyes wild with grief, Lord Arthur Savile rushed from Bentinck House, crushing his way through the crowd of fur-coated footmen that stood round the large striped awning, and seeming not to see or hear anything. The night was bitter cold, and the gas-lamps round the square flared and flickered in the keen wind; but his hands were hot with fever, and his forehead burned like fire. On and on he went, almost with the gait of a drunken man. A policeman looked curiously at him as he passed, and a beggar, who slouched from an archway to ask for alms, grew frightened, seeing misery greater*

than his own. Once he stopped under a lamp, and looked at his hands. He thought he could detect the stain of blood already upon them, and a faint cry broke from his trembling lips.

Murder! that is what the cheiromantist had seen there. Murder! The very night seemed to know it, and the desolate wind to howl it in his ear. The dark corners of the streets were full of it. It grinned at him from the roofs of the houses.

First he came to the Park, whose sombre woodland seemed to fascinate him. He leaned wearily up against the railings, cooling his brow against the wet metal, and listening to the tremulous silence of the trees. 'Murder! murder!' he kept repeating, as though iteration could dim the horror of the word. The sound of his own voice made him shudder, yet he almost hoped that Echo might hear him, and wake the slumbering city from its dreams. He felt a mad desire to stop the casual passer-by, and tell him everything.

(from O. Wilde "Lord Arthur Savile's Crime")

The principal means of textual cohesion in this fragment is repetition of different kinds: 1) **lexical repetition** (repetition of the key word): "Murder!" that is what the cheiromantist had seen there. Murder!", the repetition of the pronouns: "he" and "it" (substituting "the murder"), repetition of the words used to describe the background: "night", "dark", "wind"; 2) **lexical synonymic repetition**: "with the face blanched by terror", "the horror of the word"; "eyes wild with grief", "seeing misery greater than his own"; 3) **repetition of the verbs of motion**: "rushed, crashed the way through, on and on he went, he passed, came to the Park".

Among other means we find **substitution** (Lord Arthur Savile - he, his; the murder - it, the word, everything) and **representation**: "Murder! murder! he kept repeating" - "iteration".

Besides, the function of **connectors** is performed by conjunctions (but, and, yet). Another means of textual cohesion is **contrast**: "the night was bitter cold, and the gas-lamps round the square flared and flickered in the keen wind; but his hands were hot with fever, and his forehead burned like fire."

The whole piece deals with the description of the main character's agitated state of mind after he had learned his fate. The following lexical units contribute to the thematic unity of the text: *face blanched by terror, eyes wild with grief, rushed, crushing his way, seemed not to see or hear anything, his hands were hot with fever, his forehead burned like fire, the gait of a drunken man, misery, could detect the stain of blood, a faint cry, trembling lips, desolate wind, leaned wearily, the horror of the word, shudder, a mad desire.*

1. It was 2 p.m. on the afternoon of May 7, 1915. The Lusitania had been struck by two torpedoes in succession and was sinking rapidly, while the boats were being launched with all possible speed. The women and children were being lined up awaiting their turn. Some still clung desperately to husbands and fathers; others clutched their children closely to their breasts. One girl stood alone, slightly apart from the rest. She was quite young, not more than eighteen. She did not seem afraid, and her grave, steadfast eyes looked straight ahead.

"I beg your pardon."

A man's voice beside her made her start and turn. She had noticed the speaker more than once amongst the first-class passengers. There had been a hint of mystery about him which had appealed to her imagination. He spoke to no one. If anyone spoke to him he was quick to rebuff the overture. Also he had a nervous way of looking over his shoulder with a swift, suspicious glance.

She noticed now that he was greatly agitated. There were beads of perspiration on his brow. He was evidently in a state of overmastering fear. And yet he did not strike her as the kind of man who would be afraid to meet death!

(from A. Christie "The Secret Adversary")

2. Now, so far as this went, everything fitted in finally and rationally enough. Valentin had learned by his inquiries that morning that a Father Brown from Essex was bringing up a silver cross with sapphires, a relic of considerable value, to show some of the foreign priests at the congress. This undoubtedly was the "silver with blue stones"; and Father Brown undoubtedly was the little greenhorn in the train. Now there was nothing wonderful about the fact that what Valentin had found out Flambeau had also found out; Flambeau found out everything. Also there was nothing wonderful in the fact that when Flambeau heard of a sapphire cross he should try to steal it; that was the most natural thing in all natural history. And most certainly there was nothing wonderful about the fact that Flambeau should have it all his own way with such a silly sheep as the man with the umbrella and the parcels. He was the sort of man whom anybody could lead on a string to the North Pole; it was not surprising that an actor like Flambeau, dressed as another priest, could lead him to Hampstead Heath. So far the crime seemed clear enough; and while the detective pitied the priest for his helplessness, he almost despised Flambeau for condescending to so gullible a victim. But when Valentin thought of all that had happened in between, of all that had led him to his triumph, he racked his brains for the smallest rhyme or rea-

son in it. What had the stealing of a blue-and-silver cross from a priest from Essex to do with chucking soup at wall paper? What had it to do with calling nuts oranges, or with paying for windows first and breaking them afterwards? He had come to the end of his chase; yet somehow he had missed the middle of it. When he failed (which was seldom), he had usually grasped the clue, but nevertheless missed the criminal. Here he had grasped the criminal, but still he could not grasp the clue.

The two figures that they followed were crawling like black flies across the huge green contour of a hill. They were evidently sunk in conversation, and perhaps did not notice where they were going; but they were certainly going to the wilder and more silent heights of the Heath. As their pursuers gained on them, the latter had to use the undignified attitudes of the deer-stalker, to crouch behind clumps of trees and even to crawl prostrate in deep grass. By these ungainly ingenuities the hunters even came close enough to the quarry to hear the murmur of the discussion, but no word could be distinguished except the word "reason" recurring frequently in a high and almost childish voice. Once over an abrupt dip of land and a dense tangle of thickets, the detectives actually lost the two figures they were following. They did not find the trail again for an agonising ten minutes, and then it led round the brow of a great dome of hill overlooking an amphitheatre of rich and desolate sunset scenery. Under a tree in this commanding yet neglected spot was an old ramshackle wooden seat. On this seat sat the two priests still in serious speech together. The gorgeous green and gold still clung to the darkening horizon; but the dome above was turning slowly from peacock-green to peacock-blue, and the stars detached themselves more and more like solid jewels. Mutely motioning to his followers, Valentin contrived to creep up behind the big branching tree, and, standing there in deathly silence, heard the words of the strange priests for the first time.

(from G.K. Chesterton "The Blue Cross")

3. My mother was sitting by the fire, but poorly in health, and very low in spirits, looking at it through her tears, and desponding heavily about herself and the fatherless little stranger, who was already welcomed by some grosses of prophetic pins, in a drawer upstairs, to a world not at all excited on the subject of his arrival; my mother, I say, was sitting by the fire, that bright, windy March afternoon, very timid and sad, and very doubtful of ever coming alive out of the trial that was before her, when, lifting her eyes as she dried them, to the window opposite, she saw a strange lady coming up the garden.

My mother had a sure foreboding at the second glance, that it was Miss Betsey. The setting sun was glowing on the strange lady, over the garden-fence, and she came walking up to the door with a fell rigidity of figure and composure of countenance that could have belonged to nobody else.

When she reached the house, she gave another proof of her identity. My father had often hinted that she seldom conducted herself like any ordinary Christian; and now, instead of ringing the bell, she came and looked in at that identical window, pressing the end of her nose against the glass to that extent, that my poor dear mother used to say it became perfectly flat and white in a moment.

She gave my mother such a turn, that I have always been convinced I am indebted to Miss Betsey for having been born on a Friday.

My mother had left her chair in her agitation, and gone behind it in the corner. Miss Betsey, looking round the room, slowly and inquiringly, began on the other side, and carried her eyes on, like a Saracen's Head in a Dutch clock, until they reached my mother. Then she made a frown and a gesture to my mother, like one who was accustomed to be obeyed, to come and open the door. My mother went.

(from Ch. Dickens "David Copperfield")

4. We sat there for half-an-hour, describing to each other our maladies. I explained to George and William Harris how I felt when I got up in the morning, and William Harris told us how he felt when he went to bed; and George stood on the hearth-rug, and gave us a clever and powerful piece of acting, illustrative of how he felt in the night.

George FANCIES he is ill; but there's never anything really the matter with him, you know.

At this point, Mrs. Poppets knocked at the door to know if we were ready for supper. We smiled sadly at one another, and said we supposed we had better try to swallow a bit. Harris said a little something in one's stomach often kept the disease in check; and Mrs. Poppets brought the tray in, and we drew up to the table, and toyed with a little steak and onions, and some rhubarb tart.

I must have been very weak at the time; because I know, after the first half-hour or so, I seemed to take no interest whatever in my food - an unusual thing for me - and I didn't want any cheese.

This duty done, we refilled our glasses, lit our pipes, and resumed the discussion upon our state of health. What it was that was actually the matter with us, we none of us could be sure of; but the unanimous opinion was that it - whatever it was - had been brought on by overwork.

"What we want is rest," said Harris.

"Rest and a complete change," said George. "The overstrain upon our brains has produced a general depression throughout the system. Change of scene, and absence of the necessity for thought, will restore the mental equilibrium."

George has a cousin, who is usually described in the charge-sheet as a medical student, so that he naturally has a somewhat family-physicianary way of putting things.

I agreed with George, and suggested that we should seek out some retired and old-world spot, far from the madding crowd, and dream away a sunny week among its drowsy lanes - some half-forgotten nook, hidden away by the fairies, out of reach of the noisy world - some quaint-perched eyrie on the cliffs of Time, from whence the surging waves of the nineteenth century would sound far-off and faint.

Harris said he thought it would be humpy. He said he knew the sort of place I meant; where everybody went to bed at eight o'clock, and you couldn't get a Referee for love or money, and had to walk ten miles to get your baccy.

"No," said Harris, "if you want rest and change, you can't beat a sea trip."

I objected to the sea trip strongly. A sea trip does you good when you are going to have a couple of months of it, but, for a week, it is wicked.

(from J.K. Jerome "Three Men in a Boat")

5. No, he had never written about Paris. Not the Paris that he cared about. But what about the rest that he had never written?

What about the ranch and the silvered gray of the sage brush, the quick, clear water in the irrigation ditches, and the heavy green of the alfalfa. The trail went up into the hills and the cattle in the summer were shy as deer. The bawling and the steady noise and slow-moving mass raising a dust as you brought them in the fall. And behind the mountains, the clear sharpness of the peak in the evening light and, riding down along the trail in the moonlight, bright across the valley. Now he remembered coming down through the timber in the dark holding the horse's tail when you could not see and all the stories that he meant to write.

About the half-wit chore boy who was left at the ranch that time and told not to let any one get any hay, and that old bastard from the Forks who had beaten the boy when he had worked for him stopping to get some food. The boy refused and the old man saying he would beat him again. The boy got the rifle from the kitchen and shot him when he tried to come into the barn and when they came back to the ranch he'd been dead a week, frozen in the corral, and the dogs had eaten part of him. But what was left

you packed on a sled wrapped in a blanket and roped on and you got the boy to help you haul it, and the two of you took it out over the road on skis, and 60 miles down to town to turn the boy over. He having no idea that he would be arrested. Thinking he had done his duty and that you were his friends and he would be rewarded. He'd helped to haul the old man in so everybody could know how bad the old man had been and how he'd tried to steal some food that didn't belong to him, and when the sheriff put the hand-cuffs on the boy he couldn't believe it. Then he started to cry. That was one story he had saved to write. He knew at least twenty good stories from out there and he had never written one. Why?

(from E. Hemingway "The Snows of Kilimanjaro")

II. Dwell on the means of cohesion in the following piece. Can this piece be considered as a strictly coherent text?

One night we started for Bradford. Bradford is a tiny village not far from Nottingham. Nottingham is a very old city. A city is usually a rather large town, with a cathedral. A cathedral is a large, beautifully decorated church, the chief one of a Christian Diocese. Diocese is the area under the control of a bishop. A bishop is a high-ranking priest in charge of all the churches and priests in a large area. A bishop can be moved any number of squares from one corner towards the opposite corner. Poets' Corner is a part of Westminster Abbey where many famous English poets and writers are buried, one of them is Geoffrey Chaucer. Chaucer is best known for his long poem "The Canterbury Tales". The Archbishop of Canterbury is the head of the Church of England. In England there are many old cities, one of them is Nottingham, not far from which is Bradford. We started for Bradford in the first sentence of this story.

Selected Reader

1.

Francis W.N. **The Structure
of American English****Sequence-Sentences**

[...] only the first sentence of any conversation - or the first one following a greeting, call, or exclamation or the stereotyped response to one of these - can properly be called a situation-sentence. All the rest are either responses or sequence-sentences. They are responses if they begin a new utterance, with change of speaker, and they are sequence-sentences if they continue an utterance, already begun by a situation-sentence or response. We may thus define a sequence-sentence as any sentence which immediately follows a situation-sentence (other than greeting, call, or exclamation), a response-sentence, or another sequence-sentence, without change of speaker.

A corollary of this definition is that a sequence-sentence does not stand alone. Both the name we have given it and the definitions imply that it is part of a sequence, and therefore in some way built into a larger structure. [...]

Sequence-Signals

When we turn to the various devices which link sequence-sentences to the sentences that precede them, we are on surer grammatical ground. It is true that rhetorical matters are operating here as well, but we may distinguish certain formal devices that are clearly grammatical. In fact it is these devices that supply the only clear-cut formal differences between sequence-sentences and situation-sentences. We may recognize 4 main types: (1) substitutes, (2) determiners, function nouns, and function verbs, (3) coordinators, and (4) sentence-modifiers. These may all be grouped together under the gener-

al term sequence-signals, a term which thus covers all elements that function as grammatical links to a preceding sentence. It is a functional term, like modifier or complement, not a formal term, like noun or verb. We have space only for a brief look at each group.

1. Substitutes as Sequence-Signals. The noun-substitutes "he", "she", "it", and "they", the verb-substitute "do", the adjective-substitute "such", and the adverb-substitute "then", "there", "so", "thus", and "that way" are common sequence-signals. In the following examples, the word in the situation sentence and its substitute in the sequence sentence are underlined to show the connection.

Situation-Sentence	Sequence-Sentence
<i>I went to see <u>the doctor</u>.</i>	<i><u>He</u> told me to take a rest.</i>
<i>I don't think John <u>is coming</u>.</i>	<i><u>If he does</u> he will be sorry.</i>

The substitutes *then*, *there*, *so*, *thus*, and *that way* are common not only as adverb-substitutes but as substitutes for larger structures like prepositional phrases, included clauses, or even whole sentences:

<i>He is free <u>in the morning</u>.</i>	<i>You can see him <u>then</u>.</i>
<i>The book is <u>where it belongs</u>.</i>	<i>I put it <u>there</u> myself.</i>

2. Determiners, Function Nouns, and Function Verbs as Sequence-Signals. The noun-determiners "the", "this", and "that", all the words we have classed as function nouns, as well as certain other nouns, may function as sequence-signals. When they do, they act like substitutes in that they refer back to specific words or structures, usually noun-headed, in a preceding sentence.

He has a new job. This job is better than the last. Function verbs become sequence-signals in a similar manner, by referring back to specific full verbs or verb-headed structures in the preceding sentence:

<i>I have already <u>resigned</u>. It was time I <u>should</u>.</i>	<i>The negator "not" may function similarly: <u>He isn't speaking</u> today. At any rate I hope <u>not</u>.</i>
---------------------------------------------------------------------	-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

3. Coordinators as Sequence-Signals. When the coordinators "and", "but", "nor", "or", and "yet" function as sequence-signals, they produce what amounts to a structure of coordination whose constituents are separate sentences. In such a case, there must be a sentence-final intonation contour just before the coordinator; otherwise, we have to do not with two sentences but with a single sentence of the kind customarily called compound. The only distinction between a pair of sentences linked by a coordinator serving as a sequence-signal, on the one hand, and a compound sentence, on the other, is the presence or absence of a sentence-final intonation contour. In written material, this distinction is marked by a period or sometimes a semicolon in the first case and a comma in the second. The compound sentence is thus a reality in both speech and writing, but it has no formal marking other than intonation in the one case and punctuation in the other. Thus, an utterance such as: *The spring has come but the weather is still cold*

can be spoken (and punctuated) either way:
as two sentences:

The spring has come. But the weather is still cold. as
one compound sentence:

The spring has come, but the weather is still cold.

An understanding of this simple grammatical point makes it clear that the errors classed as "comma fault" and "run-on sentence" in the handbooks of grammar are matters of punctuation, not of grammatical structure.

4. Sentence-Modifiers as Sentence-Signals. Three kinds of sentence-modifiers are in common use as sequence-signals: (a) certain adverbs which may at other times also function as modifiers of lesser structures; (b) a group of special sentence-linking function words called "conjunctive adverbs" in the traditional grammar; and (c) various prepositional phrases, many of them stereotyped.

(a) Sentence-modifying adverbs which serve as sequence-signals are rather numerous. The following list is typical but not exhaustive:

accordingly	nearly
afterward(s)	otherwise
also	still
before	then
else	there
further (on)	thereafter
hereafter	thereupon
heretofore	too
later (on)	thus
likewise	

When these function as sequence-signals, they usually come at or near the beginning of the sequence-sentence, and are intonationally set off from the rest of the sentence. [...]

(b) The most important of the sequence-signals called "conjunctive adverbs" are the following:

consequently	hence	moreover	therefore
furthermore	however	nevertheless	

These are properly kept separate from the first group, since their only function is to link sentences. They should, in fact, not be called *adverbs* at all, but should be treated as a separate class of function words and are called by some such name as *sentence-linkers*. [...]

Two sentences linked in sequence by one of these sentence-linkers are often written as one, with a semicolon at the joint between them. This is, however, wholly a convention of the written language. A sentence so written will virtually always be spoken with a sentence-final contour at the semicolon; hence, in speech it must be considered two sentences. The reader may test this by reading the preceding sentence aloud.

(c) Various prepositional phrases, some of them stereotyped, function just like the sentence-linkers. In fact, the stereotyped ones (like the one which begins this sentence) could just as well be classed with the sentence-linkers. Some typical phrases of this sort are:

at least	in contrast	for example
in the next place	in addition	after a while
on the other hand	as a result	

Questions:

1. How does W.N. Francis define sequence-sentence?
2. What is meant by sequence-signals?
3. How does W.N. Francis characterize the main types of sentence-signals: substitutes // determiners // function-nouns, function-verbs // coordinators // sentence-modifiers?

2.

Halliday M.A.K., Hasan R.

Cohesion in English**Cohesion**

The word TEXT is used in linguistics to refer to any passage, spoken or written, of whatever length, that does form a unified whole. We know, as a general rule, whether any specimen of our own language constitutes a TEXT or not. This does not mean there can never be any uncertainty. The distinction between a text and a collection of unrelated sentences is in the last resort a matter of degree, and there may always be instances about which we are uncertain - a point that is probably familiar to most teachers from reading their students' compositions. But this does not invalidate the general observation that we are sensitive to the distinction between what is text and what is not.

This suggests that there are objective factors involved - there must be certain features which are characteristic of texts and not found otherwise; and so there are. We shall attempt to identify these, in order to establish what are the properties of texts in English, and what it is that distinguishes a text from a disconnected sequence of sentences. As always in linguistic description, we shall be discussing things that the native speaker of the language "knows" already - but without knowing that he knows them.

A text may be spoken or written, prose or verse, dialogue or monologue. It may be anything from a single proverb to a whole play, from a momentary cry for help to an all-day discussion on a committee.

A text is a unit of language in use. It is not a grammatical unit, like a clause or a sentence; and it is not defined by its size. A text is sometimes envisaged to be some kind of super-sentence, a grammatical unit that is larger than a sentence but is related to a sentence in the same way that a sentence is related to a clause, a clause to a group and so on: by CONSTITUENCY, the composition of larger units out of smaller ones. But this is misleading. A text is not something that is like a sentence, only bigger; it is something that differs from a sentence in kind.

A text is best regarded as a SEMANTIC unit: a unit not of form but of meaning. Thus it is related to a clause or sentence not by size but by REALIZATION, the coding of one symbolic system in another. A text does not CONSIST OF sentences; it is REALIZED BY, or encoded in, sentences. If we understand it in this way, we shall not expect to find the same kind of STRUCTURAL integration among the parts of a text as we find among the parts of a sentence or clause. The unity of a text is a unity of a different kind.

Texture

The concept of TEXTURE is entirely appropriate to express the property of "being a text". A text has texture, and this is what distinguishes it from something that is not a text. It derives this texture from the fact that it functions as a unity with respect to its environment.

What we are investigating in this book are the resources that English has for creating texture. If a passage of English containing more than one sentence is perceived as a text, there will be certain linguistic features present in that passage which can be identified as contributing to its total unity and giving it texture.

The concept of cohesion is a semantic one; it refers to relations of meaning that exist within the text, and that define it as a text.

Cohesion occurs where the INTERPRETATION of some element in the discourse is dependent on that of another. The one PRESUPPOSES the other, in the sense that it cannot be effectively decoded except by recourse to it. When this happens, a relation of cohesion is set up, and the two elements, the presupposing and the presupposed, are thereby at least potentially integrated into a text.

Cohesion is part of the system of a language. The potential for cohesion lies in the systematic resources of reference, ellipsis and so on that are built into the language itself. The actualization of cohesion in any given instance, however, depends not merely on the selection of some option from within these resources, but also on the presence of some other element which resolves the presupposition that this sets up. It is obvious that the selection of the word *apples* has no cohesive force by itself; a cohesive relation is set up only if the same word, or a word related to it such as *fruit*, has occurred previously. It is less obvious, but equally true, that the word *them* has no cohesive force either unless there is some explicit referent for it within reach. In both instances, the cohesion lies in the relation that is set up between the two.

Like other semantic relations, cohesion is expressed through the stratal organization of language. Language can be explained as a multiple coding system comprising three levels of coding, or "strata": the semantic (meanings), the lexicogrammatical (forms) and the phonological and orthographic (expressions). Meanings are realized (coded) as forms, and forms are realized in turn (re-coded) as expressions. To put this in everyday terminology, meaning is put into wording, and wording into sound or writing:

meaning	(the semantic system)
\ wording	(the lexicogrammatical system, grammar and vocabulary)
\ sounding /	
writing	(the phonological and orthographic systems)

The popular term "wording" refers to lexicogrammatical form, the choice of words and grammatical structures. Within this stratum, there is no hard-and-fast division between vocabulary and grammar; the guiding principle in language is that the more general meanings are expressed through the grammar and the more specific meanings through the vocabulary. Cohesive relations fit into the same overall pattern. Cohesion is expressed partly through the grammar and partly through the vocabulary.

We can refer therefore to GRAMMATICAL COHESION and LEXICAL COHESION. Cohesion is a semantic relation. But, like all components of the semantic system, it is realized through the lex-

icogrammatical system; and it is at this point that the distinction can be drawn. Some forms of cohesion are realized through the grammar and others through the vocabulary.

(PP. 1-6)

Questions:

1. How do the authors define "text"?
2. How do "text" and "sentence" correlate?
3. What proves that text cohesion is a semantic phenomenon?

3.

Dijk T.A. van.

Text and Context. Explorations in the Semantics and Pragmatics of Discourse

Chapter 8. The Pragmatics of Discourse

1. Aims and Problems of Discourse Pragmatics

1.1

In this and the following chapter we are concerned with the pragmatics of discourse, i.e. with the systematic relations between structures of text and context. This means, on the one hand, that we must try to make explicit which specific properties of discourse are determined by the structure of language users, illocutionary acts and information processing in conversation. On the other hand, certain discourse structures, when uttered in conversation, may themselves establish part of the communicative context.

The same distinction as has been made for the semantics will be made at the pragmatic level, viz between LINEAR STRUCTURES and GLOBAL MACRO-STRUCTURES. Whereas the latter will be treated in our last chapter, this chapter will investigate the relations

between the linear, sequential structure of discourse and the linear structure of context, viz between **sequences of sentences and sequences of speech acts**.

The reason for this approach is the following. Relations between propositions or sentences in a discourse cannot exhaustively be described in semantic terms alone. In the first part of this book it has become clear on several occasions that conditions imposed on connectives and connection in general, as well as coherence, topic, focus, perspective and similar notions, also have a pragmatic base. In other words: not only do we want to represent certain facts and relations between facts in some possible world, but at the same time to put such a textual representation to use in the transmission of information about these facts and, hence, in the performance of specific social acts.

1.2

One of the first problems to be treated in such a framework is that pertaining to the differences between **COMPOSITE SENTENCES** and **SEQUENCES OF SENTENCES** in discourse. At the semantic level, we were primarily concerned with relations between propositions, whether these are expressed within the same composite sentence or within several sentences. Although sentences and sequences may be semantically equivalent they may reasonably be expected to have at least different pragmatic functions. Other systematic differences in the use of sentences and sequences are stylistic, rhetorical, cognitive and social, and will not be discussed here. It will be argued that the pragmatic distinction between the expression of information in composite sentences versus the expression of information in a sequence of sentences depends on the intended illocutionary acts, on their internal structure, and on the ordering of such acts.

1.3

The problem of the **DISTRIBUTION OF INFORMATION** in discourse is not only semantic. In processes of communicative interaction this ordering depends on what we know and believe and on our beliefs about the knowledge of our conversation partners. Similarly, the information ordering is subject to our own wishes and intentions for action and our assumptions about those of the hearer.

TOPICS OF CONVERSATION are initiated and changed under these constraints. Information may be more or less "relevant" or "important" with respect to a context thus denned. The same facts may be described from different points of view or under different "prepositional attitudes". It is within such a framework, then, that notions like **PRESUPPOSITION** (e.g. versus **ASSERTION**) and **TOPIC-COMMENT** require further explication, viz as principles of social information processing in conversational contexts.

1.4

Besides these and other pragmatic properties of connection, coherence, information distribution, sentence and clause sequencing, perspective and relative importance in discourse, this chapter must focus on their relevance for the accomplishment of **SEQUENCES OF ILLOCUTIONARY ACTS**. That is, we want to know what necessary or sufficient conditions must be satisfied in order for speech acts to be combined, which acts are "presupposed", focused upon, directly or indirectly intended, and in general how sequences of speech acts are connected and coherent.

2. Sentences and Sequences

2.1

Let us start our inquiry into the pragmatics of discourse with a problem of immediate grammatical importance, viz the difference between **COMPOSITE SENTENCES** and **SEQUENCES OF SENTENCES**. In later sections the more general theoretical background for such a distinction will then be developed. Consider, for instance, the following pairs of examples:

[1] a: *Peter had an accident. He is in hospital.* b: *Peter is in hospital. He had an accident.* [2] a: *Peter had an accident. So, he is in hospital.* b: *Peter had an accident, so he is in hospital.* [3] *Peter is in hospital, for he had an accident.* [4] a: *Because he had an accident, Peter is in hospital.* b: *Peter is in hospital, because he had an accident.*

Apparently, there are various morpho-syntactic ways to express the "same" information about an ordered sequence of facts. In all these examples, reference is made to the fact that Peter had an accident and that Peter is in hospital (now) and that the first fact caused the second fact. In other words, the different expressions are semantically equivalent at least in one sense of semantic equivalence: they have the same truth conditions.

Yet, at another level of analysis the equivalence does not hold. The differences appear both between sentences with distinct syntactic structure and between sentences and sequences.

Taking the last examples first, we see that subordinated causal clauses may either occur in "first" or in "second" position, viz precede or follow the main clause. Sentence [4]a however may be used in a context in which (the speaker assumes that) the hearer knows that Peter had an accident, whereas [4]b is used in a context in which the hearer knows that Peter is in hospital. That is, the APPROPRIATENESS of the respective sentences depends on the knowledge and beliefs of speech participants at a certain point in the conversational context. On the other hand, examples [1-3] are normally used in those contexts in which the speaker has no such assumptions about the knowledge of the hearer, or rather in which he assumes that the hearer does NOT know either of the facts referred to. This means that [1]a-[3] would be inappropriate answers to any of the following previous questions of the hearer:

[5] *Why is Peter in hospital?*

[6] *Where is Peter? They say he had an accident.*

Sentence [4]b, however, is appropriate after question [5], whereas [4]a, although perhaps a bit awkward, is appropriate after [6].

The complex sentence, apparently, has properties which are similar to that of the TOPIC-COMMENT articulation: "known" elements come in first position, "new" elements in second position. Since the known element in this case is a proposition, we may say that the first clauses in [4] are PRAGMATICALLY PRESUPPOSED. Hence, one of the differences between the sequences and the coordinated compound sentences is that relating to the well-known ASSERTION-PRESUPPOSITION distinction: in [1-3] each proposition expressed by the utterance of the sentence or sequence is asserted, whereas in

[4] only the second position propositions are asserted and the first position sentences presupposed (in the pragmatic sense of this term, i.e. assumed by the speaker to be known to the hearer). Yet, there is a difficulty, because we may also maintain that both [4]a and [4]b, taken as a whole, are assertions. [...]

5. Pragmatic Information Processing

5.1

The basic idea of pragmatics is that when we are speaking in certain contexts we also accomplish certain social acts. Our intentions for such actions, as well as the interpretations of intentions of actions of other speech participants, are based however on sets of KNOWLEDGE and BELIEF. Characteristic of communicative contexts is that these sets are different for speaker and hearer, although largely overlapping, and that the knowledge set of the hearer changes during the communication, ideally according to the purposes of the speaker. Trivially, when we make a promise or give advice, we want the hearer to know that we make a promise or give advice. This knowledge is the result of a correct interpretation of the intended illocutionary act. At the same time we want the hearer to know "what" we are asserting, promising or advising, viz what is the case, what we wish to be the case, what is to be done or what we will do, in some possible world (mostly the actual one). By uttering the sentence *John is ill* I may express the propositional concept "that John is ill", and in so doing accomplish a referential act if I denote the fact that John is (now) ill. These, as we saw, fairly complex acts have a social point as soon as I have the intention to demonstrate that I have this particular knowledge about this particular fact. But as long as my observer-hearer also has this knowledge, there is little more than such a demonstration, and nothing changes beyond the fact that my hearer understands that I have some knowledge. My semantic acts acquire a pragmatic function only if I have the additional assumption that the hearer does not possess certain knowledge (about the world, about my internal states) and the purpose to CHANGE the knowledge of my hearer as a consequence of the interpretation of my semantic

(meaning, referential) act, by which I express my knowledge or other internal state. If this purpose is realized I have accomplished a successful COMMUNICATIVE act, that is I have been able to add some propositional INFORMATION to the knowledge of my hearer.

5.2

This picture is well-known. But, as soon as we try to analyse the details of such communicative acts, problems arise. In previous chapters we have already met the difficulty of distinguishing, within the sentence, "old" from "new" information, and topics from comments. In a simple sentence like *John is ill*, with normal intonation, this seems quite straightforward: "John" is or expresses the topic, because the phrase or argument refers to a known referent, whereas "is ill", which has comment-function, refers to an unknown property of John.

Yet, we have assumed that information comes in propositional chunks, so that the new information is indeed "John is ill", or perhaps "a is ill" if John has been referred to earlier in the conversation and if a = John. In any case, the noun phrase *John* not only identifies, and refers to, a specific referent, but at the same time indicates what the sentence, or the discourse, is ABOUT.

Cognitively, this means presumably that part of our knowledge-set, viz the "John"-part, is activated, containing general and accidental knowledge and beliefs about John. The new information "John is ill (now)" may then be added to our actual knowledge about John.

If this epistemic change takes place according to the purposes of the speaker and through the interpretation of his utterance, we say that this change is a consequence of the basic pragmatic act of an ASSERTION.

Somewhat more complicated is the situation with composite sentences, e.g. *Because John is ill, he won't come tonight*. The question is: does this WHOLE sentence, when uttered in an appropriate context, count also as an assertion, or only the second clause? In the latter case: what act is performed by the utterance of the first clause? If above we assumed for such sentences that the proposition underlying the first clause is "pragmatically presupposed" by the utterance of the sentence, we thereby meant that the proposition is already in the knowledge set of the hearer, at least according to the beliefs of the speaker. It follows that, following our characterization of asser-

tion given above, no assertion needs to be made in order to inform the hearer about this fact. The fact that the proposition is nevertheless expressed in the given example must therefore have another pragmatic function. Much in the same way as we say that a topic indicates what an assertion is about, a subordinate clause may "point" to the existing knowledge into which new information must be integrated. And in the same way the expression of such a first proposition counts as reference to a known "object", viz some fact in some possible world. "About" this fact, so to speak, we then may say that it caused another fact, which was unknown to the hearer. Hence we need an assertion to inform the hearer about this fact. Similarly, we also need an assertion to inform him that this second fact (*John won't come tonight*) is a consequence of the first fact (*John is ill*).

At this point of our argument we may choose two roads. Either we say that in our example TWO new facts are made known and hence TWO assertions are necessary, possibly making one composite assertion, or we say that we make known two new facts, possibly constituting one "compound" fact, by ONE assertion.

As a working hypothesis we take the second road: the utterance of a complex sentence of this kind is ONE assertion. If not, we would need assertions for each new information of a clause. The sentence *Peter kissed a girl*, when uttered, would under an atomic propositional analysis, constitute several assertions: that Peter kissed someone, that the someone is a girl, that the kissing took place in a past world, etc. Of course, such propositions may be expressed, and hence be asserted separately. If we heavily stress the noun phrase *a girl*, we assume the other atomic propositions known but not that "the one whom Peter kissed is a girl". Similarly, we take "*p* causes *q*" as a proposition denoting one fact, viz that two facts are in a certain relation, which requires one assertion. In other words: by interpreting ONE assertion we may nevertheless acquire knowledge about *several* facts in the world, because a proposition may entail other propositions.

The question is whether our one-sentence = one-assertion approach is also satisfactory for compound sentences, e.g., *John was ill, so he went to bed*. Unlike the example with the subordinate and pragmatically presupposed clause, there is no propositional information present in the knowledge of the hearer in order to link the second

part of the sentence. In fact, he did not yet know that John was ill, so he cannot even appropriately interpret the second clause without knowledge of the first clause. We therefore are inclined to consider the utterance of the first clause as a proper assertion. Once this knowledge has been acquired (and the related topics, e.g. John, or illness), a second assertion can be made with respect to this knowledge, viz that the first fact had a certain consequence. Unlike the atomic propositions mentioned above, the first proposition here is what we may call "world-determining". It determines the set of worlds in which the second proposition of the compound sentence is to be interpreted. [...] It may therefore be concluded that for compound sentences of this type, we have ONE COMPOUND ASSERTION. The assertion is compound because it consists of (at least) two assertions which are both essential for the main assertion: the first must necessarily be made in order to be able to make the second (... *caused him to go to bed*), because the required knowledge is not available in the hearer's memory.

5.3

Whereas an assertion, as we have defined it, is an illocutionary act, PRESUPPOSITION or "presupposing" does not seem to be an act because there is no intended communicative change operated in the hearer due to an "act of presupposing", which is rather a mental act, viz an assumption about the knowledge of the hearer. Of course, such an assumption may be EXPRESSED by various linguistic means. But as such assuming knowledge about a fact is not much different, pragmatically, from assuming knowledge of an object. In that sense, "presupposing" would be if anything a part of a prepositional act or SEMANTIC ACT. Of course, we could give a more or less pragmatic turn to this reasoning, by saying that the knowledge of speakers and hearers is involved. And we would make it an "illocutionary" act, if the speaker intends to act in such a way that the hearer knows that the speaker has some information, but in that case it falls together with the act of assertion. As opposed to proper pragmatic (illocutionary) acts, presupposing, as an assumed act, does not have any obvious purposes defined in term of consequences of changes brought about in the hearer (as distinct from those of assertions).

According to this argument we can no longer speak of a presupposition-assertion articulation of sentences or utterances. First of all, presupposing, if an act at all, is semantic, whereas an assertion is a pragmatic act. Secondly, the act of assertion is based on the sentence as a whole, not only on the "new"-information part of the sentence.

Yet, such a binary articulation of sentences seems useful if we keep the distinction between old and new information. In that case we need another term for the introduction of new information, viz the term INTRODUCTION itself, whereas presupposing is the act of reference to known objects and facts. The act of introduction, similarly, may pertain to new objects, new properties of old objects, and to new facts. In general the presupposition-introduction distinction is also grammatically expressed or else to be inferred from existing information, e.g. from previous sentences in a discourse. The illocutionary act of assertion, then, is the pragmatic instruction to use this semantic information for epistemic change, such that a set of presupposed propositions is expanded with a set of introduced propositions.

It should be emphasized that these proposals are merely tentative for the moment, and intended to underline some pragmatic difficulties involved in the usual presupposition-assertion distinction (if assertion is taken here as an illocutionary act).

5.4

This discussion about semantic and pragmatic information processing is also relevant for a further analysis of our earlier difficulties with different speech acts (or not) within the same composite sentence. Take for example the following sentence:

[54] *I'll send you a postcard this summer, because I am going to Italy.*

Superficially speaking we could say that by uttering this sentence we accomplish first a promise and then an assertion. Note, however, that the sentence is ambiguous. Due to its initial position, the main clause may express a presupposed proposition (I may just have made a promise with the same content). In that case, the subordinate clause in final position expresses the introduced proposition, providing the

reason of my (known) future action. This makes the utterance of the sentence an explanatory assertion. The second reading arises when the first proposition is not presupposed, but simply an announcement about future action, also followed by an explanatory assertion of this future action. Both propositions are introduced in that case. The same would hold for a third reading in which the contextual conditions for a promise are satisfied (a certain obligation of the speaker with respect to the hearer). This is possible only, however, if the specific content of the promise is introduced in the sentence. In other words: presupposed elements of a sentence cannot as such "carry" a speech act. Trivially: promising to do *A* is senseless if the hearer *i* already knows that I will do *A*. But as soon as a promise is involved, I no longer have a "mere" assertion. We have a promise with the propositional base "to send a postcard because I will be in Italy", much the same way as the promise "to send a postcard from Italy". As for the conditional promises, we could say that the domain of validity of the promise is restricted: if unexpectedly my trip to Italy is cancelled I am no longer committed to my promise.

Note, incidentally, that there are cases of complex or compound sentences which convey COMPOSITE SPEECH ACTS, viz in the cases where not the facts are related, but a fact with a speech act, <, two speech acts:

[55] *I'll send you a postcard this summer, because I know that I'm going to Italy.*

[56] *I'll send you a postcard this summer, because I know that you like postcards.*

In these cases, the second clause expresses an explanatory assertion for the promising act, accomplished by the utterance of the first clause: they express necessary conditions for appropriate promising. On the other hand, if we add *I promise that* to [54], the because-clause does not express a cause of my promising (or only when it entails "I know that"). Similarly, we may have *When I am in Italy, I'll send you a postcard*, but not *When I know that I'm going to Italy, I'll send you a postcard*, whereas *When I know that I'm going to Italy, I (can) promise you to send a postcard* is again acceptable.

(pp. 205-206, 219-222)

Questions:

1. What is the basic idea of pragmatics?
2. What is the difference between complex sentences and sequences?
3. What is the difference between assertion and presupposition?
4. What is a composite speech act?
5. In what way does prepositional analysis help reveal discourse connectedness? What role does pragmatic information play in text cohesion?

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Test 1

The Morphemic Structure of the Word

I. Define the following notions:

system, paradigm, signeme, morpheme, complementary distribution, erne-term.

II. Do the morphemic analysis of the words on the lines of the distributional classification:

condense, grouse, formalizer, manliness, she-goat, cranberry, gentlemanly, agreeablenesses, exclude, resist.

III. Pair off the words which stand to one another in non-contrastive distribution:

burned, spelled, go, intelligible, spelt, went, discussing, spelling, discussed, profitable, gullible, formulae, discussion, non-advisable, burner, profited, gullable, burnt, formulas.

IV. Build up allomorphic sets:

fifty, spiteful, brethren, trout, pins, ability, goose, nuclei, pailful, tempi, foxes, paths, able, full, phenomena, fits, fifteen, mice, pathfinder, five, bought, geese, age, buys, brother.

Test 2

Grammatical Categories of the Noun

I. Dwell on the numerical features of the nouns:

1. The board of advisers have been discussing the agenda of the next meeting for an hour already.
2. Sonata is not played by an orchestra.
3. It was a tragedy that he died before he could enjoy the fruits of all his hard work.
4. The measles is infectious.
5. Sea-wasp is poisonous.
6. He bought another pair of scales.
7. The tropics are not pleasant to live in.
8. They produced a number of steels.
9. The machinery was due to arrive in March.
10. She dropped tear after tear but he didn't raise his head.
11. This was more like home. Yet the strangenesses were unaccountable.

II. Define the language means used to mark the gender distinctions of the nouns:

1. The tom-cat was sleeping on the window-sill.
2. Australia and her people invoke everyone's interest.
3. Next week we are going to speak about the continent of Australia: its climate and nature.
4. The tale says that the Mouse was courageous, he never let down his friends when they were in danger.
5. Something is wrong with my car, I can't start her.
6. I saw a car left on the beach; its windows were broken.
7. They have got five cows and a bull, two cocks and three dozen hens, a drake and ten ducks.
8. His new yacht is very expensive; he paid about a million dollars for her.
9. A woman-doctor was to operate on the patient.
10. A he-goat is more difficult to tame than a she-goat.

III. Arrange the phrases into

two columns according to the type of their casual semantics (on the principle of differentiating between possession and qualification) and use the proper articles with them:

officer's cap, young man's thesis, tomorrow's important press-conference, mile's distance, Wilde's last epigram, yesterday's unexpected storm, hour's walk, last poem of Shelley, new children's shop, two weeks' journey, day's work, in ... two months' period, nice children's caps, new women's magazine, boys who played yesterday in the yard's toys, three hours' walk.

IV. Open the brackets and account for the choice of the casual form of the noun:

1. [The plane + safety] was not proved.
2. [For + convenience + sake] he decided to travel light.
3. [Birds + killing] is barbarous.
4. [Delegation + arrival] was unexpected.
5. No one managed to swim [five miles + distance] in such nasty weather.
6. [Bride + bridegroom + their relatives] luggage was so bulky that they had to hire another car.
7. [Boy + Smith] broke a leg.
8. You'd better go to [nearest + greengrocer].

V. Account for the use of the articles:

1. The dog was tamed by man a long time ago.
2. He felt pity as he knew that living with him didn't give her pleasure. It would have been a surprise to hear that she felt attached to him.
3. A group of boys were playing volleyball.
4. The woman who teaches us Italian now is not a teacher.
5. The theatre showed us a new Oscar Wilde, not the great Wilde, but a man in despair, full of doubts.
6. It was better to have a sulky Arthur than no Arthur at all.
7. She was no woman, she was servant.
8. Hollowquay was a has-been if there ever was. Developed first as a fishing village and then further developed as an English Riviera - and now a mere summer resort, crowded in August.

I. Point out the classificational features of the adjectives and adverbs:Test 3. Adjective and Adverb **Test 3****Adjective and Adverb**

1. Her maternal instinct never betrayed her.
2. They were of the same age but he treated her with paternal gentleness.
3. The Russians are believed to be a very inventive people.
4. The boy's parents are sure that his intellectual potential is great but so far he hasn't shown any signs of an extremely intelligent child.
5. They are discussing now if the land of the country should be common or private property.
6. In our private talk he told me about his decision to give up composing music for our theatre.
7. The 17th century was the golden age of Dutch painting.
8. Everyone admired her golden hair.

II. Open the brackets using the forms of degrees of comparison:

1. It is much (pleasant) to go bathing in bright weather than on a rainy day.
2. I'm sure he is the (true) friend I have.
3. He felt even (unhappy) after what he had heard.
4. It is (true) to say that Australian English is (little) influenced by American than British English.
5. It was the (glad) day of her life.
6. She closed the door (hastily) than I had expected.
7. The (much) you read the (soon) you enlarge your vocabulary.
8. The boy's ambition was to become a pilot and fly (high) and (fast) of all.
9. Many suggested that we should go (far) into the forest.
10. The patient breathed (hard).

III. Intensify the expressiveness of the utterances:

1. You have been kind to me, I appreciate this.
2. His position in the firm is better now than before.
3. If you try to press him, the situation will not be easier for you.
4. Davy was the more talented of the two brothers.

5. Of the two brothers, Nick behaves the more wisely.
6. Her Italian is now better than before.

IV. Translate the word combinations into English using Adjective + Noun or Noun + Noun patterns where possible:

- a) зубная боль, зубной врач, зубной согласный;
- b) железная воля, железная дорога, железный век;
- c) золотая рыбка, золотая валюта, золотая середина, золотое сердце, золотое шитье, золотые волосы, золотой песок, золотой шанс, золотая корона, золотая свадьба, золотая молодежь, золотой трюфель, золотые прииски, золотые пляжи;
- d) женская одежда, женская школа, женская походка, существительное женского рода, женское (феминистское) движение, женские руки, женская литература;
- e) смертный приговор, смертная казнь, смертный час, смертное существо, смертельная рана, смертельный враг, смертельный яд, мертвые, смертельная болезнь, смертный грех, умирающий, смертельное оружие, похоронный марш, Мертвое море, смертельно обиженный, смертельная схватка, смертельная опасность, бес смертный, детская смертность, смертельная доза наркотика.

Test 4

Verbals

I. Define the modal meanings of the infinitive in the following sentences:

1. There's no reason why it should have anything to do with her personally (Christie).
2. She looked at Tommy. "And I wonder why?" Tommy had no solution to offer (Christie).
3. If you are puzzled over the cause of a patient's death there is only one sure way to tell (Christie).
4. "I gather that in the last war you had rather a delicate assignment." "Oh, I wouldn't put it quite as seriously as that," said Tommy, in his most non-committal manner. "Oh no, I quite realize that it's not a thing to be talked about." (Christie)
5. "First I'm going to have lunch at my club with Dr. Murray who rang me up last night, and who's got something to say to me about my late deceased aunt's affairs..." (Christie)

II. Point out participle I, gerund and verbal noun in the following sentences:

1. In the soul of the minister a struggle awoke. From wanting to reach the ears of Kate Swift, and through his sermons to delve into her soul, he began to want also to look again at the figure lying white and quiet in the bed (Anderson).
2. That was where our fishing began (Hemingway).
3. But she didn't hear him for the beating of her heart (Hemingway).
4. Henry Marston's trembling became a shaking; it would be pleasant if this were the end and nothing more need be done, he thought, and with a certain hope he sat down on a stool. But it is seldom really the end, and after a while, as he became too exhausted to care, the shaking stopped and he was better (Fitzgerald).
5. Going downstairs, looking as alert and self-possessed as any other officer of the bank, he spoke to two clients he knew, and set his face grimly toward noon (Fitzgerald).
6. He was not by any means an imbecile: he was devoted to the theatre; he read old and new plays all the time; and he had a flair for confessing

earnestly that he was a religious man, and frequently found peace by kneeling in prayer (Saroyan).

7. She was delighted with his having performed for her alone, with his having had her seat removed from the gallery and placed in his dressing room, with the roses he had bought for her, and with being so near to him (Saroyan).
8. Something essential had been absent from his voice when he had made the remark, for the girl replied by saying she wished she had taken home-making and cooking at Briarcliff instead of English, math, and zoology (Saroyan).
9. I just wondered how a painter makes a living (Saroyan).
10. I've been painting seriously, as the saying is, since I was fifteen or so (Saroyan).

III. Account for the use of the Complex Subject and Complex Object constructions:

1. He heard a woman say in French that it would not astonish her if that commenced to let fall the bombs (Fitzgerald).
2. Over her shoulder, Michael saw a man come toward them to cut in (Fitzgerald).
3. It did the trick for Thomas Wolfe as long as he lived, and for a lot of others, too, but exuberance seems to stop when a man gets past his middle thirties, or the man himself stops (Saroyan).
4. He had expected the man to look like a giant, and to act something like one, but the old writer had looked like a bewildered child... (Saroyan).
5. All cocktail parties are alike in that the idea is to drink and talk, but every party is made special and unique by the combinations of people who happen to be at them (Saroyan).

Test 5

Syntagmatic Connections of Words

I. Define the classificational properties of the following word-groupings:

1. the eyes flashed,
2. a long row,
3. was a fool,
4. absolutely ruthless,
5. frank, loyal, and disinterested,
6. can't call,
7. out of,
8. I suppose,
9. reference being made,
10. considerably damaged.

II. Define the types of syntactical relations between the constituents of the following word combinations:

1. saw him,
2. these pearls,
3. insanely jealous.

III. Paraphrase the following circumlocutions using word combinations of the pattern Adj + N:

1. insects with four wings,
2. youths with long hair,
3. a substance that sticks easily,
4. a colour that is slightly red,
5. manners typical of apes,
6. a chain covered with gold leaf,
7. publications that appear regularly every year,
8. relations like those between brothers,
9. behaviour typical of men,
10. a colour like that of a human body.

Test 6

Constituent Structure of Simple Sentence

I. State the structural type of the sentences:

1. "And what is *your* opinion of me?" "Hard as nails, absolutely ruthless, a born intriguer, and as self-centered as they make 'em." (Maugham)
2. "A woman like me is ageless." (Maugham)
3. "Glaser, play the accompaniment." (Maugham)
4. What a strange woman! (Maugham)
5. "You've rung the wrong bell. Second floor." (Maugham)
6. "How are you, my dear? Keeping well, I hope." (Maugham)
7. "I should have preferred to see you alone, Albert." (Maugham)
8. "We get on very well together, don't we, old girl?" "Not so bad." (Maugham)
9. "You're not serious?" "Quite." (Maugham)
10. "I think you must be out of your mind." "Do you, my dear? Fancy that." (Maugham)

II. Define the type of the subject and the predicate of the following sentences:

1. The door was opened by a scraggy girl of fifteen with long legs and a tousled head (Maugham).
2. "We've been married for 35 years, my dear. It's too long." (Maugham)
3. I should merely have sent for the doctor (Maugham).
4. Mrs. Albert Forrester began to be discouraged (Maugham).
5. "Who is Corrinne?" "It's my name. My mother was half French." "That explains a great deal." (Maugham)
6. I could never hope to please the masses (Maugham).
7. The coincidence was extraordinary (Maugham).
8. Why should the devil have all the best tunes? (Maugham)
9. No one yet has explored its potentialities (Maugham).
10. I'm fearfully late (Maugham).

III. Build the IC-model of the sentences:

1. The hand of fate was beckoning to her (Maugham).
2. The little houses held about them the feeling of a bygone age (Maugham).

Test 7

Actual Division of the Sentence. Communicative Sentence Types

I. Analyze the actual division of the following sentences and the means used to mark it:

1. "Albert, there's Mrs. Forrester to see you." (Maugham)
2. "Both in prose and verse you are absolutely first class." (Maugham)
3. On the wizened face of Oscar Charles was a whimsical look (Maugham).
4. She must leave no stones unturned (Maugham).
5. It was latish in the afternoon next day when Albert Forrester... set out from her flat in order to get a bus from the Marble Arch... (Maugham).
6. "I've always taken care to make you share in all my interests." (Maugham)
7. "Well, my dear, what have you to say to me?" (Maugham)
8. And a very nice cosy place it is (Maugham).
9. "Often at your parties I've had an almost irresistible impulse to take off all my clothes just to see what would happen." (Maugham)
10. "What I say is, Albert's worked long enough." (Maugham)

II. Define the communicative sentence type and speech-act characteristics of the given sentences, dwell on the actual division patterns used in them:

1. "You'd better put on your coat, Albert." (Maugham)
2. "What on earth do you mean by that?" (Maugham)
3. Why don't you write a good thrilling detective story? (Maugham)
4. "But you must play fair with your reader, my dear." (Maugham)
5. "I will submit to your decision. But you think over the detective story." (Maugham)
6. "I suppose /was asked?" he barked. "Well, in point of fact you weren't." (Maugham)
7. "Were you bored, dear?" "Stiff." (Maugham)

Test 8

Paradigmatic Aspect of the Sentence

I. Define the predicative load of the sentences:

1. I can't describe it properly (Priestley).
2. You might have noticed it earlier (Chesterton).
3. Shouldn't she have thought about it then? (Chesterton)
4. I can't begin to understand it now (Chesterton).
5. I hadn't met a soul all afternoon (Priestley)

II. Build up the constructional paradigm based on the two primary sentences:

1. The man stopped. He dropped something.
2. They stopped. They were talking in whisper.
3. She was cross. I broke the window.
4. He knew. They were in Rome.
5. They passed the exams. Mother heard it. She was glad.

III. Form sentences with greater predicative load taking as the basis the following kernel sentences:

1. He wrote a poem.
2. I saw him at once.
3. He made a mistake.
4. They described the man in detail.
5. He saw them off.

Test 9

Composite Sentence

Define the types of clauses and semi-clauses in the following sentences:

1. When he gained the crest of the Magazine Hill he halted and looked along the river towards Dublin, the lights of which burned redly and hospitably in the cold night (Joyce).
2. He remembered her outburst of that night and interpreted it in a harsher sense than he had ever done (Joyce).
3. It was a long white stocking, but there was a little weight in the toe (Lawrence).
4. Whiston had made the fire burn, so he came to look for her (Lawrence).
5. She slowly, abstractedly, as if she did not know anyone was there, closed the door in his face, continuing to look at the addresses on her letters (Lawrence).
6. She hung her arms round his neck as he crouched there, and clung to him (Lawrence).
7. She remained clinging round his neck, so that she was lifted off her feet (Lawrence).
8. He would be miserable all the day if he went without (a kiss) (Lawrence).
9. She was self-conscious, and quite brilliantly winsome, when the baker came, wondering if he would notice (Lawrence).
10. Thinking that to be known as La Falterona was grander than any title, she did not use his name (to which indeed she had no right, since after divorcing him she had married somebody else); but her silver, her cutlery, and her dinner-service were heavily decorated with a coat of arms and a crown, and her servants invariably addressed her as *madame la princesse* (Maugham).

Test 10

I. Define the classificational features of the following word-groupings:

1. husband and wife.»
2. oddly affected,
3. seemed fitting,
4. outskirts of the moor,
5. stopped the car,
6. in order to,
7. to intentionally interrupt,
8. green larches,
9. towards the valley,
10. rather gruesome.

II. State the structural type of the sentences, define the type of the subject and the predicate in them:

1. "How about a little more houseorgan oratory about money being power?" (Fitzgerald)
2. It's a fine time (Fitzgerald).
3. "Don't try to whip yourself up into a temper." (Fitzgerald)
4. "But there's something wanting, isn't there?" Ashurst nodded. Wanting? The apple tree, the singing, and the gold! (Galsworthy)
5. "I say, what d'you suppose happens to us?" "Go out like flames." (Galsworthy)
6. "Well, you ought to sleep, you know." "Yes, I ought to, but I can't." (Hemingway)
7. "Sit down a bit." (Galsworthy)
8. Her quick, straight handshake tightened suddenly (Galsworthy).
9. The whole thing was like a pleasurable dream (Galsworthy).
10. His arms were seized (Galsworthy).

III. Build up the IC-model of the sentences:

1. Mile's own room was simply furnished.
2. His dark eyes deliberately avoided my face.

IV. Analyze the actual division pattern of the sentences and the language means used to mark the theme and the rheme:

1. And in this manner did Wee Willie Winkie enter into his manhood (Kipling).

2. There's something happened to the Colonel's son! (Kipling) "What mischief have you been getting into now?" (Kipling) He lost his good-conduct badge for christening the Commissioner's wife "Fobs" (Kipling).
3. These long-forgotten years - how precious did they now seem to Tom (Lawrence).
4. There was no other way of managing the child (Kipling). "How do you find the Brangwens?" "A peculiar couple." (Lawrence) Copy had permitted him to witness the miraculous operation of shaving (Kipling).
5. Sudden and swift was the punishment - deprivation of the good-conduct badge and, most sorrowful of all, two days' confinement of barracks (Kipling). Maria was delighted to see the children so merry (Joyce).

V. Define the communicative sentence type, speech act characteristics and the actual division pattern of the following sentences:

1. "Aren't you going to play whist?" (Lawrence) "Tell me what's a matter, Elsie," he said (Lawrence). "Don't be cruel to me." (Lawrence)
2. "I don't want you to say anything about it." (Lawrence) "Then I'm not stopping here," he said. "Are you coming with me?" (Lawrence)
3. "I wonder where they did dig her up," said Kathleen to Miss Healy (Joyce).
"Would you like to come and spend a few days with us?" "Willingly." (Maugham)
"I think you'd better *meet prima donna*" I said at last (Maugham).
"Do you think I have the time to acknowledge all the books twopenny-halfpenny authors send me?" (Maugham)

VI. Define the predicative load of the sentences:

1. It wouldn't have hurt to give it him (Maugham).
2. Why didn't you remind me? (Maugham)
3. I was just being made use of (Maugham).
4. Have I ever told you about Benjy Riesenbaum and the pearls? (Maugham)

VII. Give the constructional paradigm based on the two primary sentences:

He was furious. They kept him waiting. Mary crossed the street. She saw her creditor.

VIII. Form sentences with greater predicative load taking as the basis the following kernel sentences:

1. I tore the string of pearls off my neck (Maugham).
2. I drew myself up to my full height (Maugham).
3. We had a row on the boat (Maugham).

IX. Define the types of the clauses making up the following sentences:

1. As her invitation was so pressing, and observing that Carrie wished to go, we promised we would visit her the next Saturday week (Grossmith, Grossmith).
2. Lupin, whose back was towards me, did not hear me come in. (Grossmith, Grossmith).
3. I rather disapprove of his wearing a check suit on a Sunday, and I think he ought to have gone to church this morning (Grossmith, Grossmith).
4. It irritated the youth that his elder brother should be made something of a hero by the women, just because he didn't live at home and was a lace-designer and almost a gentleman (Lawrence).
5. But Alfred was something of a Prometheus Bound, so the women loved him (Lawrence).
6. She hated him in a despair that shattered her and broke her down, so that she suffered sheer dissolution like a corpse, and was unconscious of everything save the horrible sickness of dissolution that was taking place within her, body and soul (Lawrence).
7. Strange as my circumstances were, the terms of this debate are as old and commonplace as man (Stevenson).
8. Then, as the endless moment was broken by the maid's terrified little cry, he pushed through the portieres into the next room (Fitzgerald).
9. La Falterona watched him scornfully as he groveled on the floor (Maugham).
10. In fact it is he who had bought her the luxurious little villa in which we were now sitting (Maugham).

Test 11

Revision Tasks

I. Account for the recipient's reaction and say why some sentences may seem ambiguous:

1. Sergeant: "Who likes moving pictures?"
(Most of the men eagerly step forward.)
"All right, you fellows carry the pictures from the basement to the attic."
2. - What has four legs and flies?
- I don't know.
- Your dinner table.
3. An angler was staying at an inn situated close to a river which provided good fishing, and desirous of getting some bait, he said to the servant-maid:
"I say, girl, can I get a horse-fly round here?" The girl looked wooden. "Have you ever seen a horse-fly in these parts?" "No, sir, but I once saw a cow jump over a fence."
4. Mother: "Jimmie, run over and see how old Mrs. Smith is this morning."
Jimmie (returning): "She said to tell you it was none of your business."
Mother: "Why Jimmie, what in the world did you ask her?" Jimmie: "Just what you told me to. I said you wanted to know how old she was."
5. A lady had just bought a postage stamp.
"Must I stick it on myself?"
"Positively not, Madame. It will accomplish more if you stick it on the envelope."
6. "My secretary spells atrociously."
"She must be pretty good. I can't spell that."

7. "Is a chicken big enough to eat when it's 2 weeks old?"
"Of course, not!"
"Then how does it manage to live?"
8. "Have you ever seen a man-eating tiger?"
"No, but I've seen a man eating herring."
9. "In this place you can eat dirt-cheap."
"But who wants to eat dirt?"
10. "I love you still," said the quiet husband to the chattering wife.

II. Fill in the blanks with the proper substitutes chosen from the given string:

"I'd like to see an overcoat," said a customer.
"Why, certainly," the salesman replied. "We've got a lot of fine _____ .
What _____ would you like?"
"The warm _____ ."
The salesman took a _____ from a hanger and said: "Just feel the fabric. Try _____ on. You have never worn _____ like _____ in all your life."
The customer got into the coat. _____ was much too large. He took _____ off and handed _____ back to the salesman. _____ coat saying: "See how this The salesman handed him fits."
The man put the coat on. _____ was a fair fit.
"There's your _____," the salesman said.
"How much?" asked the customer.
"Thirty-nine seventy-five," the salesman said. "And _____ is a real buy. You can see for yourself. You go right ahead and see if you can find _____ overcoat like _____ in town."
ones, it, that, another, coat, kind, one, anything.

III. Use the appropriate form of the verb opening the brackets:

A Night in the Inn
(after Ch. Dickens)

When the dinner (to clear away) Mr. Pickwick (to conduct) through a multitude of windings and stairs to his room.
"This is your room, Sir," said the maid and (to bid) Mr. Pickwick good night left him alone.

Mr. Pickwick began to undress, when he recollected that he (to leave) his watch on the table downstairs. Now this watch was a special favourite with Mr. Pickwick, (to carry) about for a great number of years. The possibility (to go) to sleep unless it (to tick) under his pillow (to enter) Mr. Pickwick's brain. So as it was pretty late, and he was unwilling to ring the bell at that hour of the night, he put on his coat and walked quietly downstairs.

The more stairs Mr. Pickwick went down the more there (to seem, to be, to descend). Passage after passage did he explore; room after room (to peep) into. At last, just as he was on the point of (to give up) the search in despair he opened the door of a room and seeing his missing property on the table seized it in triumph.

If his progress downstairs (to be) difficult, his journey back was far more perplexing. A dozen times did he softly turn the handle of some bedroom door, which resembled his own, when a cry from within of "What do you want here?" caused him to steal away on tiptoe. He was on the verge of despair, when an open door (to attract) his attention. He peeped in - right at last. There were the two beds, which he perfectly (to remember), and the fire still (to burn) in the grate.

Carefully (to draw) the curtains of his bed Mr. Pickwick took off his coat and waistcoat and slowly (to draw) on his nightcap tied the strings under his chin. He was about to continue the process of undressing when he suddenly (to stop) by a most unexpected interruption, the entrance into the room of some person with a candle.

Who could it be? A robber? Some person who (to see) him (to come) upstairs, with a watch in his hand, perhaps. What was he to do?

(To keep) the curtains carefully closed with his hand so that nothing more of him could (to see) than his face and nightcap and (to put) on his spectacles, he looked out.

Mr. Pickwick almost fainted with horror. (To stand) before the looking-glass, was a middle-aged lady (to brush) her hair.

"I never met with anything so awful as this," thought poor Mr. Pickwick. "By the self-possession of that lady, it's clear to me that I must (to come) into the wrong room."

He hid behind the curtains and called out very loudly.

"Ha-hum."

"What's that!" said the middle-aged lady.

"It's - it's - only a gentleman, Ma'am," said Mr. Pickwick from behind the curtains.

"A gentleman!" cried the lady.

"Ma'am," said Mr. Pickwick, (to thrust) out his head. "Ma'am!" -

The lady was already near the door but the sudden appearance of Mr. Pickwick's night-cap (to drive) her into the remotest corner of the room where she (to stand, to stare) wildly at Mr. Pickwick, while Mr. Pickwick in his turn, stared wildly at her.

"What do you want here?" said the lady (to cover) her eyes with her hand.

"Nothing, Ma'am - nothing whatever," said Mr. Pickwick earnestly. "It is evident to me, Ma'am, now, that I (to mistake) this bedroom for my own."

"If this improbable story (to be) true, Sir," said the lady, "you (to leave) it instantly."

"I will, Ma'am, with the greatest pleasure," replied Mr. Pickwick. "I am very sorry, Ma'am, (to be) the innocent occasion of this alarm and emotion."

The lady pointed to the door.

"I am deeply sorry, Ma'am," continued Mr. Pickwick (to bow) very low.

"If you (to be), Sir, you at once (to leave) the room," said the lady.

"Immediately, Ma'am; this instant, Ma'am," said Mr. Pickwick, (to open) the door and (to drop) both his shoes with a loud crash.

"I trust, Ma'am," resumed Mr. Pickwick, (to gather up) his shoes, and (to turn round) (to bow) again. "I trust, Ma'am," but before Mr. Pickwick could finish the sentence, the lady (to thrust) him into the passage and (to lock) the door behind him.

- IV. To maintain the atmosphere of growing fear culminating with uncontrollable terror, the given extract creates, complete the unfinished sentences so as to express either hypothesis or supposition. Account for the choice of the forms used.**

The Accursed House

(after E. Gaboriau)

The Vicomte de B. was peacefully enjoying an income of 30,000 livres yearly, when unfortunately for him, his uncle died, leaving him all his wealth. But for his uncle's death, he ... (to go in for business).

The Vicomte learned that he was the owner of a house in the Rue de la Victoire. He learned also, that the building, bought for 300,000 francs, now brought in 82,000 francs a year.

"Too much, too much," thought the generous Vicomte. "My uncle was too hard. I will begin to lower my rents and my tenants will bless me."

With this excellent purpose the Vicomte sent at once for the concierge of the building.

"Bernard, my friend," said the Vicomte, "go at once and notify all your tenants that I lower their rents by one-third."

That unheard-of word "lower" fell like a brick on Bernard's head. But he quickly recovered himself; he had heard badly: he had not understood.

"Low ... er the rents!" said he. "Monsieur de Vicomte likes to joke. Monsieur, of course, means to raise the rents? If the lodgers ... (to learn of it), what ... (to think of Monsieur)? What people ... (to say in the neighbourhood)?"

"I was never more serious in my life, my friend," the Vicomte interrupted, "and I prefer, when I give an order, to be obeyed without reply. You hear me - go!"

Staggering as if he ... (to be a drunken man), Bernard went out of the house. All his ideas were upset, overthrown. Maybe he was the plaything of a dream, a ridiculous nightmare? Was he himself or something else? "Lower the rents!" repeated he. "It is not to be believed. If indeed the lodgers ... (to complain); on the contrary, they are all good payers. Ah, if his uncle ... (only to know), he ... (to rise from the tomb)! His nephew behaves as if he ... (to go mad)! This young man will finish badly! Who knows - after this - what he will do next? He lunched too well, perhaps, this morning." And Bernard was so pale and excited with emotion, that on seeing him enter, his wife exclaimed "Goodness! What has happened to you now?" "Absolutely nothing," said he.

"You're deceiving me, you are concealing something from me," said Madame Bernard. "Don't spare me; speak; I am strong - what did the new owner tell you? Does he think of turning us out?"

"If it... (to be) only that! But just think, he ordered me to notify all the tenants that - he lowered their rents by one-third!" She too was thunder-struck.

Next morning, Bernard, putting on his best coat, made the rounds of the 23 flats to announce his great news. Ten minutes later the house was in a commotion impossible to describe. "Why had the owner lowered his rents? What motives has this strange man?" they all wondered. For, certainly, he ... (to have grave reasons) for a step like this! An intelligent man, a man of good sense, ... (to never deprive himself) of good revenues for the simple pleasure of depriving himself. One ... (not to conduct himself) thus without being forced to by powerful or terrible circumstances. And each said to himself: "There is something behind all this! But what?"

Every tenant looked as if he ... (to try to solve) an impossible cipher.

"This man ... (to commit a crime); remorse pushes him to philanthropy," thought one of them. "The house, perhaps, was badly built?" questioned another anxiously. "Maybe it was the roof?" suggested a tenant on the fifth floor and the gentleman on the first floor was inclined to believe that the owner intended to set fire to the house with the sole object of getting great sums from the insurance companies. From disquietude it had come to fright; from fright it quickly passed to terror. So, that the gentleman of the first floor

who had valuables in his rooms, made up his mind to go, and sent in notice by his clerk. Next day a tenant of the second floor imitated the gentleman beneath him. From that moment it was a general rout. By the end of the week, everybody had given notice. Everyone awaited some terrible catastrophe. They slept no more. They organized patrols. Bernard was no more than the ghost of himself; fear had turned him into a shadow. Meanwhile 23 "To let" placards appeared on the facade of the house.

Soon everybody left. From top to bottom, from foundations to garret, the house was empty of lodgers. The rats, themselves, finding nothing to live on, left it also. Only the concierge remained, grey-green with fear, in his room. At last, one morning, after a terrible nightmare, Bernard, too, took a great resolution. He went to the owner, gave up his keys and went away.

And now on the Rue de la Victoire stands the abandoned house "The Accursed House." Dust thickens upon the closed doors and windows, grass grows in the court. And in the quarter, where stands the Accursed House, so funereal is its reputation, that even the neighbouring houses on either side of it have also depreciated in value. Lower one's rent! Who ... (to think of such a thing)??!

V. Comment upon the grammatical features of the forms ending in "-ing".

Tit for Tat

An American lady, travelling in England some years ago, got into a smoking compartment where an Englishman was smoking a pipe. For a short time she sat quietly expecting the Englishman would stop smoking. Then she began to cough and sneeze, trying to show him that she objected to his smoking. At last seeing that the man took no notice of her and did not put out his pipe she said:

"If you were a gentleman you would stop smoking when a lady got into the carriage."

"If you were a lady," replied the Englishman, "you wouldn't get into a smoking-carriage."

"If you were my husband," said the American lady angrily, "I would give you poison." The Englishman looked at her for a moment or two. "Well," he said at last, "if I were your husband, I wouldn't refrain from taking it."

VI. Fill in the blank spaces with appropriate words which constitute the lexical paradigm of nomination based on the stems "agree" and "disagree".

- Jim thinks that Betty is a ... person.
- Why?

- Because she never ... with him. Whatever he suggests she is all against it, he says.
- Perhaps Jim's idea of an ... person is a person who ... with him.

"A gentleman is a man who can ... without being

VII. Group the italicized nouns according to their numerical differential properties.

At Bertram's Hotel

It just is old England! And *the people* who stay there! *People* you'd never come across anywhere else. Wonderful old Duchesses. They serve all the old English dishes, there's a marvelous old-fashioned beef-steak *pudding!* You've never tasted anything like it; and great sirloins of *beef and* saddles of *mutton*, and an old-fashioned English *tea* and a wonderful English *breakfast*. And of course all the usual things as well. And it's wonderfully comfortable. And warm. Great *long fires*.

"I suppose," said Luscombe, "that the *restoration* was quite expensive?"

"Oh, yes. The place has got to look Edwardian, but it's got to have the modern *comforts* that we take for granted in these days. Our old dears - if you will forgive me referring to them as that - have got to feel that nothing has changed since the turn of the century, and our travelling clients have got to feel they can have period *surroundings*, still have what they are used to having at home, and can't really live without!"

"Bit difficult sometimes?" suggested Luscombe.

"Not really. Take central *heating* for instance. Americans require - need, I should say - at least ten degrees Fahrenheit higher than English people do. We actually have two quite different sets of bedrooms. The English we put in one lot, the Americans in the other. The rooms all look alike, but they are full of actual differences - electric razors, and showers as well as tubs in some of the bathrooms, and if you want an American breakfast, it's there - *cereals* and iced orange *juice* and all - or if you prefer you can have the English breakfast."

"Eggs and bacon!"

"As you say - but a good deal more than that if you want it. *Kippers, kidneys and bacon, cold grouse, York ham, Oxford marmalade.*"

"I must remember all that tomorrow morning. Don't get that sort of thing any more at home."

Humfries smiled.

"Most *gentlemen* only ask for *eggs and bacon*. They've - well, they've got out of way of thinking about the thing there used to be." ☞*

VIII. In response to the husband's remark build up a sentence making use of the following phrases:

"Why do you feed every tramp who comes along? They never do any work for you," said the husband angrily. "No," said the wife, "but..."

- | | |
|--------------------------|-------------------------------------|
| 1) to be a satisfaction; | |
| 2) to see a man; | 3) to eat a meal; |
| | 4) to find faults with the cooking. |

IX. Build up a stimulating remark with seven predicative centres making use of the following language units:

"I ...," explained a lady to an applicant for a post in the household. "You are looking for a husband, ma'am, not for a servant!" said the seeker for work.

- | | |
|-------------------------------------|------------------------|
| 1) to want a man; | 5) to be always ready; |
| 2) to do odd jobs around the house; | 6) to do; |
| 3) to run errands; | 7) to bid. |
| 4) to never answer back; | |

Glossary of Linguistic Terms

5)

<i>Entry</i>	<i>Definition</i>	<i>Equivalent terms</i>
absolute generalization	the highest degree of generalization working on the level of notions <i>Cf.: relative generalization</i>	absolute abstraction
Actant	semantic entities representing participants in a situation defined by their abstract semantic function - the function of Agent, Patient, Experiencer, Beneficent, Instrument, etc. (L. Tesniere, A. Greimas)	semantic role
to actualize	to realize, to embody; to make a language element part of evolving speech	
adjunct	1. a qualifying word, phase, etc., depending on a particular member of a sentence; 2. a secondary word in a junction (O. Jespersen) <i>Cf.: subjunct</i>	a dependent unit
adnex	a secondary word in a nexus (O. Jespersen)	
Agent (as a semantic role)	the person or other being that instigates the happening denoted by the verb, e.g.: <i>Jenny has written me a letter.</i>	
allomorph	a concrete manifestation of a morpheme, a variant, an alternative of a morpheme	
allo-term	a variant language unit actualized in a concrete speech string <i>Cf.: erne-term</i>	
aspective grammatical meanings	differential grammatical meanings describing the inner character of the verbal process in terms of its beginning, duration, iteration, termination, intermination, or its instantaneous, supercompleted, undercompleted character, etc.	categorial aspective meanings
aspective semantics	semantics describing the inner characteristics of the verbal process; it can be expressed lexically or grammatically	
Beneficent (as a semantic role)	a person or other being for whose sake an action is performed	

<i>Entry</i>	<i>Definition</i>	<i>Equivalent terms</i>
binding	syntactical relationship of clauses of different ranks (of an independent and a dependent clause) <i>Cf.: linking</i>	
bound morpheme	a morpheme that cannot form a word by itself <i>Cf. : a free morpheme</i>	
case	a nounal category showing the relation of the referent to some other referent	
cleft sentence	a construction in which a simple sentence is divided into two clauses so as to give prominence to a particular language unit and the information it carries, e.g.: // <i>was the players who/that objected to the delay.</i>	
collocation	a habitual association between particular words, such as "to" with "fro", the uses of "to" after "answer" and before "me" in "You'll answer to me!"	
comment	something said about (predicated of) the topic <i>Cf: topic</i>	focus
common gender nouns	nouns able to actualize either masculine or feminine gender properties of the referent depending on the context	
complement	an obligatory dependent language unit <i>Cf: supplement</i>	
complementary distribution	relation of formally different morphs having the same function in different environments, e.g.: cows - oxen <i>Cf: contrastive distribution, non-contrastive distribution</i>	
complementive verb	a verb taking an obligatory adjunct, a verb having an obligatory valency <i>Cf: uncomplementive verbs</i>	
componential analysis	an approach which makes use of semantic components. It seeks to deal with sense relations by means of a single set of constructs. Lexical items are analyzed in	compositional analysis

<i>Entry</i>	<i>Definition</i>	<i>Equivalent terms</i>
	terms of semantic features or sense components, treated as binary opposites distinguished by pluses and minuses: [+ male]/ [- male]. It has been argued that projection rules can combine the semantic features of individual words to generate the meaning of an entire sentence and to account for ambiguity and anomaly (e.g.: <i>*He painted the walls with silent paint</i>).	
conceptual domain	information centred around some concept	
concord	the relationship between units in such matters as number, person, and gender. The two related units should both be singular or both plural, feminine or masculine, etc. <i>Cf.: government</i>	agreement
consecutive phrase	a phrase based on logical domination of one member over another <i>Cf.: cumulative phrase</i>	
contextualization	establishing the context in which language units are typically used, i.e. finding out who, when, where, why and what for one can be expected to use this or that language unit with a certain meaning (J.R. Firth)	
continuous morpheme	an uninterrupted string of phonemes building up a morpheme <i>Cf: discontinuous morpheme</i>	uninterrupted morpheme
continuum	a set of language units interpolated between any two polar units made up by units having intermediary features; a space of transition between poles	
contrastive distribution	relations of different morphs in the identical environment <i>Cf: non-contrastive distribution, complementary distribution</i>	
coordinative phrase	a phrase based on coordination and consisting of elements of equal rank <i>Cf.: cumulative phrase</i>	

<i>Entry</i>	<i>Definition</i>	<i>Equivalent terms</i>
corteme	a unit of language having no semantic content, e.g. phoneme (M. Blokh) <i>Cf.: signeme</i>	
Counteragent	entity (or force) against which the Agent acts	
covert morpheme	an implicit morpheme, i.e. a morpheme having no explicit representation in the actual expression <i>Cf.: overt morpheme</i>	zero morpheme
cumulative phrase	a phrase whose elements are not equal in their rank <i>Cf.: coordinative phrase, consecutive phrase</i>	
deep structure	the formal syntactical construction represented by dummy symbols replaced by lexical entities in ways determined by their feature content <i>Cf.: surface structure</i>	
derivational	referring to the formation of language units	
derivational suffix	a suffix which may be followed by other suffixes (W.N. Francis) <i>Cf.: inflectional suffix</i>	
"descriptive" plural	the plural form of the noun having a pronounced stylistic colouring due to the usage of the uncountable noun in the function of the countable noun, e.g.: <i>sands, snows</i>	
diachronic	dealing with study of language changes over a period of time <i>Cf.: synchronic</i>	historical
dichotomy	division into two parts or categories	
dicteme	an elementary topical unit fulfilling the functions of nomination, predication, topicalization, stylization (M. Blokh)	~ supra-sentential construction
differential feature	distinctive feature of a categorial form	distinguishing feature

<i>Entry</i>	<i>Definition</i>	<i>Equivalent terms</i>
discontinuous morpheme	a morpheme built up of an interrupted string of phonemes, e.g.: <i>be ... -en</i> <i>Cf.: continuous morpheme</i>	
distribution	the contextual environment of a language unit <i>Cf.: contrastive, non-contrastive, complementary distribution</i>	
dominational phrase	a phrase based on the relationship of the modifier and the modified <i>Cf.: equipotent phrase</i>	subordinative phrase
elementary unit	a unit indivisible into minor constituents	minimal element, smallest unit
erne-term	a generalized invariant language unit <i>Cf.: allo-term</i>	
epistemic modality	modality expressing the degree of commitment the speaker has to the truth of the proposition expressed in the utterance. It ranges from uncertainty through possibility to probability	
equipollent opposition	an opposition whose members have different positive categorial features <i>Cf.: privative opposition, gradual opposition</i>	
equipotent phrase	a phrase based on logical succession of elements having an equal rank <i>Cf.: dominational phrase</i>	
etymon	the earliest traceable form from which a later word is derived	
Experiencer	the person enduring a certain state, e.g.: <i>He wants to eat.</i>	
extensional semantics	an approach which is concerned with establishing the character of the correspondence between a sign-function and a given state of the world <i>Cf.: intensional semantics</i>	
finite verb	a verb explicitly expressing predication on the basis of the categories of tense and mood, verb of complete predication <i>Cf.: non-finite form of the verb</i>	predicate verb

<i>Entry</i>	<i>Definition</i>	<i>Equivalent terms</i>
formative phrase	a phrase consisting both of notional and functional verbs <i>Cf.: notional phrase, functional phrase</i>	
function	special purpose of a unit, its ability to serve a certain aim; sometimes equivalent to some abstract syntactic meaning	
functional part of speech	a part of speech having a partial nominative value <i>Cf.: notional part of speech</i>	form word
Generative Grammar	a grammar which precisely specifies the membership of the sets of all the grammatical sentences in the language in question and therefore excludes all the ungrammatical sentences. It takes the form of a set of rules that specify the structure, interpretation, and pronunciation of sentences that native speakers of the language are considered to accept as belonging to the language	
genitive case	a term in grammar marking possession and analogous relations in the case system of Latin and other inflected languages	possessive case
Goal	entity towards which an action is directed, e.g.: <i>He gives a book to Jean.</i>	Addressee, Dative
government	a kind of concord in which one term controls or selects the form of the partner <i>Cf.: concord</i>	
gradual opposition	an opposition whose members are characterized by the expression of a certain degree of one and the same categorial feature <i>Cf.: privative opposition, equipollent opposition</i>	
half-gerund	a form having mixed, participial and gerundial, features	participial gerund
heterogeneous	differing in kind; having dissimilar or incongruous elements <i>Cf.: homogeneous</i>	dissimilar

<i>Entry</i>	<i>Definition</i>	<i>Equivalent terms</i>
hierarchy	organization of elements based on ranking	
homogeneous	of the same kind or nature; essentially alike; uniform in structure; composed of parts all of the same kind <i>Cf.: heterogeneous</i>	similar
icon	a highly motivated sign, visually (or acoustically) resembling what it represents (a photograph, hologram, onomatopoeia) (Ch.S. Peirce) <i>Cf.: symbol, index, sign</i>	
identification	the act of singling out a referent <i>Cf.: classification</i>	individualization
idiom	an expression unique to a language, esp. one whose sense is not predictable from the meaning and arrangement of its elements, e.g.: "kick the bucket" (= to die) <i>Cf.: free word combination</i>	
illocutionary act	an utterance which has a certain conventional force, e.g.: informing, ordering, warning, undertaking, etc. <i>Cf.: locutionary act, perlocutionary act</i>	
immanent category	a category expressing the inherent features of a part of speech (M. Blokh) <i>Cf.: reflective category</i>	inherent category
immediate constituents	constituent elements immediately entering into any meaningful combination	
implication <i>implicit, implied (deriv.)</i>	information which is not given explicit verbal expression to, but which is entailed by some other elements of the context <i>Cf.: explication, verbalization</i>	
inchoative meaning	a kind of aspective meaning consisting in the indication of an action which is shown as just starting, e.g.: <i>Let 's get going.</i>	Ingressive
index	a partially motivated sign (to the extent that there is a connection, usually of	

Entry	Definition	Equivalent terms
	causality, between sign and referent, e.g.: smoke is indexical of fire) (Ch.S. Peirce) <i>Cf.: symbol, icon, sign</i>	
indicative verbal forms	verbal forms expressing the categorial meanings of the indicative mood and describing the denoted action in terms of absolute time <i>Cf.: subjunctive forms, oblique verb forms</i>	mood forms of reality
infix	an affix inserted into the root (sta-n-d: stood) <i>Cf.: prefix, suffix, root</i>	
inflectional suffix	a suffix which must always come at the end of the morpheme groups to which they belong <i>Cf.: derivational suffix</i>	grammatical suffix
instrument (as a semantic role)	the physical stimulus of the action, e.g.: <i>to strike with a knife</i>	
intensional semantics	a branch of semantic studies concerned with the analysis of the content (i.e. meaning) of a given expression, but not the relations of signs to the objects of the real world <i>Cf.: extensional semantics</i>	
intralinguistic	concerning relations of units within a particular language system <i>Cf.: extralinguistic</i>	internal
irrealis	semantic category the differential meaning of which is denotation of imagined, projected or otherwise unreal situations <i>Cf.: "realis"</i>	
junction	relationship of two elements which is so close that they may be considered to be one composite name for what might in many cases just as well have been called by a single name (O. Jespersen) <i>Cf.: nexus</i>	
lexeme	word taken as an invariant unity of form and meaning	

Entry	Definition	Equivalent terms
lexical paradigm of nomination	an interclass system of four-stage derivative part of speech correlative constituents, reflecting regular part of speech correlations in the notional part of the lexicon (M. Blokh)	derivational paradigm of nomination
limitive verb	a verb expressing a potential limit in the development of the denoted action <i>Cf.: non-limitive verb</i>	terminative verb
linking	syntactic relationship of clauses of the same rank (either both independent or both dependent) <i>Cf.: binding</i>	
locutionary act	uttering of a certain sentence with a certain sense and reference (J. Austin) <i>Cf.: illocutionary act, perlocutionary act</i>	
loose sentence-groups	sentences in which no element can be considered as the leading (or main) element (E. Kruisinga)	~ coordinate sentence
mental paradigm	systemic principles of analysis	
modality	the way in which proposition is modified in terms of reality/non-reality (possibility, necessity, desire, obligation, belief, hope, hypothesis, etc.). It shows the relation of the nominative content to reality (M. Blokh) <i>Cf.: predication</i>	
mononomination	naming a single referent <i>Cf.: poly nomination</i>	
morph	a repeated segment of phonemic string; a combination of phonemes that has a meaning which cannot be subdivided into smaller meaningful units (W.N. Francis) <i>Cf.: allomorph, morpheme</i>	
morpheme	the smallest meaningful part of a word expressing a generalized, significative meaning. It's a group of allomorphs that are semantically similar and in complementary distribution <i>Cf.: morph, allomorph</i>	

<i>Entry</i>	<i>Definition</i>	<i>Equivalent terms</i>
morphophoneme	1. a phoneme in semasiologo-morphological function (Z. Harris); 2. Н.С. Трубецкой: «сложный образ двух или нескольких фонем, способных замещать друг друга в пределах одной и той же морфемы в зависимости от условий морфологической структуры (напр., морфофонема к/ч в комплексе рук - ч: рука - ручной)»	
narrative	the telling of stories	narration
neutralization	a type of oppositional reduction by which a neutralized language unit becomes fully functionally identified with its counter-member <i>Cf.: transposition</i>	
nexus	a predicative (and semi-predicative) relation between words (O. Jespersen) <i>Cf.: junction</i>	
nomination	naming a referent <i>Cf.: predication</i>	
non-contrastive distribution	relations of different morphs having the same function in the identical environments, e.g.: <i>learned- learnt</i> <i>Cf.: contrastive distribution, complementary distribution</i>	
non-limitive verb	verb not expressing a potential limit in the development of the denoted action <i>Cf.: limit ive verbs</i>	unlimitive verb, non-terminative verb, durative, cursive
non-personal verb	a verb which doesn't agree with a subject, the doer of the denoted action <i>Cf.: personal verbs</i>	impersonal verb
notional part of speech	a part of speech of full nominative value <i>Cf.: functional part of speech</i>	
nucleus (of a morphological construction)	a root or a combination of roots including possible non-roots, attributive to respective roots <i>Cf.: root, stem, affix</i>	

<i>Entry</i>	<i>Definition</i>	<i>Equivalent terms</i>
Object (as a semantic role)	entity (thing) which is relocated or changed; whose existence is at the focus of attention, e.g.: <i>to break the window</i> . Sometimes O. is identified with patient, .e. entity which is the victim of some action: <i>to kill a fox</i> .	
objectivity	the ability of a verb to take an object of any kind <i>Cf.: transitivity</i>	
objective verb	a verb taking an object of any kind (Direct, indirect, prepositional) <i>Cf.: transitive verbs</i>	
oblique verbal form	the form of a verb which expresses the categorial meanings of irrealty <i>Cf.: indicative verbal form</i>	non-real mood form of a verb, Subjunctive
opposition	correlation of categorial forms having a certain function	
oppositional reduction	the process of curtailing an opposition of categorial forms <i>Cf.: neutralization, transposition</i>	oppositional substitution
overt morpheme	an explicit morpheme, not zeroed <i>Cf.: covert morpheme</i>	
paradigmatic	referring to language system on the basis of invariant-variant relations, connected on a non-linear basis <i>Cf.: syntagmatic</i>	systemic
part of speech	a class of words distinguished by a particular set of lexico-grammatical features	
Participant (as a semantic role)	a person acting together with the Agent, but who is somehow "overshadowed" by him: <i>You have me to ride with</i> . <i>Cf.: Agent</i>	
particle	a functional part of speech which actualizes limiting and specifying meanings	
persona] verb	a verb which agrees with a subject denoting the doer of the action <i>Cf.: non-personal verb, impersonal verb</i>	

Entry	Definition	Equivalent terms
phoneme	the smallest constituent of a word having no meaning but fulfilling the function of differentiating morphemes	
phatic communion	language used more for the purpose of establishing an atmosphere of maintaining social contact than for exchanging information or ideas: in speech, informal comments on weather, or an enquiry about health at the beginning of a conversation (B. Malinowski, 1923)	
phraseme	a combination of two or more words as a representative of the corresponding language level	phrase, word-group, word-grouping, syntactic syntagma
Pluralia Tantum nouns	nouns having only the plural form <i>Cf.: Singularia Tantum nouns</i>	absolute plural nouns
pragmatic factor	a factor relevant for the actualization of a message in a concrete communicative situation	
predicate calculus	the logical calculus in which the expressions include predicate letters, variables and quantifiers, names and operation letters, as well as expressions for truth functions and the prepositional variables of the prepositional calculus	
predication	the act of referring the nominative content of the sentence to reality (M. Blokh) <i>Cf.: nomination</i>	
prefix	a term in word-formation for an affix added at the beginning of a word or base to form a new word, e.g.: re-write <i>Cf.: suffix, root</i>	
prepared sentence/clause	a clause introduced by connectives <i>Cf.: unprepared sentence/clause</i>	
presupposition	a proposition whose truth is necessary for either the truth or the falsity of another statement. It stays intact under negation and modal operators, e.g.: <i>John is divorced</i>	

Entry	Definition	equivalent terms
	(presupposition: <i>John was married</i>) - <i>John is not divorced</i> (presupposition: <i>John is married</i>) <i>Cf.: assertion</i>	
primary predication	predication expressed in a sentence which has as its predicate a finite form of the verb <i>Cf.: secondary predication, potential predication</i>	complete predication, explicit predication, actual predication
privative opposition	an opposition based on the principle of presence/absence in its counter-members of one and the same feature <i>Cf.: gradual opposition, equipollent opposition</i>	
proposeme	a language unit expressing a thought	~ sentence
proposition	the content of a declarative sentence, that which is proposed, or stated, denied, questioned, etc., capable of truth and falsity	judgment
prepositional acts	acts of referring and predicating (J.R. Searle)	
to qualify	1. to ascribe qualities to smth., to characterize; 2. to limit	to describe to modify
ranking clause	a nonembedded clause (M.A.K. Halliday) <i>Cf.: embedded clause</i>	
reference	1. mentioning someone or something, either directly or indirectly; 2. (<i>logic, ling.</i>) the activity or condition through which one term or concept is related to another or to objects in the world <i>Cf.: sense (2)</i>	
referent	the denoted object of the world <i>Cf.: sign</i>	
reflective category	a category expressing categorial meanings which are not inherent in the referent in question, e.g.: person and number in the verb system (M. Blokh) <i>Cf.: immanent category</i>	secondary category, non-inherent category

<i>Entry</i>	<i>Definition</i>	<i>Equivalent terms</i>
relative generalization	relative degree of abstraction, working on the level of broad or general concepts <i>Cf.: absolute generalization</i>	abstraction
relevant	pertinent, applicable, bearing on the issue in question	
"repetition" plural •	a specific plural form of the noun which acquires a pronounced stylistic marking due to the repetition of the noun in the singular, e.g.: <i>He smoked cigarette after cigarette.</i>	
replacive morpheme	a morpheme built up on the basis of root (or vowel) interchange; usually a root vowel that replaces another in a categorical form, e.g.: <i>sing - sang</i> <i>Cf.: additive morpheme</i>	
representamen	the type to which a coding convention assigns a certain content by means of certain interpretants; type-expressions conventionally correlated to a type-content by a given culture, irrespective of the fact that they can be used in order to communicate effectively something to somebody (Ch.S. Peirce) <i>Cf.: interpretant, sign</i>	
Result (as a semantic role)	entity that emerges due to some action, e.g.: <i>She has written a <u>letter</u>.</i>	Factitive (Ch. Fillmore)
retrospective coordination	establishing relation between the given action and some prior action or moment	
root	the element left after all affixes have been removed from a complex word, carrying the basic lexical meaning of the word <i>Cf.: nucleus, stem, affix</i>	
secondary predication	predication expressed by potentially predicative complexes with non-finite forms of the verb and verbal nouns <i>Cf.: primary predication</i>	potential predication, incomplete/partial predication, implicit predication, semi-predication

<i>Entry</i>	<i>Definition</i>	<i>I</i>	<i>Equivalent terms</i>
segmental morpheme	a morpheme made up by phonemes <i>Cf.: suprasegmental morpheme</i>		
semantic feature	(in componential analysis) an elementary component of meaning. Their aggregation makes up the integral meaning of a language unit		
semantics	the study of meaning of words and sentences, their denotations, connotations, implications, and ambiguities		
semes	meanings differentiated by the opposition of signemic units		semantic feature
sememe	a generalized element of meaning		lexico-semantic variant
semi-notional words	words which have a complete nominative meaning but fulfil syntactic functions typical of functional words. <i>Cf.: notional words, functional words</i>		
semi-predicative construction	a construction made up by a non-finite form of the verb and a substantive element denoting the subject or object of the action expressed by the non-finite form of the verb <i>Cf.: fully predicative construction</i>		potentially predicative construction, propositional construction
semi-proper nouns	proper nouns with mixed, identifying and typifying, meanings		semi-names
sense	1. = meaning; 2. paradigmatic (intensional) meaning. <i>Cf.: reference</i> ; 3. actual meaning of a language unit; 4. a submeaning, e.g.: <i>various senses of the word "mark"</i>		
sign	a material designator of a meaning, a concrete token element used in the concrete process of communication and reference. <i>Cf.: symbol, icon, index, representamen, interpretant</i>		

<i>Entry</i>	<i>Definition</i>	<i>Equivalent terms</i>
sineme	a unit of language having a semantic content, e.g.: morpheme, word (M. Blokh) <i>Cf.: cor t eme</i>	
significative	suggestive of a meaning	
signifie	meaning	
Singularia Tantum nouns	nouns having only the singular form <i>Cf.: Pluralia Tantum nouns</i>	absolute singular nouns
Source (as a semantic role)	smth. which gives rise/origin to another entity, cause of some action, e.g.: <u>He</u> sells books.	
stem	a term in grammar and word-formation for a root plus the element that fits it into the flow of speech <i>Cf.: root, nucleus, affix</i>	
structure	1. the set of relations between the elements of a system; 2. construction	
stylization	the function of a dicteme which consists in referring it to a particular style (M. Blokh)	
subjunct	a tertiary word in a junction (O. Jespersen) <i>Cf.: adjunct (2)</i>	
substance	1. the essence or material part; 2. the essence which underlies all phenomena; 3. that which is real; 4. that which has qualities and characteristics	
substantive	a noun	
suffix	an affix added at the end of a word, base, or root to form a new word or form of the word <i>Cf.: prefix, infix, root</i>	
supplement	a non-obligatory adjunct <i>Cf.: complement</i>	optional adjunct

<i>Entry</i>	<i>Definition</i>	<i>Equivalent terms</i>
suppletivity	the formation of word-forms from different roots <i>Cf.: affixation, inner inflection, outer inflection</i>	
suprasegmental unit	an element accompanying the realization of utterances and expressing different modificational meanings, such as accent, intonation contours, pauses, patterns of word-order <i>Cf.: segmental unit/morpheme</i>	
surface structure	the resultant syntactic construction derived through transformations of the deep structure <i>Cf.: deep structure</i>	
symbol	1. smth. that represents smth. else, smth. concrete or material used to represent smth., abstract or non-material; 2. the most arbitrary kind of sign: the word in language, the rose representing love in literature, etc. (Ch.S. Peirce) <i>Cf.: icon, index, sign</i>	
synchronic	referring to a certain stage in the development of a phenomenon; coexistent <i>Cf.: diachronic</i>	
syntagma (syntactic)	a word-group consisting of two or more notional elements	word combination, phrase
syntagmatic	connected on a linear basis <i>Cf.: paradigmatic</i>	
system	a structured set of elements connected by a common function	
topic	something about which something is said (predicated) <i>Cf.: comment</i>	
topicalization	1. process whereby knowledge of certain things/individuals is "foregrounded", i.e. taken from long-term memory stores to some working memory, in which the established information may be combined with the incoming new information (T.A. van Dijk);	

<i>Entry</i>	<i>Definition</i>	<i>Equivalent terms</i>
	2. the formation of the informative content of text (M. Blokh)	thematization
transformation	transition from one syntactic pattern to another syntactic pattern with the preservation of its notional parts	
Transformational-Generative Grammar	a type of generative grammar, first introduced by N. Chomsky ("Three Models for the Description of Language", 1956). It holds that some rules are transformational, i.e. they change one structure into another according to such prescribed conventions as moving, inserting, deleting, and replacing items. It stipulates two levels of syntactic structure: deep structure (an abstract underlying structure that incorporates all the syntactic information required for the interpretation of a given sentence) and surface structure (a structure that incorporates all the syntactic features of a sentence required to convert the sentence into a spoken or written version)	
transitivity	the ability of a verb to take a direct object <i>Cf.: objectivity</i>	
transposition	the use of a language element in the contextual conditions typical of its • oppositional counter-member by which it fulfils two functions simultaneously <i>Cf.: neutralization</i>	
unit	a constituent of a system	element
utterance acts	uttering words and sentences (J.R. Searle)	
valency	the ability of a language unit to take an adjunct, potential combinability of a language unit	
verbal	a non-finite form of the verb <i>Cf.: finite verb</i>	verbid

Glossary of Pragmalinguistic Terms

<i>Entry</i>	<i>Definition</i>
alerter	an opening element preceding the actual request (i.e., term of address, attention getter, endearment term, offensive term, etc.)
appealer	an element used by a speaker when he wishes to appeal to the hearer's benevolent understanding. It functions to elicit a hearer's signal, and occurs in a syntactically final position, and may signal turn-availability (e.g.: Will you? O'key? Aren't we?)
beneficiary	the one who benefits from the performing of the act required by the speaker
cajoler	conventionalized speech item whose semantic content is of little transparent relevance to the discourse meaning. It commonly doesn't enter into syntactical structures, but is interspersed to increase, establish, or restore harmony between interlocutors, which may be endangered through the request, etc. (e.g.: You know,...)
coerciveness	imperative force
cognitive load	(= locution, proposition) the literal content of a sentence, the situation denoted
commitment indicator	an upgrader serving to indicate the speaker's heightened degree of commitment (involvement) vis-a-vis the state of affairs referred to in the proposition (e.g.: I'm sure, certainly, etc.)
communicative competence	an ability to employ speech acts to achieve the desired communicative end
communicative risk	a potential breakdown in communication, a failure to achieve the desired communicative result
conventionality thesis	thesis formulated by J. Searle, according to which certain forms tend to become conventionally established as the standard idiomatic forms for indirect speech acts
cultural transposition	transfer of native speech categories to the target language
directness	the degree to which the speaker's illocutionary intent is apparent from the locution. In this sense it is a pragmalinguistic category which leads itself to psycholinguistic validation. It is related, but by no means coexistent, with politeness

<i>Entry</i>	<i>Definition</i>
downtoner	a sentential or prepositional modifier which is used by a speaker in order to modulate the impact his speech act is likely to have on the hearer (e.g.: possibly, perhaps)
hedge	an internal modifier used by the speaker to avoid a precise prepositional specification and, consequently, the potential provocation of such precision (e.g.: somehow, kind (sort) of)
illocutionary point	the purpose of communication, or of a particular speech act; the speaker's intent = illocutionary intent
indirectness	an intended exploitation of a gap between the speaker's meaning and the utterance's meaning: the hearer identifies an utterance as a hint. As a result of this belief he assigns the speaker some hidden intention
intensifier	an upgrader used to intensify elements of the proposition (e.g.: a <u>terrible/frightful</u> man)
interactional style	a method (or a complex of methods) employed by the speaker to achieve a particular illocutionary point and characterizing him this or that way
interactive constraints	fundamental concerns influencing the choice of strategies in a message. They are: 1. appropriateness: "be polite"; 2. efficiency (effectiveness): "be clear, direct"; 3. concern for minimizing imposition; 4. concern for avoiding negative evaluation by the hearer; 5. likelihood of use (of a strategy within a specific request situation)
internal modifiers	elements within the utterance proper, the presence of which is not essential for the utterance to be potentially understood as, for example, a request. They serve as indicating devices used to signal pragmatic force, and as socio-pragmatic devices meant to affect the social impact the utterance is likely to have (downgraders and upgraders)
interpersonal end	the purpose of maintaining relationship between the speaker and the hearer
locution	aspect of an utterance which consists in its cognitive load

<i>Entry</i>	<i>Definition</i>
locution derivable	(= obligation statement) the illocutionary intent which is directly derivable from the semantics of the locution
locutionary force	the act of speaking, the form and content of the utterance
negative politeness	(=deference politeness, concern for minimizing imposition) the degree to which an utterance avoids imposing on the hearer's freedom of actions; means of protecting the hearer's negative face
performative	a verb that characterizes the relationship between the speaker and the addressee explicating the illocutionary force of the utterance
performative structure	a structure that involves the speaker's attempts to get the hearer to perform some action by virtue of the hearer having recognized that such an attempt is being made
perlocutionary force	the effect of the utterance on the addressee
politeness marker	an internal modifier added to a request to bid for cooperative behaviour (e.g.: you know, please, etc.)
politeness theory	pragmatic theory formulated by G. Leech, according to which the speaker may be willing to save the hearer's face by means of a polite and tactful behaviour in a context of a face-threatening request
pragmatic error/deficit	failure to convey or comprehend the intended illocutionary force or politeness value
pragmatic opacity	(= indirectness) lack of transparency specifically and intentionally employed by the speaker to convey a meaning which differs, in some way, from the utterance meaning
pragmatic transfer	transfer of native procedures and lingual means of speech act performance to interlanguage communication
Principle of cooperation	"make your conversational contribution such as required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged" (Grice)
- of manner	"be clear, brief, avoid obscurity" (Grice)
- of quality	"speak only the truth" (Grice)
- of relevance	"speak to the point" (Grice)
- of politeness	"save the addressee's face, be polite" (Grice)

<i>Entry</i>	<i>Definition</i>
- of effective means	(= rationality principle) "Given a desired end, one is to choose that action which most effectively, and at least cost, attains that end" (Kosher)
prepositional content	the cognitive content of an utterance (= locution); one of the components, alongside of the pragmatic component, of the semantics of an utterance
sentence meaning	standard interpretation assigned by a particular lingual structure only
sociopragmatics	sociological interface of pragmatics that studies the ways in which pragmatic performance is subjected to specific social conditions
sociopragmatic factor	a factor determining the specific character of communication: age, sex, relative status of the interlocutors, situational constraints, degree of familiarity, etc.
sociopragmatic failure	the error learners commit when they assess the relevant situational factors as the basis of their native sociopragmatic norms
speech act	a form of interpersonal communication which is distinguished by a specific communicative intention of the speaker and its own linguistic markers
subjectivizers	elements by which the speaker explicitly expresses his subjective opinion vis-a-vis the state of affairs referred to in the proposition, thus lowering the assertiveness of the request (e.g.: I'm afraid, I wonder, I think)
supportive move	a unit external to the request which modifies its impact by either aggravating or mitigating its force
understater	an internal modifier by means of which the speaker underrepresents the state of affairs denoted in the proposition (a bit, a little)
upgrader	an element which functions to increase the impact of a request: intensifier, commitment indicator, expletive, time intensifier, lexical uptoner, determination marker, repetition of request, orthographical (supersegmental) emphasis, emphatic addition
utterance meaning	meaning rendered in a specific context by having the hearer recognize the intention of the speaker
want statement	a statement which contains the expression of the speaker's volition, desire

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